

# **Vietnam War:**

*Village Security Planning Guide for  
District and Mobile Advisory Teams  
(1970)*

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## *Vietnam War: Village Security Planning Guide for District and Mobile Advisory Teams (1970)*

The purpose of this document was to provide guidance in establishing a coordinated defense system for villages and hamlets. Contents include area security, village structure, Viet Cong infrastructure, native assets available, command and communications, and advisor guidelines. Examples of specific village security plans are used.

Topic covered include: Defense systems; Military planning; Security operations; Viet Cong (VC); Village defense; Command and control (C2); Communications; IV Corps; Defense operations; People's Self Defense Forces (PSDF); Civil military relations; Mobile Advisory Team (MAT)

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**VILLAGE SECURITY PLANNING GUIDE**  
**FOR**  
**DISTRICT AND**  
**MOBILE ADVISORY TEAMS**

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**1970**

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FOR DISTRICT AND MOBILE ADVISORY TEAMS

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
## FOREWORD

This village security planning guide is published specifically for use by District and Mobile Advisory Teams in assisting their Vietnamese counterparts in the accomplishment of the 1970 pacification and development plan. It reflects the desires of the CG, DMAC to focus the MAT effort primarily on the improvement of population security in the villages and hamlets of the IV Corps Tactical Zone. It represents the natural evolution of the MAT advisory effort which, when it started in 1967, was primarily focused on improving the organization, administration and logistical support of the Regional Forces and Popular Forces. In 1968, the primary emphasis was on improving the operational effectiveness of the Regional and Popular Forces and countering the major winter/spring offensive of the Viet Cong. In late 1968 and all of 1969, the MAT effort assisted in the expansion of government control, the construction of new outposts in areas previously held by the Viet Cong, the coordination of fire support and the development and use of the Linh Doi command and control capability.

In 1970, with nearly all Linh Doi and RF companies having benefited from MAT assistance, the MAT is being redeployed to upgrade the security of the villages and hamlets and to consolidate the gains previously made by the GVN. The major focus in 1970 will be on upgrading the Popular Forces, training and deployment of the Peoples' Self Defense Force, coordination of the activities of RD Cadre and National Police and the evolution of comprehensive and practical village defense plans for each of the 726 villages within the IV Corps Tactical Zone. As an additional effort, where time and circumstances will permit, the MAT will provide assistance, advice and encouragement to village officials in the conduct of village self-development programs.

The guidance contained herein is not sacrosanct. It represents the thinking and experience that has thus far been developed and the results of several trial efforts in working with villages in the Delta. It is recognized that conditions will vary widely with regard to friendly resources available, the nature of the enemy threat, and the skill and receptivity of the village officials. Accordingly, it is expected that MAT leaders will liberally interpret the guidance herein and adapt it to the local conditions they encounter. It is very probable that innovations and techniques developed by individual MATs may be of interest and of possible application by other MATs. Accordingly, all MAT members and leaders are encouraged to communicate, through channels, with this headquarters and to recommend changes, additions or deletions that their experience leads them to believe would be profitable.

I commend this guidance to the attention of every MAT member within the IV Corps Tactical Zone. You have the most challenging, interesting and important job at the most decisive period of the war in Vietnam. Your success or failure in achieving the objectives of improving the security of the very large Delta population may be the most important single development in this war. Good luck to you on this assignment!

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "John P. Vann". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the typed name and title.

JOHN P. VANN  
Deputy for CORDS  
DMAC, IV CTZ

## I. PURPOSE

The purpose of this document is to provide guidance in establishing a coordinated defense system for villages and hamlets.

## II. BACKGROUND

### A. AREA SECURITY:

Security must be provided against internal and external threats at each level from the peasant household to the nation as a whole. The best method of protecting the people is to deny the enemy access to populated areas. Security operations should be focused on preventing the main forces from reaching the population and on destroying the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) and local forces. Preventing main forces from reaching the population is the task of ARVN, US and FWAMF units, but that function is beyond the scope of this guidebook.

The Village is the cornerstone of local government and is the key defense area in the protection of the population. Village level defense has two specific requirements:

1. Continuous protection of the population against enemy entry and harassment.
2. Identification and elimination of the VCI and active supporters of the enemy.

A village is not completely secure and cannot be said to be pacified unless these conditions are met.

A village's limited defense resources are such that it can defend only against relatively small enemy forces of about platoon size. However, reinforcements are available from district and province level when needed. Reaction may be in the form of troop reinforcement or fire support or perhaps both. This support is part of the village defense system and must be considered when planning the defense of any village. Thus, there are two groupings of forces available for village defense:

1. Forces and facilities resident in and under the direct control of village authorities.
2. Support forces available on request.

Organization of these forces, their tasks and how they are coordinated is shown in Section III.

## B. VILLAGE STRUCTURE:

Unlike the federal system of the United States, in Vietnam there is only one government--the National or Central Government. This government exists with only three levels which are central, province and village. Districts do not constitute a level of government (i.e., they are not authorized to levy taxes or have budgets); they are administrative extensions of the provinces while hamlets are administrative sub-divisions of the villages. The fact that village council members (including the village chief and hamlet chiefs are elected from their constituencies does not make them independent of Central direction, exercised through provinces.

The basic structure of village/hamlet government was established by Decree 198 of 24 December 1966. Decree 045 of 1 April 1969, as implemented by Letter 093 of 2 June, revised that structure and put the village squarely in the business of military security. A copy of the decree, excerpted only to show security relationships, is attached as ANNEX A. A similarly excerpted copy of the letter is ANNEX B.

The degree of control over the village/hamlet government exercised by province and by districts varies widely. In some cases, the village commissioner for military affairs commands the Popular Forces "according to the village chief's plan". In other cases, the district chief issues daily operational orders for the ensuing 24 hours.


Most village chiefs and deputies and hamlet chiefs have had four weeks training at Vung Tau, including training in security. Most village commissioners for military affairs, hamlet deputies for security and military assistants have had training in security at the provincial training center. Attached as ANNEX C is an excerpt of the schedule of training at Vung Tau. An NLD advisor on each province advisory staff has been charged with public administration responsibility. He can answer questions on the structure and operation of the GVN at any level.

The village/hamlet government organization is as follows:

## SAPPERS - COUNTER

1. DUSK RECON PATROLS.
2. DECEPTION - BUNKERS.
3. DEVICES ON APPR. TO PERIM, OUTSIDE OF PERIMETER.
4. TROOP ALERT - INSPECT.
5. IMMED. ILLUM.
6. TANGLE - FOOT WIRE.
7. INTERNAL FIRE INTO WIRE.
8. USE OF FLARES - PEN.
9. COME THRU "HARD" AVENUES.
- 10.

VILLAGE/HAMLET GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION



### C. THE VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE (VCI):

For a detailed discussion of the Viet Cong "shadow government" see ANNEX D.

### III. ASSETS AVAILABLE

The assets available to provide security for the village consist of Regional Force (RF) companies, Popular Force (PF) platoons, Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC), Peoples' Self Defense Force (PSDF) groups and National Police (NP). The village chief is also a member of the District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center (DIOCC) which is the primary intelligence asset for the area. The functions and responsibilities of the assets that may be available to a village or hamlet are as follows:

A. RF COMPANY: The RF Rifle Company, which has 123 men, is organized into three rifle platoons and one weapons platoon. Weapons employed consist of M-16 rifles, M-60 machine guns and 60mm mortars. Communications consist of AN/PRC-25 radios. RF troops are locally recruited units employed in their home provinces. This force can provide security to a village or hamlet. It is capable of assuming responsibility for an assigned area of operations and of exerting tactical command/control over other smaller military and para-military forces for joint operations. The company is responsible to requests from the village security commissioner and the hamlet assistant for security, but remains under the command of the district chief, who also retains responsibility for administrative and logistical support of the company. The RF Company is capable of both offensive and defensive night operations.

B. PF PLATOON: The PF Platoon is a 35-man unit, organized into three PF squads. Arms include M-16 rifles and an M-79 grenade launcher. Communications equipment consists of AN/PRC-25 radios. PF troops are recruited and employed in their home village or hamlet. Depending on the degree of pacification, the PF Platoon is capable of defending a hamlet or small village against small enemy units. The district chief provides logistical and administrative support to the PF Platoon but is supposed to delegate operation control to the village chief. The PF Platoon is then placed under the direct supervision of the commissioner for military affairs or the hamlet assistant for security. In supporting the pacification program, the PF Platoon is required to coordinate its actions with RDC teams, PSDF and the National Police.

C. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE: The 30-man RDC team has broad responsibility to stimulate pacification and development in the political,

economic, social and security fields. The RDC team is not primarily a security force; however, two of the cadre's four main objectives are concerned directly with local security. They are: identification of the Viet Cong Infrastructure and organization of the Peoples' Self Defense Force. In attaining these objectives, the cadre must accomplish the following specific tasks:

#### Identification of VC Infrastructure

1. Draft local VCI organization chart.
2. Establish list of stay-behind communists.
3. Establish list of full-time VC agents.
4. Take census of families to identify relatives in the VC.
5. Draw a map of the hamlet.
6. Compile a family register.
7. Station stay-behind census grievance cadre to follow VCI activities.

#### Organization of Peoples' Self Defense Force

1. Motivate the people to participate fully in the activities of the popular inter-family cell groups.
2. Select leaders for popular inter-family cell groups.
3. Organize PSDF and voluntary popular inter-family cell groups.
4. Provide military training, guide students to understand orders and build defense works and obstacles.
5. Conduct military practice and political indoctrination sessions at least twice per month.
6. Organize a communications liaison network.
7. Clear bushes and set up fences along the hamlet perimeter.

In addition to its principal responsibilities, the cadre team can contribute to village/hamlet defense as a separate security force. The cadre team may go on patrols or ambushes to supplement those of RF/PF,

but they should not go more than 300 meters beyond the hamlet boundaries and should normally be deployed in and around the hamlet in coordination with PSDF.

During the day, the cadre should be fully occupied helping to organize local government and elections, helping local government to function effectively promoting the Village Self-Development Program, training the PSDF and gathering intelligence on VCI. The cadre train PSDF in the use of weapons and basic military tactics and also give political indoctrination to foster esprit de corps and a thorough understanding among PSDF members of the importance of their role in defense of their families, hamlet, village and their nation. The cadre's training program for PSDF should continue as long as the cadre remain in the hamlet and should be resumed whenever they return to the hamlet for follow-up work.

The 30-man RDC team is led by a six-man command staff with the team leader at its head. The village chief has operational control over the cadre team and the team leader--as the village chief's assistant for pacification and development--has responsibility for implementing the village chief's instructions. The deputy team leader directs the cadre in the political struggle and psychological operations. He maintains close contact with the village deputy for security who has similar responsibilities for the entire village. The deputy team leader also should supervise the political indoctrination of PSDF. The intelligence and research cadre on the command staff collect intelligence from sources such as PSDF and inter-family groups and furnishes it to the National Police at village, the DIOCC and the RDC provincial control group. Two liaison cadre have radios to maintain contact between the command staff and other elements of the team. In addition, they are available to train PSDF in communications. Each 30-man cadre team is authorized five HT-1 radios--four on the RDC net and one on the Village and Hamlet Radio System (VHRS). The RDC team is armed with 18 M-1 carbines, five M-1 rifles, 11 .45 caliber sub-machine guns and two .45 caliber pistols.

Except in the most insecure areas, the 30-man cadre team is divided into three eight-man operational teams, each of which works a single hamlet. The leader of each eight-man operational team is the chief advisor to the local PSDF commander. He assists the PSDF commander in contacting support forces and accompanies him on training patrols. In less secure hamlets, the cadre team may operate as a single 30-man unit.

The RD Cadre, through their training and organization, are in a position to make a vital contribution to village and hamlet security. However, effective utilization of the cadre requires that their security role be recognized primarily as identifying VCI cadre and training PSDF and only secondarily as a limited tactical security force.

#### D. PEOPLES' SELF DEFENSE FORCE:

The PSDF has four basic goals: political awareness and commitment to the GVN, security, intelligence gathering and village/hamlet development. The PSDF concept calls for the mobilization of each individual to defend his hamlet and that which he cherishes in it. The key is the participation of all the people, in order to isolate the VC and develop popular commitment to the GVN.

#### THE PSDF AS A POLITICAL FORCE

1. Commitment. The primary purpose of the PSDF organization is to provide a focal point for active commitment of the people to the Government of Vietnam. By the very act of joining and accepting a GVN-issued weapon, and later through active participation in military activities, members make a political/psychological commitment to the GVN.

2. Alienation of VC. In a political sense, the PSDF transfer support from the VCI to the GVN. By becoming conscious of the differences between the legitimate GVN services and VC activities, the PSDF build a barrier of non-cooperation between their fellow hamlet residents and the VC. The VC can no longer survive politically, psychologically or materially in such a state of isolation.

3. Political Warfare. The organized groups of PSDF are target audiences for special attention by GVN political warfare efforts. The PSDF unit should form the nucleus in each hamlet for regular discussion of the GVN and the current political situation. The PSDF should help to build an authentic Vietnamese nationalist spirit at the local level.

4. Dialogue with GVN. Every effort should be made to promote dialogue among the people themselves and between the people and the government officials in order to isolate the VC and provide a sense of purposeful unity with the GVN.

5. PSDF Motivation. In their role as activists, the motivation of the PSDF themselves is of paramount importance. Leadership, self-protection, training, civic pride and group conscience and regular political education are the basic motivating factors of the PSDF.

#### THE PSDF AS A MILITARY FORCE

1. A Guerrilla Force. The PSDF also constitutes a hamlet-based para-military force, organized and trained at local level, whose mission is to defend hamlet, homes and families from the VC by use of guerrilla tactics.

2. Weapons and Pay. The PSDF are equipped with the Garand M-1, the Carbine M-1, Thompson and M-3 series sub-machine guns and shotguns (see ANNEX G). PSDF should also utilize crude booby traps. GVN plans call for the limited distribution of Browning Automatic Rifles (BARs) during 1970. The members receive no pay for their military duties. Military training and political discussions do not conflict with the requirements of their normal everyday occupations.

3. Eligible Personnel. All male citizens between the ages of 16 to 17 and 39 to 50 are required to join the combat PSDF (armed members) under provisions of the General Mobilization Law. In addition, older persons, disabled veterans, women and youths under 16 should also be recruited as volunteers to perform auxiliary duties such as constructing defenses and emplacing simple booby traps or warning devices, messenger duty, intelligence collection, medical aid, etc. Able-bodied women may serve in the combat PSDF on a voluntary basis (see ANNEX E).

4. Guerrilla Tactics. The PSDF uses the military tactics of the guerrilla. The PSDF should not take up fixed defensive positions. Small groups (not exceeding three) which occupy different listening posts each night, are less vulnerable to VC targetting and attack. Direct contact is avoided except when the opposing force is clearly inferior and can be overcome easily. The basic reaction capability of the PSDF is limited to warning the hamlet people, notifying the closest friendly forces and conducting a mobile defense against intruding VC forces.

5. Reaction of Armed and Unarmed Members. From within and around the perimeter of the hamlet, the combat PSDF should snipe at and harass the enemy, moving to new concealed positions if pursued and continuing to harass. Each armed member should be prepared to hide his weapon if the enemy force appears overwhelming. The unarmed PSDF personnel set up booby traps or other obstacles and promote an attitude of non-cooperation with the VC among the hamlet population. These tactics should continue until assistance arrives. In this way, the PSDF and the hamlet as a whole can deny the VC sanctuary and freedom of movement throughout the population. PSDF reactions and day/night organization are discussed in detail in ANNEX F, Section A. Under certain exceptional circumstances the PSDF may mount joint operations with PF and provide support for PF and RF. (See ANNEX F, Section B).

6. Policy on Uniforms. The PSDF should not be set apart from the rest of the community by distinguishing marks or uniforms. With no distinguishing marking the VC cannot readily recognize nor

target them. Where PSDF are well-organized, trained, armed and motivated, the VC is unsure of himself and unwilling to venture into the hamlet.

7. Formal Leadership. The direct commander of a PSDF unit is the hamlet deputy for security, with the village deputy for security coordinating overall village PSDF activities. The hamlet deputy for security is assisted by the hamlet commissioner for military affairs, who is usually a local PF.

8. Natural Leaders. The full potential of the PSDF will likely depend upon the development and training of members with an aptitude for leadership by village/hamlet leaders, RDC and village/district advisors. As natural leaders emerge, they must be used not only to coordinate the village activities but to disseminate the information necessary to develop a broad base of political and social commitment.

#### THE PSDF AS AN INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING ORGANIZATION

The entire population should be regarded as a pool of information. The PSDF, through its connections with the populace and with the advantage of even the limited training it receives, should make a vital contribution toward developing a popular intelligence network. By separating what is useful from everyday gossip, PSDF members can be excellent natural sources for NP and RDC intelligence personnel and village/hamlet officials. Coordination between PSDF leadership and NP/RDC should be encouraged.

#### THE PSDF IN VILLAGE/HAMLET DEVELOPMENT

The PSDF should be encouraged to work on community construction projects as part of the Village Self-Development Program. This promotes group consciousness, civic pride and a stake in the future of the community.

(See ANNEX G for PSDF Logistic Support, ANNEX H for Military Training and ANNEX I for Province and District PSDF Officials).

#### E. NATIONAL POLICE:

National Police at village level consist of six to eighteen men, depending on the size of the village:

Villages with population over 10,000: 18 policemen

Villages with population between  
5,000 to 10,000: 12 policemen

Villages with population under 5,000: 6 policemen

These numbers include the village police chief and an intelligence specialist.

The village police station is located at or near the village headquarters.

The NP are under operational control of the village chief and coordinate activities with the village deputy chief for security. At no time will the NP be responsible for defending a village. Their basic responsibilities, day and night, are as follows:

1. Maintaining law and order in the village.
2. Receiving cases of judicial offenses and traffic violations.
3. Screening and classifying all residents in cooperation with RD Cadre and other intelligence sources.
4. Monitoring syndicates, associations and groups in the village.
5. Organizing and managing intelligence nets in cooperation with PSDF and other security elements.
6. Organizing police operations in village areas in coordination with military forces and National Police Field Force (NPF).
7. Apprehending VCI Cadre with the support of military forces.
8. Preparing lists of village residents, 15 years of age and up, for new ID cards.
9. Safeguarding ID card teams working in the village, with and through the assistance of military forces.
10. Training PSDF, if requested.
11. Maintaining follow-up reports on Hoi Chanh who have been released from the Chieu Ho: center and returned to their villages.
12. Any other duties as assigned by the district chief of police.

National Police at village level are equipped as follows:

1. Weapons: Revolvers, Carbines and a limited number of Sub-Machine Guns.

2. Communications: At present, the village police use the Village/Hamlet Radio System (VHRS).

See ANNEX J for details on the National Police Field Force (NPF) and Marine Police, who are not assigned to village level, but will, on occasions, be available for support on specific operations.

#### F. DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS COORDINATING CENTERS:

The provinces must guide the effort to neutralize the Viet Cong Infrastructure. Each province has a permanent PHUNG HOANG Center to insure proper coordination and cooperation between DIOCCs. The DIOCC is an attempt to create organized, sophisticated intelligence analysis and operational planning at the district. It is headed by the district chief, who exercises staff supervision over all operations and forces in the district. The DIOCC should be visited by MAT personnel each time they go to the district town so as to get an update on intelligence and to pass on any information they have.

In general, the National Police should play a leading role in the efficient running of the DIOCC. One of the most important units available to the DIOCC is the NPF (see ANNEX H).

Used properly, the DIOCC, is a vital asset for both Vietnamese and Americans. The Situation Section of the DIOCC is the source of political and military intelligence files for the district. Some of these files are:

1. Sketch maps of each hamlet, showing population by political persuasion, as well as all significant building and landmarks.
2. Dossiers on known VCI cadre.
3. Alphabetical card files on known VCI cadre.
4. VCI situation files for each village/hamlet.
5. Names of VCI cadre by area.
6. Blacklists.
7. Guide files, including Hoi Chanh willing to guide operations.

8. List of ralliers from the district.
9. Mug books and other photographs of VCI.
10. "Most Wanted" lists.
11. List of relatives of known VCI cadre.
12. Aerial photographs and map overlays.
13. Reports of VCI cadre who have already been neutralized.

There are other sources of information which are classified because of their mission, functions or subject matter. Most of the files in the DIOCC have input from village and hamlet level forces such as PF, PSDF and RDC.


The DIOCC also has an Operations Section with responsibility for planning military operations in support of the pacification program, to include PHUNG HOANG. If a military or VCI target is beyond the capability of sub-sector forces, the DIOCC Operations Section should coordinate with the province for assistance.

#### IV. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS


The Village Chief is the commander of the PF platoons and PSDF in the village. In addition, he has operational control over National Police and RDC teams. He delegates command of PF to the Deputy Village Chief for Security and PSDF units to the Deputy Hamlet Chief for Security. The Deputy Village Chief for Security performs day-to-day coordination of all military and para-military activities in the village. At hamlet level, coordination is carried out by the Deputy for Security. The Village Deputy for Security, in addition to responsibility for coordinating village defense, also has the task of organizing intelligence collection. The National Police are responsible for organizing Peoples' Intelligence Networks to collect political intelligence.

The security organization for village and hamlet is as follows:

# SECURITY ORGANIZATION



**HAMLET**




**LEGEND:** Operational Control \_\_\_\_\_  
 Coordination Responsibility -x-x-x-

Communications available to the Village Chief for tactical operations are:

1. Village Hamlet Radio System (VHRS) which provides contact between district, village and hamlet RF companies and PF platoons on the same net.
2. Province and district military net.
3. RD Cadre net.
4. US advisory net.

Where the RF companies and PF platoons are not supplied with VHRS radio, coordination is obtained only by contacting district on the civilian VHRS radios and relaying through the district military net to the RF/PF. To assure this coordination, the VHRS and the military net should be co-located at district and province level. Administrative and security communications should be located in the same office at village and hamlet levels. Training of operators in radio procedure and use of SOIs is essential for effective communication.

### RADIO NETS



## V. ADVISORS GUIDELINES

The preceding sections have outlined the need for village security, the assets available and methods of coordinating security forces. In practice, there has been little implementation of these measures. Many province and district chiefs do not provide sufficient direction and enthusiasm in regard to village defense; village level officials often do not have sufficient experience or interest to do their jobs; ineffective PF platoon leaders with little control over their men compound the problem. It is in these areas where an advisory effort can be of value. The people must want protection and must be prepared to cooperate and to contribute.

Some progress has been made in this field. Australian Village Defense Advisory Teams (VDATs) have been operating in this role over the past few months in Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, Vinh Binh and Vinh Long Provinces. Response has varied from area to area, but generally progress has been encouraging.

Experience has shown that perhaps the most important factor is Vietnamese participation at all levels. A village chief is unlikely to accept a security plan if it is obviously a US plan presented by a MAT leader. At best, it will be accepted as long as the advisors remain and discontinued upon their departure. However, if the plan is produced by the village chief, with the guidance and approval of the district chief and based on the advice of the MAT senior advisor, the chances of acceptance and implementation are greater. The role of the MAT, therefore, should be to monitor and advise throughout the formulation and implementation of the plan.

The following guide is not to be rigidly applied nor is it intended to detract from the initiative of the MAT senior advisor or his team members. The purpose is to set out the basic principles and to provide a sequence of events related to a time frame.

TIME SEQUENCE (a)	ACTIVITY & PARTICIPANTS (b)	PURPOSE OR DUTIES (c)
Prior to Day 1	MAT Research	Obtain background information on village and arrange contract through DSA (see ANNEX K).
Day 1 - 3	Meeting at District HQs: District Chief Village Chief Village Deputy for Security DSA MAT SA	The District Chief should: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Make the Village Chief responsible for formulating the village/hamlet security plan (VHSP).</li> <li>2. Enumerate the district resources available to the village chief. Explain how to obtain and use when necessary and remind the village chief of the forces available at village level.</li> <li>3. Make a member of the district staff responsible for supervising and coordinating inter-village planning.</li> <li>4. Introduce MAT SA and explain how MAT can assist the village chief in devising a plan.</li> <li>5. MAT works on team housing and other administrative matters related to their change of location.</li> </ol>
Day 4	Meeting at Village: Village Chief Village Deputy for Security Commissioner for Military Affairs RF Company Commander PF Platoon Leader Hamlet Chiefs Hamlet Deputies for Security RD Group Leaders NP Representative	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Village chief explains purpose of VHSP to participants and stresses the necessity for complete cooperation between all security elements.</li> <li>2. The task of each security element is reviewed. A proposal for coordination of security elements is discussed with special attention to means of intelligence gathering and collation, means of communications, likely enemy approaches and reaction at each level.</li> </ol>

(a)	(b)	(c)
		<p>3. Village chief makes village deputy for security responsible for drafting of basic security plan in consultation with heads of village security elements</p>
<p>Day 5 - 10</p>	<p>Village Deputy for Security</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. With NP, RDC and others: Assess enemy situation, determine strengths and locations of VC forces and members, duties and probable location of VCI.</li> <li>2. With RF/PF and RD Commanders: Determine strength and location of all defense forces, including areas of fire, weapon ranges, degree of mutual support and reaction plans.</li> <li>3. Make a comprehensive ground reconnaissance and sketch map of the village area.</li> <li>4. With village chief and hamlet chiefs: Test VHRS and other communications systems available to villages and hamlets.</li> <li>5. With village commissioner for military affairs: Draft basic security plan for submission to the village chief (see ANNEX N for sample plan).</li> </ol> <p>The Plan will include the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Brief summary of enemy and friendly situation, to include a listing of the assets available.</li> <li>b. A concise statement of the mission of the security forces.</li> <li>c. A list of specific tasks for each security element.</li> <li>d. Administration and logistics.</li> </ol>

(a)	(b)	(c)
		<p>e. A complete communications and warning system with an explanation of alternate means and the command structure.</p> <p>6. With village information commissioner: Plan psywar program to involve whole community in security plan.</p> <p>7. MAT members not directly involved in planning will be working with PF in matters of training, logistics and administration.</p>
Day 11	<p>Meeting at Village:  District Chief  Village Chief  Village Security Officials  DSA  MAT SA</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Discuss all aspects of security plan.</li> <li>2. District chief receives draft plan for study, considering particularly the coordination and type of support required from district assets.</li> <li>3. Continue MAT training of PF.</li> </ol>
Day 13	<p>Meeting at District:  District Chief  DSA</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Discuss draft plan and support from district.</li> <li>2. Decide training role for MAT and other advisory assistance from DSA staff.</li> <li>3. Discuss suggestions by MAT not accepted by village chief.</li> <li>4. Continue MAT training of PF.</li> </ol>
Day 15	<p>District Chief</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Returns VHSP to village chief with district comments on coordination and support.</li> <li>2. Continue MAT training of PF.</li> </ol>

(a)	(b)	(c)
Day 16 - 17	Village Chief	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Visits each security element and explains the mission detailed in the VHSP. This explanation should be followed by a briefing from the element leader on methods that will be used to accomplish the mission and by a schedule of training for the next two weeks.</li> <li>2. Continue MAT training of PF.</li> </ol>
Day 18 - 32	Each Security Element MAT	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Practices and coordinates its role in the security plan (see ANNEX X).</li> <li>2. Continue MAT training of PF.</li> </ol>
Day 33 - 43	Meeting at each Hamlet: Village Deputy for Security Hamlet Chief Hamlet Security Officials MAT All Appropriate	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Plan rehearsal of security plan. No more than one hamlet rehearsal should be held per day so that village and district officials may attend.</li> </ol> <p>Note: It is important during rehearsals to provide for normal security against V attack. Mock attack on hamlet (day and night). Critique at hamlet level.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2. Continue MAT training of PF.</li> </ol>
Day 44	Meeting at Village: Village Chief Village Security Officials MAT SA	Plan rehearsal of village security plan.
Day 45	All Appropriate	Mock attack on village.
Day 46	All Appropriate	Critique at village level.

At the completion of this planning and training cycle, GVN officials and US advisors should be able to evaluate the village's security potential to determine whether or not a continued advisory effort is required. However, the plan also should provide for two practice sessions a month: one with warning and one without. The MAT should make provision to have an observer to attend the first few practice sessions.

DECREE NO. 045

**Decree No. 045-SL/CV dated 1 April 69, subj: Composition and authority of village administrative committees and hamlet management boards.**

**reference: Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam 1 April 67  
Decree 234-TT/SL dated 25 May 68 and subsequent documents determining composition of the Government.  
Ordinance 57-a dated 24 Oct. 56, subj: Organization of national administration.  
Decree 198-SL/DUHC dated 24 Dec. 66, subj: Reorganization of Village and hamlet administration.**

DECREE:

## Chapter 1 - Designation

XXXXXXXXXXXX

## Chapter 2 - Composition

**Article 2: The composition of the village administrative committee determined by article 22 of Decree 198-SL/DUHC is changed as follows:**

Village Chief  
Deputy Village Chief for Administration  
Deputy Village Chief for Security  
Commissioner for military affairs  
Commissioner for agriculture and land reform  
Commissioner for finance  
Commissioner for legal documents  
Commissioner for taxation  
Commissioner for social welfare and culture

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**Article 4: Composition of the hamlet management board determined by article 36 of Decree 198-SL/DUHC is changed as follows:**

Hamlet Chief  
Deputy Hamlet Chief for Administration  
Deputy Hamlet Chief for Security  
Special Assistant for Military Affairs  
Information Commissioner

## Chapter 3 - Duties

**Article 5:** Duties of officials on the village administrative committee specified by article 26 to 31 of Decree 198-SL/DUHC are changed as follows:

1. The village chief is relieved of his responsibility for legal documents.

With regard to security, the village chief has the additional responsibility of directing forces under village authority, including Popular Forces, and executing measures within the framework of this authority.

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3. The deputy village chief for security has the following duties in addition to those specified in article 28 of Decree 198-SL/DUHC:

He follows closely political activities, intelligence organizations, PSDF, youth and sports.

He substitutes for the village chief on political and military matters when the latter is absent or busy with other work.

4. The commissioner for military affairs directly commands the Popular Forces units assigned to village and has responsibility for defense, patrols, ambushes, searches, and operations to destroy the enemy in accordance with the village chief's plan.

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**Article 7:** Duties of the hamlet management board are determined as follows:

1. The hamlet chief is responsible for those duties specified in article 39 of Decree 198-SL/DUHC. In addition he is responsible for directing forces under his authority, including Popular Forces, in accordance with orders from the village chief.

XXXXXXXXXXXX

3. The deputy hamlet chief for security assists the hamlet chief on matters of security, intelligence, politics, youth and sports, PSDF, and substitutes for him on military and political matters when the latter is absent or busy with other work.

4. The hamlet special assistant for military affairs directly commands Popular Forces assigned to hamlet, and has responsibility for defense, patrols, ambushes, searches, and operations to destroy the enemy according to the village chief's plan.

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#### Chapter 4 - Procedures for Installation of Office

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Article 9: The commissioners on the village administrative committee are appointed by the village chief and relieved from office by his decision with the concurrence of the village council, in accordance with procedures specified in article 25 of Decree 198-SL/DUHC. The commissioner for military affairs is selected from the Popular Forces.

The deputy village chiefs for administration and security are appointed by the province chief as representative of the Ministry of Interior on recommendation of the village chief after consultation with the village council.

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Article 12: The hamlet chief is elected by the people in accordance with procedures specified in article 37 of Decree 198-SL/DUHC.

The deputy hamlet chiefs for administration and security and the hamlet special assistant for military affairs are appointed by the village chief on recommendation of the hamlet chief with concurrence of the district chief.

XXXXXXXXXXXX

LETTER NO. 093

Republic of Vietnam  
Office of the Prime Minister

No. 093-TT/NV

Saigon, 2 June 1969

FROM: The Prime Minister

TO: The Deputy Prime Minister  
The Minister without Portfolio  
Ministers  
Vice-Ministers  
Province Chiefs

SUBJ: Village and Hamlet Reorganization

REF.: Decree No. 045-SL/NV dated 1 April 1969

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

I. REASONS FOR REORGANIZATION

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

II. OBJECTIVES OF REORGANIZATION

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-- The positions of Deputy Village Chief for Administration and Deputy Village Chief for Security are included in the VAC (Article 74).

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-- Two Deputy Village Chiefs are created to assist the Village Chief in administration and security to execute the duties delegated by the people.

-- A Military Commissioner and a Military Assistant are present in the VAC and Hamlet Management Board to stress village authority over its own security.

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### III. ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE

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#### B. The Village Administrative Committee

1. Composition: It is the intent of Decree #045 to broaden the composition of the village executive body. Its composition is determined as follows:

- Village Chief
- Deputy Village Chief for Administration
- Deputy Village Chief for Security
- Military Commissioner
- Agricultural and Land Reform Commissioner
- Finance/Economy Commissioner
- Legal Documents Commissioner
- Taxation Commissioner
- Social Welfare and Culture Commissioner

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The Village Chief, the Deputies for Security and Administration and the Military Commissioner may not hold another position in the VAC concurrently (except that the Deputy for Administration is allowed by Decree #045 to serve concurrently as Commissioner for Finance in a Class B village). Remaining village commissioners may cumulate one or at most two additional functions.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

#### 2. Appointment Procedure

The Village Chief continues to be elected by the Village Council and the Commissioners in the VAC continue to be appointed by the Village Chief according to procedures determined in Decree #198.

However, it should be noted that the military commissioner must be chosen from the ranks of the Popular Forces to have sufficient qualifications to execute his function.

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#### D. The Hamlet Management Board

Without regard to the type of hamlet, (the hamlet Management Board) includes:

- Hamlet Chief
- Deputy Hamlet Chief for Administration
- Deputy Hamlet Chief for Security
- Military Assistant
- Information/Chieu Hoi Cadre

Like the village, the authority of the hamlet authorities has been increased. The Hamlet Chief acts for the village chief in the hamlet, carrying out his responsibilities according to the plan and under the control of the Village Chief.

The Hamlet Chief is elected by the people. The Deputy Hamlet Chiefs and the Military Assistant are appointed by the Village Chief on the recommendation of the Hamlet Chief with the agreement of the District Chief. The Military Assistant is chosen from among the Popular Forces.

When disapproving an appointment, the District Chief must explain his reasons. In case of disagreement between District and Village Chiefs, the Province Chief has the power of decision.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

#### IV. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE VILLAGE CHIEF AND VILLAGE FORCES AND CADRE

A. Power and Responsibilities of the Village Chief:

The responsibilities established by Decree #198 remain unchanged, with the following additions:

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

— The Village Chief has the additional responsibility of controlling the Popular Forces and all kinds of cadre within the village sphere of activity.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

B. Popular Forces, the Military Commissioner and the Military Assistants

1. Appointment: The Military Commissioner is appointed and removed by the Village Chief with the agreement of the Village Council, as determined in Article 25 of Decree #198-SL/DUHC of 24 December 1966.

The Hamlet Military Assistant is appointed by the Village Chief on the recommendation of the Hamlet Chief with the agreement of the District Chief.

2. Employment of Popular Forces: The village Military Commissioner and the Hamlet Military Assistant directly command the Popular Forces through the operational control and according to the plan of the Village Chief. In case of an operational plan of an inter-village character, the Village Chief must place the Popular Forces under the general operational control of the Subsector Commander.

In a situation of military emergency, the Subsector Commander may move a Popular Forces unit from this village to another but must simultaneously inform the Village Chief.

3. Selection: The Village Military Commissioner is chosen from the ranks of the Popular Forces and must be a most senior platoon leader to have enough prestige to command and control the other Popular

Forces platoons in the village.

The Hamlet Military Commissioners who are chosen must be most senior squad leaders.

4. Rewards and Punishments of Popular Forces:

The Village and Hamlet Chiefs have the right to recommend rewards for good work by Popular Forces and may also recommend punishment in case of fault.

The District Chief/Subsector Commander must respect the recommendations of the Village and Hamlet Chiefs.

5. Rights:

a. Military Commissioner

When assigned as Village Military Commissioner, a Popular Forces platoon leader retains his old position of platoon leader.

In addition to the pay determined according to the Popular Forces regulations (Decree #96-SL/QR of 12 May 1967), he received an additional position allowance of  $\frac{1}{4}$  of the allowance of a commissioner paid by the village budget.

The salary of a Popular Forces platoon leader concurrently Military Commissioner is paid by the Ministry of Defense.

A Village Military Commissioner enjoys all of the rights accorded by the Popular Forces regulations regarding salary increases.

b. Hamlet Military Assistant

The Hamlet Military Assistant also cumulates like the Village Military Commissioner and is also paid his salary by the Ministry of Defense.

In recently pacified hamlets which have not yet a Popular Forces unit, the office of Hamlet Military Assistant shall be held by a PF who is temporarily assigned by the District Chief/Subsector

Commander and appointed by the Village Chief according to the procedure established in Article 12 of Decree #045.

The Hamlet Military Assistant also enjoys one-quarter of an assistant's position allowance and all of the rights accorded by the PF regulations with regard to salary increases.

### C. National Police

With the purpose of execution and defending the law and at the same time assisting in the maintenance of order and security in the village, National Police must be deployed at the lowest unit of government. National Police subdistricts are placed under the operational control of the Village Chief.

1. With respect to the Village Chief: The subdistrict Police Chief is his assistant in the enforcement of the law.

2. With respect to the Deputy Village Chief for Security: The subdistrict Police Chief is:

- a. Assistant for Security and public order;
- b. Agent for action on all violations of law and collection of evidence;
- c. Organizer and manager of intelligence nets; including people's intelligence;
- d. Organizer and manager of the Village National Police structure for which a subdistrict Police Chief is responsible by Decree #176-SL/NV of 26 December 1968 regarding organization and operation of National Police branches.

### D. RD Cadre

The leader of the RD Group operating in the village is the Village Chief's assistant for Pacification and Development. The RD Group is under the employment (op con) of the Village Chief.

EXCERPT OF VUNG TAU TRAINING

XXXXXXXXXXXXX

## A. 1st Week

## (1) Monday

- (a) Morning: Concept of village and hamlet self-defense.
- (b) Afternoon: Viet Cong organization at village and hamlet; census and classification of the people.

XXXXXXXXXXXXX

## (3) Wednesday

- (a) Morning: Organization of People's Self-Defense; training the people's Self-Defense Force to protect each hamlet.

XXXXXXXXXXXXX

## (4) Thursday

- (a) Morning: Concept of village defense: relationship of village authorities with military forces.

XXXXXXXXXXXXX

## B. 2nd Week

## (1) Monday

XXXXXXXXXXXXX

- (b) Afternoon: Familiarization with M-1 Carbine and .45 Colt Pistol: breakdown and assembly; firing position.

XXXXXXXXXXXXX

## (3) Wednesday

- (a) Morning Range firing: M-1 Carbine and .45 Colt pistol.

XXXXXXXXXXXXX

C. 3rd Week

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

(2) Tuesday

- (a) Morning: Training the People's Self-Defense Force: Passive struggle; active struggle; warning and alarm system; intelligence and liaison.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

(6) Saturday

- (a) Morning: Village/Hamlet defense: How to coordinate the PSDF with other military and paramilitary organizations.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

D. 4th Week

(1) Monday

- (a) Morning: Organization of hamlet-village-district intelligence liaison; review of general concept of village and hamlet management.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

(4) Thursday

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

- (b) Afternoon: Organizing the people's intelligence net

## THE VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE

"Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never command the Party." -- Mao Tse Tung.

The above quotation from Mao typifies the prevailing doctrine for the communist insurgency in South Vietnam. The armed forces of the Viet Cong are only the military aspect of a much broader political-insurgent effort. Unless the political force guiding and supporting the armed forces is also destroyed, the village will continue to be threatened either through internal subversion or the continuous regeneration of the VC armed forces.


This political organization is referred to as the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). The members of the VCI provide party guidance and direction to the overall Viet Cong insurgency, collect money and supplies and provide commo-liaison.

The basic organization of the insurgency in South Vietnam is the Peoples' Revolutionary Party (PRP), a branch of the Communist Party of North Vietnam. The PRP has joined with certain non-communist insurgent groups to create the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, but the PRP has remained the dominant force in this and other front groups such as the Liberation Committees and the Peoples' Alliance of Democratic and Peaceloving Forces.

Party directives issued in mid-1969 instructed PRP chapters to establish Peoples' Revolutionary Committees and Councils (PRCs) and to drop all reference to the PRP. This action apparently came from a desire to upgrade the PRP from merely a dissident externally-controlled party contending for authority to that of an established, legitimate rival to the GVN. In most cases, the change merely involved a switch in titles, but sometimes non-Party members were added to present a broader base of appeal. The PRP still controls all key positions and directs the activities of the PRCs.

The current estimate is that there are about 430 PRCs at village level (out of 726 villages) and 610 at hamlet level (out of 4,212 hamlets) throughout the Delta. Just over half of the village PRCs were chosen through some form of election (closely controlled by the PRP and not generally representing popular participation) and the rest were appointed by Party chapters at higher echelons. In VC areas, these PRCs are, in effect, the local government. In GVN or contested areas they are less effective, operating either from nearby base areas or from clandestine cover within a village. In many cases, the organizations appear to exist on paper only.

Village Party chapters have been re-titled as PRCs and the secretary is usually called "Chairman" (equivalent to GVN village chief) but the basic outline remains the same. A village Party chapter usually takes the form of the following diagram:



Not all village Party chapters follow this organization exactly. In larger villages with strong VC control, the Party organization is more elaborate and each of the sections has a number of cadre. In smaller villages or in GVN villages with weak PRP chapters, one person may act as the head of several of the above sections. The Current Affairs Committee is made up of the chiefs of key sections. It usually has the chiefs of the Military Affairs, Security and Finance and Economy Sections and occasionally other sections as well. The village Party chapter is controlled by the district Party committee, but the technical sections also receive district guidance and direction from technical sections at the district level.

At the hamlet level, the organization is usually more simple. Military Affairs and Frontline Supply usually are combined, as are the Information and Culture and Proselyting Sections.

There are separate front groups (usually called Liberation Associations) for farmers, women and youth. In some areas there are also front groups for ethnic minorities such as Cambodian and/or Chinese. In areas where there is a concentration of Hoa Hao residents or members of other religious groups, there may be a Religions Liberation Association designed to rally these groups to the communist cause.

At village level and below, the working cadre of the various sections are generally categorized as VC supporters rather than significant VCI cadre. They are important as sources of intelligence, but usually can be replaced by the PRP with relative ease. The ten cadre listed below, together with some of their deputies, are the hard-core members of the group and their elimination generally will achieve the dismantling of the village Party chapter.

#### Functions of Specific VCI Cadre:

1. The Party Secretary - The village Party Secretary is responsible to the District Party Secretary for the implementation of higher echelon orders in his village. He is in charge of all village activities and controls all village cadre through his section chiefs and all hamlet Party Secretaries in his area. He exercises final authority on the use of village guerrillas and usually attends Military Affairs Section meetings. He is the most important PRP representative in the village and in some cases is known by all adult residents of the village. He moves about constantly, meeting with his section chiefs individually every three or four days. He normally resides in the most secure (that is, VC controlled) hamlet in the village or sometimes completely outside the village. In the village, he usually has three or more houses out of which he operates for brief periods. He maintains all the village records and documents. He travels periodically to meet with the district

Party Secretary and other district level cadre. He is vulnerable due to his relative notoriety and his need to be in constant contact with district and his section chiefs, but he is usually accompanied by armed bodyguards.

2. The Deputy Party Secretary - The Deputy Secretary is the number two man and must be prepared to take over if the Party Secretary is removed from the scene. He functions as the Secretary's assistant and often is assigned to oversee the activities of two or more related sections of the Committee. His activities are similar to those of the Secretary.

3. Finance and Economy Section Chief - The F&E Chief at village level collects the taxes from the villagers and hamlet level sections according to directions from district level. He may also maintain tax lists, census data and production figures. He works with the Frontline Supply Section and Rear Services Support of the Military Affairs Section to support the village guerrillas. He has usually worked out arrangements with local or roving merchants to sell foodstuffs collected as in-kind taxes. The F&E Chief at village level does not usually keep large sums of money, transmitting it at frequent intervals to district level through the Party Secretary. He is vulnerable because he is engaged in an unpopular effort and has to move about a great deal.

4. Frontline Supply Section Chief - The FLSS Chief may actually be a sub-section chief under Military Affairs. He is responsible for mobilizing material resources and manpower to support VC armed units in the area. In VC-controlled areas, he may be responsible for general production control over the villagers. He works closely with Military Affairs, Security, Finance and Economy and Proselyting Sections.

5. Security Section Chief - The Security Chief is responsible for both counter-intelligence and intelligence collection activities. In areas which the VC control, the Security Chief is also responsible for regular police and judicial operations and maintains the jail. The Security Section also controls VC reconnaissance and sapper squads. The Security Chief provides necessary bodyguards to protect other important Party officials. He may be used in an enforcement role to help the Finance Economy Chief collect taxes. He is responsible for the security of documents and records and, in the lower Delta, controls the commo-liaison system (in the upper Delta this is apparently part of the VC military postal system). He usually controls a network of secret informants within the village and hamlets to maintain surveillance over the people and a network of agents who have penetrated GVN agencies and units.

6. The Military Affairs Section Chief - The MAS Chief is usually one of the village guerrilla squad leaders who has been promoted to the job and given additional training and indoctrination. He serves as the commander and/or the political officer of the village guerrillas. He uses these guerrillas to provide sentries and protection to the VC areas, to participate in combined inter-village military operations and, when strong-arm methods are needed to enforce attendance at meetings, tax collections, etc. The village MAS Chief is often also in charge of the Frontline Supply Section and coordinates the visit to his village of forces from higher echelons for operations or for re-supply. He is always in close contact with the village Secretary and the MAS Chief of the district Committee.
7. Information and Culture Chief - This cadre is sometimes referred to as the Propaganda, Culture and Indoctrination Chief which is a more accurate description of his duties. He is responsible for disseminating VC propaganda to the villagers and for the VC cultural and entertainment teams. He is also responsible for maintaining the ideological purity and drive of PRP members in the village, leading criticism and self-criticism or re-education sessions, when necessary. He is generally regarded as a key cadre because of his role in maintaining Party morale and ideological purity. He is usually better educated and indoctrinated.
8. Social Welfare and/or Public Health Section Chief - He is normally not present except in VC areas where he is responsible for organizing the populace into social action groups. A key responsibility is to organize care for wounded veterans and the families of VC troops.
9. Troop Proselyting Chief - The Troop Proselyting Chief works usually through friends and relatives of ARVN members to turn GVN soldiers in place as sources of intelligence or possible betrayal. If this is not possible, he tries to encourage desertion. He is often the organizer of the "face-to-face" struggles of village women against GVN or allied officials and policies.
10. Civilian Proselyting Chief - The Civilian Proselyting Chief is responsible for developing the appeal of the VC and organizing support from the general populace. He works closely with the Propaganda Chief, but is really responsible for slightly different function--the organization of supporting front groups. He is responsible for most direct Party recruiting at the village level. He often is the most educated, articulate, and highly indoctrinated PRP member at the village level. He is vulnerable because of his public role and his need to move around to contact various front groups.

## PSDF UNIT ORGANIZATION AND DUTIES

NOTE: The following is quoted directly from Circular #4152/BNV/NDTV/2, dated 9 July 1969, by the PSDF Directorate, Ministry of the Interior. It should be noted that although elaborate description of duties for the non-combat groups is found in Section II, the first organization effort will be directed to the combat PSDF. Once the combat PSDF are organized and training has become regular, political activities should start focusing only on this group at first. The political activities should be quickly expanded to include women's auxiliary, elders and youth groups. The circular follows:

Republic of Vietnam  
Ministry Of Interior  
PSDF Directorate  
#4152/BNV/NDTV/2

Saigon Date 9 July 1969

FROM: Vice Premier, in charge of P&D Program, concurrently Minister of MOI.  
Clerk General of the National PSDF Committee.

TO: Ministers, Deputy Ministers, Chairman of the PSDF Committees.

SUBJ: Organization and Duty of the PSDF.

REF : Circular #3451/BNV/NDTV/2, dated 31 May 1969.  
Decree 104/SL-NV, dated 5 August 1969.

The aforementioned circular outlined the plan for organization and duties of PSDF at hamlets and sub-hamlets.

I. ORGANIZATION:

At the hamlet and sub-hamlet level, male and female citizens, depending on their sex and age, are organized into groups as follows:

- Combat PSDF group (consisting of male citizens, under the provisions of the General Mobilization Law, and voluntary female citizens).
- Women's auxiliary PSDF group (voluntary).

- Women's auxiliary PSDF group (voluntary)
- Elders PSDF group (voluntary)
- Youth PSDF group (voluntary)

The abovementioned groups are organized as follows:

1. Combat PSDF Group:

The basic unit of the combat PSDF is the team (14 members, three male cells and one female cell); three teams form into one inter-team (44 members), three inter-teams make one group (134 members). At those hamlets where the population is not sufficient for the formation of three teams, two teams can be formed into one inter-team and so forth; two inter-teams will make one group.

2. Women's Auxiliary PSDF Group:

The women of age from 16 to 50, who voluntarily join the women's auxiliary PSDF group, depending on their ability, age and desire, are divided into the following group (each team comprises five to eleven members):

- Public Health and Education Team
- Social Welfare Team
- Entertainment Team
- Economic Development Team

Several teams (from two to five) make one inter-team--several inter-teams (from two to five) make one group.

3. Elders PSDF Group:

The elders (over 50 years old) who voluntarily join the Elders PSDF group, depending on their ability, age and desire, are divided into the following teams (each team comprises five to eleven members):

- Public Health and Education Team
- Social Welfare Team
- Economic Development Team

Several teams (from two to five) make one inter-team. Several inter-teams (from two to five) make one group.

#### 4. Youth PSDF Group:

The youths, male and female (from 13 to 15 years old) who voluntarily join the PSDF group, depending on their ability and desire, are organized into teams (each team comprises five to eleven members):

- Social Welfare Team
- Gymnastic and Sport Team
- Entertainment Team

Several teams (from two to five) make one inter-team; several inter-teams (from two to five) make one group.

Remarks - The youth PSDF members will be placed separately into male and female teams.

#### 5. General Articles:

a. All levels, team leader, deputy team leader, inter-team leader, deputy inter-team leader, group leader and deputy group leader of the abovementioned groups are elected by the group members themselves. Particularly for the youth PSDF group, besides the youth PSDF group leader, the hamlet chief or sub-hamlet chief will delegate one youth or one elder who has ability and understands thoroughly the youths' psychology, to act as "advisor" for the group leader and to guide activities for the youths.

b. Towards the elders, youth and women's auxiliary groups, the inter-team can be established only when there are two teams or more. If less than two teams, the team will follow the direct system up to the group level.

## II. DUTY:

### 1. Combat PSDF Group:

The Combat PSDF group is responsible for the principal duties such as follows:

- Security activity in the interior of hamlets and sub-hamlets.

- Defensive deployment, guarding and patrolling in and out of hamlets and sub-hamlets, if possible.
- Motivation of common activity, mutual aid and construction of hamlets and sub-hamlets.
- Assistance to the police force or the Army in intelligence operations (elimination of VCI) first aid, evacuation, etc.
- Support and protection of the people and their properties.

## 2. Women's Auxiliary PSDF Group:

The members of the women's auxiliary PSDF group are to assume the principal duties as follows:

- a. The public health - education team. Participates in public health missions, publicizes information on prevention of diseases, cure, first aid, evacuation, popular education, etc.
- b. The social welfare team. Participates in missions of social relief, takes care of children, encourages the PSDF members morale by consoling and looking after the group members and their families.
- c. Economic development team. Develops animal husbandry, handicraft (knits, weaves, sews and fabricates useful things of handicraft industry, etc.) for increasing the interests of families, etc.

## 3. Elders PSDF Group:

The Elders PSDF group members are to assume the following duties:

- a. Public health - education team. Participates in missions of public health, popularizes information on prevention of diseases, cure, evacuation, first aid; advises, guides and promotes popular educational movements, exterminates illiteracy, debauchery, superstition, etc.
- b. Social welfare team. Consults and helps the development and consolidation of PSDF at the locality takes part in social welfare missions; takes care of and comforts and guides the members and their families, especially in virtue, traditional ethics and in maintaining the establishment of hamlets.
- c. Economic development team. Advises, stimulates and participates in missions to improve the peoples' life such as development of animal husbandry, agriculture, manual work, etc.

4. Youth PSDF Group:

The youth PSDF group members have the following duties:

- a. Social welfare team. Participates in easy social welfare missions such as to work for public sanitation campaign; gives gifts and comforts the combat PSDF members, etc.
- b. Gymnastic-Sport team. Organizes the sport team, familiarizes with gymnastics, sports and healthy games and outdoor activities (excursions, campings, etc.).
- c. Information-Liaison team. Broadcasts and popularizes information in villages, hamlets--acts as liaison line among the PSDF units in hamlets.
- d. Entertainment team. Organizes and plays the main role in entertainment missions; national dramas and songs.

In addition, the addressees are required to order the subordinate PSDF committees to invite a few influential representatives of the Elders and Women to the locality to reinforce the local PSDF committees, from capital, provincial and city levels downwards.

The abovementioned representatives are to be advisors for the PSDF committee concerned, urge and guide activities for the Elders, women and youth PSDF at the locality.

It is requested that addressees immediately admit the male and female citizens who voluntarily join the abovementioned organization.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL  
/s/  
TRAN THIEN KHIEM

## PSDF REACTION SCENARIO

## SECTION A: PSDF ALONE

The PSDF utilize a guerrilla-type, mobile defense concept adapted to their skill level and assets. Should the VC attempt to enter the hamlet, the PSDF take two basic actions: warning and mobilizing the hamlet members and friendly forces and taking reactive measures.

Warning of impending VC entry or attack must be passed to the hamlet people, who then hide the children, put out booby traps, take up concealed positions and prepare for passive resistance should the VC succeed in entering the hamlet.

The PSDF notify friendly forces by whatever means available, such as voice, runner, gong or rifle shot. For warning, alerts and requests for tactical support to friendly units they may use the Village Hamlet Radio System (see page 14).

In the meantime the combat PSDF should collect their weapons from their place of safekeeping in the hamlet local office and take up concealed positions along the path of the approaching VC. As the VC approach the PSDF will harass and snipe at them.

During this time the PSDF remain hidden and retreat with their weapons to new hiding place, should the VC pursue them. From the new position, they will continue the harassment. Enemy attrition should be constant. Unless the VC force consists of only a few men, a direct confrontation between the Armed PSDF and the VC should not be attempted.

By this time, help should have arrived from PF or RF. If this assistance does not come, the armed PSDF continue to harass, snipe at and ambush the VC and the unarmed PSDF adopt a non-cooperative attitude.

Basically, the same approach is followed at night, although at this time the PSDF is more systematically organized as a hamlet guard in roving patrols of two or three men, which move throughout the hamlet and along its perimeter. Should they stop in the shadows along a likely VC approach they should not wait longer than 30 minutes in one spot. No set route of patrol should be adopted for repeated use and regular stopping places should be avoided. Routes should be controlled sufficiently to prevent PSDF from engaging each other.

At no time will the PSDF on duty take up fortified positions. A S-40 rocket or even a skillfully used hand grenade will probably destroy any PSDF bunker or guardhouse and most certainly the people within. PSDF should use nothing more than natural cover and concealment.

The best protection for PSDF in groups is movement. Small groups which change their station irregularly cannot be targeted in advance and the VC are, therefore, much less likely to attack them. A far greater area can be secured by using small roving patrols. Two or three men who know each other can be very effective in the manner described.

When the VC are sighted by a three-man patrol, two men can delay and harass the VC while the third member attempts to notify the hamlet chief and supporting forces by message or by radio.

#### SECTION B: PSDF COORDINATION WITH PF/RF

PSDF should not venture outside the hamlet limits by themselves. Following the rule of one (preferably two or three) PF to ten PSDF, ambushes on the approaches to the hamlet may be mounted using the PSDF. These ambushes should be mounted after dark and should change position at least once during the night, if possible.

PSDF may also participate in PF patrols in lesser numbers. Or, should the situation dictate, PSDF can be used only temporarily to take place for PF in an outpost thereby freeing some PF for patrol and ambush duty in the area surrounding the hamlet. This will create a security zone outside the hamlet to supplement PSDF--providing security within the hamlet.

Reaction/counter-penetration forces can be mounted in order to exploit VC presence; however, this should be attempted by PSDF only under excellent leadership and after prior practice with the PF. Normally, PF form the core of such a force.

The PSDF can also support regular armed forces of any kind while they are in contact or imminent contact by gathering intelligence, by harassing and demoralizing the enemy forces from all sides and by organizing the population to engage in passive resistance in the presence of the VC.

## PSDF LOGISTIC SUPPORT

1. Logistical Support to PSDF is provided by RVNAF through province A&DSL Company.
2. Weapons Sources: Maximum use will be made of weapons which are presently in the possession of GVN and RVNAF. First priority will be given to use of US captured weapons which are serviceable and can be supported logistically. Weapons which are excess to RVNAF requirements will be issued to PSDF. Additional weapons will be provided from US sources only when they cannot be provided from existing RVNAF stocks.
3. Criteria for Weapons Issue: The following criteria will be used in the issue of weapons:
  - a. The PSDF must have been trained in the use of weapons and a plan for defense of the hamlet has been approved by the district chief.
  - b. The hamlet administration must have agreed to accept responsibility for the weapons and is considered by the district chief to be competent to maintain control and accountability.
  - c. The hamlet population has, in the opinion of the district chief, demonstrated a commitment to the GVN and the defense of the hamlet.
  - d. The number of weapons issued for PSDF will be kept to a minimum consistent with the population of the hamlet and security conditions in the area of the hamlet. Weapons will be provided the PSDF to meet the specific needs of the hamlet rather than as a specified number of weapons for each hamlet. Common use of individual weapons by members of the PSDF will be required in order to keep the number of weapons necessary to a minimum; distribution is normally based on a ratio of one weapon for every three combat PSDF member. Common use may then be made by three PSDF members, each on a different shift during night guard duty. All village and hamlet officials must be aware of the need to keep every weapon "on duty", all night, every night.
4. Weapons Accountability: Accountability for weapons will be maintained to facilitate future collection and control of firearms issued to the civilian population of the hamlet and to reduce the possibility of loss or diversion of weapons.

5. Weapons Distribution: District advisory teams should closely monitor the availability of weapons at province level (through the province advisory team) and at each level down to the individual user. Stockpiled weapons should be freed for distribution. Public distribution ceremonies may add to the stature and commitment of the PSDF.

6. Basic Load:

Garand M-1	- 120 rounds
Carbine M-1	- 90 rounds
Thompson & M-3/M-31A	-
Sub-Machine Gun	- 225 rounds
Shotgun	25 rounds

7. Weapons Maintenance: Unserviceable weapons should be sent back through RE/PE channels to the province A&DSL Company. All materials for maintenance of weapons such as cleaning patches, lubricating oil, cleaning rods and linseed oil are supplied by the A&DSL Company in response to request from the village chief sent through the district chief. Cleaning rods are issued on the basis of one per every ten weapons.

## • PSDF TRAINING

1. The following subjects must be covered in the military training of a hamlet PSDF unit.

a. Weapons:

Weapons assembly, dis-assembly, maintenance  
Principles of holding, aiming, firing  
Live firing and zeroing  
Night firing techniques

b. Mobile Defense Techniques

Two/three-man patrol/within hamlet  
Patrol as part of PF unit  
Squad and fire team tactics, fire control  
Use of effective cover and concealment; camouflage  
Reaction sequence  
Cooperation of RF/PF

c. Static Defense Techniques

Listening posts  
Ambushes  
Organization of booby traps and obstacles  
Guarding fixed installations

d. Communication

Review of simple technique  
Radio nets available and procedures

e. Command and Control System

f. First Aid and Evacuation

2. The PSDF unit should receive instruction in intelligence gathering, methods of relaying intelligence and its role in preventing VC infiltration, through the PHUNG HOANG program.

3. Political training will include sessions on the nature of communism, reasons for opposition to communism, the current political situation and political discussion periods.

4. Basic military, intelligence and political training is completed in a 60-hour cycle. An advanced lesson plan of 60 (more) hours is also available through the National PSDF Directorate, Ministry of the Interior.

## PSDF PROVINCE AND DISTRICT OFFICIALS

1. Province direction for PSDF is provided through the province PSDF committee and the province permanent PSDF office. PSDF cadre may also exist at district.
2. The province PSDF committee, consists of the following:
  - a. Chairman (province chief)
  - b. Secretary General (province deputy for administration).
  - c. Province deputy for military affairs.
  - d. Chief of provincial technical services.
3. The province permanent PSDF office monitors PSDF activity and carries out policy as stated by national directives and the province PSDF committee. So far, the MOI/PSDF Directorate has issued no directives concerning the make-up and organization of this office. An example of one province's organization follows:
  - a. Chief, concurrently military officer or civilian of equal rank; charged with execution of national and provincial directives.
  - b. Assistant Chief, concurrently military officer; charged with inspection and training program.
  - c. Officers and NCOs as necessary, charged variously with training, publicity and political indoctrination, recruitment, weapons distribution and supply.
  - d. Administrative clerk(s).
4. The district PSDF committee monitors village/hamlet PSDF progress. This committee consists of the district chief as chairman and the deputy for administration as executive director. This committee/office is often assisted by military personnel who supervise training and weapons distribution. District PSDF organizations may consist of professionally-trained PSDF cadre who concern themselves with the broad range of PSDF activities including political indoctrination.

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## NATIONAL POLICE FIELD FORCE (NPF) AND MARINE POLICE

The NPF is an organic part of the National Police which has received both civil police and military training. The major function of the NPF, in conjunction with the Special Police Branch (SPB), is to eliminate the VCI.

This mission establishes the NPF as a primary reaction force for anti-VCI operations in conjunction with other resources through the PHUNG HOANG program. They are located in platoon strength at district level (not all districts are covered yet). They are lightly armed, foot-mobile units designed, trained and equipped to operate in rural areas from which enemy main forces have been cleared. The platoons may be assigned to village operations as necessary.

NPF operational procedures may be summarized as follows:

1. To operate as a reaction force for the National Police.
2. Conduct continuous ambushes, patrol and police operations day and night to prevent VC activities and to maintain security and order.
3. In combined operations with friendly forces, the main role of the NPF is a supporting one, as follows:
  - a. Apprehend VC who hide among the people.
  - b. Uncover VC caches.
  - c. Temporarily detain VC prisoners of war.
  - d. Search objectives in the assigned operational area.
  - e. Protect and screen refugees.

The NPF SOP issued by the Director General, National Police is the guidance on NPF use and operations.

Marine Police bases are located on the primary navigable waterways (Mekong and Bassac Rivers) in IV Corps. Their major mission is security of the waterways denying unobstructed use of waterways by the enemy. Specific duties are as follows:

1. Interception and capture of contraband material and illegal war materials.
2. Immigration control.
3. Control of waterborne traffic in certain water areas.
4. Apprehension of law violators.
5. Verification of on-board documents required by GVN law.

The Marine Police have a flexibility enabling them to assist in combined operations in their assigned areas day or night. They may also be used to insert or extract troops, as needed.

Marine Police units are equipped with 40-foot police patrol boats (PPBs) and 17-foot interceptor boats; the boats are lightly armed and have their own communications which net with other police units.

## ACQUISITION OF DETAILED INFORMATION

Prior to moving to the target village, the MAT should obtain maximum information from all available sources. Individual MAT members should be tasked with acquiring this information under the direction of the MAT leader. The information must be recorded by the MAT leader for future reference. The following is a checklist for information essential to MATs:

## 1. Province and District

Check with advisory team members to determine the political, religious and economic structures of the village, to include background on the village chief, deputy for security and other prominent persons.

## 2. Province

## a. Personnel

(1) Check A&DSL Company for strengths of RF and PF units in village.

(2) Check with PSDF cadre for strength of organized and trained PSDF and number of arms issued.

(3) Check RD office for strength of RDC in village.

## b. Intelligence:

(1) Check the enemy situation and VC organization in and around the village at the province PHUNG HOANG Center (PHOENIX Coordinator), S-2, and Chieu Hoi office. Information should include units, strengths and weapons used.

(2) Secure maps and air photos of village (not always available, sketch maps may have to suffice).

## c. Operational Assets:

(1) Check whether NPF, PRU and APT are assigned to the district.

(2) Know available province assets and how to use them.

(3) Check with PsyOps advisors.

d. Logistics:

Check status of supply of all units in the village at A&DSL Company.

### 3. District

a. Verify all province statistics and information (both personnel and logistics).

b. Check at DIOCC to determine the local VC organization, outstanding VC personalities and the pattern of enemy and friendly operations in the village.

c. Become familiar with district-based assets such as NAFF, RF, reaction forces and artillery.

d. Become familiar with all available means of communications from the village.

### 4. Village

a. Verify all previous information.

b. Sleep in each hamlet at least one night if a PF platoon is deployed. Discuss security situation with PF platoon leader. Evaluate the outposts. Inspect PSDF with hamlet officials after dark.

c. Draw a sketch of each hamlet, friendly units, locations and areas of operation, terrain features, population centers and fire support plan, including blank zones.

## PHUNG HOANG PLAN

The National Police at village level are responsible to the village chief for the complete neutralization of the local VCI. The NP commander at village should be the Deputy Chairman of the village PHUNG HOANG Committee (see example in model village plan at ANNEX N). As such he should establish the Peoples' Intelligence Network (attached) and the village PHUNG HOANG plan which should include:

1. Systematic collection of intelligence on VCI to:
  - a. Identify individuals by position.
  - b. Identify family members, friends and associates.
  - c. Determine locations and routes normally used.
  - d. Determine weapons, bodyguards or other protection used.
  - e. Establish operational patterns for individual VCI members.

2. Involvement of the people of the village in the anti-VCI program. The village chief should publicize the names and illegal activities of members of the VCI. The people must be taught exactly how these individuals threaten their security and how they can contribute intelligence.

3. Targetting of vulnerable individual VCI cadre by:

a. Selecting the method of neutralization. There are three basic ways: to kill, to capture or to induce to rally. Planning should be based on the premise that killing will only occur as a result of armed resistance to an attempted arrest or rally operation. To kill a VCI is to negate his intelligence value; to capture a VCI cadre is to make future exploitation possible and to rally a VCI cadre is to make future exploitation probable. There are other considerations. The death of a VCI cadre member causes, at most, temporary disruption of his organization; there is no compromise of its secrets; all the VCI must do is to find a suitable replacement. The capture of a VCI cadre forces the organization to face the possibility that their identity, organization and modus operandi will be compromised. They must divert their attention to defensive measures of counter-intelligence and security. The defection of a VCI as a Hoi Chanh seriously disrupts the infrastructure. Its leaders must assume that the rallier compromises the whole organization. They must make changes in their organized activities and they may become suspicious of each other and the persons known by the rallier.

b. Assigning the mission of neutralizing the targeted individual to an agency. (If village assets are inadequate, the target should be referred to the DIOCC for assistance). In some cases, the village NP is able to act on its own but, in most cases, other village security elements such as the PF or PSDF, may be required. The NP should accompany any PHUNG HOANG operation.

4. Exploitation of successful anti-VCI operations while they are in progress. Captured VCI and ralliers may know someone else in the immediate vicinity. Good immediate interrogation makes one operation do the work of many.

5. Evaluation of all PHUNG HOANG activities to determine if the security of the village has been enhanced by the effort. Until the VCI has been destroyed as an operation, the village cannot be rated as completely secure.

#### FORMATION OF A PEOPLES' INTELLIGENCE NETWORK:

Some of the information normally known by the people include:

1. Who is collecting illegal taxes?

2. What families have members in the VC? What are their jobs? Where are they?

Peoples' Intelligence Network: One of the best sources of information available in the village is the villager himself. No one has better access to VCI information, but inhabitants must be taught to distinguish between the infrastructure and the ordinary guerrilla who carries a weapon. On the surface, the low-level VC appears to be the greater threat to the stability and peace of the village. Once the village chief and his deputy for security educate the people to the threat posed by the infrastructure, these officials should organize their collection of intelligence information among the people to the extent of creating informal agent nets. Because it is of great importance to protect the cooperative villager from reprisal by the VC and VCI, the village chief and his deputies must be discreet in their intelligence operations among the people. Properly educated to the need for their assistance and protected when they make a contribution, the villagers will begin to develop a sense of participation in their own defense.

3. Which persons in the village try to convince the inhabitants that the GVN is not protecting them?

4. Is anyone trying to organize the people to protest the war?

5. Who, if anyone, is trying to organize the women in the village to "struggle" against GVN "atrocities"?

6. Who, if anyone, tries to prevent villagers from voting at election time?

7. Who are the known VC sympathizers in the village?

8. Has anyone been threatened with reprisal because of his position or actions? By whom?

9. Do important VC pass through the hamlets at night? Where do they stay? Who supports them?

10. Are there areas where no one goes? Why? Who lives there? There are many more such questions which should be considered.

SUGGESTED ROLES FOR SECURITY ELEMENTS IN  
VILLAGE/HAMLET SECURITY PLAN

RF Company: Reconnoiter area, plot mortar fire in coordination with village chief. Plot overlapping MG and rifle fire. Plot overlay coordination of artillery with district. Conduct refresher courses in ambush and patrol techniques. Coordinate ambushes and patrols through village chief with PF platoons so as to saturate village area. Review and practice communications procedures. Assistance may be received from district advisory team and MAT.\*

PF Platoon: Conduct refresher courses in ambush patrol techniques. Establish a system of shifts to insure maximum use of force at night. Integrate PSDF into patrols and ambushes. Review communications procedures. Assistance may be received from district advisory team and MAT.

RD Cadre: Coordinate patrols and ambushes with PF to take up any slack. Train PSDF to take place of RDC. Establish and upgrade family group/cell intelligence gathering system. Assistance may be received from PF, RF or MAT.

PSDF: Conduct marksmanship training. Establish three-man patrols (no fixed positions). Establish and practice communication procedure to include use of VHRS. Coordinate in-hamlet and hamlet perimeter patrols with PF. Integrate forces with PF for out-of-hamlet patrols with ambushes. Plan use, construct and practice use of booby traps. Coordinate intelligence gathering with National Police in village. Assistance may be received from village officials, MATs, RF and RDC.

NATIONAL POLICE: Coordinate activities with deputy village chief for security. Participate in training of PSDF, if requested. Maintain contact with NPFF and Marine Police if they are located in area, for fast reaction on VCI information responsible for the PHUNG HOANG program.

## SOC MAU VILLAGE DEFENSE PLAN

I. SituationA. Enemy

1. The Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI), a criminal organization, working against the people of Soc Mau is present and acts in a covert role (see Appendix 1).

The village PHUNG HOANG Committee will manage the overall attack on the VCI of the village and the hamlets (see Appendix 2).

2. Chau Tre A Co - A local force company normally operating between VS 001601 and WS 912431; armed with AK-47 rifles, K-1 rifles, a German MG and four B-40 launchers. This unit has the mission of hindering the economic progress of the people in Soc Mau and preventing government economic assistance to the people. In addition, this unit is used to support and escort larger foreign forces through the Soc Mau area.

3. Soc Mau Guerrilla Unit - Approximately one platoon armed with AK-47s, K-1s and carbines, operating throughout the Soc Mau-My Vinh area with the mission of interdicting the Tan Tri-Ha Vinh Road.

B. Friendly (see Appendix 3)

1. PSDF - Each hamlet has a PSDF unit with a separate unit located in the refugee area of San Thien Hamlet. The mission of these units is to provide static security for the population.

2. PF - Two PF platoons are assigned to Soc Mau. ZL/16 for security of the lines of communications and ZL/15 retained as a mobile reaction force.

3. RF -

a. The 454 Company is directly assigned to Soc Mau to assist in securing the population.

b. The 581 Company is present in Soc Mau for bridge security.

c. The 761 Company is assigned to Soc Mau for bridge security.

## II. Mission

All assigned, attached and available friendly forces will coordinate in an effort to provide security, including neutralizing all VCI cadre, for the people of Soc Mau on a 24-hour, daily basis, as directed.

## III. Execution

A. Concept - PSDF will provide the core of defense. They will be supported by minor static defensive positions manned by RF and PF. Major supporting units will be employed in accordance with the mobile defense concept (see Appendices 3 and 4).

B. PSDF - Each hamlet PSDF unit is responsible to the hamlet chief and under the control directly of the hamlet deputy for security to operate according to guidance from the village chief. Each unit will provide one-third of its available strength for nightly guard patrol.

In addition to providing nightly security teams, the PSDF will make every attempt to gather information about VC and VCI activities. This information will be passed to the village deputy for security.

Each PSDF leader is responsible to coordinate with any friendly units within his area of responsibility. A hamlet defense map will be kept by the PSDF leader and updated as units are changed. Pre-planned artillery will also be shown on this map.

### C. PF -

1. ZL/15 - Will operate under the direct control of the village chief with the task of providing a ready reaction force and supplementary forces for road clearing operations.

2. ZL/16 - Will operate under the direct control of the village chief with the primary task of providing static security at the bridge, (WR 009674), and along the Ha Vinh Road, (WR 007158). These units will be responsible for road clearing operations from their locations to the next northern-most outpost before 0800 each day. In addition, one squad will be attached to ZL/15 as deemed necessary for operational requirements.

### D. RF -

1. The 454 Company is directly responsible to the Commander, Kien Minh Sub-sector. However, they will operate under the control of the village chief in their role of static security and artillery support within Soc Mau Village. Two platoons, including the headquarters, are located at WS 077180. This element is responsible for the conduct of nightly ambushes in accordance with the mobile defense concept as

directed by the sub-sector commander. In addition, two squads will be maintained to assist ZL/15 in their mission at the request of the village chief. H&I and supporting fires will be provided by the company, as required. The remaining two platoons located at WS 080408 and WR 885277 are required to provide night ambush forces consisting of at least one-half their total strength as directed by Kien Minh District. The platoon at WS 940288 is directed to coordinate with San Thien PSDF and assist them whenever possible.

2. 581 Company - Operating directly under the sub-sector commander assigned to secure bridges at WS 077192 and WR 113411 and the canal intersection at VL 881721. In addition, these units will coordinate with local PSDF units and provide support when needed. Daylight and road clearing operations will be run at the direction of the sub-sector commander.

3. 761 Company - Operating under direct control of Kien Minh Sub-Sector. Assigned the mission of bridge security vic WR 988827 and WR 958264. In addition, this unit is required to coordinate with PSDF in the defense of the San Thien Refugee Center and Son Dinh Hamlet. Daylight and road clearing operations will be run as directed by Kien Minh District.

E. Police - The police will work directly under the village deputy for security. They are required to provide population control in Soc Mau and to coordinate with the village security council in their effort to neutralize the VCI.

F. RDC - When available, will work directly under the control of the village chief to provide training and static security, as required.

G. Supporting Fires:

1. The 454 Company will support ZL/15 with 81mm mortar with both H&I and supporting fire. (81mm are not authorized under TO&E for RF Company but are sometimes available).

2. The 581 Company will utilize the organic 60mm mortar in direct support of the bridges and the canal intersection point.

3. The 761 Company will utilize the organic 60mm mortar to provide support of the PSDF at San Thien Refugee Center and Son Dinh Hamlet.

4. The Kien Minh artillery will be responsible to provide pre-planned fires and final protective fires, as requested by the village chief.

3. All aerial support will be requested and coordinated at province.

#### IV. Administration and Logistics (see Appendix 5)

A. The village headquarters is required to coordinate administrative and logistical support for PSDF and PF units through the district headquarters.

B. RF and RDC units will submit their own administrative and logistical requirements directly to the province headquarters for action by the A&DSL Company or RD Council.

C. An on-hand reserve consisting of one basic load per weapon will be maintained for emergency use only.

Each subordinate unit commander will be responsible for the maintenance of the basic load at his location. In the case of PSDF, the village commissioner for self defense will be responsible to perform weekly checks on the hamlet reserves. An additional reserve of ten weapons, 4000 rounds of carbine ammo and 4000 rounds of Garand ammo will be maintained by the self defense commissioner at village headquarters to prevent the shortage of weapons or ammo on the hamlet level.

D. Items not normally issued to PSDF such as trip flares and hand signal flares will be obtained by the PSDF commissioner through coordination with RF/PF and local advisory units. PSDF leaders should be cautioned against unnecessary usage of these items.

#### V. Command and Signal

A. VHRS and province nets (see Appendix 6).

B. Chain of command (see Appendix 7).


#### 7 APPENDICES

##### DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 K/M Subsec Cdr
- 1 K/M Arty
- 1 ca unit concerned
- 1 K/TH Cdr
- 2 Vil Ch
- 1 Vil Dep/Sec
- 2 Province HQs

IMPORTANT COMMUNIST CRIMINALS OPERATING IN SOC MAU VILLAGE


APPENDIX 1



(Complete village files and files on hamlet communist criminals are maintained by the National Police).

PHUNG HOANG COMMITTEE

SOC MAU VILLAGE



**FUNCTIONS:**

**VILLAGE CHIEF:** Manages the overall attack on the VCI; performs liaison with the DIOCC; with the assistance of the RDC Team Leader and the Information Commissioner, educates the people of Soc Mau to understand the criminal threat of the VCI.

**VILLAGE POLICE CHIEF:** Organizes the Peoples' Intelligence Network with the assistance of RDC team leader; maintains files and records on village and hamlet communist criminals; plans and participates in all anti-VCI operations.

**RDC TEAM LEADER:** Establishes initial records and files on village residents and assists Village Police Chief in collecting VCI intelligence.


**INFORMATION COMMISSIONER:** Assists Village Chief in anti-VCI education program and publishes lists and posters of known communist criminals operating in Soc Mau.


**DEPUTY FOR SECURITY AND COMMISSIONER FOR MILITARY AFFAIRS:** Contributes intelligence gathered by PSDF and PF; furnish additional forces when necessary to conduct anti-VCI operations.

**CHIEU HOI CADRE:** Participates in planning and conducting operation to induce VCI cadre to rally.

**HAMLET CHIEF:** Conduct anti-VCI program at hamlets and coordinate with village PHUNG HOANG Committee.


	OUTPOST
	PSDF CONTROL
	UNARMED
	HAMLET BOUNDARY
	VILLAGE BOUNDARY
	MOBILE AMBUSH POSI






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SUPPLY CHANNELS



VILLAGE & HAMLET RADIO NET & COORDINATED COMMUNICATIONS




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\* NOT ALWAYS PRESENT

COMMAND AND CONTROL

APPENDIX 7



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