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 Sample Page 2 - Muammar Qaddafi Rise to Power in Libya

Sample Page 2 - Muammar Gaddafi Rise to Power in Libya - Libyan Revolution 1969-1972  - CIA, State Department, National Security Council and White House Files

First Page Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger to President Richard Nixon, March 20, 1970

Washington, April 16, 1970

16 April 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT :The [text not declassified] Libyan Operation and F-5 Aircraft

1. The United States has contracted to deliver 8 F-5 aircraft; the commitment predates the September revolution. The matter of the U.S. Government honoring its agreement with Libya has assumed a political significance that obviously transcends the military value of the aircraft.

2. I hosted a lunch on 15 April for Ambassador David Newsom and Deputy Assistant Secretary Rodger P. Davies; the latter represented Joe Sisco. David Blee and Archie Roosevelt completed the Agency side of this meeting.

3. The purpose of the meeting was to expose State more fully to the thinking underlying the "Option 1-A" approved by [text not declassified] the President. Newsom consistently took the position that the USG was not really interested in Libya and that in official matters the White House did not appear to reflect any of the attitude inherent in both the [text not declassified] discussion, as he understood it, and the decision [text not declassified] He cited the White House view on the problem of the 8 F-5 aircraft as evidence of this. Both Newsom and Davies appreciate that the decision on the F-5s was directly related to the French Mirage deal with Libya, the agony over Phantoms for Israel, public attitudes on the Arab-Israel war and the Israeli pressures on the problem of Libyan arms. Nevertheless, both thought it might help save Libya if the USG could get around the problem of reneging on its F-5 agreement.

4. Ambassador Palmer has come in with a proposal that is designed to gain time and avoid the risk of a crisis over a Libyan charge that the U.S. is not meeting an obligation. The cable is attached and is a concise statement of the problem.

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