

World War II

*Intelligence activities in the Philippines
during the Japanese occupation*

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

UNCLASSIFIED

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION

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DOCUMENTARY APPENDICES (II)
VOLUME II, INTELLIGENCE SERIES



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

Tokyo, Japan
10 June 1948

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PAUL J. MUELLER
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

C. A. WILLOUGHBY
Major General, GSC
AC of S, G-2

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The basic manuscript for Vol. II, "Intelligence Activities in the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation," was prepared by Maj E. A. Williams. Subsequent edit, expansion and revision: Maj General C. A. Willoughby; T/Sgt J. R. Elder (WAC) and Miss J. Corrigan, G-2. SCAP.

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APPENDIX XIV

DEVELOPMENT OF CONTACT WITH AMERICAN POW
IN JAPANESE CAMPS

11 December 1943

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SUMMARY

Development of contacts with American POW in Japanese Camps.

SECTION I: General Background:

1. Lt. Col. Mellnik's work with MIS-X. Washington, D.C.
2. Possibility of making contact with POW in Mindanao and Luzon.

SECTION II: Detailed study of Mindanao POW Situation.

1. POW camp, organization, work activities, extent of Jap surveillance.
2. Proximity of guerrilla organization, intelligence activity of this unit, tactical and intelligence possibilities of this unit; possible aid to POW.
3. Conclusions: Desirable to send MIS-X officer to guerrilla unit to assist POW and coordinate intelligence.
4. Recommendations in detail to carry out pars. 3.

SECTION III: Detailed Study of Luzon POW Situation.

1. POW camp, organization, work activities, channels of communication to Manila, intelligence possibilities.
2. Conclusions: Desirable to contact POW for morale and intelligence reasons.
3. Recommendation: That PRS of AIB contact POW.

APPENDIX :

- "A" - Memo to AC of S, G-2 from Lt. Col. Mellnik.
- "B" - Map showing the POW camp in Mindanao.
- "C" - Letter of instruction to Lt. Col. Englehart at Cabanatuan.

11 December 1943

STAFF STUDY FOR CHIEF OF STAFF.

SUBJECT: Development of contact with American POW in Japanese Camps.

SECTION I: GENERAL BACKGROUND

1. A memorandum to A. C. of S., G-2 was recently received from Lt. Col. Mellnik in regard to contacting American POW in Japanese camps (Appendix "A"). The problem involved, the benefits to be gained, and the known desire of the G-in-C to aid these prisoners, has led to a G-2 Staff Study of his memo and recommendations.

2. Briefly, Lt. Col. Mellnik, in his MIS-X work in Washington, D.C., was impressed with the value of MIS-X activities in European POW camps. The extent to which the camps were organized, the valuable information secured, the escape assistance provided, and the high morale effect on POW as a result of direct contact with their own forces. When he queried MIS-X as to its POW in the SWP, they replied there was none; that they had not been able to start work in this area, but desired to present the features of MIS-X to GHQ, SWP, particularly the work it was doing in POW camps in Europe. He talked over the possibility of aiding POW in P.I. with MIS-X. One MIS-X officer, who was ordered to duty here, was tentatively slated for POW activity, when and if authorized. This was Lt. Rosenquist, MIS-X, on duty with 5th AAF in Brisbane.

3. Lt. Col. Mellnik contends that the problem of aiding the prisoners is one of making and maintaining contact with them. One camp is at Davao Penal Colony in Mindanao, easily accessible to guerrilla units, and lightly guarded. To this camp, the assistance can be substantial. The second camp is at Cabanatuan, in Luzon. This area is highly organized by the enemy. Contact with this camp, while difficult, will pay dividends, as the camp acts as a pool of POW labor, which covers important Luzon military installations.

SECTION II: Detailed Study of Davao Penal Colony POW Camp

1. a. This camp is located 52 km northeast of Davao, and about 12 km from Davao Gulf. There is one second-class road to it from Davao, with numerous bridges. The camp is in the center of a jungle, and was originally built to house Filipino convicts with 20 year sentences. The camp is the shape of a rectangle, one by two miles in dimension. (see Plate 25).

b. It contains 2000 American POW, of whom 600 are officers. About 1000 go to work each day in the colony grounds. The camp also serves as a labor pool for outside work details for the Japs. These include

- 1) 20 men in the motor repair and truck drivers' pool in Davao City.
- 2) 30 men making salt on Davao Gulf.
- 3) 100 men on a Japanese abaca plantation.
- 4) Variable number stevedoring in the Davao dock area.

The 1000 who work in the camp itself are divided into about 50 groups of various sizes, from 150 repairing the road to Davao, to three or four doing Jap K.P.

c. (1) The main American hospital is at the Davao Penal Colony. POW sick on outside work details are brought in to this camp. At infrequent intervals, outside work details are rotated. The camp is organized with an American Camp Headquarters, whose main duty is to fill the labor requisitions each day. The Camp Hq. normally assigns individuals to specific work details. Freedom of movement within the camp compound is not restricted. Visiting is frequent between hospital and camp.

(2) Interior work details are scattered throughout the colony. The Japs make no pretence of guarding the prisoners. The duty of the sentry is to supervise and direct the work. Such work details as logging, firewood gathering and abaca stripping, are all in the jungle. Under such circumstances, it is impossible for the sentry to exercise much surveillance. He merely counts noses at noon and prior to return to camp. The orchard and coffee picking details had no sentries, as those details were composed of old and sick officers, too weak to do much work, much less escape (McCoy & Mellnik escaped from the coffee detail). All POW are brought back to the prison compound at 6 p.m. each day. The compound is surrounded by barbed wire, with tall sentry towers placed at intervals.

(3) The Jap garrison is not over 250. This includes mess and administrative personnel, outpost guards (Japs worried about guerrillas), work detail guards, and an interior guard of the camp. There are seldom more than 50 sentries available to guard the 50 different work details.

2. a. 30 km north of the POW camp in the jungle is a community of 5000 Filipinos who evacuated Davao City when the Japs invaded Mindanao. To protect themselves against Jap interference, they organized a guerrilla unit under Major Laureta. Major Laureta was a Philippine Constabulary officer, and for two years prior to the war, was traffic control officer of Mindanao. At the outbreak of war he was in command of a P.C. battalion in Davao City. When Mindanao surrendered, he evacuated to the hills with part of his unit. This served as a nucleus for his present organization. It now numbers 1000 men and 150 rifles. He exercises absolute powers in his area. Is extremely loyal and has effectively prevented Jap interference with community life in the area.

b. (1) Major Laureta's unit is composed of men, natives of Davao City, between 16 and 25 years of age. He has established contacts in Davao City, has procured Jap passes for his men, and in April 1943, was quite active in getting information out of Davao which would keep him abreast of Jap activities effecting his area. His southern outpost at Lungagog, is 12 km from the POW camp at the Colony. The 12 km in between is guerrilla territory - guerrilla patrols use it, the Japs stay in their outpost at Anabogan. Laureta's Headquarters is at Kapungagan, on the Libuganon River.

(2) In the past few months he has established weekly courier contact with Col. Fertig's Headquarters, had had his unit inducted into the 10th Military District, and is now a member of U.S. forces in Mindanao. Travel time from Major Laureta to Col. Fertig's Headquarters is about 7 days by courier.

(3) About 10 of Laureta's men are former inmates of the Davao penal colony. With Col. Fertig are the two Filipinos who assisted Col. Mellnik's party in its escape. Two Americans who escaped at the same time are now unit commanders in the Agusan Province.

3. a. Col. Fertig has been quite busy in other areas in the past years, and has not had a competent officer to send to Laureta to assist in organization and intelligence. Considering the distance involved, and the location of Laureta's unit (it could not tactically assist Fertig in Occidental Misamis, Lanao or the Aguan) this organization is the last organized guerrilla unit to get attention from the 10th MD.

b. (1) It seems apparent that a force of 1000 rifles (which could be developed under Laureta) would be a distinct asset to us in the event of our landing in Mindanao. The unit is 3 days march from Davao City, and in a direction unprotected by the Japs (jungle).

(2) This unit, so intimately familiar with Davao City, can likewise be utilized for intelligence purposes far beyond its present undirected scope of activities. Directed sabotage activity could easily be affected.

(3) Its proximity to the POW camp and direct communication with the 10th MD, makes it the logical point of contact with the POW, and the place from which active assistance to POW may be initiated.

4. a. Considering Major Laureta's organization with a view to its suitability as a focal point for aid to American POW in Davao penal colony, the following is a discussion of what can be done:

(1) photographic evidence of conditions in the camp. Col. Mellnik states that it is possible to get anything into the camp which can be carried.

(2) Positive assistance to POW in the shape of vitamin pills, A and B-1 particularly. Mail and news bulletins will follow. The morale effect of contact with their own forces will be greater than any material benefits.

(3) Data for the State Department re additional violations of the Geneva Convention rules. Data for the War Department re casualties, etc., as so many have died, and more will die, with no record of date of death or circumstances.

(4) Establishment of an intelligence system within the camp (there are sufficient officers there). The POW outside work details will be a fruitful source of information. This should result in accurate intelligence of enemy activities in all areas in which POW labor is used.

b. Laureta's intelligence system at present is directed towards local security. This is due to lack of experience in relative value of information and lack of contact with agencies who could use the information, rather than the lack of effort on his part. The fact that many of his men were residents of Davao, with friends and relatives there, makes his unit invaluable from an intelligence view-point. This means an intelligence coverage of the key city of Davao. Laureta's intelligence training is limited. He will need a directing hand.

c. That his force of 1000 men has been kept intact of 18 months and his civil community enthusiastically supporting him, is good evidence of Laureta's organizational ability and honesty. His force, if equipped would be a valuable asset in attacking the enemy from the rear in conjunction with our own forces. His men, familiar with the area, could likewise assist us by sabotaging bridges, power plants and railroads in conjunction with our own operations. His position on the Libuganon is impregnable. Jungle trails only lead into it. His area is well patrolled, and enemy intelligence is extremely limited.

5. a. The possibilities inherent in operating in Major Laureta's area; aid to POW, intelligence in Davao, organization for active support of our own troops, requires that an officer be sent into that area. MIS-X at Washington in conjunction with Lt. Col. Mellnik, tentatively selected Lt. Rosenquist. He has been in MIS-X for over a year, has served in the National Guard (Field Artillery) for ten years prior to that as a 1st Sgt. Mellnik thinks Rosenquist can do the job. Rosenquist is now on duty at the 5th Air Force in Brisbane, on MIS-X work, and is willing to take over the job.

b. The officers to direct establishment of POW intelligence system in the camp are Lt. Col. Memory Cain, 200th CA (NG), and Lt. Col. G.H. Stubbs, CAC. They are both trustworthy, active, intelligent, and their morale is high. There is on file at G-2 a recent letter to Lt. Col. Stubbs from his mother. This letter will establish the authenticity of our contact.

c. The possibility of aiding the escape of POW was considered. From all reports, the POW are too weak to engage in a mass escape, while the escape of smaller units may invite drastic retaliation.

6. a. Recommend that 1st Lt. H. A. Rosenquist, MIS-X, be authorized to proceed to Mindanao, P.I., and that Col. Fertig be directed to make arrangements for his trip to Major Laureta's headquarters.

- (1) That Lt. Rosenquist will work under G-2, GHQ.
- (2) That he be authorized to procure supplies from SWP or MIS-X agencies (vitamins, etc.) for this mission.

b. His primary mission:

- (1) Make contact with POW at the Davao penal Colony.
- (2) Furnish them such assistance in medicines and vitamins, mail, news bulletins, as transports facilities may permit.
- (3) Investigate the possibility of assisting the escape of selected POW.
- (4) Direct the establishment of an intelligence system within the camp and act as an outlet for it.
- (5) Broaden the scope of Major Laureta's intelligence network to include coverage of military installations in Davao City.
- (6) Investigate, and report to GHQ, what Laureta's unit, properly equipped, could do to:
 - a) Assist the American landings thru direct attack and sabotage of Jap installations in Davao.
 - b) Prevent the massacre of American POW in the Davao penal Colony in the event of our landing in Mindanao.
- (7) Recommend to this Headquarters minimum supplies needed to accomplish b(6), (a), and (b).

c. His secondary mission will be:

- (1) To act as Col. Fertig's liaison officer to Major Laureta.
- (2) Direct the procurment of such intelligence as the 10th MD may desire.

SECTION III: Detailed study Cabanatuan POW Camp.

1. Cabanatuan is in the province of Nueve Esija, in central Luzon. It is about 100 km north of Manila. The POW camp is located 9 km east of the town of Cabanatuan. It is in the center of a rice growing area.

a. The POW camp consists of a hospital area and the camp compound proper. Latest reports indicate a minimum of 6000 American POW at this camp about 1000 officers and 5000 enlisted men. The camp is surrounded by a barbed wire fence. High sentry towers are located at strategic points, and the approaches to the camp are quite open and guarded. The country side is flat and low - a typically rice paddy area.

b. The Jap guard consists of about 250 reservists, with about one year of training. This unit furnished the guards for outside work details, interior guard, administration and supply and the routine police duties of the camp.

c. The interior administration of the POW camp is handled by an American Camp Headquarters. This Headquarters coordinates roll calls, admissions to the hospital area, keeps records and initiates sanitary precautions. Its chief duty is to provide work details as called for by the Japs. The camp serves as a labor pool from which the Japs draw as occasion demands. As of Oct. 1942, the Japs had POW working parties in Bataan, Corregidor, Nichols Field, Clark Field, Ft. McKinley, Nielson airport, dock area in Manila and a motor pool in Manila. As members of these working parties get sick, or the job is completed, the POW are returned to Cabanatuan. At infrequent intervals these working details are rotated. The POW cannot make use of what they see.

d. Work details in and around the camp proper consists of routine police, repairing buildings and roads, and gathering firewood. The firewood detail of about 100 men goes out each day into the woods. This detail is the camp's only daily contact with the outside world. At noon-time several carabattas arrive at the scene of the woodcutting with items of food to sell. The Japs permit this sale - profiting thereby. Those carabattas proved to be reliable channels of communication with Manila. Another channel was the American truck driver who took the Jap truck into Manila each week.

2. a. Communication from the POW camp at Cabanatuan to Manila is already in effect. Col. Watrous, Medical Corps, a former physician in Manila has a reliable channel. Maj. Cavender, formerly manager of the Manila Hotel, also has one. These channels are through to their friends in Manila, and are being used to supply currency and mail into the camp. Letters from internees in Santo Tomas were not infrequent. No attempt had been made by the POW as of Oct. 1942, to use these channels for military intelligence, as there was no definite outlet for it in Manila, and the need for currency was great. The channels were used by those who had personal friends in Manila or the civilian internment camp.

b. The possibility of POW securing information of military value in Luzon appears excellent. The widely scattered working parties in important military areas cannot avoid seeing what is going on. This course of information should prove more reliable than the infrequent Filipino verbal reports which too often are colored. The state of mind of civilians, the supplies available to them and the conduct of the Japs in the area, will give us an indication of the civil support to be expected in the event of invasion.

c. (1) It appears that aside from assistance to POW at Cabanatuan, which in view of the location of the camp will be limited to letters and news bulletins, contact with the POW will develop a prolific source of military intelligence in the most important island in the Philippines. There are about 1000 officers in this camp. Selected ones could be instructed to establish an intelligence agency to question returning members of outside work details, evaluate the information and, as occasion permits, expand the scope of intelligence activities.

(2) The officers known to be in this camp, and with whom contact should be made are: Lt. Col. E Carl Englehart, CAC (formerly with G-2, Hq. Philippine Dept.); Lt. Col. Saint, Corps of Engineers; Lt. Col. Watrous, Med. Corps; and Maj. Howard Cavender. These officers are healthy with high morale, and have numerous contacts with the camp. G-2 has a letter to Maj. Erven Somerville (POW at Cabanatuan) from his wife. This letter will establish the authenticity of our contact.

(3) To take advantage of the intelligence facilities available in the POW camp will require a channel of communication from GHQ to the camp. The agency at present operating in Luzon is the Philippine Regional Section of AIB. The nature and extent of its activities need not be commented on here. The initial contact will take time; subsequent contacts with the POW will be simplified, as the POW have a direct channel to Manila.

3. a. Recommend that the P.R.S. of A.I.B. establish a channel of communication between G-2, GHQ, and the POW at the Cabanatuan Camp. The first letter to go in will contain:

(1) A letter for Maj. Somerville at Cabanatuan to establish the authenticity of the contact.

(2) A letter of instruction, re establishment of a POW intelligence system within the camp addressed to Lt. Col. E. Carl Englehart and Lt. Col. Saint, Corps of Engineers. (See Appendix C).

(3) A late news summary of world events.

C.A.W.

4 December 1943

MEMORANDUM:

TO : A. C. of S., G-2, GHQ., S.W.P.A.

1. In conversation with MIS-X at Washington, D.C., I found this section extremely active in assisting American POW in enemy hands. Among their many activities were: briefing air crews in escape procedure; methods of communicating with our forces in the event of capture; establishment of escape and intelligence channels. The activities of MIS-X has resulted in the planned escape of several hundred American POW, a continuous flow of military intelligence from the enemy area, and a highly organized POW unit in each of the enemy POW camps.

2. The 8,000 American POW now concentrated in the Philippines have had no contact with American forces since their surrender. Conditions in these camps are deplorable, morale is extremely low, guerrilla units are active in all areas, and no action has been initiated to prevent the massacre of these POWs in the event our forces land in the camp areas.

3. The two main concentration areas for American POWs are Gabanatuan (6000) in the province of Nueva Ecija and the Davao penal Colony (2000), with about 15 smaller groups on working parties nearby.

a. The Gabanatuan camp, located in the middle of Luzon, can be contacted through agents in Manila or guerrilla units operating in the area. The camp sends out working parties each day, members of which are permitted to buy items from the local people. The assistance to this camp will be limited to easily concealed mail, news bulletins, currency, etc. The effect on the morale of the POWs as a result of contact with their own forces will be very great. The camp should be directed to organize an intelligence system. The numerous working parties returning to Gabanatuan would be interrogated and a prolific source of accurate information within the occupied area thus made available. There are at least 500 officers in this camp, freedom of movement within the camp area is not restricted, and the camp can develop its own intelligence network throughout the working party areas of Luzon.

No attempt was made to obtain intelligence or interrogate incoming working parties while I was in this camp. This was due to our inability to send it out. We were able to keep a constant flow of messages to and from Manila; messages from internees at Santo Tomas University were frequent.

To assist this camp, and to obtain information from it, will require that an agency of GHQ contact the camp itself through channels which already exist in AIB. Officers to be contacted at Gabanatuan are: Maj. Larry Bosworth, CAC; Maj. R.D. Glassburn, CAC; Lt. Col. Saint, C.E.; Lt. Col. E. Carl Englehart (former member of G-2, Hq. Philippine Department).

b. (1) The camp at the Davao penal Colony presents a much easier problem. It is 52 km northeast of Davao, 12 km from the coast, and in the center of the jungle. About 30 km north of the colony there is a community of civilians who had evacuated from Davao when the Japs invaded that city. This community has organized a guerrilla unit under Maj. Laureta, a Constabulary officer who commanded an Infantry Battalion during the Jap invasion. The guerrilla unit was organized to prevent Jap interference with the life of the community, and has succeeded to such an extent, that the Japs leave them severely alone. The unit

consists of 150 rifles and 1000 men. They are extremely loyal and well organized. Travel time from Col. Fertig to Maj. Laureta is about 14 days. Maj. Laureta's unit is too far away to actively assist Col. Fertig in the north.

(2) There are 2000 POW in the colony. About 800 go out to work each day. The American camp Headquarters assigns the members to specific work details. The POW work in the rice fields, orchards and in the jungle logging. There are few Jap guards, as the hazards of the jungle and physical weakness of the POW are deterrents to escape. Contact with the POW is a simple matter. There are about 600 officers in this camp.

(3) In Maj. Laureta's organization there are at least ten men who were formerly civil prisoners in the colony. The two Filipinos who assisted our party to escape are in Mindanao and available. When our party spent ten days with Maj. Laureta, he indicated a strong desire to put himself and his unit under U.S. control. He is at present in contact with Col. Fertig's Headquarters and with civil prisoners in the colony.

He had already established numerous contacts with civilians in Davao City, had obtained several Jap passes to go into the city, and was collecting such intelligence as would enable him to keep abreast of Jap activities affecting his area. He has no radio transmitter or receiver. Laureta's outpost is 12 km from the penal colony.

4. a. Assistance to the POW at the colony can be more substantial than at Cabanatuan. It is easy to bring in relatively bulky objects into the camp. Vitamins, A and B1 particularly, mail, news bulletins can be taken in. A camera can be introduced and photographic evidence of conditions in camp secured. The range of activities and assistance will be limited by transport facilities and the ingenuity of the person concerned.


b. (1) Intelligence of enemy activities, installations, conditions in Davao and the surrounding area can be secured by an organized group within the camp, as the camp furnishes the pool of truck drivers and motor repair men for the Jap motor pool in Davao. Other working details will cover different areas.

5. Recommend that an officer be sent to Maj. Laureta to do the following:

- a. Make contact with the POW at the Davao penal colony.
- b. Furnish them such assistance in medicines and vitamins, mail, news bulletins, as transport facilities may permit.
- c. Direct the establishment of an intelligence system within the camp and act as an outlet for it.
- d. Broaden the scope of Maj. Laureta's intelligence network.
- e. Formulate a plan of action for Maj. Laureta's unit to:
 - 1) Assist the American landings through attack and sabotage of Jap installations in Davao.
 - 2) Prevent the massacre of American POW in the Davao penal colony in the event of American landings in Mindanao.
 - 3) Secure such arms, munitions and sabotage material as will enable it to fulfill its mission.


6. Officers to be contacted at the penal colony are: Lt. Col. M. Cain, CAC; Lt. Col. G.H. Stubbs, CAC; Lt. Comdr. Smith, USN, and Lt. Col. Nelson, Inf.

S.M. MELLNIK
Lt. Col., CAC



MINDANAO
10TH MILITARY DISTRICT

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
Military Intelligence Section
General Staff
APPENDIX "B"
DAVAO PENAL COLONY AND
POSSIBLE ESCAPE ROUTE



- PROVINCIAL BOUNDARIES
- 1ST & 2ND CLASS ROADS
- - - MAIN TRAILS
- GUERRILLA COURIER ROUTE BETWEEN 10TH MD HQ AND MAJOR LAURETA'S FORCES

SUBJECT: Military Intelligence.

TO : Lt. Col. E. Carol Englehart, CAC, and Lt. Col. Saint, CE,
POW Camp, Cabanatuan.

1.. It is directed that you establish an intelligence system within the POW camp to procure and evaluate information on:

- a. Enemy activities throughout Luzon, to include:
 - 1) Corregidor
 - 2) Bataan
 - 3) Clark Field
 - 4) Nichols Field
 - 5) Ft. McKinley
 - 6) Manila
 - 7) Nielson airport
- b. Conditions among civilians in populated areas to include:
 - 1) Status of food and other supplies available to civilians.
 - 2) Their attitude towards the enemy.
 - 3) Degree of cooperation to be expected when U.S. forces arrive.
- c. Conditions existing in the POW camp to include:
 - 1) Violations of Geneva Convention rules.
 - 2) Roster of prisoners, alive and dead.
 - 3) Physical condition of POW.
- d. The Jap administrative and guard unit to include:
 - 1) Number, state of training, unit and officers.
 - 2) Attitude towards POW, with trend, if any.
 - 3) Attitude towards the war.

C.A. WILLOUGHBY,
Brig. General, U. S. Army,
A. C. of S., G- 2.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF
G-2 INFORMATION BULLETIN

G-2 STAFF STUDY OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS SITUATION

NO.:

DATE:

W. D. INDEX:

25 February 1944

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

G-2 STAFF STUDY OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS SITUATION

25 February 1944.

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25 February 1944.

SUBJECT: G-2 Staff Study of the Philippine Islands Situation.

TO : Chief of Staff.

SECTION I: General Situation in the PI.

1. Guerrilla organizations were initially formed by Filipinos as a police force to check the wave of lawlessness following the breakdown of civil police due to Jap occupation. (This applies to rural areas only.) The guerrilla organizations were in reality local community police units. With the passing of time, and some "co-prosperity" education, these police units took on the added responsibility of protecting the communities from the Jap.

2. Guerrilla organizations were supported by the communities which they protected. Facilities of the towns such as power plants, machine shops, coconut oil plants, and distillation units, were made available to the guerrilla forces. As a result, coconut oil was produced to run diesel engines in launches and coconut milk was distilled for the alcohol to run the few motor vehicles available. In the more populated areas, civil administrators were established. As the Americans who had not surrendered came down from the hills, they developed command units to unify larger areas. As a result, inter-community trade and liaison were established, and the defense became an area one instead of local. Plans were made to increase the production of food, supply officers were appointed, to procure it, and a currency was established to purchase it. The civil administration, working with guerrilla authorities, is now firmly established. Gradually island areas became unified and were recognized as Military Districts (area divisions of the Philippine Army with which Filipinos were familiar). District commanders were "recognized" by GHQ, and the Philippine Regional Section of A.I. B. was established to coordinate the activities in the islands.

3. The strength of guerrilla organizations at present varies in different islands. Generally speaking, they are strongest in the islands which have the poorest road system. The strength depends pretty much on the extent of Japanese penetrations. Jap activity is centered in the more highly developed and productive islands. In assessing guerrilla strength it is important to note the extent of civilian support. Filipinos at present are more pro-American than American themselves. Reasons for this attitude would fill a book, and vary from their liking of American movies to Jap prohibition on wearing white collars and ties.

4. LUZON: Organized guerrilla activity here on a large scale is negligible. Recent reliable information shows the existance of numerous anti-Jap units, actively supported by the civil populace, but as yet unorganized. The excellent system of roads permits the Japs to police all areas and to deny the guerrillas the use of food producing areas. It will be impossible to organize a combat unit in Luzon. Intelligence activities only are carried on there. These activities are increasing in scope and should be encouraged. With an extremely loyal civil populace, ready to do anything within reason to harm and expel the enemy. It is possible to establish intelligence units in Luzon to a point where we could get daily reports of enemy troop, ship and planes strengths and movements within 24 hours. (In some sections of Luzon this is possible now.) Plans should be made now to cover all important Jap facilities in Luzon with an intelligence network. Not because of its immediate value,

but for future employment. Preparations or sabotage activities is a feature of Luzon activity to be encouraged. The volume of shipping in Manila Bay provides an excellent target. When active operations are conducted in Luzon, controlled sabotage activities will do much to hinder enemy movements. A sabotage organization, acting in conjunction with our own forces, could, on or prior to "D" day, immobilize a considerable portion of the enemy air strength and motor transport facilities.

5. The Visayan Islands of Mindoro, Panay, Negros, Bohol, Leyte and Samar are under various stages of guerrilla control. Guerrilla strength varies from 300 in Mindoro to 14,000 in Panay. The Japs are most active in Panay, Negros, and Cebu, the richest and most productive islands in the group. As our forces approach the P.I., the Japs will undoubtedly intensify their efforts to reduce the combat efficiency of the guerrillas in these areas, and will meet with considerable success. Thus the activities of the guerrilla units in the Visayas will be reduced to intelligence, harassing, ambushing and sabotage. These functions the guerrillas can carry out. Japs at present are ruthless in their destruction of guerrilla supporting communities in these areas. Whole communities evacuate to the hills when the Japs approach. In the mountains Jap patrols find the going too expensive. It will be impossible for the Japs to eradicate all resistance in these areas, although they can and probably will, keep it in a disorganized state. We should therefore plan on receiving sabotage and intelligence assistance from the Visayas; if they can actively support our operations with combat units, so much the better. At present, the Visayan Islands are the bases from which intelligence activities are carried on in Luzon.

6. a. MINDANAO: This island is ideal for guerrilla organization. The size of the island, plus the limited number of cross island roads, the mountainous nature of the terrain, and the large number of inland agricultural communities, provide guerrilla units with food, protection and maneuver room. Japs now occupy in force the cities of Davao, Cotabato, Zamboanga and Gagayan, with smaller units (100-300) in other communities. Outside of Davao proper, Jap penetrations are possible only in force. Jap force in Mindanao total about 12,000 men.

b. The guerrilla organization here has about 20,000 men, of whom half are armed. The island is divided into division and regimental areas. About 100 Americans hold key positions and run the extensive radio net. The crying need in Mindanao is American combat officers. The 100 Americans there are mostly enlisted men of the Air Corps, Infantry and Navy, who were able to avoid capture. Their experience and vision is limited. Their primary purpose is to wait the war out as comfortably as possible; their morale precludes any aggressive activity. In short, they are tired, have been on the defense too long, and are in need of assistance if the latent power of the guerrilla units is to be fully developed.

c. The nuclei of combat groups already exist. Divisional, regimental and battalion areas are recognized and accepted. Boundaries between units are definite. Units have definite missions. Commanders are known to each other. Terrain studies are being made. A carabao transport system has been established to facilitate the distribution of food. All units are in radio or courier touch with the 10th M.D. Headquarters. Airfields are being built. American prestige is extremely high. Units must be restrained from seeking combat with the Japs.

d. The present policy of GHQ with respect to Mindanao is to supply the troops with arms, medical supplies and radios. Continue the organization and consolidation of positions. Avoid any aggressive action which will bring Jap reinforcements into the area. Concentrate on developing coast watcher stations and intelligence.

e. Notes on guerrillas:

(1) Units are skilled at ambushing the enemy. They will attack a column or convoy and run away, awaiting another opportunity. They are not accustomed to bombing or shelling. Either type of activity will disperse them.

(2) Units are extremely mobile within a few days walking distance from source of supply. Unit Headquarters consist of commander and a few messengers. To concentrate a large force in a particular area will require time to build up food supplies in the area.

(3) Units have maximum fighting efficiency in their own areas.

(a) They know the trails like a book - a force unfamiliar with the area will have extreme difficulty in making progress even without opposition.

(b) Nearby communities are extremely loyal to the units. When units are withdrawn to the hills, the people move with them.

(c) They have effectively blocked roads and trails leading into their areas by burning bridges, constructing road blocks and machinegun nests, and active patrolling. In one Jap penetration from Cagayan to Talakog with 800 men, a guerrilla force of 150 delayed the Jap advance of 30 miles for 8 days, inflicting over a hundred casualties. The Japs stayed in Talakog about three days and then withdrew. Their return to Cagayan was harassed every step of the way, resulting in many more casualties. Such Jap forays do little damage; their casualties raise the morale of the guerrilla units, and the civilians are further convinced of the necessity of supporting the guerrilla forces. Such delaying operations are now being accomplished with a limited ammunition supply, 30 cal. rifles, a few machine guns, and no trench mortars, bazookas or land mines.

(d) The lengthy coastlines of all the islands makes inter-island traffic quite secure. The Jap patrol boats cannot stop all the native bancas using the inland seas, as distances are short enough to be covered in a few hours of darkness. The overwhelming loyalty of the Filipino people assures assistance and shelter to Filipinos and Americans.

7. Summary of expected minimum guerrilla effort in support of our own forces, assuming adequate planning, continuation of present supply facilities and a more directive control over guerrilla activities in the P.I. than is being exercised by the Philippine Regional Section of A.I.B.

a. LUZON and VISAYAN ISLANDS:

(1) Prompt and accurate intelligence of all enemy activities on a wide scale prior to and after operations in the area are started.

(2) Planned sabotage of Jap airfields, motor and rail transport, coordinated with our own effort.

(3) Nuclei of combat organizations now in being, which can be recruited, officered and equipped by our forces after occupation to augment our combat strength.

b. MINDANAO:

- (1) Complete intelligence coverage of enemy units and military installations such as airfields, docks, landing beaches, etc.
- (2) Planned sabotage of Japs airfields, motor transports and shipping, to be coordinated with our "D" day effort.
- (3) Combat units to secure and guard a beachhead prior to our landing.
- (4) Continue construction of airfields now underway, seize enemy emergency landing fields.
- (5) Combat units to delay enemy advance against our beachheads thru destruction of bridges, mining of roads, roadblocks and delaying actions.
- (6) Following occupation of Mindanao:
 - (a) Organized combat units to be recruited to full strength, equipped with arms, officered by our forces, to be used for further operations. At least 20,000 men are now organized into loose organizations. Their use will permit us to reduce our L of C garrisons, take care of isolated Jap units hiding in the mountains, and spearhead an attack to the north.
 - (b) Expand the present guerrilla civil administration to take immediate control of civil affairs, thus releasing our forces for tactical duties.
 - (c) Immediately put into effect plans for increased food production to augment our food supplies.

SECTION II: Situation in Mindanao.

A. DISCUSSION:

1. In addition to intelligence and sabotage activities, the guerrilla organization in Mindanao can be equipped and trained to assist our forces with combat elements. We have complete freedom of action in 95% of the island. Jap activities outside of occupied cities are limited to patrols in force along main highways. These forays are becoming more expensive to the Jap as our supplies increase. The possibility that the Japs will send a strong force into Mindanao to neutralize the guerrilla forces does not exist. However, with a strength of 12,000 in Mindanao he is unable to control more than 5% of the territory. To seriously curtail guerrilla activities will require ten times as many men as he now has in the area. Logistics and guerrilla activities preclude any attempt by the enemy to concentrate 100,000 men on the island. To neutralize guerrilla activities will require that every town and village be occupied in force. These villages and towns are extremely anti-Jap, and are the centers of guerrilla activity. The Jap forces (assuming they do occupy every village) will be extremely dispersed, with limited ability to concentrate in any one particular area. In view of the above, it is unlikely that the enemy will immobilize such a large force on the island, and it follows that it is unlikely he will be able to neutralize the guerrilla organization. The Jap has been aware of the extent of the guerrilla organization since early 1943, and has been unable to do much about it. His probable course of action will be to concentrate his forces in key areas where supply will be easy and rapid communication possible. Davao, Cotabato, Zamboanga, Cagayan and Surigao are the possible concentration centers. Davao being the richest and most centrally located city, will most likely be the main Jap concentration area, as troops from here can move by water or marching

to Cotabato and Cagayan, and by water to Zamboanga and Surigao. Davao city, with its substantial Jap population, is being used as a supply base, an outlet for the islands rice, hemp and lumber, and is being developed to make the Jap forces in Mindanao self-sufficient.

Acting on the assumption that our guerrilla forces can be kept intact, supplied and expanded, let us see what they can do to assist our forces prior to and after occupation.

2. Intelligence:

- a. A complete picture of enemy ground units.
- b. Data on all his airfields, including description, number of planes, fuel storage places, repair facilities, ammunition dumps.
- c. Data on all shipping entering Davao Gulf.
- d. Trail maps of areas we wish to operate in.
- e. A radio connected coastwatcher system already in effect in Mindanao and the Visayan Islands.
- f. Spot reports on all enemy activities in the island on short notice, via established radio net.

3. Sabotage:

- a. All enemy air fields. It would be possible for a well planned sabotage organization to practically ground all enemy planes in Mindanao on, or a few days before "D" day.
- b. Enemy shipping in Davao, Cotabato, Zamboanga and Surigao.
- c. Delay the advance of enemy coming to attack our beachhead by:
 - (1) Planting land mines in the roads (the limited road net canalizes motor traffic into bottlenecks).
 - (2) Destroying bridges in advance of the enemy. (These bridges are usually small ones over streams, and can be rebuilt in a day).

4. Combat Units:

- a. Secure such beachheads as we need prior to our landing.
- b. Seize lightly guarded enemy emergency landing fields.
- c. Delay enemy advance against our beachhead by means of road blocks and delaying actions.
- d. Continue with present construction of airfields.
- e. Diversionsary attacks on enemy concentrations coordinated with our "D" day effort.

5. Post-occupation Activity:

- a. Organized combat units to be recruited to full strength, equipped with arms, officered by our forces, to be used for further operations.
- b. The present guerrilla civil administration to be expanded through prior appointments by the head of the Commonwealth government.
- c. Put into effect plans for increased production and distribution of food for our forces.
- d. Mobilization of civil manpower for stevedoring, road repair, airfield construction and such other work as may be required by our forces.

B. GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION OF MINDANAO.

1. Headquarters 10th Military District is the directing agency of U.S. Forces in Mindanao. It is commanded by Col. W. Fertig, Corps of Engineers, who was called to active duty in April 1941 for the purpose of constructing airfields. About 47 years old, he was on duty in Mindanao at the time of the surrender. He fled to the hills and later came down and assumed command of guerrilla forces. He established communications with GHQ, and has gradually extended his control over all guerrilla forces in the island.

2. With the assistance of AIB parties, he has established an excellent coastwatcher system with a large radio net. He is gradually expanding his intelligence system to cover the island. Due to his pre-occupation with administrative problems, lack of experienced assistants, his own inexperience, and the fatigue induced by living under pressure, he has reached the limit of his capabilities. It must be remembered that the guerrilla movement was a spontaneous and individual affair. Local leaders are still not trustful of this man who assumed control over units which THEY had organized. Col. Fertig is not a forceful personality. His influence at present stems from his being the source of all supplies from the SWPA, and that he is the officially recognized CO of the 10 M.D. His authority to commission officers is doubted (actually he has recommended the appointment of several Americans as officers). His authority to induct guerrilla units into the service of the U.S. in Negros. Actions which he should take relative to organization, promotion of officers, legalizing guerrilla units, pay laws, disability benefits, etc., are at present too numerous for him to handle even if he did have the authority to act.

3. As the guerrilla organizations grew up individually, they began to cooperate with each other for mutual exchange of foodstuffs and information. The assumption of command by Fertig came considerably later. Most of the units he had not seen. Local leaders paid him lip service only, and their cooperation was in direct proportion to what he could do for the units in obtaining supplies. This cooperation has increased considerably as greater amounts of supplies were shipped into the area, and the extent of GHQ's support of the 10th MD was noticed. In passing, the entire Philippine guerrilla movement is being retarded because of the lack of a recognized GHQ appointed commander who has not been involved in the early guerrilla force scramble for power.

4. Civil authorities in guerrilla areas were delighted to cooperate, as the guerrillas were the sole law enforcement agencies. Civil provincial governors, judges, etc., who held those jobs prior to the war were allowed to continue. Those civil officials who had cooperated with the Japs were liquidated by the civilians, or took refuge in Jap occupied territory. The Japs receive little cooperation from civil authorities in the occupied cities of Mindanao. Such cooperation is merely a means to survival. The people, who see their properties taken over by the Japs military and civilians, are firmly resolved to wait it out, are keeping their bolos sharpened, and continue to maintain contact with guerrilla forces. The Jap version of the Gestapp, the "Kempei" makes sporadic attempts at exterminating subversive activities, but normally concentrates on the wealthier Filipinos whose properties they can appropriate. Civil administrators and currency committees are appointed by President Quezon, their powers are defined, and their activities will continue until a Commonwealth government is established. For our purposes, it can be assumed that civil officials will be available to step into jobs now held by Jap puppets when occupation takes place. The Filipino civilians will have taken care of puppet officials prior to our arrival.

5. In 95% of Mindanao, civilian communities continue to live under normal conditions. Occasional Jap forays (about every 6 months) merely provide a bit of excitement to an otherwise placid existence. This state of affairs is due largely to the fertile soil, much cultivated land, and an abundant food supply. The island is practically self-sufficient in all respects. Coconut oil and distilled coconut milk serves as fuel; abaca furnished the fiber for weaving clothes, the land will grow 3 crops of corn per year. Sugar, coffee, and cocoa are cultivated. There is sufficient rice, corn and camotes (a lowgrade sweet potato) for the people, while pigs and chickens are just as

numerous as ever. Sole civilian shortages are shoes (which rural Filipinos wear for adornment), matches, soap and medicines. Such items were never too plentiful in the rural districts, and their loss is not too great a hardship. The Japs offer the civilian a job in the rice paddy, an opportunity to learn "Nippon-go", a return to the days of no toilet facilities, no movie or ice cream, no white collar jobs, and most irritating of all, no political discussions. The Filipinos have responded to "co-prosperity" inducements with tongues in cheek in the occupied areas, and with open ridicule in unoccupied areas. The initial Jap propoganda effort was directed to make the "back to the soil" movement palatable to the Filipinos. In view of the high standards of education and the high proportion of adult literates in the Philippines, this attempt to push the Filipino people back into the rice paddies, has aroused all the parents of children for whom better things were planned. The Jap was quite sincere and outspoken in his idea that the Filipinos were to be the laborers while the Japs would do the directing. A policy such as this, forced on a people having the highest standard of living in the Far East, an occidental culture derived from 400 years of contact with white people, and an awareness of the equality of all people, was bound to cause extreme bitterness and resistance. The policy has accomplished all that and more. It can be taken for granted that in the entire Philippine area the people will actively support our efforts to expel the enemy. This paper is concerned with capitalizing the physical and human resources of Mindanao to assist our war effort.

6. The present policy of GHQ towards the Philippines is to supply the guerrilla units with arms, medical supplies and radios. Continue the organization and consolidation of positions, avoid any aggressive action which will bring Jap reinforcements into the area, and concentrate on developing coastwatcher stations and intelligence. This policy has encouraged guerrilla forces, aided them and has resulted in a stable, well organized civil and military government controlling 95% of the territory of Mindanao. This organization has the enthusiastic support of the civilians in the area. It has developed transport facilities for exchange of commodities, arranged for the planting of crops for guerrilla forces, established an authorized system of currency, set up a coastwatcher and intelligence system, divided the island into regimental areas, and in all respects, has justified the policy and faith of GHQ in the American and Filipino people living in the area. Inclosure No. 1 is a map of Mindanao showing organization, troop dispositions, and regimental areas of Mindanao. A breakdown of Americans in the area is included, with sketches of leading commanders and staffs. Considering the total personnel of the guerrilla units, the most striking feature of the set up is the extremely small number of experienced American officers. It is a tribute to the foreign policy of America, that the Filipinos people have rallied around the few Americans to such an extent. The situation in Mindanao at present is such that healthy Americans with guerrilla forces do NOT want to be evacuated, and a recent evacuee, having had his appendix removed, has asked to be returned to the area.

C. CONCLUSIONS:

1. From the above discussion, certain conclusions can be drawn about Mindanao; extent of its possible assistance to our war effort, and the need for active direction of guerrilla activities by GHQ.

a. The 10th Military District in Mindanao is a stable, well organized well run unit of the U.S. Army.

b. The possibility of its neutralization by the enemy prior to our invasion is remote.

c. The extent of civilian support of guerrilla units, quite sizeable at present, will increase in scope as our forces approach the Philippine Islands.

d. That the latent power of guerrilla and civilian units in the area if properly directed, will do much to assist our landings, save us thousands of lives, and months of time.

e. That intelligent planning and direction will shorten the period of confusion following occupation, establish civil government promptly, permit our mobilization of civil manpower for military use, and make the transition from Jap occupation to American occupation as rapid and as painless as possible.

f. That available American personnel have reached the limit of their capabilities. This is due not of inefficiency, but to lack of trained staff and combat officers.

2. To exploit the latent power of Mindanao will require intelligent direction of the intelligence and tactical units of the guerrilla forces. In view of the lack of trained personnel in the area, it is believed impractical to maintain such direction by remote control from the SWPA. The personnel available in Mindanao are unable to do more than keep the status quo. Considering the vast amount of work yet to be done in the area, training and organizing units, building up food supplies, preparing unit dispositions to assist our forces, coordinating intelligence agencies, planning for eventual expansion of civil governments, it is evident that the available American personnel in Mindanao are too few and inexperienced to handle the job.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. This discussion leads to an obvious recommendation: that qualified American staff and combat officers be sent into the area. A limited number initially to make a survey of material and personnel needs. They will undoubtedly recommend further additions. Specifically, the following personnel should now be sent in:

a. A senior officer, rank of Colonel or Brigadier General, to take command of all U.S. Forces in the Philippines. He should be physically active, resourceful, with sound judgment (see "2" below for amplification).

b. An officer, grade of Lt. Colonel or Colonel, as operations officer. He should have had staff training if not experience.

c. An officer, grade of Captain or Major, trained in intelligence work, to develop and coordinate G-2 activities in the PI.

d. An officer, grade of Captain or Major, Signal Corps, with radio experience, to advise on all matters pertaining to radio traffic (present personnel in Mindanao handling radios are EM from PT boats, B-17s and Filipinos).

e. An officer, grade of Captain or Major, with Australian "commando" training, to investigate use to which sabotage material can be used, train commando units, and recommend type of equipment to be sent in.

f. Five officers (1 for each division area), rank of Captain or Major, Infantry, with combat training if not experience, to investigate the needs of divisions, assist in planning defense of those areas, recommend types of equipment required, and extent to which guerrillas can support our effort.

2. At first sight it does not appear reasonable or necessary to send in an officer senior to Col. Fertig. However, the prompt unification of guerrilla elements in the PI requires an unbiased GHQ appointee.

a. Col. Fertig has attained his position as CO 10th MD in competition with other guerrilla leaders. Prior to stabilization of the Military Districts, he had attempted to extend his control to other areas outside of Mindanao. This move has caused considerable resentment among the other island leaders, the resentment resulting in their taking a suspicious viewpoint of all Fertig's activities. As the bulk of supplies are at present going to Colonel Fertig's area, they feel their suspicions are well founded.

b. The greatest unifying element in the PI at present is Gen. MacArthur. His influence exceeds that of all others, including President Quezon. GHQ visitors to the areas so far have been transient observers with specific missions. A GHQ appointee to take command of all guerrilla units would be welcomed by all factions because it would indicate:

- (1) Increased interest by Gen. MacArthur in guerrilla forces.
- (2) Imminence of more concrete support.
- (3) An arbiter with GHQ authority to settle disputes and make decisions not colored by personal ambitions or prior commitments.
- (4) An end to the confusion resulting from misinterpreted radio messages from GHQ to MD commanders.
- (5) A more realistic GHQ policy towards the PI forces, based on sound, unbiased recommendations of a known and trusted commander.

c. Col. Fertig is an excellent administrator but has little if any tactical experience. While a tactical commander is necessary in Mindanao, it is much more important to have a GHQ representative to command all U.S. Forces in the PI, as Mindanao is only one part of the PI picture.

c. The officer sent into the area must be physically active, as he will need to travel considerably. He should have had considerable military experience in the field to enable him to make sound military recommendations based on resources and terrain. While previous experience with Filipinos and the Philippines is desirable, it is not absolutely essential. The important essential is that GHQ have confidence in his judgment. His observations, investigations and recommendations will cover a wide field, from currency committees to landing beaches. Such an officer would be of inestimable value to us in preparing the groundwork for future operations.

SECTION III: Direction of PI Activities.

A. DISCUSSION.

1. Strengthening our forces in the PI with additional office personnel and supplies will be a great step forward in putting the PI forces on a working basis. The result of additional officers will be more definite military recommendations, more specific intelligence data, and requests for a definition of policy on numerous civil affairs.

2. a. The agency charged with the conduct of affairs in the PI is the Philippine Regional Section of A.I.B. It was established originally to maintain radio traffic with guerrilla units. Prior to that time the initial organization was developed by G-2 with policy decisions by the C-in-C; the ground work for current activities was laid under a plan "Signal Communications required for Philippine Operations" which covered intelligence and coastwatchers; supply of radios and the organization of a signal company to handle the traffic. As communication facilities increased, it was found possible to send in supplies. The Navy was interested in coastwatcher stations, so it provided operational subs to take radios, coastwatcher parties, and arms into the area. Several parties have already been sent in, the volume of supplies has steadily increased, our information on internal conditions has likewise increased, and has disclosed an exceedingly favorable state of affairs.

b. PRS now has the duty of advising the C-in-C in guerrilla matters, arranging for supplies to be shipped to the islands, establishing coastwatchers stations, sending intelligence parties into the area, and interpreting for the C-in-C the guerrilla messages for GHQ. G-2 coordinates messages and comments, and publishes a monthly G-2/G-3 Situation Report and Estimate, for limited staff circulation. Extracts

of these reports reach O.P.D., War Department. When guerrilla activities were a mystery, and the guerrilla agencies were getting started, the PRS was adequate to handle the problems. The PI situation has changed considerably, (or rather our knowledge of it has become greater). It is a situation where 16,000,000 people are anxiously awaiting our return; where anti-Jap organizations exist all over the country seeking for means to help us; where civil governments, loyal to the U. S., function and defy the invader. That is the situation confronting GHQ. The problem is how to capitalize on the manpower, loyalty and available resources in the PI to the end that our conquest of the islands will cost us the least in man power and time. The PI problem has outgrown the exploratory stage. It is now an operational and intelligence problem. A list of things which PI forces can do is contained in Section 1, para. 2 of this study, under the headings of Intelligence, Sabotage, Combat Units, and Post Occupation activity. It is firmly believed that these activities represent a MINIMUM of what we can expect if aggressive and intelligent direction is given PI affairs.

c. Known United Nations strength and current operations point to an accelerated allied advance into the PI. It is believed that planning for PI activities should be taken over by General Staff Sections.

3. a. Activities with respect to PI affairs fall under the general heading of:

- (1) Procurement, evaluation, analysis and compilation of intelligence, both operational and civil.
- (2) Tactical organization and training of guerrilla units.
- (3) Planning for specific use of guerrilla forces.
- (4) Planning for conduct of civil affairs, to include governments finance, civil economy, propoganda and Quislings.
- (5) Supply of, and communication with, guerrilla forces.

b. Intelligence activities under 3.a.(1) above, is at present a PRS affair coordinated with G-2. There was a small PI section of G-2, recently enlarged to cope with increased volume of intelligence coming in. The extent and value of this intelligence is constantly increasing. This activity should be a G-2 function, with PRS the collecting agency.

c. Organization and training activities under 3.A.(2) above is at present, charged to no staff section. The limited number of trained officers in the PI precludes any such activity. Guerrillas do not know how to use new weapons such as bazooka guns, land and tank mines (ideal weapons in guerrilla areas). The ease with which Filipinos can travel throughtout the area should be capitalized by training natives in sabotage activity and cammando work. The training of these troops for specific tasks cannot be over emphasized. This activity should be charged to G-3.

e. Civil affairs activities under 3.a.(4) above are handled by the C-in-C, in conjunction with the Philippine Commonwealth government in Washington, D.C. The numerous civil problems attending our occupation will require that a competent person or group, familiar with PI government affairs, be present to plan for and advise the C-in-C in these matters.

f. Supply of guerrillas under 3.a.(5) above is now handled by PRS. This agency had developed an excellent supply system to the PI. The volume of supplies is increasing; the facilities for such supplies will likewise increase. The type of supplies (at present combat and morale) will require study to fit it in with the planning. PRS should continue to handle this phase of the work.

B. CONCLUSIONS.

1. The extent of PI activities has reached a stage where general staff sections must study the problem with a view to:
 - a. Outlining staff procedure to be followed in handling PI affairs.
 - b. Assigning definite responsibilities to general staff section.
 - c. Establishing a "Philippine Island General Affairs Section" to study, plan for and advise the C-in-C on civil affairs.
2. To take advantage of the assistance which the organized forces in the PI can give us, our key personnel must be sent in at least 6 months prior to our attack. Planning must start at least nine (9) months prior to attack day.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. That a "Philippine Island General Affairs Section" be established under the Chief of Staff, with the mission of studying and planning for conduct of civil affairs to include :
 - a. Government, finance, economy, propaganda.
 - b. Mobilization of civil economy to assist our effort.Since the G-2 will be involved in the analyses of PI intelligence, this section should maintain close liaison with G-2.
2. That intelligence matters be assigned to G-2, charged with the dispatch of missions, planning, procuring, evaluation, analyzing and compiling PI intelligence.
3. That organization and training of PI units be assigned to G-3, with the mission of preparing PI forces to support our effort.
4. That supply matters be assigned to G-4, with PRS as its operating agency (in view of its success and experience in supplying guerrillas to date).
5. That Communications be assigned to the Chief Signal Officer.

C. A. WILLOUGHNEY,
Brigadier General, U.S. Army,
A. C. of S., G-2.

ANALYSIS OF STRENGTH AND EQUIPMENT 10th MILITARY DISTRICT

(See Map Attached)

SUMMARY (taken from available figures, and does not include the Sulu Command):

	<u>U.S. Personnel</u>	<u>Total Personnel</u>	<u>Total Arms</u>
Mil Dist Hq	37	-	-
105th Division	2	3500	2100
106th Division	5	3000	1500
108th Division	4	6000	4000
109th Division	7	3000	1600
110th Division	<u>27</u>	<u>4000</u>	<u>3000</u>
TOTAL	82	19500	12200

NOTE: Commander Parsons states that Col. Fertig told him that as of 5 December 1943 the total guerrilla personnel on Mindanao were 28,400 and the total arms registered 16,000. The distribution of the difference between above totals is not known.

U.S. Personnel known to be on Mindanao with guerrillas 82
Total of these known to have been holding commission
before surrender 10
Total of these known to now be holding guerrilla
commissions, or appointed to commissions AUS
since surrender 51

Total known personnel shown on map and listed as
key personnel (incl Filipinos). 32
Total of these known to have held commissions prior to
surrender (incl Filipinos). 18

DATA ON KNOWN MINDANAO GUERRILLA LEADERS **

(See Map Attached)

GRINSTEAD, Lt. Col. James, AUS: *

40-45 years, US Army Reserve in PI. Brought to PI by Gen. Wood in 1926 as one of several hand picked young officers to strengthen the Philippine Constabulary. Was sent to Mindanao as a Lieut. PC and according to Doctor HAYDEN did a good job suppressing the Moro outlaws there. He rose to a Captain and was Provincial Inspector for Lanao, left the Constabulary in 1936-37 and conducted a personal business on Mindanao. Joined the guerrillas in early 1943, placed in command of the guerrilla 106th Division in December 1943. Dr. HAYDEN considers him very capable.

MORTERA, Lt. Col. Ciriaco, PA:

Graduated PC Academy 1917 and was active in combating the Mindanao guerrillas afterwards. Was deputy governor of Cotabato, in 1938 was stationed in Cotabato as Major and was on Cebu with General CHENOWYTH before surrender of the USAFFE forces. Was CO of the (guerrilla) 106th Infantry in Misamis Occidental in 1942 and later became CO of the (guerrilla) 105th Division, Zamboanga and Misamis Occidental. Is reported to be trusted by FERTIG and holds his own with the other American Division commanders on Mindanao. Personally known to Dr. HAYDEN who considers him able and completely reliable.

SUAREZ, Lt. Col. Alejandro, PA;

Well educated Constabulary officer with a year in the University of Michigan. Served many years in the southern islands and earned for himself a reputation as a determined and fearless officer. Left the Sulu where he had been station commander and deputy governor of Siasi, in 1938. Was Provincial Commander of Province Cagayan when the war broke out and was sent shortly after to Sulu as provincial Governor to strengthen the position there. He fought the Japanese on Jolo and then escaped to Cotabato and fought with the USAFFE forces until surrender. Escaped from the Japs and returned to Sulu to organize the guerrillas there. Well known to Dr. HAYDEN, who speaks highly of his ability.

HEDGES, Lt. Col. Charles, AUS:

American gold mining engineer in Philippines for several years, was commissioned on Mindanao in April 1942 and performed duty as CO Motor Transport, 81st Division in Lanao. Went to hills after surrender, joined Fertig early in the guerrilla movement and was appointed CO of the guerrilla 108th Division in Lanao in 1943. FERTIG states he is an excellent worker and has demonstrated his leadership ability. KUDER states he is an excellent field commander.

CURAMING, Major: *

Was among original guerrilla leaders in Lanao, commanding the 120th (guerrilla) Regt north of Iligan. Present duty not reported, possibly G-2 108th Division.

KALAO, Major Busran: *

Moro Datu, active in organizing the Bolo Bn on Mindanao before surrender of the USAFFE forces and in persuading the Moros of Lanao to resist the Japanese. Was hostile to the guerrillas originally but joined forces with the 108th (guerrilla) Division early in 1943. Was associated for a time with Capt. MORGAN'S activities. CO of the 126th (guerrilla) Regt. Southwestern Lanao, still active in anti-Jap propoganda among the Moros. KUDER does not like him personally.

MINDALANO, Capt. Manalao: *

Moro Datu in Lanao, CO 127th (guerrilla) Regt in southeastern Lanao. Reported to be one of most brilliant and ruthless Moros in dealing with the Japanese. Former school teacher.

BAGUINDAALI, Major Anonngo: *

Another colorful Moro Datu in Lanao, CO 129th (guerrilla) Regt, northeastern Lanao.

AIF OFFICERS, Capt. K. A. STEELE, Lts. R. BLOW and GILLOR:

With the AIF in Singapore, taken prisoner at surrender, moved to Kuching early 1943 and later to Sandakan in North Borneo, escaped from Sandakan in June 1943 and arrived at Tawi Tawi in August or September 1943 where they assisted the Sulu guerrillas until leaving for Mindanao in November 1943. On Mindanao they assisted the 109th (guerrilla) Division in successful attacks on Japanese patrols landing along the north coast of Lanao in January 1944. Col. FERTIG values their services.

McGEE, Lt. Col. Frank, AUS:

Retired Major, Cavalry, American resident in PI, plantation owner from the Mati, Davao area. Was interned by the Japanese and escaped in early 1943, went to Cotabato, joined the guerrillas there and was made CO of the 106th (guerrilla) Division when it was formed in Cotabato in Dec. 1943.

PAGE, Major Herbert, PC:

45-50 years, old time Constabulary officer. In 1938 was a Major stationed in Zamboanga as Provost for southern Mindanao, now CO 116th (guerrilla) Regt in southern Cotabato and Davao. Dr. HAYDEN states his rating is not very high.

FERTIG, Col. Wendell W., AUS:

Mining engineer before war connected with Masbate Consolidated Gold, went to Manila 1941 on construction work for the US Army Engineers. Was on Bataan and later sent to Mindanao to replace Major Eads of General Sharpe's command. Escaped to the hills at time of surrender coming out late in 1942 to coordinate the guerrilla bands on Mindanao. Well liked by the people for organizing peace and supplies on the island. Does most of work without staff, for want of capable assistance.

McCLISH, Lt. Col. Ernest E., AUS:

Formerly and officer in the 61st Infantry and stationed at the Malabang airfield. Was in Bukidnon after surrender and went to NE Mindanao early in 1943 to command guerrilla forces there. Is an active figure in local social activities and popular with the Filipinos. Combat duties reported to be left largely to Major CHILDRESS. There is some indication McCLISH is not always discreet or tactful in his dealings.

CHILDRESS, Major Clyde, AUS:

Former Lieut., 61st Infantry. After surrender he joined the guerrillas at Sindangan, Zamboanga, in 1943 he moved to the 110th (guerrilla) Division area and is now Chief of Staff of the Division. He is reported to be a fearless fighter, well liked by the people and commands the loyalty of his men.

DONGALLO, Capt.:

It is believed he has had training in the Army or Constabulary and saw some action before surrender. Was with ABBOTT at Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, when ABBOTT started organizing the guerrillas there. Later McCLISH moved him to Gingoog to strengthen the guerrilla organization there, is hard hitting, tough, able and well liked. Evacuees report that he is one of the most reliable of Filipinos under combat conditions.

ABBOTT, Capt. Clyde: *

Formerly PFC, Hq and Hq Sqdn, 19th Bomb Group, now Executive Officer of the 110th (guerrilla) Infantry, Balingasag. ABBOTT was one of the prime movers of the guerrilla movement in Misamis Oriental. Evacuees had a good deal of respect for him and indicated he does a good job with the training he has.

MARSHALL, Capt. Paul: *

Formerly a Sergeant, 60th Coast Artillery, on Bataan and Corregidor, taken prisoner, moved to Davao and escaped from the Davao Penal Colony in April 1943. Was G-2 110th (guerrilla) Division, later CO 114th (guerrilla) Regt, Surigao. Able but lacks training.

SPIELMAN, Lt. Robert: *

Formerly EM, Hq Det USAFFE, taken prisoner time of surrender, moved to Davao and escaped from Davao Penal Colony April 1943. Served with G-3 (114th guerrilla) Regt, Surigao and later as A. C. of S., G-3 110th (guerrilla) Division. No training.

HIPE, Capt. Leo: *

Filipino, former EM, saw action on Luzon during the campaign, escaped to Mindanao and joined the guerrillas in Misamis Occidental. Not trained for intelligence work but worked self up from the bottom, now acting as A.C. of S., G-2 for the Headquarters.

BOWLER, Lt. Col. Robert V., AUS:

35-40 years, regular Army officer, was at Davao with the 38th Division, escaped to the hills after surrender. Took command of the 109th (guerrilla) Division early 1943, named by FERTIG to assume command 10th MD should anything happen to him, was appointed CO "A" Corps (consisting 105th, 106th, and 108th Divisions) early January 1944 with Headquarters in vicinity of Iala, Lanao. Is reported to be a quiet and not particularly good mixer.

PENDATUN, Major Salapida: *

Cotabato Moro Datu, graduate of College of Law, University of Philippines, held a reserve FA commission and called to active duty before war, promoted to 1st Lt. before surrender, organized and acted as commander of the Moro Bn of Cotabato. After surrender was one of first guerrilla leaders in the Cotabato-Upper Bukidnon area, was reluctant to join 10th MD forces, later was under BOWLER command and then moved to Cotabato as commander of the Northern Cotabato area 106th (guerrilla) Division. Dr. HAYDEN states he is intelligent, has displayed unusual initiative and energy and is one of the most promising young Moros.

UDTOG, Datu Matalam:

Illiterate Cotabato Moro, brother-in-law to PENDATUN, one of the most powerful Moros in southeastern Cotabato. His men were a portion of the Bolo Bn under General Vachon and saw action in the Digos-Dacao front before surrender of the USAFFE forces. The Bn has been reorganized as part of the guerrilla forces.

DISANGALAN, Datu:

Similar background to UDTOG and PENDATUN, probably attached to PENDATUN's unit.

LASANG, Lt. Salvador: *

Nothing known of his abilities, serving as Asst Adjutant General, the 10th MD Adjutant being removed.

DIVA, Pacifico. PA: *

Present grade unknown, formerly Lt. in QMC, 1940; now believed acting as A. C. of S., G-4, 10th MD.

ARONDINE, Major: *

No information available, possibly A. C. of S., G-3, 10th MD, held post in 1943 until September, at least.

GARCIA, Lt. Patriciano: *

Apparently had experience in G-1 office work before surrender and was known to be acting as A.C. of S., 10th MD before the Hq moved from Misamis Occidental in June 1943.

EVANS, Major James, AUS, MC:


American Army surgeon, went to PI late in 1943 with Major Smith. Now Signal officer and surgeon at CP of CO 10th MD.

YOUNG, Lt. Robert H., AUS:

Filipino, 24 years, saw action as a Lt. in PA on Luzon in the Philippines campaign, joined guerrillas on Zambales after surrender and came to Australia in 1942 as special messenger to Gen. MacARTHUR. He returned as second in command Capt. Hamners party.

**This list is not inclusive, covering only leaders which have been reported to date.


* Commissions not confirmed by SWPA, etc.



MINDANAO
10TH MILITARY DISTRICT

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
Military Intelligence Section
General Staff

GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONS
15 FEBRUARY 1944



----- PROVINCIAL BOUNDARIES
——— 1ST & 2ND CLASS ROADS
- - - - - MAIN TRAILS

109th DIVISION:
Lt. Col. James Grinstead, CO
Leading figures: None reported
Total U.S. personnel: 7
Total Div. Strength: 3,000
Total Div. Arms: 1,600

10th MILITARY DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS:
Col. Wendell W. Fertig, AUS, CO (CP on Agusan)
Lt. Col. Robert V. Bowler, C/S in charge Hq.
G-1: Lt. Patriciano Garcia (?)
G-2: Capt. Leo Hipe (with Col. Fertig)
G-3: Major Arondine (?)
G-4: Diva (temporarily on Agusan w/Fertig)
AG: Lt. Lasang (with Fertig), probably temporarily.

105th DIVISION:
Lt. Col. Ciriaco Mortera, PA, CO
Leading figures: None reported
Total U.S. personnel: 2
Total Div. Strength: 3,500
Total Div. Arms: 2,100

SULU COMMAND:
Lt. Col. Alejandro Suarez, PA, CO
Lt. Robert H. Young, AUS
Total U.S. personnel: 5
Total Area Strength: 4-500
Total Area Arms: 150

108th DIVISION:
Lt. Col. Charles Hedges, AUS, CO
Leading figures:
Major Curaming
Major Busran Kalao
Major Anonngo Banguidaoli
Captain Manalao Mandalano
3 AIF officers
Total U.S. personnel: 4
Total Australian: 6
Total Div. Strength: 6,000
Total Div. Arms: 4,000

106th DIVISION:
Lt. Col. Frank McGee, AUS, CO
Leading figures:
Major Herbert Page
Major Salapida Pendatum
Dater Dilangalan
Dater Matalam Udtog
Total U.S. personnel: 5
Total Div. Strength: 3,000
Total Div. Arms: 1,500

(1)
CP of CO 10th MILITARY DISTRICT:
Col. Wendell W. Fertig, AUS, CO
Staff:
G-1: None (see 10th MD Hq.)
G-2: Capt. Leo Hipe
G-3: None (see 10th MD Hq.)
G-4: Pacifico Diva (Rank unknown). PA
AG: Lt. Salvador Lasang
Sig O: Major James Evans, MC
Total American personnel with Staff: 36
(Mostly code personnel and safehand messengers)

(1) For security reasons the Hq was split, Col. Fertig with a skeleton staff on the Agusan and Lt. Col. Bowler with the main staff in Lanao.

110th DIVISION:
Lt. Col. McClish, AUS, CO
Leading figures:
Major Clyde Childress, AUS
Captain Dongallo, PA
Major Laureta, PC
Captain Clyde Abbott
Captain Paul Marshall
Lt. Robert Spielman
Total U.S. personnel: 27
Total Div. Strength: 4,000
Total Div. Arms: 3,000

SUMMARY OF DISPOSITIONS OF P.I. GUERRILLA FORCES:


LUZON, MINDORO & MARINOUQUE... TOTAL UNKNOWN & OF LITTLE TACTICAL USE.

PALAWAN & NEARBY ISLANDS	1,000	
PANAY AND ROMBLONS	13,500	
MASBATE	700	
NEGROS	8,000	
CEBU	5,000	
BOHOL	4,000	
LEYTE	2,500	
SAMAR	2,000	
MINDANAO		
AS SHOWN	19,500	
ADD'L. REPORTED	8,500	28,000
SULU ARCHIPELAGO		4,500
TOTAL	APPROX.	65,000

COMPOSITION OF FORCES:

APPROX. TOTAL ARMED COMBAT FORCES	35,000 *
UNARMED COMBAT PERSONNEL	20,000
ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL	10,000
TOTAL	65,000

NOTE: * BASED ON FRAGMENTARY REPORTS



SOUTHERN LUZON, VISAYAS & MINDANAO

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA
Military Intelligence Section
General Staff
GUERRILLA DISPOSITIONS
15 FEBRUARY 1944



**CURRENT MINDANAO DISPOSITIONS
COMPARED TO 15 JANUARY:**



	<u>15 FEB.</u>	<u>15 JAN.</u>
TAWI TAWI AREA	200	200
JOLO AREA	200	200
ZAMBOANGA AREA	600	600
MISAMIS AREA	800	700
ILIGAN - MALABANG AREA	500	300
GAGAYAN AREA	2,700	2,700
SURIGAO AREA	1,600	1,600
GINGOOG AREA	100	100
DAVAO AREA	8,000	8,000
GOTABATO AREA	2,000	2,000
MALANGAS AREA	100	100
	<u>13,700</u>	<u>13,700</u>

NOTE:

TOTALS DO NOT INCLUDE TROOPS REPORTED
PASSING THROUGH PI.

**SOUTHERN LUZON, VISAYAS
&
MINDANAO**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA
Military Intelligence Section
General Staff
ENEMY DISPOSITIONS
15 FEBRUARY 1944



APPENDIX XVI

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS PLAN FOR MINDANAO

2 May 1944

	Page
Plan	1
Plate, "Pattern of Enemy Ground Dispositions, 15 April 1944"	
Table, "Monthly Reports of Enemy Ground Strength, April 1943 - March 1944"	

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS PLAN FOR MINDANAO

2 May 1944

1. Key Enemy Areas on Mindanao: Recent Allied landings in NW New Guinea have placed Mindanao in the fore in the Japanese NEI-PI-Palau defence line. Main centers of interest on Mindanao whose development are now being pushed by the Japanese are Davao Gulf, Sarangani Bay, Illana Bay from Cotabato to Malabang, Cagayan-Bukidnon, Zamboanga City and the road net connecting these areas. (See Incl.1)

a. Davao Gulf Area: This area is the most important to the Japanese, being a forward naval base and a rapidly developing air center. Recent intelligence indicates that this is to be one of the main posts in the Jap defence system. Airfield activity extends along the NW coast of Davao Gulf from Hijo in the north to Malalag in the south and on Samal Island. Defenses and installations are being developed as rapidly as available labor will permit.

b. Cagayan-Bukidnon Area: This appears to be the second most important base on Mindanao. The airfields are being developed in the Cagayan area and south to the Bukidnon Valley. Labor is being conscripted for development of these and other installations.

c. Cotabato-Malabang Area: The importance of this area and the activity now going on there is not clear, however at least two airfields are being developed and troop strength has been increased since January 1944.

d. Sarangani Bay Area: Intelligence indicates that this is becoming an important link in the Mindanao defense system. It appears that two airfields are being developed in the north end of the bay, with more possible. Shipping has increased sharply within the past two months and enemy patrols have been carrying out reconnaissance in the Sarangani Islands, possibly with the thought of developing forward defense installations there.

e. Zamboanga City: This area is of interest to the Japanese mostly for protection of shipping enroute to Davao.

f. Internal Communications: The key areas, Davao, Sarangani Bay, Cotabato and Cagayan, are connected by a road net (See Incl. 1) of great strategic importance. At present the road from Cagayan to Davao is opened though apparently not for heavy MT traffic. Activity on other sections of the net is uncertain.

2. Current Intelligence Coverage of the above Key Areas: Contact with the Mindanao guerrillas was established in January 1943 and has been maintained since. When contact was first established, Fertig's command covered NW Mindanao. Since that time the command has been extended and consolidated to include the entire island. Actual enemy strength reports available from April 1943 to March 1944 for all areas on Mindanao are shown in Incl. 2. Of the key areas:

a. Davao Gulf Area: Almost nothing but general reports have been received from the north coast road area, from Davao -Samal Island, from the south coast road area or from the east coast. No indentifications have been received and only after specific request has air intelligence and location of installations been obtained from this area. Actual enemy strength and strategic capabilities are still largely unknown quantities. Radios have been placed some distance north of Davao within the last few weeks. No radios are south of Davao City on the east coast and the radio on the south coast of Davao Gulf is only a coastwatcher station.

b. Cagayan-Bukidnon Area: Guerrillas have been active in the immediate area since 1942 and have contact inside most of the occupied towns. Enemy strength intelligence has been adequately covered but only recently have details of strategic enemy activity other than patrols and location of gun emplacements, etc., been reported. Our estimate of the enemy potential is still largely based on inference. The only identification from this area was confirmation of the presence of elements of the 10th Independent Garrison Infantry unit. No radios are placed in the Bukidnon Valley to report enemy developments and movements there.

c. Cotabato - Malabang Area: Strength reports for western Cotabato were available in some detail to October 1943 and for the Malabang area, five times during the past year.

No maps or information on enemy installations, etc., are available from these areas. No recent information has been received concerning enemy activity except in most general terms. No indentifications have been received and only scattered general information has been available. There are no radios and very likely no intelligence personnel in any of the Cotabato Valley or Koronadal Valley areas.

d. Sarangani Bay. Outside of shipping reports and possibly conflicting reports of airfield activity on the north coast of the bay, little information has been received from this area. Other intelligence indicates that some importance is attached to the area by the Japanese, however. The radio station at the mouth of the Bay is primarily a coastwatcher station and is at best too far from Jap activity to report operational information.

e. Zamboanga City. Strength reports have been fairly regularly received together with a picture of Japanese activity.

3. Conclusions.

a. Reports of enemy strength and activity which could be observed by moderately trained personnel have been inadequate particularly in Davao, Cotabato-Malabang and along the road net.

b. Reports of strategic capabilities, intentions and activities have been totally inadequate and particularly so in the area indicated in "a." above.

c. Although contacts exist within most occupied areas, only one identification and few captured documents have been received.

d. The existing guerrilla communication net does not adequately cover the key areas, Malabang-Cotabato, Sarangani Bay, Davao and the road net. This probably indicates that few, if any, suitable intelligence agents are operating in these areas.

e. Not only is enemy intelligence coverage inadequate and slow in areas in which the enemy has most interest but the radio net from the point of providing maximum assistance for potential Allied activity is totally inadequate.

4. Recommendations.

a. That intelligence personnel be sent into Mindanao consisting of:

- (1) An intelligence officer for the CO, 10th MD, to direct intelligence activities.
- (2) Intelligence parties, equipped with radios to cover the areas:
 - (a) Along SW Davao Gulf, Malalag to Davao City - four parties.
 - (b) Area Malabang to Cotabato - three parties.
 - (c) Buayan in Sarangani Bay - one party.
 - (d) Cotabato to Kabacan - two parties.
 - (e) Kabacan to Malaybalay - two parties.

b. That PRS procure and equip such personnel and sent them in at the first opportunity.

c. That such personnel be instructed to cover specific areas and develop the following:

- (1) Enemy units.
- (2) Enemy air strength, activity and development.
- (3) Enemy dispositions, defenses and installations.
- (4) An intelligence system prepared to report enemy movement along road nets.

C. A. WILLOUGHBY,
Brigadier General, U.S. Army,
A.C. of S., G-2.

2 Incls:

Incl. 1 - Mindanao Enemy Ground Dispositions, 15 Apr 44, with overlay showing current guerrilla communications.

Incl. 2 - Monthly reports Mindanao Enemy Ground Strength, April 1943 - March 1944.

MONTHLY REPORTS MINDANAO ENEMY GROUND STRENGTH
April 1943 to March 1944

	April 43	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	Dec. 43	Jan. 44	February	March
<u>ZAMBOANGA</u>												
Zamboanga City	400	?				500	500				1000	700
Basilan Id	200					200	200					200
Malangas Area	-	-	-	-	-	150	150	150	150	150	150	150
Pagadian Area	-	-	150	150	150	-	-					
Dipolog Area	-	-	200	200	200	150	-	-	-	-	-	200
Sindangan Area	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<u>MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL</u>												
Belingao Area	-	-	?	?		-	50			140	200	?
Oroquieta Area	-	-	300	?	80	100	100			150	?	?
Misamis Area	-	-	?	?	500	3/500	1000	700		400	?	?
<u>LANAO</u>												
Baroy-Lala Area	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	?	400	400	300
Liangan-Kolambugan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	?	600	600	200
Iligan-Camp Overton	200	250	250		300	300	1000			400		1500
Pantar-Momugan	60				3/400	3/400	100			150		
Dansalan	300				150	150	100			400		
Ganassi	50				50	50	45			70		
Malabang	50				50	50	45			300		
<u>MISAMIS ORIENTAL</u>												
Alubijid Area	-									?	?	-
Opol Area	50									-	250	-
Cagayan Area	4/500	800	+?		2/300	2/300	1000	3500	300	+1000	2000	6000
Gingog Area	-	-	-	-	180	180	180					500
Camiguin Id.	-	-	-	-	?	-	-	400		?	100	-
Balingasag	-	100	?		?	-	-				?	-
<u>AGUSAN</u>												
Nasipit	80	+?	150									?
Butuan	100	150			200							?
Cabadbaran	80											-
<u>SURIGAO</u>												
Surigao	180	150	150	?	300	150	60	+500	800	1500		
Badas Placer	50				30	50	200	?	500	700	?	
Dinagat Id.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	?	?	?
<u>DAVAO</u>												
Monkayo-Compostella	+15000			8000	10/15000	8/12000	8/12000	18000				
N Road S to Tagum							?	300	300		?	
Tagum Area							?	100	200		?	
Bunawan-Licanan							?	200	400	1000	?	
Catitipan-Sasa							?	400	100		?	
Davao							?	300	150		?	
Sanal Id.-Talikud							?	?	-			
Talomo Area	30											
Daliao Area	30											
Digos Area												
Malalag Area												
East Coast Davao Gulf								200				
Mati Area					?							
East coast Davao	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<u>COTABATO</u>												
Glan Area	BC only	150					30			?		
Buayan	BC only					40		40			?	
Makar	BC only										?	
Koronadal	BC only	BC only	BC only	BC only	BC only	BC only	?				?	
Cotabato	300	?	300	300	100	300	50	+700	+3000			3000
Parang	80		40	80		100	?					
Pikit Area	300	?	150	200	150	100	100					
Kabacan Area	300	?	40	150	50	200	10					
Sarangani Id.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kidapawan	-	-	200	200	200	40	?					
<u>BUKIDNON</u>												
Del Monte Area	240				300	300	250	500	200		?	
Malaybalay	160				100	100	100	650	600		?	
Valencia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	?	100		?	
Kibawe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	?	100		?	
<u>SULU</u>												
Jolo	60	?					50		?	?	?	
Tawi Tawi	-	-	-	-	-	-	150		?	?	?	

Enclosure 2

**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA**

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

G-2 INFORMATION BULLETIN

REPORT ON CONDITIONS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

No: 12

DATE:

W. D. INDEX:

JUNE 1943

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

20 August 1943.

The attached report is based on information obtained from various sources within the Philippine Islands while on trip to that territory between the dates 5th March and 8th July 1943.

The writer travelled extensively within the 10th Military District, visiting practically all units; also to a more limited extent within the 9th Military District.

C. PARSONS,
Lieut. Commander, U.S.N.R.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF
G-2 INFORMATION BULLETIN
REPORT ON CONDITIONS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

NO: **DATE:**
W. D. INDEX: **JUNE 1943**

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- 'A' - Enemy Dispositions
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- 'C' - Guerrilla Communication Net Work.

* Condensed in this version.
 ** Omitted in this version.

REPORT ON CONDITIONS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
AS OF JUNE 1943

(NOTE: This report is based on information obtained from various sources within the Philippine Islands while on trip to that territory between the dates 5 March and 8 July 1943. Agents were used freely to obtain information from within occupied areas, and especially in Manila where valuable documentary and verbal information was secured as to the economic, financial, political, and general conditions within the enemy-controlled puppet national government. The writer travelled extensively within the 10th Military District, visiting practically all units; also to a more limited extent within the 9th Military District.)

1. General Information:

Between the period June 1942, to which date first-hand information from within the Philippines was reported by the writer, to June 1943, a number of changes have taken place within the Islands. The enemy has continued to dominate the general situation in occupied areas, and has utilized the minimum number of soldiers and kempei police to accomplish the desired results. In the outlying districts, the centers held by the enemy, generally speaking, are limited to capitals of provinces and the larger cities. The hinterland in all sectors, except around Central Luzon, are not patrolled or bothered by the enemy -- it is in those "free" sectors that the guerrilla movements have been usually started, and where the strongholds of the guerrillas continue to be located.

* * * * *

Atrocity stories in the Philippines in the occupied areas seem to be "out" for the duration. The enemy is now treating the civil population with a greater degree of courtesy than during the first few months of occupation. The kempei (military police) soldiers are being gradually replaced by Filipino policemen, and as the reorganized Philippine Constabulary soldiers are trained and sent to the various provincial units to take over the maintenance of law and order, treatment of the civil population may be expected to be even better. The terrorizing methods used by the Japanese during the early days of occupation have been dispensed with almost entirely -- such as the looters cage, hanging looters in conspicuous places in the towns, execution of looters and other severe methods of punishment, probably thought necessary by the conquerors in the beginning to keep in line the overwhelming superiority of numbers in the civil population compared to the invading force (and the occupational force) of enemy soldiers. Reports are heard from all districts that the remaining force of soldiers and soldier policemen (Japanese) have been instructed to treat locals with courtesy and friendship, and not to require the bowing to sentries (previously punished by slapping when overlooked by passing civilians), and, generally, a letting up of the originally strict enforcement of regulations. It is apparently the idea of the enemy government that better results are obtainable where the cooperation of the local populace is secured without military or physical force. They are getting this cooperation on the part of the people, as the people have generally come to the opinion that the much awaited and much desired "aid" may not come for a long time, and that in the meantime it is necessary to do something to make a living. They are still waiting for the "aid" to arrive, but are making the best of the situation and giving what may be termed a mild form of cooperation to the enemy in matters of economic and commercial endeavor. In fact they have no other recourse at

present -- regardless of the fact that this situation is exactly what the enemy desires.

* * * * *

2. Prisoners of War (Military):

Filipino prisoners of war have practically all been released from the prison camps. They were released gradually upon a parolee system, where the prisoner would obtain the backing of two guarantors to warrant good behavior of the prisoner, and that he would not leave the town (occupied by enemy) where he was paroled, without permission. Prior to release of the Filipino servicemen, more than 27,000 of their estimated original number of slightly under 50,000 died while in confinement. Deaths were caused by malaria, dysentery, beri-beri and other dietary deficiency diseases. It is believed that this terrible death rate did much towards causing the enemy to arrange their final release.

American prisoners of war are confined in two main prison farms with detachments at several places in the islands where special work is being done with their help -- airfield being built near Puerto Princesa, Palawan; Corregidor defenses being repaired using some 200 American prisoners; railroad bridges on Luzon, general road repairs, and stevedoring work in Manila; hospital work at Bilibid; and a few detachments doing general repair work in Central Luzon. The main prison camp is located at Cabanatuan, where the prison population is estimated at around 9,000; and the other main prison camp is at the Davao Penal Colony, some 12 kilometers north of the city of Davao, where some 2,000 prisoners are confined. About the middle of 1942, all service prisoners of the rank or equivalent rank of Colonel or above in all services were sent to Formosa or to Japan. Enlisted men were sent with the officer prisoners, at the ratio of one man per general officer, and one man per two officers with the rank of Colonel. Subsequently, a number of enlisted prisoners with special qualifications, such as mechanics, technicians, etc., were sent to Japan, reportedly for work in Japanese factories.

Conditions in both the general prison camps are deplorable. The mortality rate has been exceptionally high. At Cabanatuan, over 50% of the prisoners from Bataan have already died, over 25% of the prisoners from Corregidor have died, or an average of over 40% mortality amongst American servicemen on Luzon to date. These deaths have been caused by malaria, dysentery, beri-beri and other dietary deficiency diseases -- most of which could have been avoided had the enemy been humane and supplied the camp hospital with medicines to cure and combat the diseases, and given a ration of food which would have permitted the prisoners to maintain their health, both available in substantial quantities to the enemy. It is conservatively estimated by the prisoners themselves that unless something is done soon to improve conditions as to medical supplies and adequate food rations, only the sturdiest prisoners will be alive at the end of another eighteen months. The food being given the prisoners is about 90% boiled, polished rice -- a mess kit full three times daily. To this basic ration is added an insignificant allowance of fish, meat, poultry, and vegetables. A medical officer from within the Cabanatuan camp advised that the situation could be remedied by supplying the camp with substantial quantity of vitamins (especially "B"), and funds with which to purchase from the enemy-controlled canteen inside the camp articles of food, so as to be able to augment the presently inadequate ration (this is permitted only at Cabanatuan -- at Davao prisoners are not permitted to purchase from within or from outside sources). Strong representations should be made through diplomatic channels to the

enemy government to try to improve the conditions of the prisoners, in order to stop the continued wholesale slaughter of our captured men through starvation and lack of medical care. The statement herein to the effect that the diet of the prisoners is deficient and inadequate to maintain life for any period of time has been completely confirmed not only from medical officers within the Cabanatuan camp, but also from eight officers recently escaped from the Davao Penal Colony. The situation is very serious.

In this connection, steps have already been taken, at the orders of General MacArthur, to assist the prisoners through means available within the Islands at the present time. It is not unlikely that quite substantial assistance may be afforded the prisoners, but this should not cause strenuous efforts to be relaxed to secure improvement of their conditions through diplomatic representations.

At Davao Camp conditions are somewhat better than at Cabanatuan -- this due more to the initiative of the prisoners than to a more liberal attitude of the enemy towards the prisoners. In Davao, the prisoners are sent out daily on work details (officers are used as day laborers) to gather firewood, logging, farm projects, etc., and while on these details the prisoners have found ways and means through their own initiative (and oftentimes at great risk) to provide themselves with additional food.

At both the Cabanatuan and Davao camps, infraction of rules and regulations is met with the most severe punishment. An attempt to escape at Cabanatuan resulted in the cruel torture of three high-ranking American officers for a period of three days in plain view of the prison population and then in their final execution by bayoneting. An officer was shot to death by a sentry when seen catching a small parcel of tobacco or food thrown to him over the fence by a well-meaning native from outside. A young naval officer was beheaded when a note he smuggled out of the camp to a native friend in a nearby town was intercepted by an enemy agent -- in the note he indicated that he would attempt to escape at the first opportunity. There are many similar stories of mistreatment and cruelties.

It is interesting to note that at Davao, where conditions are admittedly better than at the Luzon camp, as of April 4th more than 800 of the prisoners were hospital patients and only 1,000 were certified as able to go on the outside details. At Cabanatuan, it is estimated that of the 9,000 prisoners, not 2,000 could be certified as being able to do physical labor.

3. Civilian Internees:

While a long way from being satisfactory, the lot of the civilian internees is considerably better than that of military prisoners. At first, there were several internment camps in the different places of the Islands, but gradually they have been eliminated by the transfer of the internees to Davao and to Manila and Baguio. At present, there are only two main internment camps -- the largest being at grounds of Santo Tomas University, Manila, where there are some 6,000 internees (American, British, and other Allied nationals, including women and children); Davao, with about 2,000 internees; and possibly a third small camp still at Baguio, with about 250 internees. (Note that reports have been received to the effect that the internees from Manila were sent to Los Banos from Santo Tomas early June 1943, but this has not yet been confirmed.)

At the two main camps, the living conditions were not bad. Personal comforts were not lavish, but beds were available as well as mattresses and mosquito nets (the internees' own equipment, of course). Conditions were very crowded -- families could not live

together, etc. Food has been inadequate where the internees have had to depend upon the camp ration alone. Fortunately, the civilians have been permitted to receive parcels from friends outside the camp, and this has been possibly the only reason internees have not suffered the same fate as the military prisoners. At Manila, the internees are allowed 70 centavos per day for living -- out of which 22 centavos are deducted for light and water. The remaining amount of 48 centavos (24 cents) provides a diet which might barely sustain life in people with originally normal health. Reports from Manila and from Davao show that the morale of the internees remains high, in spite of the prolonged confinement. There are reports of morale deterioration and petty bickering amongst themselves within the camps, but all in all the mental condition of the internees may be considered very good. There have been only one or two cases of insanity, and the death rate has been even lower than during normal times. Women and children are given the best of everything available -- there is a decided community spirit evident in that respect. The better-off internees contribute regularly to a fund to take care of the internees not so well off. Upon authority of General MacArthur, steps have been taken to supply the internees with funds from time to time, in as substantial amounts as security and risk from enemy detection will permit. If the conditions at Los Baños continue as at Santo Tomas (assuming transfer of Manila internees to Los Baños), with funds the internees will be able to purchase from a canteen within the camp food and articles required for personal health -- and at Davao, internees have been given this same privilege -- so that efforts to get funds to the internees will have a definitely beneficial effect on their health, not to mention their morale. A substantial supply of vitamin concentrates, and other medical supplies now unobtainable in Manila, such as aspirin, milk of magnesia, insulin, quinine or atabrine, sulfa drugs, etc., should be brought in for delivery to the internees through agents and without knowledge of the enemy. While this may on the surface appear to be a difficult task, actually the smuggling of money and supplies to the internees would not be very difficult. Detection by the enemy after delivery may be possible (and definitely probable) if the internees themselves do not take steps to keep the acquisition of money and supplies from the knowledge of the enemy. It would seem that their appreciation of aid would instill in them a sufficient caution to make them very security minded. The internees are allowed almost total autonomy within the confines of the camps; the camps are administered by internee committees, and any funds and supplies smuggled into the camps should be able to be handled satisfactorily by the committee members without coming to the attention of the Jap officers in charge.

4. Financial Situation:

In the Philippines, a number of types of currency are now being circulated. In the occupied areas, the principal currency is the Japanese military currency, in denominations of one, five, ten, and fifty centavos, one, five, and ten pesos. Philippine Government currency is still permitted circulation by the enemy, but it has practically disappeared from the market altogether; so much so, that when it is presented for use, the enemy immediately suspects that it may represent an illegitimate transaction. (Note that any planned use of "old" money in the occupied areas of the Philippines must carry with it a plan for the exchange of the currency for Japanese military currency within the areas through trusted contacts to avoid suspicion being aroused.) In the occupied areas, there is a black market for U.S. currency, usually at a small discount on par (about 180 pesos Japanese military currency

per 100 dollars U.S. currency), due to the risk run by the parties to the exchange (death, if caught).

In the "free" areas, emergency currency authorized before the southern provinces fell into the hands of the enemy still has a rather widespread circulation. In the recognized guerrilla districts, new issue of emergency currency is the basis of circulation, and the public has confidence in this currency as demonstrated by its widespread circulation. The 10th Military District currency for Mindanao is accepted at full value in the adjoining districts. In the unrecognized districts, nearly every barrio has printed emergency currency (usually in small change), using as security a supply of 20-peso "bombers" in provincial emergency currency, which because of the high denomination is worthless for ordinary circulation within the barrios. It is planned by the various barrios to redeem the "barrio" currency at the end of the emergency. This type of currency is not given widespread circulation -- the bills from one barrio being valueless in other barrios.

* * * * *

Within the "free" areas, when the guerrilla currency first was placed in circulation, there were black market exchange rates -- generally against the new currency. As recognition has come to the districts (10th Military District particularly), the guerrilla currency has risen in value and may generally be considered as almost on a par with the Philippine Government currency. Practically no U.S. currency is encountered in the free areas, but it may readily be converted into either Philippine currency or emergency currency, at better than par, in small amounts.

No coins may be found in circulation either in the free or in the occupied areas. They have disappeared from use completely. It is reported that the enemy has exported all coins captured or gathered after the surrender for use as metal in Japan, and thus only a limited amount of coins may be expected to be placed in circulation again when normal conditions return to the country.

* * * * *

It is estimated that the Japanese military organization has put into circulation throughout the occupied areas more than 100 million pesos -- and it has been estimated that about 12 million pesos in Japanese military currency is being added to that amount monthly. It is not beyond imagination to consider that by the time normal conditions are restored, there may be in circulation in the occupied areas a much larger amount of Japanese currency than original Philippine Government currency before the war in the entire archipelago.

It may be of interest to note that in the "free" areas practically no Japanese military currency may be found. That which may have gotten into the area in the earlier days has all been sent into the occupied areas in exchange for purchases or by the guerrilla units for intelligence work behind the enemy lines. It is considered valueless.

5. Political Situation:

* * * * *

The people in the Philippines today wish several things very badly -- first of all, redemption from the Japanese by General MacArthur, and the return to normal conditions that existed before

the war; then they hope to be indemnified for their losses directly and indirectly caused by the war; they hope for (and halfway expect) substantial assistance from the United States in the rehabilitation of the country after the war; and they expect liberal concessions and generous trade relations from and with the United States in order to bring about a fast recovery. If it is to be the policy of the United States to grant any of the items mentioned as connected with the wishes of the Filipino people, it would be much better to emphasize such facts rather than to mention the promise of the grant of independence. It conversely would not be advisable to mention by radio newscasts that the granting of independence would be dropped and would not be considered. This would give the enemy ample ammunition in support of the promised grant of independence to the Philippines during the current year by the enemy -- through claiming bad faith of the United States to the Filipino people.

The Philippines' political structure after return of the country to its former status after the war will have suffered considerable changes. The voter will not follow the former leaders as blindly as he did before. The guerrilla groups have definite ideas as to the political leaders who have remained within occupied territories and have cooperated with the enemy. The guerrillas will have quite an influence on the election of local and national leaders after the war -- and for that reason a number of the puppet officials (and they include practically all of the important political leaders) will lose their popularity and their political positions. Guerrilla leaders will come forward after the war and be elected to representative posts in the National Government -- this is inevitable, as these guerrilla leaders have already done much to establish themselves in the political favor of the potential voters.

Although the popularity of President Quezon has suffered considerably since his departure, he is still the real leader of the people, and all will undoubtedly rally around his banner again upon his return from the United States, especially if he returns to the country with an open mind and with a willingness to support those deserving men who have done such good work out in the unoccupied areas with the guerrilla groups, and with the knowledge that some of the puppet leaders will have to go by the boards. The name of General Manuel Roxas is foremost in the minds of the people today as their next President and leader, due to his wartime activities and refusal to cooperate with the enemy since his surrender. He would naturally receive the support of the guerrillas because of his service as a soldier and his subsequent refusal to accept a post in the enemy's puppet government.

At the present time, there is no political situation in the Japanese-occupied areas comparable to the democratic form of Government in existence before the war. All political parties have been dissolved, and all officers are serving as a result of appointment by the Japanese forces. No elections have been held.

The attitude of the average puppet official functioning under enemy control may fall within three general categories: First, the official (especially national official) who claims to have been told by General MacArthur and President Quezon to stay in his position upon arrival of the enemy and to continue to look after the interests of the people. He claims that General MacArthur and President Quezon only restricted him to committing any belligerent acts and in taking an oath of allegiance to the Japanese Government. Men of this type have not exceeded their original directives, have not cooperated to a greater extent than the minimum required of their positions. Several have resigned their

original positions. These men are to be trusted and may be considered to be completely loyal to the Allied Cause. The men in the second category are those who for reasons of personal gain, because of weakness, or due to being disgruntled at the lack of a quicker return to the Philippines on the part of American Forces -- or a number of similar excuses -- have overplayed their part in cooperating with the enemy. These men feel sincerely that they are pro-Filipino first of all; secondly, possibly, they prefer Americanism and the return to the normal conditions as experienced under American guidance than to Japanism and the type of life that they feel they would have to live should Japan be the ultimate victor in the Far Eastern war. They excuse their outward cooperation with the enemy and their rather outspoken speeches against America and the Americans on the ground that they are pro-Filipinos, and that the Philippines as an independent country -- promised both by the enemy and by the United States -- will not require them to be openly pro-American or pro-Japanese. It is certain that upon a reversal of conditions, and upon arrival of American troops to the areas where they now hold forth, their attitude will reverse as quickly as the situation, and you will find them willing to damn the enemy they are now praising. We have seen this happen once already -- where in December several of the Filipino leaders made impressive speeches over the radio and published in the press articles praising the Allied efforts, and pledging their loyalty to that side; and when in the hands of the enemy, these same men now make the same speeches almost word for word in behalf of the other side. True, some of this may have been dictated or even forced upon them by the enemy; but, in general, it is known that for the reasons first stated above when outlining the type falling into the second category, these men have voluntarily taken the attitude as expressed most appropriately in their speeches. The third category includes those officials and citizens who have openly and voluntarily cooperated with the enemy. This individual has no hidden excuse for his activities, although most of them to save their lives will allege coercion, force, or any number of reasons for having cooperated with the enemy. In this category fall especially those officials who did not hold important posts in the national or municipal governments before arrival of the enemy; and who have come forward now as leaders under the Japanese control. Not only politicians have placed themselves in this category -- a number of Filipino businessmen, church leaders, professional men, military men, and similar types have lent their efforts wholeheartedly to the enemy.

Names that fall definitely within each of the three categories, to include officials leading the National Government, have been compiled and will be submitted as an exhibit to this report. The officials in the occupied areas in the provinces are being investigated, and eventually names and classifications will be prepared and submitted. Careful observation is maintained at the National Capitol so as to be in a position to change classifications quickly of any official -- and for the protection of any of the officials known to be trustworthy.

Upon the approach of Allied troops to the Philippines -- upon the fall of the first Allied bomb on enemy installations, there is sure to be an uprising in the occupied areas against puppet officials. Even at present the puppet officials fear for their lives as a result of continued threats which they receive from anonymous and guerrilla sources.

In this connection, it may be recommendable to arrange through one of the Manila Intelligence Nets a plan for the evacuation and protection of the loyal puppet officials and of their

families when there is a move to be made towards the Philippines which might result in mob rule flaring up. As mentioned, some officials are sincerely loyal, can be of use at the present time, and should be protected if at all possible to do so.

* * * * *

6. Economic Situation (Occupied Areas):

In the occupied areas, the enemy, although having been able to solve a few of his economic headaches encountered from the date of his arrival into the various areas, still finds plenty to cause him worry.

In Manila and Central Luzon, where the major economic and industrial endeavor has been concentrated by the enemy through the Economic Corps, a plan of changing from non-essentials to basic foodstuff and articles required (or desired) by the enemy for export to Japan has been followed religiously, and with a certain degree of success. The enemy upon arrival at Manila immediately took over all industrial plants in the city, and gradually has placed all in operation under Japanese management, using Filipino or neutral staff and laborers. Payment to the native staff and laborers has been set at figures considerably lower than those paid during normal times. All coconut oil plants in Manila are working at full capacity, producing from copra (which is purchased through the Japanese controlled purchasing agency from nearby provinces at 7.00 pesos per hundred kilos delivered to factory) coconut oil, lard, oleomargarine, soap, edible oil, and other products. Two of the three rope factories are running at full capacity, producing rope from Davao hemp (received regularly from Davao by enemy transports). Cigarette factories, breweries, match factories are in full operation. The spinning and weaving plant of the National Development Company is expected to start operating shortly, using cotton produced in Tarlac. Other smaller industries have been re-established to the fullest extent possible. All of them are completely controlled by the enemy units -- either civil or military.

The small portion of the products of the factories which the enemy permit to remain in the Islands is again controlled by the enemy's distributing organization, made up principally of Japanese merchants who have previously done business in Manila and other parts of the Islands -- bazaars, soft drink parlors, etc. The Japanese merchants' association act as distributors of the articles rationed to the public, and sell to the only trade outlets permitted to Filipinos and neutrals, the retail trade under the sari-sari system. The products of the factories in Manila are not all turned over to the distributing organization for sale within the Philippines. Only a small portion of the production is marketed in the country, and that portion is rationed strictly. The bulk of the production is exported to Japan -- especially soap, lard, oleomargarine, coconut oil (two shipments also went to Germany by tanker), rope, beer, matches, and cigarettes.

The enemy believes that this system has done much toward re-establishing commerce in the occupied areas, but the Filipinos do not like the monopoly at all. They find trade restrictions on all sides, and while they dare not complain or request a change in conditions -- their memory is still fresh of the terrorism spread by the enemy in the early days of the conquest, through severe punishment for the slightest infraction of rules -- they would welcome with open arms the return to conditions enjoyed by them under the form of commercial administration of pre-war days. The Filipino businessman realizes that under the present form of commercial set-up he can never be more than a worker for the enemy -- sari-sari storekeepers, farmers, and laborers. This

does not fit in with the ideals that have been instilled in him through forty-odd years of existence under the American Flag.

In the occupied areas outside the commercial centers of Manila, Cebu, Davao, and Iloilo, the economic situation is basically that of controlling the production of farm products and the changing over of production to articles required to feed the population and to export to Japan. For instance, sugar has practically gone out of existence. A few fields were allowed to ratoon (regrowth without planting), and a few of the centrals had a very restricted grinding season during the 1942-43 crop year. It is estimated that for the next crop year practically no centrifugal sugar will be produced. Generally, the fields previously planted to sugar cane have been planted with Taiwan or upland rice and cotton. As a result, the agricultural areas of Central Luzon and of Negros have supplied the enemy government with a sufficiency of rice to handle the feeding of the people in the occupied areas, and it is believed a surplus has been produced, as there is evidence of a certain amount having been exported from the Philippines. Cotton planting has met with a certain amount of success in the Central Luzon region, and with failure in Panay and Negros. In the south, guerrilla activities have interfered with the production of agricultural products, and the small amount of cotton planted and harvested is believed not to have been of much importance. The enemy, however, was able to secure a harvest of nearly a quarter million tons from Luzon where the occupied areas in Central Luzon are more in enemy hands, and with but little guerrilla interference. This cotton production, except for a small amount turned over to the National Development Company for spinning and weaving at Manila, has been exported to Japan. Of the various areas planted to cotton, Tarlac gave the best production; and while the tonnage per acre is less than that of cotton-producing countries, and while this agricultural effort may not be of commercial value in normal times, undoubtedly the enemy has been able to benefit from an economic standpoint, and stands to benefit in the future until he is driven from the Islands.

Life in the city of Manila, and other occupied metropolitan areas, is divided into two classes under the present conditions. The people who are employed seem to have ample funds to take care of their living, and a surplus with which to frequent places of amusement; people who are not employed and who have no means of securing funds from those who are more fortunate (and there is a substantial percentage of such people) are objects of charity and have a very difficult time making both ends meet. Thus you have prosperity and practically starvation going hand in hand. You have inflation and Japanese military money being spent like water (due principally to lack of confidence in its ultimate worth when the enemy is pushed out), along with a decided shortage of funds on the part of the unemployed, and consequent misery. The only saving factor in these areas is the rationing of basic commodities -- rice, sugar, salt, etc. -- to the public at low prices through the Kalibapi, which gives the poorer classes a chance to get their requirements at prices they can afford to pay when they are able to get money.

In the occupied areas, agricultural products may be sold only through the Government monopoly and at prices fixed by the Japanese military administration.

7. Economic Situation (Unoccupied Areas - Guerrilla Districts):

The foregoing has been intended to cover the economic situation in the areas occupied and under the control of the enemy. In the "free" or unoccupied areas where the enemy has been

restricted (either by his own desire or through pressure of the different guerrilla groups) to a few main cities (this refers principally to the Visayas and Mindanao, although there are a few areas on Luzon which could be included, such as Sorsogon, Ilocos Norte, and the region just south of Aparri), the economic situation has proven to be quite different.

In the unoccupied areas, the inhabitants have come back to their farms and have dedicated their efforts to producing basic commodities and in producing or assisting in the production of articles for the feeding of themselves, of the guerrillas, and a surplus for use in trading with nearby provinces for such items as may not be available at home. As a result of this general policy which has been fostered successfully by the guerrilla commanders, the people find that they can enjoy a remarkably pleasant and normal existence, and do not miss to a great extent items of daily life which had been considered as essentials in the past. Rice, corn, or camotes (sweet potatoes) is the basic food for the people -- depending upon the areas most suited to grow the product. Coconuts are usually available in unlimited quantities, from which home-side industries have made available a handy supply of oil for cooking and lighting their lamps, the grated coconut for food, for feeding animals, shells for charcoal; coconut tuba has been found an easy source for production of alcohol (straight distillation in crude stills gives a ten percent recovery of alcohol from tuba); hemp has given thread for cloth; coconut shells also make fine buttons; sea shells give lime; sea water condensed in the sun gives a supply of salt; bananas and casaba roots dried and powdered make good flour (cakes and bread made from the flour of these plants can compare very favorably with those produced from wheat flour); condensed pineapple and other fruit juices rich in fruit sugar make fine syrup which is used in lieu of sugar; shoes are made from hemp for uppers and old automobile tires for soles; water and wind power are utilized now to a great extent for supplying power to run rice mills, battery-charging plants. There are many other substitutions and utilizations too numerous to put in a report.

Taxes in the free areas are being collected by the civil Government wherever economic conditions will permit. As the emergency currency is placed more and more in circulation, it will be still easier to place taxes on the various enterprises, land, crops, etc., from which to derive an income sufficient to cover cost of civil administration. In some of the unrecognized areas, guerrillas, in cooperation with municipal and provincial governments, have placed a "Victory" tax of twenty centavos per adult per month, from which funds will be secured to maintain these guerrilla organizations. This will be discontinued upon recognition and financial backing for the guerrilla troops by the United States Military Service.

Prices of various commodities have been held down to a level comparable to that of pre-war days. This is almost automatic, since each individual farmer produces practically all of the articles required for himself, his family and retainers or employees, and the surplus production of his farm is used more to barter for items not produced by him -- not with the idea that he may need the items, but that to secure them his life at home will be more comfortable. For instance, he may exchange rice for sugar, shoes, or cloth. Commerce between the different districts is encouraged by the guerrilla units, and carefully controlled to see that no abuse of the plan may occur and that prices and values may be kept within reasonable limits. In Negros, there is quite a large amount of sugar still on hand from pre-war production. A substantial

percentage of this sugar is located within areas controlled by the guerrilla units on the island. In Mindanao, there is practically no sugar produced (although at present the farmers are planting sugar cane, which will eventually give them sugar through the open kettle method of production), but there is quite a surplus of rice and corn, so that trade between Mindanao and Negros guerrilla units by means of sailboats (large native bancas) is of mutual benefit and acts as a controlling factor for prices. Mindanao being a large copra-producing island, which gives the base products needed for the manufacture of soap in quantities beyond local requirements, soap also is exported to islands in the Visayas in exchange for woven goods of hemp (shoes, hats, sailcloth, etc.) which these other islands have specialized in for years. Even within Mindanao there is an interchange of articles which has levelled out the supply and demand questions, and has improved economic conditions considerably. For instance, in the Bukidnon Valley there is a plentiful supply of meat, Irish potatoes, coffee, tobacco, white beans, pineapples and pineapple products, whereas there is a decided shortage of sugar, salt, rice, soap, and similar products which are produced in abundance in the lowlands and along the seacoast. The guerrilla units have formed carabao transport trains of from 50 to 100 animals, and they climb the trails daily, taking to the valley over rather difficult trails the lowland articles and returning with the surplus articles from Bukidnon. Transportation of needed articles throughout the island to places where required has been one of the worthwhile accomplishments in the Mindanao district. It is understood that this problem has also been solved satisfactorily in the other districts in the Visayas. In the lowlands, the guerrilla units in Mindanao have trucks operating. They also have a number of motor launches. Trucks are operated on tuba alcohol, and the launches on coconut oil.

Prices of locally grown or produced commodities are controlled and remain well within the reach of the average man; prices of imported articles are out of reach for normal use. Medicines are exceptionally costly, and until the U.S. forces brought in a supply of medicine to the guerrilla units (a part of which have been used to assist the civil populace), there was a decided problem concerning the increasing shortage of the original supply -- especially for malarial control. Canned goods, cotton goods, cigarettes, and all other imported articles have increased in price several hundred percent. The average individual has had to go to substitutes for his requirements and has found that in the Philippines this has not been hard. The results have been particularly encouraging and morale-building to him. He has found, probably for the first time in his life, that in the Philippines he can enjoy economic independence of a nature never dreamed of before -- this, of course, presupposes a willingness to live a simple life and not indulge in the luxuries which he has learned to enjoy during the past few decades. There is very little that he actually requires that cannot be supplied within the country.

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The enemy upon arrival in the Islands did nothing to preserve the various mining units in working condition. The gold mines were stripped of power plants, small machinery, pumps, spare parts, fuel, lubricating oil, which resulted in the practical abandonment of the mines. As a result of no power, the underground pumping units stopped and the mines in most cases flooded. This flooding of the underground workings will mean the disintegration of the shafts and mining equipment, so that upon reopening of the mines, a major effort and considerable investment will be required.

This has been true not only of the larger mining districts of Baguio, but also in the Camarines and in Masbate. The enemy on the other hand has shown a keen interest in the base metal mines and immediately started an investigation for shipping out the base metal ores on hand at the invasion and in continuing in operation the base metal mines.

At present, the enemy is operating the copper mines at Mangcayan and Lepanto, employing some 2,500 laborers. A copper concentrate is produced and shipped regularly to Japan. The enemy is also operating the San Mauricio mines on a small scale and choosing only the copper bearing ore. He is also operating the Philippine Iron Mines, and is taking steps to reopen the iron mine at Marinduque. He is operating the manganese mines on Busuanga Island, and a small manganese mine at Guindulman, Bohol.

The enemy has shipped from the Philippines the mined manganese ore at Busuanga Island, also that which was stored at Manila and Cebu awaiting shipment, and a portion of the ore stored at Coron, Siquijor; also the chrome ore mined and awaiting shipment at Acoje, Masinloc and at Cebu City. The enemy has not taken steps to operate the mines at Acoje, Masinloc, Opol (chrome mine), Siquijor, Samar Iron Mine, nor any of the other base metal mines in the outlying districts. The main reason for not being able to undertake these projects has been the interference from the guerrilla units.

In addition to the mining ventures from which a steady supply of copper concentrates and iron ore are being shipped to Japan, the enemy has collected all coins available in the Islands and has shipped them to Japan, presumably for their use as metal. He has recovered also several million pesos in silver currency dumped into the ocean near Corregidor before the fall of the fortress. Early after the fall of Manila, the copper centavo could be sold to the Japs for as high as three or four centavos of Japanese military currency. Silver coins were at par, indicating the high value placed on copper. At the present time, the Japanese in the Philippines still will pay a premium for copper coins.

8. Morale Of The People:

The morale of the Filipinos in the occupied and unoccupied areas is still high and hopeful, though at times a feeling of impatience is indicated. It can fortunately be said that even in Manila, where the economic conditions are probably the worst found in the Islands, with but few exceptions all are sincerely anxious for their redemption and for a return to conditions which existed before the war. The enemy has conducted a well-planned campaign to win the friendship of the Filipinos, utilizing propaganda which under different circumstances might have had its effect on the people. In spite of this, the people still have faith in the American-Allied ability to win the war, and pin their faith on this outcome; they are not happy under Japanese domination -- they were happy under the former conditions.

In the unoccupied areas, the morale of the people is even higher than that of the people in the enemy-controlled areas. The people in the free or guerrilla-controlled areas (speaking of the Visayas and Mindanao particularly), find that they are now enjoying the freedom of economic independence. As they find more ways to substitute locally available products for the imported items of former days, their morale improves. Even when told that the "aid" they have dreamed of so often during the past year or so may be a long time in coming, and that the war may last for years, the resultant effect on morale has been unnoticeable. The visible signs of interest in the country on the part of General MacArthur

and the U.S. Forces through the few shipments of much needed medical supplies, and a few American cigarettes and copies of American magazines have more than overbalanced any bad effects which may have been caused by the advice of delayed arrival of what they consider as "aid." The people were more than interested to learn that the Americans also have had to change their mode of living, and that they too have had to sacrifice for the war effort. It was of utmost interest for them to hear that the Americans now find a shortage of transportation facilities, of sugar, rubber, meat, canned goods, coffee, and many other items which have gone in normal times to make up the living requirements of the average American. Locals in the Philippines began to realize for the first time that they have plenty of sugar, plenty of good coffee, plenty of meat, poultry, fish, eggs; fruits and vegetables in abundance. They were even amused to hear that there was a shortage of fuel for heating the houses in the Eastern States, and a control of woolen clothing. Here they have perpetual summer -- and the matter of clothing is one of decency and not one of personal comfort. The natives had a decided boost in their morale upon getting information that the Americans have had to sacrifice, and are still having to sacrifice for the war effort, and instead of being downhearted over the news of the return to former times being delayed for a longer time than they led themselves to expect in their natural optimism, and wishful thinking; they are actually planning now for a life to take them through the next two or three years, and find that since they have actually gotten down to the task, the outlook is not a bad one. They realize that they have already lived over eighteen months under wartime conditions, which in the beginning were rather stringent due to the uncertainty of conditions, but which during the past eight or ten months have more or less become routine, and with but little warlike activity to upset their daily life. The guerrillas also, generally speaking, are doing a good job in the free areas to re-establish a normal type of living. Where they have dedicated their organization more to the establishment of law and order, and have restricted their war activities to strictly guerrilla tactics, they have had remarkable success in keeping the enemy close to the centers originally chosen for their concentration, and retaliation on civil populations for offensive activities of the guerrillas has been seldom.

The morale of the American and Allied European citizens in the hands of the enemy is also high, in spite of their life in concentration camps, or at home under a parolee pass. This is surprising as a year ago there was a marked tendency towards deterioration of morale. In short, it may be said today that the morale of the Americans and their associates in the camps is about the same as it was a year ago. They have had to undergo the hardship of living in restriction to the internment camp grounds at Santo Tomas (Manila) and to the areas formerly used as internment camps. They have been very crowded, and have had a ration of food which has been very monotonous. The food value of the ration, however, has been life sustaining, and the internees have been permitted to receive packages of food and other items from sources outside the camp, and only a few have not been able to make arrangements to receive food, funds and supplies from friends in the city -- all of which has made it possible for most of the internees to arrange their daily living according to a very workable schedule, and to supply themselves with items of foodstuff and sometimes luxuries to augment the tiresome diet given within the camp itself. There is, however, an indication of deterioration of this high morale (bickerings amongst the internees and the magnification of their problems), but even this will probably not be felt for some time

now that a recent change of site of the internment camp has been reported by the Japanese. At the new site at Los Banos (or at Canlubang -- as yet confirmation of the actual new location has not been made) there will be plenty of space, which will undoubtedly permit families to live together, and will permit of much more privacy than that which was available when living together in large dormitories at Santo Tomas. To counteract the advantages of the new site, however, will enter a number of disadvantages, such as distance from Manila which will possibly prevent the regular reception of articles from outside sources, and loss of contact with homes by a number of the internees who continue to maintain homes in Manila in charge of loyal servants to send in food daily, handle the laundry of clothing, etc., and at many where the wife and children are living under parolee passes, while the husband has been confined at the Camp. These disadvantages will be overcome eventually, however, and the advantages of living at a camp in the provinces will certainly prove more healthful and afford a more normal type of living to the internees than that at the University of Santo Tomas campus and college buildings.

Morale of the American prisoners of war is bad. They have seen so much of war before the fall of their units, and then they have seen their comrades dying by the hundreds, so that today they are in poor mental condition. Their poor physical condition goes a long way to affect their outlook and their morale. They have given up hope of being saved, and many of them look forward to death by one of the diseases prevalent in the two camps -- malaria, dysentery, scurvy, beri-beri, and other dietary deficiency diseases. This is a very unfortunate condition, and upon authority of General MacArthur recent steps have been taken to supply the prisoners secretly with food, funds and medical supplies. What can be done immediately will depend upon what security for the aid sent the camps may be had, and what enemy retaliation if discovered is brought upon the prisoners or the agents of the Manila Intelligence group. If no difficulties are encountered at the camp, there is no doubt a good supply of funds may be furnished the prisoners, and as they are permitted to purchase foodstuff and articles from the prison canteen, their personal conditions may be improved subsequently. Medical supplies, principally quinine and vitamin concentrates, may be smuggled into the camp at Cabanatuan and at Davao in such amounts as may be purchased on the local markets -- which will be very limited. Plans have been made and supplies outlined for helping the prisoners in the future to a greater and really helpful extent. Actually getting funds and supplies to the prisoners within the two prison camps will not present many difficulties. At Manila, the agents of the Manila Intelligence groups have been able to get inside the camp almost at any time desired -- and at Davao work parties of prisoners may be contacted by agents. The difficulty will be in keeping the fact from the knowledge of the enemy. Heavier purchases from the prison canteen, existence of medical supplies, and betterment in the condition of the prisoners, may bring about an investigation and a discovery of the supplies and funds having been sent into the Camps. The enemy may close his eyes and be inwardly thankful that one of his problems may have been solved for him -- and on the other hand, he may be resentful of the improved conditions, and mete out a retaliation, or at least make it more difficult to get in supplies thereafter. Before anything very substantial is done over a period of months, as presently planned, a few test remittances of food, medicine and funds will be made, and the results observed.

9. Coastwatcher Stations:

In the 10th Military District (Mindanao and Sulu) radio

watcher stations have been installed to cover the Davao Gulf, the Surigao Straits, the north coast of Mindanao from Northern Zamboanga eastward to Gingoog Bay, and on the south coast of Mindanao, at Lebak (south of Cotabato), Labangan (Illana Bay), Margosatubig, Malangas and Kabasalan. These stations, together with rather extensive landline telephone and telegraph stations within the district network, all flash news of ship and plane movements quickly to the net control station at the headquarters of the District.

The flashes are sent to GHQ, SWPA, as quickly as possible in order that the information may be in the hands of any submarine commander patrolling the Philippine waters in time to be of use.

In addition to the relay of the information to SWPA an arrangement is now under trial with the commander of one submarine which involves the broadcasting of the daily flashes direct to the submarine on a prearranged schedule, using a cypher of double transpositions. This, if successful, could be extended to cover all submarines sent to this area for patrol duty. The broadcast of flashes to the submarine direct is done in addition to the usual transmission of the information to SWPA.

Aside from the watcher net established in the 10th Military District, it is understood that flashes on ship and air-plane movements are being sent regularly from stations established in the 6th and 7th Military Districts (Panay and Negros), and that an efficient watcher station net is also in operation in these districts.

An interesting angle to the establishment of watcher nets has been the fortunate sinking of a number of enemy vessels in the areas; once or twice in sight of the watcher station; which has all been a stimulant for the morale of the people, and to the definite encouragement of the work at the watcher stations. People living in the "free" areas know now that the Philippines have not been abandoned by America -- they have seen results of submarine activity in their country.

Stations should be established as soon as equipment is made available, at the following points not now being covered:

a) On the north end of Samar Island to cover the San Bernardino Straits.

b) Eastern Samar to cover movement of vessels eastward of the Islands which do not come through the Island passages.

c) Northern Mindoro to cover the Manila Bay entrance and the Verde Island Passage.

d) Western Palawan to cover vessels that may be taking the China Sea route -- usually from Takao to French Indo-China or Malaya.

e) Eastern central Mindanao for the same purpose as indicated in "b."

These stations could be equipped with the same type of radio equipment supplied heretofore -- low-powered, comparatively short-ranged, battery sets -- to operate through control stations at one or more of the Military Districts. It is recommended that all sets operate on the same frequency for uniformity, so as to simplify the monitoring by the control station -- that the control station be supplied with a separate set for use only in monitoring, day and night, flashes from watcher stations (as compared with the present arrangement of working all stations within the District at a scheduled time twice daily) -- and that an arrangement be worked out along the lines of that now being tested, of broadcasting the information to the submarines which might be on patrol within the Philippines, and simultaneously to the SWPA,

or that the central station after receiving flashes and giving them careful evaluation (necessary because watcher stations report many craft, such as small sailboats, which would obviously be of no interest to the Navy), be permitted to report directly to the Naval radio station in the area controlling the submarines in Philippine waters (sending duplicate messages simultaneously to GHQ if desired) so as to assure quickest possible transmission to the submarines; under either of these arrangements it is conceivable that valuable combat information could be in the hands of the patrol vessels within a few hours of transmission from the watcher station. These arrangements would require the delivery to the Islands of about eight or ten radios for additional watcher stations, and one high-powered radio transmitter and receiver to be installed at the control station of the District. The teleradios previously supplied have been found very well suited for the work outlined for them. They are portable and may be moved from place to place frequently to avoid detection by the enemy; and they have been found to be efficient and flexible to changing conditions of different locations. They should continue to be equipped with motor battery-charging sets, as motor fuel of some kind or other is usually obtainable in the areas where the sets may work. As a safety measure, however, it would be well to supply a hand charger, or wind charger, with each set if obtainable. A complete set of spare parts, including crystals, should be sent with each set. Especially required amongst the spare parts are power vibrators, condensers and transformers. Although not tried yet, a dry cell battery-operated set such as the AT-4 would probably be as good (if not better) set for watcher stations, if the question of supplying power batteries does not prove an obstacle.

10. Propaganda:

With the knowledge that the Filipino people, with but few exceptions, in both the unoccupied and occupied areas, may be counted on for their pro-Allied loyalty for an indefinite period of time, it makes the problem of broadcasting radio propaganda a simpler matter than if it were necessary to convince the people that alliance again with America is better than anything they could expect should they be lured over to the side of the enemy through his very interesting and admittedly efficient radio propaganda. The enemy has used every possible angle to line the Filipino people up for "Asia for the Asiatics," "Philippines for the Filipinos," "Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere" and so on. The Filipino people have listened with an Asiatic poker-faced solemnity to the glamour of the Japanese radio broadcasts -- but to counter this, they have seen more tangible evidence against such propaganda closer to home. They have seen their industry taken over by the Japanese businessman, their flag taken down and replaced with the Japanese flag, they have felt the pinch of a "simple" life as plugged by the Japanese propaganda to be the proper way to live as an Asiatic in Asia. The propaganda will not reach the mass of the Filipino people, even if the war and the "aid" is delayed for several years.

The average Filipino citizen is definitely concerned over the promise of independence to the country by the United States as emphasized too much on the San Francisco radio broadcasts. He is afraid that the independence will deprive him of that part of his former life which has been connected so comfortably and prosperously with the United States. He does not want to lose contact with the country whose name has been synonymous in the Philippines with health, education, comfortable living and freedom from internal troubles, and from international difficulties during the past four decades.

It is believed that radio propaganda at the present time should be directed to the Filipinos with the knowledge of their basic loyalty -- somewhat the same as if the propaganda were being directed to American domestic audiences -- and let them know here that they are not being forgotten by the United States, that the return of U.S. armed forces to the Islands to evict the Japanese is inevitable (although it may be delayed for a longer time than the Filipinos in their impatience may desire), and that upon the return of the former government to the Islands, everything possible will be done to bring about a rehabilitation of the industry and business of the country, and the re-establishment of "normal" conditions to the satisfaction of the Filipino people.

Due to the danger of focusing attention too much on the guerrilla efforts, which might bring about increased pressure on the part of the enemy for their elimination, it is believed that no mention of their continued resistance, nor of their efforts should be made. The guerrilla units are following strictly guerrilla tactics at the present time, with the idea that if they continue to do so, the enemy will not bother much with reinforcements of their troops in the centers within the guerrilla controlled territories. Areas lightly held may be easier taken when the time comes for the guerrilla units to act offensively in coordination with any activity in the direction of the Philippines on the part of General MacArthur's forces. Propaganda to help the guerrillas may at present be more of a detriment than help.

Printed propaganda directed to the Filipino people would be of definite assistance throughout the Islands. This could be sent to district commanders in the Islands with supply shipments, who would arrange for circulation throughout the areas, both occupied and unoccupied. It would help in keeping to a high point the morale of the guerrillas, and of the people of the Islands. Such propaganda should be carefully prepared and lithographed in good quality work so that its having been prepared in America will not be doubted -- thus it would serve as a message from the American people to the Filipino people. The subjects most likely to help at the present time would include short messages to the Filipino people indicating a positive plan to return to the Islands to evict the enemy; asking for the patience and continued loyalty of the people in waiting for the return to pre-war conditions; reference to the plan (if there is one) for the rehabilitation of the Islands; messages from General MacArthur to bolster the morale of the Filipino people; messages from President Quezon and President Roosevelt impressing on the Filipino people the plan for return to the Islands of the Commonwealth Government, and of the plans to re-establish the economic structure of the Islands after the war; messages pointing out the acts of the enemy within the country which are detrimental to the interests of the Filipino people -- such as commercial monopolies by the Japanese, taking down of the Filipino flag, the implanting of Japanism, wherever possible to the destruction of Filipinism, etc.

Pamphlets containing messages to the people, containing news of Allied victories, with pictures, and carefully distributed through the intelligence agents of the various districts; both inside the occupied areas and throughout the free areas, would be helpful to the guerrilla movement, without necessarily bringing down retaliation or campaign to eliminate the guerrilla forces -- this, of course, with the understanding that the propaganda does not mention the guerrilla forces. It should contain messages of achievements in other theaters to indicate to the Filipino people the strength of the Allied forces and assurance of ultimate victory.

Present radio propaganda has an excellent coverage in

the "free" area, and almost no coverage within the occupied areas. The enemy has taken every possible means to prevent the listening to foreign newscasts within the occupied areas. First, he permitted the use of shortwave receivers, after prohibiting the use of outside antennas -- thinking that with the removal of the outside aerials, foreign broadcasts could not be heard. It was found that not much difficulty was experienced in getting the broadcasts with no aerial -- and surely with an inside aerial, strung under the house to avoid detection, the broadcasts from the more powerful stations came in as well as with the outside wiring. Next came an order not to listen to the foreign stations, with a penalty of death if caught. Then came the order in January 1943 that all sets must be registered and sent into the Japanese bureau for re-conditioning to prevent listening to shortwave stations. In the meantime, the Japanese military administration installed in Japan and in Manila high-powered long wave stations which are expected to cover all points within the occupied areas -- including shortwave relay of Manila broadcasts to Cebu and Davao, for re-broadcasting on long wave to the units within those areas.

The result of the efforts of the enemy to prevent the listening to U.S. newscasts within the occupied areas has been very good. There are a very limited number of listeners to the news programs, but as the penalty for getting caught is so severe, they are careful not to broadcast either the news or the fact that they are listeners.

One reason for the casual acceptance of the Japanese efforts to prevent listening, frankly, has been that the newscasts have been so stereotyped and of no particular value. The average listener has been told daily the same items and in the same manner. There have been the daily communiques indicating the usual number of bombs dropped on the various enemy installations, the usual number of planes destroyed, vessels sunk, and other victories. This has all been well accepted -- but it has been taken so much as a matter of fact to be expected of the Allied forces, and of no particular news interest. More domestic news of the United States, human interest items, and a more informal type of broadcast might arouse more interest.

In the unoccupied areas, the newscasts are listened to by groups in every district, even in the smallest municipalities. The guerrilla reporters copy the slow-dictated newscasts (an excellently established broadcast for purposes of copying), and post it on bulletin boards and for circulation to the outlying districts. The news is well accepted, and the act of circulating the current news throughout the areas is a fine morale-building effort.

* * * * *

A plan might be workable eventually for reaching the occupied areas through the installation of a powerful longwave broadcasting station somewhere in a secure place within the guerrilla-controlled areas, for re-broadcasting on longwave the U.S. shortwave programs, and for broadcasting local news items. This is recommended for immediate consideration only so far as the installation of the equipment is concerned, but not for actual use until such time as it may be advisable to reach the people within the occupied areas to build up support for expected Allied activities in the country. A premature use of the station would probably cause the enemy to take successful steps to eliminate it.

11. Penetration Parties:

These parties, as such, are not required nor recommended for the military districts in the Visayas and Mindanao. These

districts are now well in the hands of the guerrilla units, and in most cases communication nets have been established to assure secure communications from within the districts. Reliable and thorough intelligence information may be supplied as desired.

In each of the Military Districts already recognized, and in each of the other districts as soon as recognized, it might be helpful and very desirable for morale-building effect as well as for closer contact with GHQ, to send an officer to act as observer for GHQ and liaison with the guerrilla leader of the district. An observer could be of much help to the guerrilla leader in assisting him to unify and keep unified the various troops within the district, as experience has shown that the observer (being tangible evidence of interest in the guerrilla movement on the part of General MacArthur) has been able to build morale in all parts of the district visited, both among the military and civil populations. The observer's value is more for "living evidence" of American interest in the Islands, than possibly his own efforts. His presence does much toward allaying fears of the people that they may have been abandoned by General MacArthur's forces, and strengthens their continued patience for the return of what they refer to as the "aid." It is probably a mistake to send into the Military Districts untrained Filipino enlisted men from SWPA of the type sent to date. Their effect on the morale of the local guerrilla troops is damaging. They return to the Philippines with stories of luxurious treatment in SWPA, good pay and usually display a comparatively substantial amount of money. The men are well equipped with shoes, good clothing, modern equipment -- items far from being obtainable by the guerrillas, even better than guerrilla field officers possess -- all of which adds up to create a feeling of discontentment amongst the guerrillas. Were there a need for this type of personnel, the sending of them might be justified, but in the various military districts there is a surplus of manpower available, including professional and technical men. As a matter of fact, it might be well to consider on the part of GHQ the possibilities of securing from the Philippines trained personnel for any of the departments of the services in the SWPA which might be lacking in specialists -- such as radio operators, doctors, mechanics, surgeons, chemists, radio technicians, merchant marine officers and similar types, of which there is a surplus available in all of the free areas. Needless to say, these men would be very glad to volunteer for service in the SWPA.

Up to this point, the remarks have been directed against purely penetration parties being sent to Military Districts already organized and recognized (or to these districts as soon as they have been recognized). There might in time be a decided advantage, however, to have such parties sent to areas near or on the Island of Luzon and not for the purpose of contacting guerrilla groups. These penetration parties could be organized for the collection of intelligence information, and for potential assistance in unifying any friendly groups encountered or developed in the areas. Great care should be taken in training, equipping, and selecting men to make up the parties. To be taken into consideration is that the men could not keep their identity withheld from the people in the area (even if they were natives of the place) nor that they had come from outside. This being true, there is no advantage in selecting men to make up penetration parties especially for their ability to land and attempt to pose as inhabitants of the site selected. In fact, they would be at a distinct disadvantage, as guerrilla groups throughout Luzon, either legitimate or outlaws, are so afraid of Fifth Columnists and espionage agents (Filipinos) being used to a great extent by the enemy to track down and uncover these groups that they would treat with considerable suspicion any

new faces in the area, and this treatment might easily result in loss of life. On the other hand, if an American or Americans could be included in the parties, they could be expected to be looked upon with less suspicion and could reasonably expect the protection of friendly civilians in these areas (and they are friendly). An American serviceman would obviously not be regarded as being an agent of the enemy. His party would be considered in the same light. They would naturally run the risk of detection by Fifth Columnists, or enemy agents, but their risk would be far less than that which a Filipino from outside would run. English is spoken sufficiently throughout the Islands, so that knowledge of the language is not necessary.

A penetration party to the barren northwest coast of Mindoro might be feasible. An alternate site would be on the southern part of Bondoc Peninsula. A party at either of these places could, when acquainted with the people in the district, and when the friendship of the native population may have been investigated and found secure, develop a group of agents from the locals to send into the occupied areas for the purpose of securing information, and for the delivery of cyphered messages to the intelligence group now functioning within the city of Manila. Members of the party would definitely not be able to get into occupied cities such as Manila without undue risk of detection, whereas agents developed amongst residents in the area (successfully experienced in the three recognized military districts) could do so. If the danger, or rather the delay, in development of secure agents from within the sites makes this plan undesirable, it would not be difficult to arrange that agents from within the occupied areas (men already known to be completely trustworthy and loyal) be sent to act as couriers for the penetration party.

Penetration parties should take a minimum of equipment. Personal effects could be limited to a couple of changes of clothing, toilet articles and medical kits. A good radio transmitter and receiver, together with means of charging batteries, should be sent. It should be of low power to make detection more difficult, and to increase its portability. Messages could be relayed through any of the network stations by prearrangement, and without necessarily having to disclose to the relaying station location or purpose of the party or contents of messages. The party should have an ample supply of Japanese military currency or of Philippine Government money for use within the occupied areas -- failing a supply of these types of currency, a supply of U.S. currency in the largest possible denominations would furnish the means of securing funds in use in the area (U.S. funds meet with ready acceptance by holders of surplus amounts of Japanese military currency, in spite of death penalty being imposed by the enemy if the transaction is discovered). Photographic materials, a good camera, and a limited amount of material for sabotage and other subversive activities could be included. No food or cooking utensils need be included.

12. Supplies to Guerrillas:

The shipment of supplies to the 6th, 7th and 10th Military Districts has been of invaluable assistance to the guerrilla organizations. As other districts are recognized, supplies of similar nature as those sent to the three presently recognized districts should be sent regularly. They are badly needed -- especially medical and dental supplies, ammunition and morale-building supplies.

It can be foreseen that the delivery of say four or five tons of supplies per each submarine going to patrol duties in Philippine waters will be inadequate to take care of the minimum

requirements of the districts. Assuming five districts to be supplied in the Visayas and Mindanao, this would mean a shipment to each district only at from four to six month intervals.

It is believed that serious consideration should be given to the delivery of supplies to the 10th Military District in larger amounts for use in that district and for delivery to the adjacent districts. Secure and adequate landing facilities are available in this district for receiving say up to 200 tons; unloading and dispersal of shipment to be done in one night. It is not certain that other districts are so fortunately equipped. If not, supplies for those districts could also be handled satisfactorily through the 10th Military District. There is constant sailboat traffic between the districts, and as yet no difficulty has been experienced in sending supplies from one district to the other. In case of any plans in the future to send supplies by air, the 10th Military District might again be a suggested supply base for adjacent districts, due to its large areas of unoccupied territory, and isolated areas with airfields which could handle the largest planes with no expected interference on the part of the enemy (at least for the first few shipments). The 10th Military District is the nearest to the SWPA airports.

Aside from the routine shipment of supplies to the units in the Visayas and Mindanao, and for penetration parties around Central Luzon, the shipment of supplies to units located in Northern Luzon should be considered. It is understood that the submarines operating the nearest to that area work out of Pearl Harbor. There are many secure sites in Northern Luzon for the landing of supplies, and in cooperation with the guerrilla units and through their communication system, a rendezvous for the submarine could be worked out, and plans developed for the delivery of funds, supplies and ammunition, along lines already successfully being handled in the South. An early consideration of an initial shipment to Northern Luzon is highly recommended. As Governor Roque Ablan is understood to be active in the guerrilla activities in Ilocos Norte, a site within his province -- possibly Bangued Bay -- would probably offer satisfactory landing facilities. The west coast of Luzon (south of Bangued Bay) would not be recommendable during the next four months due to the southwest monsoon. Investigation may disclose also that a site on the barren and almost uninhabited east coast of Northern Luzon would be accessible to the guerrilla units under Major Praeger.

If air transport to the Philippines is not practicable, it is recommended that an extra trip of a submarine be made after a patrol now and then to bring up a larger amount of supplies to the guerrilla districts. A suggestion along the following lines might meet with acceptance of the Navy: A submarine returning from patrol would go to a northeastern Australian port (Darwin, for instance) where a shipment of say thirty or forty tons of supplies (full capacity of the vessel) would be ready for loading, also the required amount of fuel oil and provisions for the trip. The supplies and cargo would be loaded and the vessel dispatched as soon as possible for the trip to Mindanao. The only "fish" to be carried on the submarine would be those in the tubes, leaving the torpedo rooms free for loading cargo. The cargo would be delivered to the site chosen, and the vessel would return to its base in Australia in the usual manner for maintenance and fitting-out for its next patrol. It is calculated that this would probably not add three weeks to routine patrol.

In sending supplies to the recognized districts, unless the Navy requires that the shipment be accompanied by someone to arrange contact and delivery of the supplies at destination, it

would be an easy matter (assuming the continuance of present conditions in the various areas) to land the supplies at safe and secure contact points without requiring anyone to accompany the supplies. Should the Navy desire a representative aboard to make arrangements at destination, this could be handled by an officer or enlisted man (one individual only) who should know enough of local conditions at the designated discharge point to go ashore in a small boat to arrange for landing facilities. No stevedores to unload the supplies are required, as in each delivery heretofore the personnel on the delivering vessel has handled the discharge entirely, and has been able to discharge the entire shipment in a matter of about a half hour. In each of the districts in the Visayas and Mindanao, there are areas held completely in friendly hands, isolated from enemy pressure or patrols, and where the submarine could even surface and discharge cargo at midday with no great risk. With the perfection of a rapid communication of messages to submarines (as indicated under subject of "watcher stations") additional security would be given to submarines through making available means to advise the vessel quickly of any change in the security of an area designated for the discharge of supplies. Present communication facilities between the various districts and the SWPA give limited protection to the security of the vessel, but a delay is experienced in getting advice to vessel (usually two days) which may be too late to protect against a changed condition. With careful planning and better coordination between the services to avoid delay at destination, and to avoid jeopardizing the security of the submarine through having a watch being kept for the arrival of the vessel for more than a day or so, the matter of landing supplies in the Philippines can be made an easy routine, and definitely of no unusual risk to the delivering vessel. This will be made the matter of a separate subject, outlining in detail various delivery points considered secure, and a method of arranging for quick delivery at destination without requiring the presence of a special representative aboard vessel to handle the contact and landing of the shipment.

The types of supplies most needed by the guerrilla organizations are as follows and in the priority listed:

a) Medical supplies, with emphasis on medicines for malaria, dysentery, tropical ulcers. Also needed are cotton, bandages, tetanus injections, dental supplies for simple fittings, extractions, etc., disinfectants, quinine or atabrine, also sulphathiazole and the other sulpha drugs both in pill and powder form -- these should make up the bulk of each shipment. They are needed badly, not only by the military men, but by the civil population. The needs of the civilians in the areas must be met by the guerrillas, as there is absolutely no other manner in which they may be made available to the people.

b) Ammunition: On each shipment by submarine, it is understood that around four tons of ammunition could be accommodated to act as "weight" cargo to balance the "measurement" cargo made up of medical and general supplies. Within the weight indicated, it will be possible to ship about 50,000 rounds of .30 cal. rifle ammunition, about 20,000 rounds of .45 cal. pistol ammunition, a few cases of 20 gauge shotgun shells, and about 10 cases of hand and rifle grenades. The bulk of the ammunition should always consist of .30 cal. rifle ammunition. The assortment of the other items is not of much importance.

c) Money or the means with which to produce emergency funds. The money should be Japanese military currency in denominations of say from five centavos to five pesos (counterfeited currency); Philippine Government currency, in small denominations, say not over bills of ten pesos or U.S. bills in large

denominations to be used to purchase currency circulated in occupied areas.

In addition to the money (which is required for use for intelligence purposes within the occupied areas by agents of the guerrilla organizations), when sending supplies to the recognized districts, a supply of linen rag bond paper, and inks of various colors should be included. On the basis of actual and expected added circulation of notes monthly within the 10th Military District, some 30,000 sheets of paper (about 12 x 14), 25 lbs of black, and 10 lbs each of red, green, blue and flake white inks are required monthly to take care of the printing of the required notes. The currency printed runs from five centavos to twenty peso bills. A recommendable alternative would be to lithograph the guerrilla emergency currency in SWPA, following identical wording and signatures presently used. The advantages of this plan are many -- less space required for shipment compared with paper and ink, well lithographed bills would be more difficult to counterfeit, morale-building effect and added confidence which the people would have in a well designed set of currency (not possible now by guerrilla units due to limited and crude facilities.)

d) Radio equipment: Each shipment of supplies should contain several telereadios or dry-cell-powered sets for use within the network of the guerrilla districts, and for the installation of additional watcher stations. These sets should be equipped with crystals of the same frequency as those furnished with the radios first sent, in order to permit standardization. In addition to the radios for making new installations, there should be sent spare parts for the radios previously sent, and parts of a general nature for the sets built originally in the districts.

e) Sabotage material and other items for subversive activities within the enemy's lines (incendiary pencils and charges, time bombs and any other articles) could be developed for this type of work. It would not be at all difficult to carry out subversive activities within the enemy-occupied areas through the use of agents and contact men already in service when the appropriate time arrives for this type of work. The results undoubtedly not only would be damaging to the enemy, but would be morale-building for the guerrillas. They would take pleasure in being able to hurt the enemy, and hinder his warlike activities and economic efforts, without meeting him in open warfare, and where only a few men could do lots of damage.

f) Morale-building supplies: This type of supplies should not be overlooked. There should be included cigarettes, late American magazines, propaganda leaflets, a few late moving picture films especially newsreels (several projectors of the commercial type are available in the 10th Military District under guerrilla control), khaki cloth, needles, thread and buttons, shoes, socks, underwear, sundry toilet articles, such as tooth paste, razor blades, books, games, athletic equipment, tooth brushes, combs and such similar items -- these articles are unavailable in the Philippines, and their receipt by the guerrilla units will undoubtedly do much to keep the morale of the troops at a high level. A small amount of wheat flour for communion wafers and of mass wine might be sent at intervals for the Irish (Columban) and American (Jesuit) priests, of whom some thirty-five or forty are located at parishes within the guerrilla-controlled areas of Mindanao, and who are cooperating with the guerrillas to the fullest extent. (The work of these priests for the guerrilla movement in Mindanao cannot be praised too highly. The superior of the Jesuit priests is actively engaged in working at the 109th Div. Headquarters in developing projects for the substitution of articles available locally for articles previously imported -- he has done a fine job on working out a method of using cinchona bark concentrate for the treatment of malaria. In the other districts are also a number of priests who have always shown a keen interest in helping the guerrillas, and in protecting them from the enemy in many cases.)

g) Such sundry supplies as may be requisitioned

from time to time by the guerrilla leaders.

It is estimated that a typical shipment of say up to eight tons aboard a submarine on regular patrol, would best be divided 50% ammunition, 20% medical and dental supplies, 10% money, paper and ink, 5% sabotage material, 5% radio equipment and 10% morale-building and sundry supplies. If say thirty tons could be brought on a special trip of a submarine, it should be made up of 35% ammunition, 20% medical and dental supplies, 15% money, paper and ink, 10% each of radio equipment, sabotage material and morale-building and sundry supplies.

Supply of tires for the limited number of trucks in operation seems to be adequate for the present -- as well as an unlimited supply of coconut oil for use in diesel engines, and motor fuel alcohol made from the direct distillation of tuba (sap from the coconut tree), and of other products such as camotes, corn, casaba, etc. In the 10th Military District, some 125 gallons of motor alcohol are produced daily. There is still a limited amount of gasoline, kerosene and diesel fuel on hand within the areas, but these articles are closely rationed and only used where a substitute fuel will not serve.

There is ample supply of food in all guerrilla areas. None need be sent.

13. The Enemy:

The enemy organization within the Philippines is headed by General Tanaka, who replaced General Homma, and who maintains office and residence in the palace of the U.S. High Commissioner at Manila; next in rank to him is General Commander of Greater Manila, General Wati, who has offices in the Department of Interior Building, and who resides in the home of President Quezon on the Boulevard. The admiral in charge of the naval units has his offices in the old offices of Admiral Hart in the Marsman Building in the Port Area. He lives in the home of Mr. J.B. Findlay on the Boulevard. Colonel Ohta heads the military police (Kempei-Tai). His office and place of imprisonment for military suspects and prisoners are at Fort Santiago. He lives in the home of Mr. H. Marsman in Pasay. At the head of the civilian economic corps, made up of a group of civilian experts sent to the Philippines with the responsibility and task of developing the industries and agriculture of the Islands to conform to the requirements of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, is Mr. Shozo Murata. He has offices in the Wilson Building, and lives in the house of Mr. M. J. Ossorio, on Dewey Boulevard.

The military organization in the islands is made up of from forty to fifty thousand soldiers; of which the bulk is stationed in and around Manila. Between Fort McKinley and Camp Murphy there are around ten thousand men, with about five thousand more scattered between the airfields and within the city of Manila proper. There are some ten thousand men spread throughout the provinces of Luzon, including a fair-sized detachment at Corregidor. Beach fortifications have been added (the batteries of coast artillery pieces damaged during the bombardment of Corregidor are apparently of no interest to the enemy, and apparently no attempt is being made to place them back in operation). The undamaged artillery is reportedly being kept in order for use. It is estimated that some ten thousand men are distributed throughout the Visayan provinces, and about a like number in Mindanao, of which the largest garrison is maintained at Davao.

It seems to be the policy of the enemy to consider the Philippines as a complete and self-sufficient garrison, calculated on the number of men now on duty in the Islands. This also seems to be the case so far as air strength is concerned, artillery pieces, etc., as there have been no additions to the strength of men or material since the fall of the Visayan Islands. Shift of strength has been made from time to time to campaign against guerrilla units in districts where the guerrillas have been aggressive -- for instance, Panay during the fall and winter of 1942, Northern Luzon early this year, and more recently Cebu. At present, there

is an added interest of the enemy in Mindanao, and pressure is being increased at various points. All of this activity, however, is being handled by the permanent enemy garrison originally assigned to the Philippines, and no fresh troops from outside are reported to have arrived.

In addition to the regular garrison of enemy troops, there are being added every six weeks some 500 Filipinos to the Bureau of Constabulary. These men are mostly paroled prisoners of war, and are trained for the Constabulary under Japanese instructors. They are estimated to number about 3,000 at the present time. These men are added to the various Japanese garrisons and a percentage of them is added to raiding parties. They apparently are not all armed, and a number of deserters have joined the guerrillas from time to time. It is believed by the guerrilla leaders that upon an attack against the enemy by U.S. or guerrilla armed forces, where the attack looks as if it might be successful, the Constabulary men (with but few exceptions) may be expected to turn on the Japanese.

The enemy is using airfields at Aparri or some other Northern Luzon point, Clark Field, Nichols and Nielsen at Manila, Iloilo, Cebu, Tacloban, Cagayan, Zamboanga, Legaspi and Davao. A constant stream of medium bomber airplanes are ferried through the Philippines to an outside southern base. Over the Bukidnon Valley daily are counted from five to twenty-five planes daily going southward towards Davao. There is almost no traffic northward. These are in most part twin-motored planes, although a few single-motored planes are sometimes included.

The principal air bases in the Islands are located at Clark Field, Nichols Field and Nielsen Airport. Many improvements have been made at the old fields. At Nichols, the old runways have been considerably extended, and new ones added. The runways now radiate from a large center rotunda in a star-like form. These runways are now all made of concrete. At Nielsen Field, the main runway has been extended beyond the road which originally connected the McKinley road with the Spanish Hospital, and the road has been closed. The main and cross runways here have also been concreted. Clark Field has been improved somewhat in the same manner as Nichols Field, and it is at Clark Field that the enemy has his main fighting force. There are three important landing fields now being prepared -- one at Lipa, Batangas, another at Santa Rosa, Bulacan, and one near Puerto Princesa on Palawan. Most of the laborers working at these fields are American prisoners of war, estimated at about 1,500.

It is estimated that the enemy does not maintain more than 120 airplanes of all types in the Philippines. At Nichols Field, there are about forty planes, mostly medium bombers; at Nielsen there are about twenty, mostly observation and training planes. Nielsen is also used as a terminal for the transports which ply between Formosa and the Philippines and from Manila southward, handling passenger traffic mostly. At Clark Field (their most important base) are fighter planes and a few small bombers -- about fifty in all. There are twelve Zero fighters detailed at Clark amongst the other types of fighter planes. There are also a few planes distributed throughout the Islands, usually two or three at each of the provincial fields.

Near or surrounding the main airfields are anti-aircraft batteries which are open and clearly visible. These batteries are of but secondary importance and are mostly captured American guns without sights and manned by Filipino officers and soldiers, under Japanese commanders. The Japanese main anti-aircraft batteries, of which there are a substantial number, are hidden, well camouflaged, and located at sites somewhat farther from the fields. These are manned by Japanese soldiers and officers.

Observation and patrol planes, from ten to fifteen, fly from Luzon bases regularly every day, especially during the early morning hours. They are apparently patrolling the coastal waters along the west coast of Luzon and to a lesser degree along the east coast.

Lately, regular flights of modern heavy bombers, in groups of around twenty to twenty-five, have been arriving at Nichols Field for an overnight stay, continuing their flight southward the following day. This has been occurring almost daily for the months of March, April and May 1943. These flights passing through Manila are undoubtedly the same flights observed over the Bukidnon Valley, heading southward. The only discrepancy is that the Manila observer has indicated that they were "modern heavy bombers" whereas the planes observed in flight over Bukidnon have been of the modern, twin-engined, medium bomber type.

The enemy has made strong efforts to re-establish within the occupied areas, and for that matter throughout the Islands, the public utilities, road networks, rail lines and inter-island steamship service.

In Manila, the public utilities were not destroyed before falling into the hands of the enemy. They have been continued in service without interruption. The Caliraya hydro-electric project, to supply current to the city of Manila, and which was almost finished when the war began, has been completed to a limited degree (not completely successful), and which has resulted in an added supply of a limited amount of current to augment the supply from the Meralco copra-meal burning plant, and the hydro-electric unit at Botocan near Pagsanjan. The gas supply for domestic use in Manila has been maintained through the use of coconut oil as a fuel. Electric and gas rates have been increased by 15%.

In Cebu, the electric current for the city is supplied from the cement plant at Naga.

All highways are back in condition, with all bridges having been repaired (mostly using American prisoner laborers) on the Island of Luzon. The Manila Railway lines have all been put back in condition and trains are maintaining through schedules from the former northern terminal at San Fernando, La Union, to Legaspi, with another line to Cabanatuan in use again. The railway line on Panay is back in service from Iloilo to Capiz.

The inter-island steamer service has been re-established with the use of a number of vessels salvaged by the enemy after the fall of Corregidor and placed in regular service between Manila and the outlying provinces. Incidentally, a few of them have been sunk by American submarines recently. Certain other inter-island vessels, of a larger tonnage, have been refloated and sent out to Borneo and Formosa. Seven tugboats have been captured, or salvaged, by the enemy and are in use out of Manila.

The only ocean-going vessel known to have been refloated, or salvage attempted, was the "Don Jose" which was refloated and towed to Manila. Apparently, it was found too far damaged to repair and place in operation as it was taken out to the beach near Paranaque, and permitted to sink in the sand.

Earnshaws Docks in the port area of Manila has been rebuilt and is used for docking the vessels in inter-island service. Engineer Island has not been rebuilt.

Wooden vessels from 100 and 200 feet long are being built in Manila and at Malabon. It has also been reported that construction of similar types of vessels is being undertaken at Albay. The slipways in Manila which are used for the construction of the smaller wooden boats are located between the Ayala Bridge

and the Estero de la Quinta -- slipways formerly owned by Chinese, and use in building and servicing vessels of the fishing fleets which operated out of Manila. The old slipways in Malabon and on the Vitas canal are used for the construction of the larger type wooden boats. At the Manila and Malabon slipways there were under construction during the month of April 1943 not less than fifteen wooden vessels.

Since the opening of Manila Bay after the fall of Corregidor in May 1942 and until the month of August of the same year, the average arrival of Japanese vessels in Manila Bay was around 140 per month. From September 1942 until the early part of January 1943, the average was reduced to not over 70 vessels per month. Then from January to the end of April, the movement increased again to an average of around 160 per month. These vessels consisted mostly of transport and cargo ships, with an occasional appearance of a cruiser and a few destroyers. Convoys of from ten to fifteen ships were sometimes formed outside the breakwater in Manila. Their escorts must have been waiting for them outside of Corregidor (probably Hamilo Cove), as the convoys left Manila without escorts. Convoys sailing for the southern theaters of war apparently take the San Bernardino Straits passage.

The appearance of several hospital ships in the harbor at Manila at almost regular intervals creates a suspicion that they may be used for other purposes than that indicated. It is a known fact that a hospital ship was used on a regular run from Cotabato to Davao during the month of May 1943, transporting full cargoes of rice.

The cargo movement in the harbor at Manila has been mostly outward. The usual cargo has been sugar, rice, lard, soap, salt, and scrap iron. Coconut oil to the total amount of some 70,000 tons has been shipped on tankers up to the end of April 1943. Of interest is that on two of the tankers loading coconut oil outward, German volunteers or refugees were sent away, and the presumption was that these tankers were destined for Germany.

The enemy is having a fair amount of success in administering the civil affairs of the occupied areas through the formation and functioning under puppet officials of the Kapisanan Paglilingkod Sa Bagong Pilipinas, or the so-called neighborhood associations. These neighborhood associations established by the enemy in the occupied areas, for the purpose of control and discipline of the civilian populace have proven most effective. Briefly, the system involves the appointment of heads of small groups of residents (usually ten families is the smallest group), who are responsible for the behaviour of the people within the group. The smaller groups are parts of larger groups. A census of all people within a certain group is filed with the military police, and no person may enter or leave the group area without proper permit from the proper officials. Thus, the enemy is able to control or rather to prevent the infiltration of guerrilla agents into the occupied areas. Group leaders know that if an unlisted person is found living within his group, he, and possibly all members of the group, may be subjected to severe punishment -- and there have been cases of wholesale execution of all members of a group in retaliation for the acts of one member.

An example of the efficiency of the neighborhood association idea will indicate the difficulties of outside intelligence agents functioning within the enemy-controlled areas. It was desired to send a test telegram over the Japanese-controlled postal-telegraph system to an agent in Manila from Cagayan. The wording of messages permitted, and the manner in which censorship is handled seemed to make possible an easy means of communication between agents at different enemy-occupied cities through a plain language code. However, messages filed must be signed and address given of the sender, which makes necessary the sender be bona fide member of a neighborhood group. Consequently, guerrilla agents smuggled into a town for brief periods could not file a message with a fictitious name as sender. A reply to a message or messages received for

delivery within the town must bear the name and address of a person listed as living within the area, and consequently a member of one of the neighborhood groups. Of course, reliable agents residing within the communities have been developed and plans are under way for communicating with similar agents in other areas, but the plan could not be worked with guerrilla agents working from outside the cities.

Incidentally, there are a sufficient number of pro-Japanese civilians living within the occupied areas to require utmost caution to be used by anyone who may act as agent for the guerrillas. Risk of detection is great.

In the early part of December 1942, the Military Administration called together the heads of the various political parties in the Islands, who were told that the Commander-in-Chief desired the voluntary dissolution of all political parties, and the formation of a single party for the National Service of the New Philippines. The party was formed and now is known as the Kalibapi. The Director-General of the association was made an ex-officio member of the Executive Commission and next in rank only to the Chairman. Hon. Benigno Aquino, probably the most cooperative of the puppet officials with the Japanese, was appointed Director-General. As Assistant Director-General, and at the same time Chief of Propaganda, the famous Mr. Benigno Ramos of Sakdal fame (who has led several movements against law and order in Pampanga in the past) was chosen. The other members of the board of directors are Atty. Pio Duran, Chief of General Affairs, Hon. Jose Laurel, Jr., Director of Provincial and Municipal Administration, Hon. Dominador Tan, Director of Research and Planning, Hon. Alfonso Mendoz, Director of Luzon, Hon. Oscar Ledesma, Director of the Visayas, Hon. Jaun Alanao, Director of Mindanao, and Mr. Arsenio Luz, Secretary-Treasurer. All are with the rank and salary of First-Class Bureau Directors.

The membership in the Kalibapi is supposed to be voluntary, but no government employee, even the day laborers, may collect pay without exhibiting his membership card. Rice and other rationed commodities are sold at government prices only to holders of Kalibapi membership cards. Anyone dealing with the government in any way whatever, especially people applying for licenses, or concessions, are required to produce membership cards before action is taken on their applications.

The Board of Directors of the Kalibapi has been conducting speech-making tours to the principal towns of Luzon for the purpose of preaching orientalism, hatred for things Anglo-Saxon, and of course, asking for collaboration with the Japanese for the establishment of the Co-Prosperity Sphere in the Philippines. These efforts on the part of the Kalibapi have not been particularly productive of results. It is also reported that the keenest cooperative members of the association have been disillusioned as time has passed, and are not at all happy in their having chosen to aid the enemy. Many of them are now doubtful of their original zeal in working for the interests of the enemy since they have seen non-acceptance of their enthusiasm or of their arguments to change over from the inherent and well implanted ideal of democracy and Americanism in the hearts of the Filipino people -- and especially since they have seen a bogging down of the speedy conquests of the early days of the war, and now ever-increasing fear on the part of these officials that the Japanese may not win the war after all. Soon these lads may be expected to start toning down their speeches to the people, and start working out ways and means for a jump to the side of the Allies at the first moment an opportunity affords. What form their future activities may take is of but little importance -- of interest at the moment is the fact that even the original "Quislings" and the first to jump to the aid of

the enemy, are now doubtful of any benefits they may have expected to derive from their cooperation with the enemy. They are definitely not happy in their positions and are fearful of what the future may bring them.

A problem requiring careful thought and solution is that of what attitude to take with reference to the USAFFE Filipino officers and men who have upon release from prison camps accepted posts in the Bureau of Constabulary, and who have while on duty with the Japanese military forces within the Islands conducted warfare on the guerrilla units -- resulting in the death of a number of the unsundered USAFFE officers and men. They have, to a limited extent, been used by the Japanese as undercover agents and spies to hunt out and guide the Japanese forces to the hide-outs of the guerrillas (especially in Luzon) and have been used as patrols to hold places taken from the guerrillas.

From talks with soldiers of the Constabulary who have deserted and escaped from their posts with the Japanese and who have joined the guerrillas, the following has been ascertained:

Of the Filipinos in the Constabulary, the majority, in fact, practically all, are there against their convictions, and would prefer to be with the guerrillas. This class of soldier plans to turn against his Japanese comrades when the opportunity arises (that is, when the American troops return to the Islands).

A small minority of the men are sincerely cooperating with the enemy, and may be considered as "Quislings" in the full sense of the word. These men are the ones who act as spies on the guerrillas (also upon the other men within the Constabulary organization, making it difficult for the loyal soldiers to discuss their ideas amongst themselves), and who are the most outstanding in their efforts when campaigning with the Japanese soldiers against the guerrillas.

How to determine who is or who is not pro-enemy in his inclinations and efforts against the troops still offering resistance to the enemy is a problem of major proportion.

14. Commando Training:

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15. Americans in Free Areas:

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16. Bomb Objectives:

Having in mind the rather comprehensive directives on "bomb objectives" for Philippine targets, as gotten out by A-2 in Washington, the following information has been compiled and recorded to be used to correct or augment these directives:

In Manila, all of the Port Area remains destroyed as it was at the end of enemy bombing during December 1941, and the "scorched earth" destruction by the USAFFE troops when abandoning Manila, except for Earnshaws Docks which has been rebuilt and is being used for the repair and maintenance of vessels of the re-established inter-island fleet. The piers (1,3,5, and 7) were never destroyed to such an extent that they could not be used. They are all now in full use.

All coconut oil factories are working at full capacity.

Meralco electric plant is still supplying current to the city for domestic and commercial use. Caliraya hydro-electric project has been brought into limited production of current for Manila. Botocan hydro-electric plant is in full operation.

All rope factories in Manila are running.

The shops and round-house of Manila Railroad Company have been completely repaired and are in use for the maintenance and operation of the railroad.

On Luzon, all railroad and highway bridges have been repaired. Traffic on all railway lines and highways has been re-established.

Sugar centrals are not being used and their destruction would ordinarily not be of detriment to the enemy. Distilleries at the centrals are producing alcohol for motor fuel and would make excellent targets.

Clark Field, Nichols Field and Nielsen Airport have been repaired, improved considerably, and the runways all concreted. These are the principal air bases in the Islands. New fields are being built in Lipa, Batangas; Santa Rosa, Bulacan; and Puerto Princesa, Palawan.

Iron mines being worked by the enemy and from which shipments are being made regularly to Japan are located at Jese Panigiban, Camarines, and Balanacan, Marinduque. Manganese mines are operated at Guindulman, Bohol and at several sites on Busuanga Island.

The Lepanto Copper mines at Mancayan are being operated at full capacity, using 2,500 laborers. A new pier has been erected at Tagudin from which copper concentrates are shipped regularly.

The Insular Lumber Company plant at Fabrica, Oriental Negros, is reported (but not confirmed) as being operated by the enemy and shipments of lumber are made regularly. Logs are shipped from the Basilan Lumber Company, located on the northern end of Basilan Island, Zamboanga Province; and from Dingalan Bay, on the central eastern coast of Luzon.

The large oil storage tank located at Rio Guinobatan, Masbate, and which was captured together with a large amount of diesel fuel upon the fall of Masbate into enemy hands, has been dismantled and taken to Manila -- possibly for erection at Manila, but more likely for export to Japan and reerection there.

The oil storage tanks at Iloilo, located on the north banks of the Iloilo River (near the mouth) were all left intact and fell into enemy hands (scorched earth destruction failed, reportedly due to enemy action in outflanking the group sent to set off the dynamite placed under the tanks) and are being used by the enemy to full advantage. Also the tank installation located at Jordan, on the west central coast of Guimaras, is still intact with a modern concrete pier and pumping installation. Storage facilities for some 3,000,000 gallons are available at this installation.

At Cebu, although a large portion of the business section at Port Area was destroyed by retiring USAFFE troops, the piers were not burned or destroyed. They fell into enemy hands and are being used regularly for the storage and shipment of articles out of the country and between the Islands.

At Zamboanga the pier is still in good condition and is being used regularly by the enemy. There is usually a vessel (transport, tanker or warship) alongside the pier daily.

In connection with the above, the intelligence groups within the Islands today, working through the commanders of the recognized military districts, are in a position to secure and supply information concerning any of the bomb objectives in which the Air Intelligence may be interested. This information could be supplied within a matter of a few days, except in cases where long trips would have to be made to make an investigation. It is

suggested that a questionnaire be submitted by Air Intelligence, outlining the type of information desired and information of a specific nature concerning bomb objectives already reported or on which a report is desired. Such a questionnaire would guide the intelligence units in outlining work for their agents along lines which would give the most valuable results. The intelligence agents are now located within enemy-occupied territory in most parts of the Philippines. They are particularly active in Manila, Iloilo City, Negros, Cagayan of Misamis Oriental, Davao City, and in Leyte.

17. Manila Intelligence Group:

Shortly after Manila fell into the hands of the enemy, a group of interested reserve officers of the Philippine Army banded together under a reserve officer of the U.S. Navy for the purpose of collecting information from within the occupied areas of Manila and Luzon, and for the purpose of getting this information into the hands of the armed forces at Bataan and Corregidor. It was found not practicable to send this information to the armed forces. However, the group continued to function with the idea that sooner or later the information (verbal and documentary) could be transmitted to officials outside the occupied areas.

A member of the group succeeded in leaving the area and was able to place at the disposal of the headquarters of the Army and Navy such information and documents accumulated up to and including the month of June 1942.

All work of the group has been on a voluntary basis, and the men in the group have run risks in order to keep posted on the activities of the enemy within the national capital, and especially with reference to the inner feelings of the puppet officials so that their loyalty may be checked and kept as a matter of record for use upon return to the American forces to the Philippines.

The group is made up of influential men of various nationalities -- headed at present by a Filipino Major of PA Reserves, who was an elected senator at the outbreak of the war, and includes a Spanish capitalist, a Swiss business leader, and a few influential Filipino citizens from the Spanish and Filipino Manila community. Also in the provinces near Manila is a group of unsurrendered American servicemen who have not been able to function with the intelligence group, but who have been kept in contact and helped from time to time against the future when these men may be able to render help when a change in conditions may be expected.

The intelligence group has been recently contacted from Mindanao, the chief of which has made the trip by sailboat to bring latest information, and to outline the functions of the group for the future. Much of the information contained in this report has come from the group. Pending further instructions, the group will continue to function in the collection of information, and in addition to which it will immediately start working along the following lines:

a) Steps will be taken immediately to secure large sums of Japanese military currency from a secure source, for use in the improvement of conditions of internees and prisoners of war on Luzon -- in return for which the group will on behalf of the U.S. Government deliver an obligation to pay the donors after the war in U.S. dollars at an exchange rate now ruling in the islands of two pesos Japanese military notes per one dollar U.S. currency. Funds realized from this plan will be smuggled into the prison camp and into the internment camp; will be used for the purchase of much needed medical supplies, vitamin concentrates,

and other items required by the prisoners and internees, and for the furthering of the work of the intelligence group.

b) The group has installed a radio receiver in the city of Manila, and arrangements have been made with the commander of the 10th Military District to broadcast messages from time to time and as required, using a cypher already delivered to the group. This will make possible the transmission of further orders to the group.

c) Due to the danger of detection of radio transmitting apparatus in the city of Manila or in its nearby districts, steps have been taken to install a radio station of the portable type in an isolated position on the Bondoc Peninsula or in Sorsogon Province. These sites would be available to runners from Manila within a matter of two days. While not ideally efficient, such a plan would be more secure and would present fewer difficulties of detection than if located within the area of the net. In this connection, it should be recorded here that one of the most active of the group's agents was caught, together with some of his helpers, while trying to establish a short wave radio station near Manila. This was discovered through the enemy's espionage system of agents. He was imprisoned at Fort Santiago in July 1942, under sentence of three years at hard labor. His helpers are presumed to have been executed. The imprisonment of this member of the group did not result in the disclosure of the existence of the group, nor of the names of any of the members still functioning. It did, however, impress upon the group the importance of security, and of the necessity to observe the utmost caution and secrecy in its activities.

d) The group through one of its "neutral" members expects to purchase shortly a sailboat with auxiliary motor, to be licensed under the Japanese bureau for the purpose of off shore fishing. This vessel will be based near Lucena (southern port connected to Manila by rail and easily accessible for sending runners, etc.) and can be used to deliver messages to the radio outpost expected to be installed at Sorsogon or Bondoc, or for numerous other purposes -- including contacts with submarines to deliver documents, reports, etc., and to receive supplies.

e) To place more operatives within the enemy-controlled civil government, so as to be better able to secure information as to the activities of the enemy and to keep closer in touch with the activities of the puppet officials.

28. Recommendations:

In conclusion, the following recommendations are made:

1. Continue sending supplies to the Military Districts, in increasingly large amounts, and more often.
2. Arrange for establishing watcher stations on Bondoc Peninsula, San Bernardino Straits, Mindoro, and other strategic points. If possible, a centrally located radio station should be established in southern Philippines to receive all watcher station flashes, evaluate and consolidate the information received, and transmit the news direct to the Navy Station which controls the patrols in the Islands.
3. Arrange for American servicemen in areas to send periodically, via radio, messages to nearest of kin and to receive replies (this would have high morale-building effect).
4. Repatriate General Roxas when deemed advisable.
5. Recognition of the 9th Military District under Colonel Ruperto K. Kangleon.
6. Send a shipment of supplies to the 9th Military District (medicines, radio equipment, arms and ammunition, morale-building and general supplies are badly needed).

7. Repatriate such American servicemen as are not needed in the areas -- probably two hundred.


8. Send to Manila Intelligence Net substantial supply of vitamin tablets (especially "B-1"), quinine, etc., for delivery to prisoners of war and internees at Cabanatuan and Los Banos (arrangements have already been made to supply funds in as large amounts as possible). Send same to 10th Military District for prisoners of war and internees at Davao.


9. Bring from PI to SWPA any needed personnel -- such as doctors, dentists, nurses, mechanics, radio operators, radio engineers, etc. There is a plentiful supply of this personnel from the Filipino services.

10. Bring from PI any needed products which are available -- cinchona bark for quinine production, coconut oil, lumbang nuts, rubber latex, etc. Supplies of these items are plentiful.

NOTE: The above recommendations are not listed in order of any priority.

G. PARSONS






LEGEND


- Local net channels
- Inter-island channels & contact with KAZ (Darwin)

SOUTHERN LUZON, VISAYAS & MINDANAO

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA
Military Intelligence Section
General Staff
PHILIPPINE DISTRICTS
COMMUNICATION NET
15 August 1943



- LUZON:**
- 1 WWAL Maj Praeger, northern Luzon.
- PANAY:**
- 2 NCL Col. Peralta, 6th MD NCS and contact with KAZ (NCL is MID for inter-island traffic).
 - 3 GTI Romblon Intel Center.
 - 4 UME Pucio Pt Coastwatcher.
 - 5 RGE Masbate.
 - 6 WBB For standby use.
 - 7 UBX Near NCL, handles local traffic.
 - 8 KRC 66th Inf.
 - 9 KTQ 64th Inf.
 - 10 KML 61st Div NCL.
 - 11 CTON Confessor. (?)
 - 12 KAM 65th Inf. (Captured?)
 - 13 ZEO 63rd Inf.
- CEBU:**
- 14 CRX Cebu (Captured).
 - 15 NCS Cebu (Maj. Cushing?)
- NEGROS:**
- 16 DKZ Abcede and Villamor, 7th MD.
 - 17 CRX Abcede at Talong.
 - 18 WSR Ausejo and DX standby for relay to SWPA for Col. Fertig, Southern Negros.
- MINDANAO:**
- 19 ERT Col. Fertig, 10th MD, relaying from NCS to Australia as WY2B.
 - 20 WAB Malangas.
 - 21 WAA Pagadian.
 - 22 WAC Caburan, Davao Gulf Coastwatcher (was UU2).
 - 23 TAR Malaybalay.
 - 24 BCF Valencia Field.
 - 25 TAC Imbatug.
 - 26 MRS Anakan (Walters).
 - 27 KLN Lrg set del by Parsons, inst inland fr Bonifacio as standby.
 - 28 TUT Panaon Island Coastwatcher and 9th MD Contact
 - 29 WAM 10th MD NCS (Bacolod).
 - 30 REG Port Lebak.
 - 31 TAB Near Opol.
 - 32 WAL Kabasalan.
 - 33 WAQ ATR-4 with Hamner.
 - 34 WAN Inland fr Misamis with 105th Div
 - 35 WAP Lala, Hq 108th Div.



MINDANAO

Military Intelligence Section
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

GUERRILLA DISPOSITIONS
15 August 1943

0 10 20 30 40 50
STATUTE MILES

10th MD:
CO : Col. Wendell W. Fertig

105 Regt: (1)
ZAMBOANGA-MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL
SECTOR
CO : Lt. Col. Ciriaco Mortera
(Major-P.C.) (2)
Str. : Approx. 2500 men
Arms : Approx. 1200 rifles (with
misc. other arms)(3)

108 Regt:
LANAO-COTABATO SECTOR
CO : Lt. Col. Charles H. Hedges
(Commissioned in P.I. late
1941)
Str. : Approx. 2500 men
Arms : Approx. 1200 rifles (with
misc. other arms)

109 Regt:
WESTERN MISAMIS ORIENTAL-
BUKIDNON SECTOR
CO : Lt. Col. Robert V. Bowler
(Capt. Inf. O-294619)
Str. : Approx. 2500 men
Arms : Approx. 1200 rifles (with
misc. other arms)

110 Regt:
EASTERN MISAMIS OR-AGUSAN-
SURIGAO-DAVAO SECTOR
CO : Lt. Col. Ernest E. McLish
(Capt. Inf. O-296967)
Str. : Approx. 2500 men
Arms : Approx. 1200 rifles (with
misc. other arms)

(1) These regt's locally called
"Div's" and divided into 3
"Regt's" of approx. 800 men each.

(2) Indicates pre-war status.

(3) An average of about 20 rounds of
ammo. per rifle is available for
all rifles on Mindanao with
production about 3000 rounds
per week.

LEGEND

--- PROVINCIAL BOUNDARIES

--- MILITARY DISTRICT BOUNDARIES

--- 1ST & 2ND CLASS ROADS

||||| " " UNDER CONSTRUCTION

UNKNOWN WHETHER COMPLETED

▨ CONCENTRATION OF FORCES

--- SCATTERED ELEMENTS ONLY

APPENDIX XVIII

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS OF COL. N. L. MANZANO

12 December 1944

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Report on Intelligence Operations	2
List of Intelligence Personnel in Luzon	6

12 December 1944

MEMORANDUM: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, SWPA.

In compliance with your request, enclosed herewith reports covering my experiences in intelligence operations during this war and personal observations of the Mindanao guerrillas.

N. L. MANZANO,
Colonel; A.U.S.

Encls:
2 reports.

12 December 1944

A. Personal Experience:

1. On or about March 28, 1941, the undersigned, with Major Latimer, Ord., second in command, led a group of volunteers from Bataan in an attempt to land at Balayan and locate the exact position of heavy Jap guns placed on the hills of Cavite Province opposite Corregidor. This group was to furnish firing data to our Corregidor batteries. After accomplishing this mission, we were to establish an intelligence net in Luzon for future operations. We were furnished a letter signed by General Wainwright requesting all Filipino patriots to give us assistance in the execution of the mission assigned to us.

2. The group, sailing on a launch, was intercepted by a Jap Man-of-war (gunboat?) at night when opposite Nasugbu, Batangas, and was forced to retreat to Bataan. Attempt was then made to sail direct to Manila, exclusively on intelligence mission. It was then felt that an all Filipino group would have a better chance of success. Lt. Osmundo Mondonado, PA, AC., replaced Major Latimer as my assistant. Difficulty was encountered in obtaining water transportation, and before it could be made available, Bataan fell.

3. Upon my release from the concentration camp on August 1942, I devoted my time investigation conditions in Luzon, paying special attention to the different anti-Jap Units operating in the Island and how they could be of value in obtaining intelligence coverage. By December 1942, I came to the conclusion that an organization called "Free Philippines" was the only one composed of honest, prominent, intelligent, civic spirited persons carrying out anti-Jap activities in Luzon. I became the Military Advisor to this Unit. Through it I was able to advise several guerrilla groups and lead them into concentrating their activities on intelligence operations. The "Free Philippines" also kept me informed on the activities of officials of the Puppet Government.

4. On July 1943, I called Lt. Mondonado to duty and asked him to act as my Executive. We organized an intelligence net, but due to limited funds available, we were not able to expand our organization as we desired.

5. At about this time, a Mr. Luzuriaga, from Negros, who claimed to be an agent of Maj. Villamor, then at Negros, contacted me through a member of "Free Philippines". Our first intelligence report was sent out through him. His promise to assist us in establishing direct contact with SWP was not fulfilled. Capt Raval and Capt. Alabastro, agents of Colonel Peralta also contacted "Free Philippines" for assistance. Like most guerrilla intelligence agents we found them to be very indiscreet; their identity and activities were, in no time, all over Manila. Since they were already being assisted by Anderson, Ramsey and "Free Philippines" in their intelligence operations, I did not feel the necessity of getting myself connected with them.

6. About this time, Brigadier General Manuel Roxas approached me with the request that I undertake the coordination of all anti-Jap activities in Luzon. I accepted with the understanding that I would concentrate my efforts on intelligence coverage. The sum of ₱2,000,000 Jap money monthly was allotted for my activities (sufficient to buy 10 sacks of rice).

7. On November 1943 I was informed by General Roxas that General Lim was taking over the coordination of guerrilla activities in Luzon. General Lim instructed me to continue in charge of intelligence operations. On this month I sent my second intelligence report to Major Phillips of Mindoro, through Mr. Jose Ozamis, agent of Colonel Fertig and associate of General Roxas.

8. On January 1944 I was requested by General Roxas to proceed to Mindanao, contact Colonel Fertig and request him to obtain transportation for me to report to Headquarters SWPA. I was provided with a letter from Mr. Ozamis to Colonel Fertig stating General Roxas' desire. General Lim also asked me to make the trip. My mission was to acquaint the Commanding General, SWPA, of the conditions prevailing in Luzon and attempt to obtain assistance in our activities, specially means for direct communication between Luzon and GHQ. I left Luzon on 25 January 1944 with a third intelligence report on the Island.

9. Due to the means of transportation used (sailboat), inclement weather (typhons), and enemy ground and sea activities (ran into Japs in Siquijor, Calamba, and Butuan, and had to evade several Jap launches), I did not reach Colonel Fertig's Headquarters until the middle of March 1944.

10. The purpose of my mission, as well as the highlights of my intelligence reports were transmitted by radio to SWPA Headquarters. A radiogram from the Commanding General was received advising me that my services would be of greater value if I remained in the Philippines. A second message was received from the Commanding General, SWPA, on 14 April 1944, expressing his desire that I direct procurement of intelligence and extension of nets in Luzon. The location of my Headquarters was left to my discretion. Colonel Fertig was advised to extend to all intelligence groups in Luzon such assistance and guidance as he could furnish, and that all information would be transmitted through the 10th Military District until more direct communication could be established. Above messages were the last ones I received from SWP until September 1944 (six months later) when I was informed that my return to Luzon was inadvisable and that I was assigned to the 10th Mil. Dist.

11. During the latter part of April 1944 we sent back to Luzon five agents who had arrived in Mindanao with me. Most of these men represented guerrillas in Luzon and were returned to their respective units with some funds and instructions. Lt. Flores, Head of L.O.D., group in Luzon was furnished a radio transmitter to be delivered to Lt. Mondonedo, my assistant. Two men were to proceed to Ramsey's Headquarters, one to Anderson, and one to "Free Philippines". Of these men, Anderson's agent arrived safely, the two men of Ramsey's remain unaccounted for to date, the "Free Philippines" agent was heard from last September and Lt. Flores was captured by the Japs and confined at Ft. Santiago. (He has been released recently and is working for Major Smith).

12. In early May 1944, Capt. Pettitt and Mr. Shafer, members of Anderson's guerrillas arrived at Headquarters, 10th Mil. Dist., also charged with the mission of obtaining assistance for their unit, and secure direct communication with GHQ. In compliance with instructions received to assist all intelligence groups in Luzon, Colonel Fertig provided them with some funds and supplies. These two men attempted to return by banca to Luzon and failed. They finally arrived at Leyte with me by plane on 6 December 1944.

13. From May to September 1944 I sent several messages to Headquarters, SWPA, advising the Commanding General that our difficulties consisted primarily in the lack of communication and offered suggestions for their solution. This point was stressed in all our reports submitted previous to that date.

14. In early August 1944, I was directed by Colonel Fertig to proceed to the east coast of Surigao to meet a submarine that would take me to Luzon. The Japs occupied the coast before the submarine arrived. I was then advised to proceed to Misamis Oriental for a possible rendezvous with a submarine.

15. The trip across Mindanao from Agusan to Misamis Oriental took almost one month. On September 27, 1944, I took charge of a submarine rendezvous at Alubijid, but by that time orders had already been issued assigning me to the 10th Mil. Dist. and I had to remain.

16. On November 1944, I was advised by Colonel Fertig to proceed to Colonel McClish area where I would be picked up by plane coming from Leyte. I arrived by sailboat at Camiguin Island where I again met Capt. Pettitt and Mr. Shafer. On 6 December 1944, we arrived at Tacloban. I immediately reported to Colonel Whitney who directed me to report to the Adjutant General for new assignments.

17. During the period of my stay in Mindanao, before my assignment to the District, I acted informally in the capacity of Inspector General of the 10th Mil. Dist. upon request of Colonel Fertig. On my assignment to the District, Colonel Fertig made my appointment as Inspecting General official. I have visited the provinces of Surigao, Agusan, Bukidnon, Misamis Oriental, Misamis Occidental, and Zamboanga. Of the six guerrilla divisions of Mindanao I had occasion to observe the activities of four of them.

B. Comments:

1. A better intelligence coverage of Luzon could have been obtained had my original request to proceed to the SWPA Headquarters, confer with the Staff and then return to Luzon with the necessary means to operate, been approved.

2. The writer had established in Luzon an organization which was potentially capable of obtaining excellent results on intelligence work. The personnel selected was loyal, discreet, and with adequate technical qualifications for the mission (see inclosure).

3. All Luzon units were desirous of a centralized control. As a matter of fact, all agents sent by the different units of Luzon to Mindanao in an attempt to contact SWPA Headquarters, requested such centralization. They would have been glad to submit to one leader provided he was named by GHQ. Taking advantage of this general desire, a Jap informer (C1012 - Vera Cruz), succeeded, with fake credentials, and posing as head of GHQ Intelligence Service in Luzon, in gaining a thorough knowledge of the organization, activities, and personnel of most of the underground units operating in Luzon.

4. Although I had been instructed to direct procurement of intelligence in Luzon, I had to remain in Mindanao for ten months unable to conduct operations effectively due to inadequate means of communication. I repeatedly requested GHQ to provide means of transportation of personnel and supplies to Luzon, but apparently this could not be effected. Attempts to deliver meager supplies from the Mindanao to Luzon by bancas were complete failures; what finally arrived at Luzon took too long and were only a part of what was originally sent.

5. The writer could have probably returned to Luzon by banca. Some inconspicuous, full blooded Filipinos have made the trip although many more have fallen in enemy hands. Capt. Pettitt and Mr. Shafer, two adventureous and fearless guerrilleros, were in Mindanao for over six months attempting to sail for Luzon. Even admitting that I could have made the trip, I would have returned to Luzon empty handed and without accomplishing any of my missions. .

6. Recent information received seems to indicate that although the undersigned was unable to take personal charge of intelligence coverage in Luzon, the intelligence net he had established in the Island is assisting the personnel designated by GHQ to carry on this important activity. Lt. Flores of L.O.D., and Lt. Mondonedo, writer's assistant, are now in contact with radio stations operated by Major Smith and Capt. Anderson, respectively.

7. Outside of the above slight contribution to the intelligence operations of the GHQ, the writer regrets that due to circumstances beyond his control, inability to secure more rapid means of transportation than bancas, lack of radio communication with Luzon, his long stay in Mindanao, and failure to reach the SWPA Headquarters, he was unable to accomplish the following missions which he intended to carry out when he left Luzon last January:

- a. Transmit personally to the Commanding General, SWPA, the verbal messages entrusted to him by General Roxas and General Lim.
- b. Operate efficient intelligence calls in Luzon.
- c. Plan and execute measures for the relief of American prisoners of war in Luzon.

8. Incidentally, above stated circumstances, also contributed materially to the seizure of my family, wife and four children, by the enemy and at their being kept in Jap custody for several months.

C. Recommendations:

1. That intelligence operatives in Luzon contact the persons listed in the inclosure and use their services to secure intelligence coverage.

N. L. MANZANO,
Colonel, A.U.S.

1 Encl.

List of persons who have assisted our unit in intelligence operations in Luzon:

Brigadier General Manuel Roxas. Occasionally informed us on activities of the Puppet Government and its officials.

Brigadier General Vicente Lim. Furnished information on Philippine Army Officers.

Lt. Colonel Sioco. P.A. Chief of Staff of General Lim's Division in Bataan.

Major Valeriano. P.A. Son of Colonel Valeriano, graduate of P.M.A., organized an intelligence cell in Manila under the auspices of "Free Philippines".

Lt. Colonel Domacal. P.C. Furnished data on the Bureau of Constabulary.

2nd Lt. Osmando Mondonado, P.A., AC. My assistant, graduate of P.M.A. and of several Air Corps schools in the U.S. Organized intelligence cells all over Luzon with personnel drawn among P.M.A. graduates and scout non-coms. Has agents covering Clark Field, Aparri, Cabanatuan, Bataan, Los Banos, Manila Piers, railroads, etc.

3rd Lt. Mondonado, P.A. AC. Brother of above. Honor graduate of P.M.A. class of 1941. Assisted his brother in his work.

Juan Miguel Elizalde. Furnished financial assistance to our unit.

Jose Ozamis. Formerly majority floor leader, Philippine Legislature. Our contact with Colonel Fertig and Major Phillips.

Major Jose Razon. Manager of the sugar interests of Roxas y Cia (Spanish concern), personal friend of and our contact with General Roxas. Informed us of activities of government officials.

J. P. Reyes. Asst. Attorney General of the Philippines. Recognized head of "Free Philippines". Kept us informed on Government affairs.

A. Bautista. Prominent lawyer, partner of Araneta and Bautista law firm. Member of "Free Philippines". Contacts Colonel Enriquez, Markings and Panay guerrillas.

Rafael Rocas, Jr. Businessman and newspaperman, graduate of Notre Dame University. The most active member of "Free Philippines". Contacts Terry Hunters, Anderson's, Huckbalajaps guerrillas.

Lorenzo Tanada. Prominent lawyer, former Asst. City Fiscal, City of Manila, member of "Free Philippines". Contacts agents of Negros guerrillas.

1st Sgt. Suplemento. 14th Engineers, Philippine Scouts. Runs our group of scout operatives in and around Manila (includes Nichols Field, Nielson Air Port, Ft. Wm. McKinley).

Cipriano Soler. Civil Engineer formerly in Bataan as Asst. Civil Engineer.

S/Sgt. Nazareta. 14th Engineers, Philippine Scouts. Works on Neilson Airport and lives near Ft. McKinley. Keeps us informed on activities at both places.

Gorado A. Prida. Captain, Air Corps, Republic of Spain. Cousin of Colonel Manzano. Runs underground message center for us.

Jose L. Manzano. Brother of writer, hacendero of Balayan. Advisor to guerrillas of Batangas.

Ramon M de Amusategui. Asst. Manager "El Ahorro Insular". Spaniard. Contacts American prisoners of war, Cabanatuan.

Maria Martinez. A business woman, formerly a mine stock broker. Contacts American prisoners of war at Ft. Mills, (Maj. Lothrop, CE, Seater and Baldwin). Secures reports from them on progress of fortification work.

Manuel Manosa. Civil Engineer, Asst. Manager Metropolitan Water Works. Furnishes data on utilities, railroads, etc, also on American internees.

Manuel Xexes Burgos. Former Comptroller, Manila Railroad. Intelligence Officer for Markings Guerrillas in Manila.

Ramon Oriol. Owner of "Oriol Marble Works". A patriot. Contact man of Markings Guerrillas.

Mr. Duggleby. Manager of Hauserman's Mining interest. Recognized leader of American civilian internees in Luzon. Keeps us posted on developments in internees camps.

Matas Garcia. Captain of inter-island boat. Covers shipping, dock and ship construction activities.

Amado Gonzales. Chief engineer of ship operating under Jap control. Covers same items as above. Furnished us data on Takao port, Formosa, including information on aluminum sheet factory in that area.

Eduardo Taylor. Chief Engineer and Asst. Manager, National Development Corp. Formerly manager Cebu Portland Cement Factory. Brother-in-law of Colonel Manzano. Gave us data on industrial and mining products.

Frank O'Classen. Spanish-American mestizo. Radio engineer. Assisted in the erection of radio installations in Guam for the U. S. Navy. Now Chief Radio Engineer for Jap controlled radio power station between San Juan and Marikina. Gave us detailed data on Jap radio installations in area near Manila.

Scout Non-Coms. Many were used. All are willing to participate in any activity against the enemy.

Enclosure to "Intelligence Operations, Colonel N. L. Manzano".

APPENDIX XIX

HISTORY OF THE
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, USAFFE

APPENDIX XIX

HISTORY OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, USAFFE

Little is known of the brilliant achievements and sacrifices of the members of the Military Intelligence Service of the USAFFE. Rumors, some authentic and some incredible, of their accomplishments used to reach the embattled lines of beleaguered Bataan. The effect on civilian morale was tremendous and kept "the home fires burning" until liberation day. An attempt, therefore, is made here to bring to light known facts bearing on the activities of the officers and enlisted men of this service, in the hope that these facts will do justice, in some degree, to the immortal feats of MIS personnel living or dead.

The activities of the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) may be divided into three phases: first, from the outbreak of war in the Philippines on 8 December 1941 up to the surrender of Corregidor on 6 May 1942; second, the period of Japanese occupation of the Philippines; and third, from the landing of General Douglas MacArthur and President Sergio Osmena at Leyte on 20 October 1944 up to 15 March 1945, when the MIS ceased functioning.

First Phase of the Intelligence Service

The Military Intelligence Service under the command of Brig. Gen. Simeon de Jesus, organized under G-2, USAFFE, in the early part of January 1942, was the nucleus of intelligence operations conducted against the enemy. At the inception of the war, no such organization existed. Intelligence operations then were confined to the gathering of information valuable to the conduct of military operations, under a central unit -- G-2, USAFFE. But the confusion that arose in the early stages of the war in the Philippines localized intelligence work to units either isolated or severed from their main units. This was inevitable. Transportation was disrupted, telephone and telegraph communications destroyed, bridges blown, military supplies and equipment burned on the grounds of military exigency. Orders previously given to all USAFFE units in Luzon to converge on Bataan were being carried out, but this vast troop movement had to be accomplished with little communication between units.

In January 1942, after the withdrawal of troops to Bataan, General de Jesus was called to Corregidor for a conference. What took place at that meeting was the organization of the MIS in Bataan, directly responsible to Col. Charles A. Willoughby, G-2, USAFFE. The imposing personality of this American officer, combined with his abiding faith in the loyalty of the Filipino people to the cause for which the USAFFE was fighting in Bataan, won the respect and admiration of the officers and men in the MIS. His leadership inspired spontaneous obedience to orders, however perilous the mission assigned; and his generosity in commending accomplishments added incentive for the MIS to accomplish more and more.

As soon as it was organized, the MIS operated under instructions from G-2, USAFFE. As its name implies, mission of the MIS was to collect, evaluate, and disseminate military information obtained behind the enemy lines in Bataan and other enemy-occupied

areas. Funds for the purpose were furnished by the Finance Officer on duty with HPD at Little Baguio, Bataan, and Corregidor. All money received was properly accounted for by the Finance Officer assigned to the MIS. The CP of this organization was at Km. 172.5 Mariveles, Bataan.

In personnel, the MIS started almost from scratch. Such of the men who chose not to join the 2d Regular Division (when the 1st Provisional Brigade commanded by General de Jesus was renamed and given a new commanding officer) remained under the command of General de Jesus. His staff was made up of officers and men whose loyalty and devotion to duty was unquestionable and gave credit to its organizer.

Roster of the Military Intelligence Service in Bataan was as follows:

1.	Brig. Gen. Simeon de Jesus	USAFFE	Killed by Japs
2.	Lt. Col. M. S. Torralba	"	
3.	Maj. Lamberto T. Javalera	"	
4.	Maj. Agustin G. Gabriel	"	
5.	Maj. Valeriano E. Sison	"	
6.	Maj. Agaton S. Panopio	"	
7.	Maj. Rafael Monserat	"	
8.	Capt. Dominador Mascardo	"	
9.	Capt. Fred Ruiz Castro	"	
10.	Capt. Jose P. Rueda	"	
11.	Capt. Eugenio de Jesus	"	
12.	1 Lt. Generoso S. Maceda	"	
13.	1 Lt. Tomas Carillo	"	
14.	1 Lt. Leon Ma. Guerrero	"	
15.	1 Lt. Jose Tatco	"	
16.	1 Lt. Tomas Karingal	"	
17.	1 Lt. Santiago Safe	"	
18.	1 Lt. de la Fuente	"	
19.	1 Lt. Melecio Custodio	"	
20.	1 Lt. Jimenez	"	
21.	1 Lt. Bernardo David	"	
22.	2 Lt. Osmundo Mondenedo	"	
23.	2 Lt. Antonio Palou	"	
24.	2 Lt. Juan de Jesus		Killed by Japs
25.	2 Lt. N. Morales		
26.	2 Lt. Angel Miranda		
27.	3 Lt. Felipe Buencamino III		
28.	3 Lt. Angel L. Banawa		
29.	3 Lt. Florentino Aquino		
30.	M/Sgt. F. Singculan	"	
31.	1/Sgt. J. Ferrer	"	
32.	1/Sgt. Ballad	"	
33.	T/Sgt. Ruben Villanueva	"	
34.	T/Sgt. J. Aduan	"	
35.	T/Sgt. S. Luis	"	
36.	Sgt. Lavarán	"	
37.	Sgt. Perfecto Samonte	"	
38.	Sgt. Vera	"	
39.	Sgt. Jose S. Maniquis	"	
40.	Cpl. G. Peralta	"	
41.	Cpl. Julian Ramos	"	
42.	Cpl. B. Seralde	"	
43.	Cpl. Ocampo	"	
44.	Cpl. Flor	"	
45.	Cpl. Molina	"	

46.	Pvt. Maximo Revilla	USAFEE	Killed during liberation
47.	Mr. Feliciano Bote	Civ. Operatives	Killed by Japs
48.	Mr. Magno Topacio	" "	Killed by Japs
49.	Mr. Hiram Ramos	" "	Missing
50.	Mr. Santos	" "	Killed
51.	Mr. Sixto Dimaano	" "	
52.	Mr. Aure	" "	
53.	Mr. Vicente Versoza	" "	
54.	Mr. Fausto Alberto	" "	
55.	Mr. Quiambao	" "	
56.	Mr. Marco	" "	
57.	Mr. Ruben Ramirez	" "	
58.	Mr. Mauricio Guidote	" "	Killed by Japs

The selection of agents and operatives was based not only on daring, intelligence, and resourcefulness; it was equally based on loyalty, devotion to duty, and dependability. Great care was used in screening, to make sure that the best men were employed. Civilian agents of the Philippine Constabulary under Major Agustin G. Gabriel were processed into the service; enlisted men from the line and civilian employees from the Quartermaster Service were called upon to serve; and qualified civilians were recruited from the different evacuee camps set up in Bataan.

After proper indoctrination regarding the importance of their mission, agents and operatives were sent out. Some were dispatched to Northern and Southern Luzon, others were sent to Central Luzon, while the rest pried into the enemy's center of operations in Manila. Intelligence men with a rudimentary knowledge of combat were planted in the front lines.

In the early part of February the Japs occupied Balanga, the capital of Bataan. Both Capt. Mascardo and Lt. Maceda were sent to no-man's-land to detect Jap concentration. Without regard to their lives, these two officers with four enlisted men reconnoitered near the place. After obtaining enough information about the enemy, they returned to the CP at about 2000 H. Immediately Capt. de Jesus made a sketch of the Jap location and was sent to HPD with the request that Balanga be shelled. The whole night Balanga was shelled, as reported by men from CPLR at Orion. The following morning General de Jesus received a telephone call from General Willoughby asserting that there were no Japs in Balanga, but General de Jesus assured him that there were. On the same day, when Capt. Mascardo and Lt. Maceda were in the vicinity of Pilar, Bataan (a daily routine work of these two officers) they met Agent Santos of the MIS coming from the direction of the enemy line. He reported that the shelling of Balanga was very effective and estimated that the Japs sustained no fewer than 3,000 casualties. He saw these casualties moved from one place to another in trucks.

Of the reports that gave the most tactical value to the Fil-American forces on Bataan, the following may be mentioned: 1) the enemy concentrations of men and materiel in the church, capitol, and school at Balanga, which were blasted by our artillery; 2) the convoy of 90 trucks loaded with troops to reinforce the enemy's depleting strength at Abucay, which our batteries mercilessly wiped out; 3) the capture of papers from the pocket of a dead Japanese officer, which, decoded and evaluated, turned out to be the enemy's plan of attack on Bataan and Corregidor; 4) the size of the forces that forced the issue on 8 April 1942; and 5) the procurement of Japanese-sponsored dailies which were distributed to the leaders at Corregidor.

The hair-raising achievements of the operatives and officers of the MIS were legion, but it would be most unfair to omit the individuals who were outstanding. Their feats were inscribed in the tablets of their faith in the cause for which they were unflinchingly fighting.

Col. Margarito S. Torralba planned the operations of the MIS, which were carried out under the darkness of night and in the daytime when Japs were incessantly bombing numerous targets. With his impressive personality, courage, faith, and tactics, he executed his plans in the most effective way.

Major Lamberto T. Javalera, Chief of the Intelligence Section, fresh from his tour of duty with the Manila Secret Service, performed the delicate job of choosing and recruiting operatives. In classifying and evaluating information gathered, in directing intelligence operations in the line, and in gathering military information himself when no operatives were available, Major Javalera established a claim to the unreserved confidence of his superior officers. At one time he had to scour the innermost recesses of the Mariveles Mountains for the purpose of exploring whatever information the Negritos might have on enemy dispositions in the western sector. That he was able to secure valuable intelligence from this fierce tribe of mountaineers was a patent proof of his tact and ability to handle men.

Lt. Tomas Karingal with Sgt. Jose S. Maniquis collected tactical information from Nueva Vizcaya and Mountain Province. The intelligence they gathered from Japanese-infested places such as Bayombong, Solano, Payawan, Kiangan, Pagong, Banawe, Dodo, Bontoc, Sadanga, Bangad, Lubuangan, Banat, Lagan-ilang, Bangued, and San Quintin was transmitted to Bataan Headquarters through the facilities offered by Batong-Buhay Mines. These two men were able to make other trips to enemy-occupied areas for valuable information about the enemy.

Lt. Melecio Custodio daringly crossed Manila Bay from Corregidor to Luzon via Ternate, Cavite, to gather intelligence about the enemy situation. In addition, he procured calcium sandoz, calcium gluconate, and hemostatic serum to be delivered to President Quezon in Corregidor. Lt. Custodio was also responsible for obtaining the photograph of General Artemio Ricarte which was badly needed by General MacArthur at that time.

Capt. Dominador Mascardo and Lt. G. S. Maceda, in their reliability to provide boats and boatmen when needed, were the embodiment of a resolute driving power. Capt. Eugenio de Jesus, Engineer Officer, made finished drawings of sketches of enemy installations before such information was relayed to Colonel Willoughby. Without him, no intelligence report could have been made of such hazy maps as were drawn by our non-engineer operatives.

Lt. de la Fuente dared cross enemy lines so that he might return to Manila with funds to procure medicine for distribution among Americans left behind somewhere in the Montalban hills. Agent Topacio's fast accomplishment in capturing a document which proved to be the enemy's plan for the invasion of Bataan enabled the forces thereon to make necessary preparations to repel the attack. Equally remarkable was the accomplishment of Mr. Santos, who, after disguising himself as a fisherman supplying fish to the Japanese, was able to determine size and disposition of enemy troops in Balanga, the capital of Bataan.

In dispatching Atty, Feliciano Bote to contact all members of the Executive Commission and Dr. Victor Buencamino of the NARIC, the MIS pulled a stunt of great boldness and audacity. In this plot against the unwelcome conqueror, Sgt. Singculan contributed a valuable share by carrying messages between President Quezon

on Corregidor and his secretary Jorge B. Vargas, who was made Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission with offices at Malacanan Palace.

Sgt. Villanueva's love for his ailing leader inspired him to sally forth in quest of medicine for President Quezon. That his president might live to see the day when the Philippines would be liberated and that he might hear again the joybells of freedom ringing -- these were all that mattered to Sgt. Villanueva.

To those operatives who braved the tightly-guarded waters of Manila Bay and died in the performance of their duties, no other tribute could be theirs than the applause and admiration of the civilized world.

Great praise goes to Lt. Maceda, the Chief of Supply, for unusual zeal in procuring food and supplies in a truly deficient section of the country and for the equitable distribution thereof to all members of the unit. Without his aid the men of the MIS could never have demonstrated their courage, devotion to duty, and abiding faith. Credit is also due to the Assistant Supply Officer, Lt. Jose Tatco, who was able to go beyond the USAFFE OPLR in quest of fresh food for MIS personnel. He deserves credit, too, for identifying forest substitutes for civilized men's vegetables.

Lt. Tomas C. Carillo, despite the limited medical supplies he had with him, was able to cure ailments of both the military and civilian personnel of this unit. On many occasions he was forced to search the mountain vastness for medicinal substitutes. When medicine was getting scarce, Lt. Maceda was assigned to gather Philippine medicinal plants as recommended by Col. Arthur F. Fischer. Bark of dita trees, duhat, stems of "makabuhay" vine, and others were consequently accumulated and stored. These duties of Lt. Maceda were in addition to his other assignments ably done, such as dispatching operatives across Manila Bay, gathering information about the enemy, and procurement of food and supplies from the area between the two lines.

That the war in Bataan was not only a war of force but a war of nerves as well was understood early by the MIS. For this purpose, a daily, captioned "See You in Manila," was edited by Capt. Fred Ruiz Castro, assisted by Lts. Leon Ma. Guerrero and Felipe Buencamino III. The paper was designed to boost the morale of the troops, to keep ever burning the ideals for which the war was being fought, and to prognosticate the shape of life that would surely come if the men shirked their assigned duties. Psychological warfare was on.

As the dark situation became apparent from information gathered, it was evident that the enemy was pressing from all corners of the peninsula. Communication between Bataan and the occupied areas was becoming difficult, if not impossible. In such a critical moment, General de Jesus, true to the best qualities of a natural leader, called a staff meeting to discuss his proposed plan of carrying on the mission of the MIS in the event that the Americans surrendered and we were captured. It was decided to divide the archipelago into three main districts: Luzon, under Major Lamberto T. Javalera; Visayas, under Lt. Col. Margarito S. Torralba; and Mindanao, under Major Valeriano Sison. "Each should bear in mind ..." the general began, but could not continue. There were tears in his eyes. He was choked with emotion.

Before Bataan fell, General de Jesus instructed Lt. Maceda to escape from Bataan and proceed at once to Manila so that the intelligence work of the MIS could be continued in operation. Without delay Maceda started from Bataan 10 April and proceeded to Manila, arriving there on 12 April. During the period when most MIS

officers were still concentrated in Capas, Tarlac, Lt. Maceda kept himself busy contacting operatives of the outfit who did not surrender and who were arriving in Manila one after another. After learning the whereabouts of a number of these escaped operatives, Lt. Maceda set up a preliminary organization. He indoctrinated members with the idea that the service was a continuation of former activities under General de Jesus on Bataan and that it was organized to help, directly or indirectly, the sacred cause for which the United States and the Philippines were fighting. With this end in view, all possible efforts were to be made to thwart the activities of the Japanese in the Philippines. The organization would give physical and financial aid to other units in their underground operations against Japan.

Second Phase of the Intelligence Work

Upon arrival of Brig. Gen. Simeon de Jesus in Manila sometime in August 1942, Maceda immediately contacted him and received his approval on the preliminary organization he had set up. He further suggested, as Chief of the Operational Section, Lt. Col. Dominador T. Mascardo, who was soon to be released from POW concentration camp.

With the presence of Lt. Col. Mascardo in Manila on 15 November 1942, the activities of this outfit began. More members of the unit were selected for their loyalty, bravery, and self-sacrifice. All members were instructed that under no circumstances should they reveal either the existence of the organization or the identity of its members. Only in rare instances did the members of this unit know each other. Few members of the organization were empowered by Lt. Col. Mascardo to take in other men to work with the outfit; and under no circumstances were the latter permitted to know of the existence of the outfit and the identity of other members.

General de Jesus, more hopeful than ever for the return of the old order, issued secret instructions, among which were: 1) to carry on the mission of the MIS by underground activities, 2) to contact guerrilla leaders for professional advice, 3) to give them aid and comfort whenever and wherever an opportunity presented itself, 4) to accept employment in the Filipino-run agencies if such would be a means to achieve the desired end, and 5) to make all reports to a central agency controlled by General de Jesus.

The complete roster of the Operational Section approved and operating directly under Brig. Gen. Simeon de Jesus in Manila during the Japanese regime is shown on the following pages.

The sphere of activities of this outfit was limited by lack of money, as all expenses were met with the limited personal funds of the members. However, information was steadily gathered; and after radio stations on Luzon were in contact with GHQ in Australia, intelligence gathered by the MIS was relayed to these stations for transmittal, to give information on shipping, troop movements, air activity, and military installations. Samples of these daily intelligence reports are:

12 Sep 1944 - A Jap hospital ship, Siberia Maru, 8,000 tons, berthed at Pier 5/2 bringing women and children (Jap subjects) from Davao. On this date Pier 7 is full of army cargoes, and army trucks are busy carrying out these cargoes to bodegas in the suburbs of Manila. At Pier 5/1 an army transport, 8,500 tons, bringing troops showing signs of fatigue and weariness, also from Davao. At 1000 H the airfield siren was sounded, and all workers on ships were ordered to stop. At the same time, the red flag was hoisted,

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
OPERATIONAL SECTION

NAME	PRESENT RANK	GUERRILLA RANK	USAPFE or GUERRILLA	PRESENT ASSIGNMENT	GUERRILLA ASSIGNMENT	COMPONENT	REMARKS
1. Siméon de Jesus	Brig-Gen.	Brig-Gen.	U		Chief Mil. Int. Service	Regular	Killed by Japs
2. Margarito S. Torralba	Colonel	Colonel	U	Camp Comdr. Camp Murphy	Asst Chief Mil. Int. Service	Regular	
3. Lorenzo Santa Maria	Major	Lt-Col	U		Unit coordinator to other Guerillas	Regular	Killed by Japs
4. Agaton Panapio	Lt-Col	Lt-Col	U	CO, PAGD	Unit coordinator to other Guerillas	Regular	
5. Dominador Mascardo	Major	Lt-Col	U	Provincial Com: Rizal Province	Chief Operational Section	Regular	
6. Generoso S. Maceda	Major	Lt-Col	U	Adm Officer G-2 (PA)	Executive Officer Operational Sec.	Reserve	
7. Eugenio de Jesus	Major	Lt-Col	U		Asst Ex Officer Operational Sec.	Reserve	Reverted to Inactive Status
8. Bernardo David	1st Lt	Captain	U	TDY, G-2 (PA)	Liaison Officer to Majs Galang & Ramsey	Reserve	
9. Modesto Mascardo	1st Lt	Captain	U		Operative	Reserve	Killed by Japs
10. Jose D. Tatco	Captain	Captain	U	CO, 25th Co MPC Pasig, Rizal	Operative	Reserve	
11. Juan de Jesus	2d Lt	1st Lt	U		Operative	Reserve	Killed by Japs
12. Jaime Mascardo	Captain	1st Lt	U	FS, PA	Operative	Reserve	

MIS OPERATIONAL SECTION

NAME	PRESENT RANK	GUERRILLA RANK	USAFFE or GUERRILLA	PRESENT ASSIGNMENT	GUERRILLA ASSIGNMENT	COMPONENT	REMARKS
13. Ricardo David		1st Lt	G		Operative		In civilian life
14. Tomas Mascardo		1st Lt	G		Operative		In civilian life
15. Emiliano Mascardo	1st Lt	1st Lt	U	AG, MPC	Operative	Reserve	
16. Andres Ortiz		1st Lt	G		Operative		In civilian life
17. Vicente Romero		1st Lt	G	Bu. of Science	Operative		In civilian life
18. Godolfredo Alcasid	1st Lt	1st Lt	G	Bu. of Science	Operative	Reserve	In civilian life
19. Cayetano F. Tuazon	Captain	1st Lt	U	AUS, Okinawa	Operative	Reserve	
20. Fortunato Oliveros		1st Lt	G		Operative		In civilian life
21. Paterno V. Oppus	1st Lt	1st Lt		MPC, Rizal	Operative	Reserve	
22. Petronilo C. Dulay	1st Lt	1st Lt	U	Phil. Consulate Hawaii	Operative	Reserve	
23. Alberto Banares	T/Sgt	M/Sgt	U	MPC, Pasig, Rizal	Operative	Reserve	
24. Fernando Angeles		M/Sgt	U	Unknown	Operative	Reserve	
25. Joaquin Andres		M/Sgt	G		Operative		In civilian life

MIS OPERATIONAL SECTION

NAME	PRESENT RANK	GUERRILLA RANK	USAFFE or GUERRILLA	PRESENT ASSIGNMENT	GUERRILLA ASSIGNMENT	COMPONENT	REMARKS
26. Jose Basilio		Sgt	G		Operative		In civilian life
27. Feliciano David		Sgt	G		Operative		In civilian life
28. Pedro David		Sgt	G		Operative		In civilian life
29. Atty. Salvador Mascardo					Civ. Operative		In civilian life
30. Atty. Godolfredo Sareal					Civ. Operative		In civilian life
31. Mr. Felix Angeles					Civ. Operative		In civilian life
32. Mr. Catalino Lozada					Civ. Operative		In civilian life
33. Mr. Leon Clemente					Civ. Operative		In civilian life
34. Mr. Florencio Nadal					Civ. Operative		In civilian life
35. Mr. Sergio Ongkiko					Civ. Operative		In civilian life
36. Mr. Florentino Manalo					Civ. Operative		In civilian life
37. Mr. Maximo Roque					Civ. Operative		In civilian life
38. Miss Susana Dizon					Civ. Operative		In civilian life

indicating danger. After the lapse of one hour all work on ships resumed, and at 1800 H all workers were ordered to go home early.

15 Sep 1944 - At Pier 5/2, large transport, 9,000 tons, unloaded rifle bullets and anti-aircraft shells (loaded). Foodstuffs such as biscuits and confectioneries, 1,000 bags of mail, 5,000 cases of medical supplies, and 1,000 cases of 100-lb bombs. Around Port Area, all Jap soldiers busy digging air-raid shelters and army trucks carrying all ammunition outside the pier premises. Army trucks camouflaged with grasses and leaves of trees, and nipa shack covered with grasses and branches of trees. Under nipa shack are anti-aircraft guns and long-range guns.

21 Sep 1944 - 42 Army and Navy transports including those at the bay and piers. Three ships on the bay are: Eikyo Maru, 9,000 tons; Resin Maru, 7,000 tons; Olympia Maru, 8,000 tons, shipping cargo rice from Saigon. I was on board the Resin Maru at 0930 H. Four Jap planes were maneuvering a dog-fight, when suddenly appeared 10 planes, which mixed in the maneuver. People unaware they were US and RAF planes. Two Jap planes plunged into the sea with tails burned, after 2 minutes. Two US planes plunged into the sea. Formation after formation of US planes and RAF planes appeared from the north. Witnessed 2 US planes swoop down on an 8,500-ton freighter with accuracy... Super diving of US planes caused 10 ships to burn, others sank instantaneously. At 1500 H US planes appeared again. One US plane shot down. At 1540 H, 6 more ships were blasted. At 1630 H all planes disappeared.

23 Sep 1944 - Jap soldiers cleaning debris around Port Area.

25 Sep 1944 - Filipino laborers hired to help clean debris in Port Area.

5 Oct 1944 - 12,000-ton ship at Pier 7 unloading troops. Estimated 2,000, fully equipped, entered Manila in four armored baby tanks and in 10 army trucks. Repair on Pier 3 started. Two AA guns, grass camouflaged, installed near Parian gate.

7 Oct 1944 - At 1830 H one large transport at Pier 7, fully laden with Jap troops estimated to be 6,000. Another at Pier 5 unloaded 20 heavy armored tanks and 20 trucks. Special train arrived in Manila with 1,000 soldiers fully equipped.

11 Oct 1944 - Streetcar used to transport cargoes from Port Area at 2100 H. American prisoners and internees boarded a 9,000-ton ship (name concealed) out of breakwater.

15 Oct 1944 - Total ships in bay, 29. When US planes appeared, smoke screen emitted by ships to camouflage their identity and position. Ten US planes dived and strafed the vessels. Three transports set ablaze. Two US and two Jap planes downed. Train 916 from Pangasinan arrived in Manila at 1500 H, with 1,000 soldiers in full pack.

16 Oct 1944 - Two ships left bay escorted by a destroyer. Kemye Maru, 9,000 tons, at Pier 1. A 10,000-ton transport at Pier 7. One 8,500-ton transport unloading sugar. Reliable information gathered from high officials of the Taiwan Unyu Kaisha Ltd., a company subsidiary to the Jap Military Administration, says that this week 50 transports were loaded with troops for the defense of the Philippines. Regarding 2 transports carrying 3,000 internees and POW for Taiwan, 1 transport has been identified as Kojurio Maru, and

left Manila at 1630 H on 11 October 1944.

Information submitted to the invasion forces included the following military objectives, with action taken:

1. Gasoline dump at Pinagkaisahan (Guadalupe pile of drums) - Direct hit.
2. Lissar Perfume Factory used as Japanese ordnance shop (ordnance shops from Nielson and Nichols airfields transferred to this factory) - Direct hit.
3. Gasoline dump at South Cemetery near the Meralco car line - Missed.
4. Dummy places near the poblacion of Makati - In spite of report, bombed.
5. Dummy barracks at Nielson Airfield along the south side border - Not bombed.
6. Emergency pier near Insular Sugar Control, constructed by Japanese Marines - Carpet bombings, 3 guevarras, 2 motor launches.
7. Network of tunnels in Makati and Guadalupe filled with oil, gasoline, and foodstuffs; constructed by Japanese Marines - Not bombed.

Other objectives submitted for the information of the invasion forces were as follows:

1. Cavalry at Los Banos, Laguna, with strength of 1,000 horses.
2. Defense positions in Batangas:
 - a. Should landing be effected at Balayan Bay, the line will be: Taal Lake - Indang - Naic.
 - b. Should landing be effected at Batangas Bay, first line will be: Batangas - Cuenca - Taal Lake - Taal. Second line will be: Taal Lake - Tanawan - Lipa - Tayabas Bay. Third line will be: Laguna Bay - Mt Makiling - Tayabas.
 - c. Mt Makiling, facing Batangas Bay, surrounded by barbed wire and trenches constructed at the base.
 - d. Santo Tomas as focal point with mobile division in reserve.
 - e. Road under construction from Santo Tomas to Tagaytay via Talisay.
 - f. Col. Setuguchi in command of this sector, coordinating with Commanding General of the Manila Defense Area.
3. Tank division disposed as follows:
 - Lucban, Tayabas sector - 74 medium.
 - Aritao, Isabela sector - 120 medium.
4. According to high-ranking Japanese officer, after their defeat in the Visayas, Mindanao, and Southern Luzon, Japanese will make their last stand in the Mountain Province.

Other objectives reported by the MIS as possible spots for sabotaging were:

1. Chaco Building - Ammunition inside building.
2. Cine Oro & Tivoli - Supplies and ammunition.
3. Santa Cruz Church - Machinery and naval equipment.
4. Philippines Engineering - Engineering supplies.
5. Elizalde Building - Ammunition and alcohol.

6. Letran College - Gasoline
7. Casa Manana - Ammunition and machinery.
8. Former Custom Building - Ammunition and naval equipment.
9. Philippine School of Arts and Trade - Ordnance supplies.
10. Cathedral de Manila - Ammunition and machinery.
11. Port Area - Gasoline dump.

Third Phase of the Intelligence Work

Gathering of information for use by the invasion forces continued, but after 25 December 1944 reports were no longer filed, because of the critical conditions that prevailed in Manila and its vicinity. During the liberation of the Philippines, the MIS gave aid and comfort to the invasion forces whenever possible, and by means of propaganda work did what they could to keep the people informed on the true state of affairs.

On 15 March 1945, upon order of Major Basilio J. Valdes, the Military Intelligence Service ceased functioning.

APPENDIX XX

PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF MAJ. E. C. CRUZ

June 1943 - February 1944

APPENDIX XX

Personal narrative of Lt. Col. Emigdio C. Cruz, PA,
sent to Gen. C. A. Willoughby, 30 July 1946.

As I left the submarine base at Perth, Australia, on board the USS Thresher, the words of General MacArthur before I left Brisbane kept ringing into my ears. He said, "Cruz, this is a very tough job. Personally, I believe you have no chance to go through. With your connection to President Quezon you have become very well known. I give you 10 percent chance to enter Manila, but honestly I believe you have no chance to get out." However, I had a feeling that I would succeed. So, when I got on board the submarine and found the seven tons of arms and ammunition consigned to the guerrilla forces in Negros, I felt even more elated and encouraged.

The Thresher was on its regular patrol duty. I was only an incidental passenger, but soon the officers made me one of them and the men made me feel at home. The Skipper, Commander Hull, even allowed me to stay on watch on the tower at night and early dawn. On the fourth day of our trip we gave chase to a Japanese convoy of three tankers and a destroyer. The fourth torpedo hit one of the tankers and we crash-dived. We stayed under water for about eighteen hours hearing the explosions of the depth charges and feeling the concussions from them. This experience was repeated several times and by the time we reached Philippine waters we had sunk three other tankers and one Japanese destroyer.

On July 6, we received instruction from Australia that I was to land on the southwestern shore of the island of Negros. I asked the Skipper if the message could be broken if intercepted by the enemy. He said that it was possible but not very likely. On the morning of July 9, scanning the western shore of Negros through the periscope, the Skipper saw a Japanese cruiser patrolling the very point where I was going to land. We laid low and waited until dark. At about seven that evening, the coast was clear, and I saw the familiar sight of a Philippine sailboat. We made contact with the guerrillas through a rubber boat and unloaded the seven tons of arms and ammunition in a record time of 45 minutes.

I was happy when I met Major Jesus Villamor, and even more so when I learned that he was in charge of the guerrillas in that district. I felt that because of my previous acquaintance with him, I could have all the necessary cooperation and information for my trip to Manila. In this feeling I was later sadly disappointed. I stayed with his group of guerrilla officers and lived in the jungles of southern Negros under the name of Major Suylan. I was saving the name Gatsby, my alias registered in Australia, for radio communications only. On July 12, the third day after my arrival, the Japanese made a surprise raid on the place of my landing. They captured a considerable amount of the arms and ammunitions I came with, definitely verifying their suspicion that the guerrillas were receiving supplies from Australia. Because of this incident, I was not able to discuss with Major Villamor the details of my trip to Manila until about a week later. During this period of delay, I occupied myself in treating and curing the sick who were in a very miserable condition, including the wife of Maj. Villamor himself who was suffering from advanced anemia, secondary to malaria.

One day Maj. Villamor told me that he thought it was not

safe for me to go to Manila. "Even among the guerrillas there are some who know your true identity," he continued. He further said that he was waiting for instructions from GHQ in Australia regarding my trip. I had to stand by and wait.

During this time I had the opportunity to observe the intelligence work he was doing, but he never allowed me any access into his workings. In other words, although I was cordially treated, I felt like a stranger there. I was trying to make my own plans for my trip out of the meager information I gathered from the couriers coming in and out of the camp. Finally, upon my insistence, I was allowed to go with a party going to Panay. My plan was to ask the help of Col. Peralta. I was met in San Dionisio, Panay, by the agent of Maj. Villamor, a certain Lt. Yojuico who made all efforts to obstruct my plans of contacting Col. Peralta. I decided therefore to return to Negros and engage the help of Governor Alfredo Montelibano, who was hiding in the northern sector of the island. I even asked Maj. Villamor to permit me to go with one of his couriers who was then going to see the Governor. But he denied this request and instructed his courier not to take me along. I therefore appealed to Col. Abcede, who was then the District Commander of the Negros guerrillas. Col. Abcede was very nice and kind to me. He not only gave me a guide but provided me with an escort consisting of a lieutenant and twelve enlisted men. Of these only three reached with me the hiding place of Gov. Montelibano at the top of Canlaon Volcano. The whole trip took fourteen days of continuous hiking through jungle which was infested with mosquitoes and Japanese patrol parties. Gov. Montelibano welcomed me cordially and promised to help me. He said that if I could reach the town of Cadiz on the northern shore of the island, I could very easily procure a sailboat. He told me to stand by while he looked for decent civilian clothes for me and the right man to guide me through the Japanese-occupied towns of Manapla and Bacolod.

I had been with Gov. Montelibano five days when the Japanese raided us and drove us deeper into the jungle. The guerrillas fought the Japanese for three days and gave a good account of themselves, killing more than sixty of the enemy with three wounded on the guerrillas' side. The new arms and ammunition I brought had their baptism. Through one of the guerrilla officers I learned that Major Roberto was in the neighboring hills. I decided to contact him and engage his aid for my trip up north. By a stroke of luck, he had at that time a crew of five men from Sorsogon who had been stranded in Negros for several months and who were desperately anxious to go back to their families. In common desperation we took the risk and went through the enemy cordon. After refitting their small and frail sailboat, we left the shores of Cadiz for Luzon.

My crew were all from Sorsogon and were complete strangers to me. They spoke nothing but Bicol, which I had to learn. During my stay in Negros I learned to speak the Visayan dialect and could pass as a Visayan, a fact which pulled me out of many tight spots whenever questioned by Visayan Japanese Constabulary soldiers.

I loaded my ship with dried and salted fish and chicken and posed as a trader, assuming the name of Jacinto Calderon, the alias I used in Panay. Ordinarily the trip should take only seven days. This time it took fifteen days eluding the Japanese patrol boats and stopping on several islands to dispose of and replenish my goods. On one of these inter-island trips I was becalmed in the middle of the sea and was overtaken by a Japanese patrol boat. They searched us and the boat suspiciously. They asked me where I came from. When I answered that I came from Negros, they brought out a Visayan interpreter. This Visayan asked questions about Major Cruz, the bandit who brought the arms to Negros. I answered in Visayan,

saying I did not know anything about the bandit and that I was just a merchant. Then I overheard the interpreter say, "He is no Tagalog, he is Visayan."

Then it occurred to me that they were looking for a Tagalog. From then on, I became very chatty with my crew and tried to learn more of the Bicol dialect. By the time we reached the island of Calintaan off the shore of Sorsogon, I was able to pass as a Bicolano. I paid off my crew in this island of Calintaan and, unknown to them, I crossed the strait along to Sorsogon that same night.

I felt more confident as I set foot on Luzon soil although I knew I was still several hundred miles away from my destination. I assumed the name of Emilio C. Conde and entered the town of Matnog. The first thing I did was to look for Gov. Salvador Escudero who, I learned, was the head of guerrilla activities in the Bicol region. I was lucky enough to win the services and confidence of a young man from Matnog named Arturo Almasan, who served as guide and companion in all my trips in the Bicol region and Manila. I went to Irosin, then climbed the Bulusan Volcano to see Toni, the son of Gov. Escudero. The old man, Escudero, had gone to Samar to see Kangleon but was taken ill and later was captured by Merritt, a rival guerrillero of Kangleon.

Toni informed me that to enter Manila safely I had to have a Kalibapi membership and a residence certificate. With one of his assistants, I went down to Irosin to secure these credentials. By the time we reached the lowland, the Japanese were raiding the town. I proceeded to Santa Magdalena, a coastal town controlled by the Japanese. The town mayor, a Japanese old-timer named Daito, was quite friendly. After a few minutes of casual conversation I was able to convince him that I was an old-timer like himself. He sold me the Kalibapi membership certificate and residence certificate for two hundred Japanese pesos. Armed with these papers, I went back to the town of Matnog, having been told by Mayor Daito that it was the best place to get transportation for Lucena or Manila. True enough, when I got into the place, the sailboat of a Chinese merchant, Tiong Hing, was getting ready to sail for Lucena, Tayabas. Somehow the Chinese sensed that I was connected with the underground works but after a little persuasion he agreed to take me along.

That evening, a group of eight men under the leadership of an American mestizo named Johnson came over to the house where I was hiding and demanded an explanation of my presence in town. Before I could utter a word, Johnson accused me of being a Japanese spy and had his men drag me towards the shore. He made me carry a shovel and said that he was going to show me how they dealt with Japanese spies in that place. I asked to be taken to his commanding officer because he was making a terrible mistake. But he refused, saying that he was the chief and whatever he said would be done. "Oh, God! Have mercy on me!" was all I exclaimed. After a few minutes' silence, with my feet getting heavier with every step, I asked if he was going to kill a Bataan boy without even hearing what I had to say. The word Bataan worked like magic on him. He turned around and asked with surprise, "Are you from Bataan? I fought in Bataan, too," he continued, without waiting for me to answer. He ordered his men to go back to the house, and the two of us walked slowly behind. He did most of the talking, enthusiastically narrating his dramatic escape after the surrender of Bataan. I told him that I, too, escaped with a couple of boys after the surrender and had been living in Santa Magdalena ever since, and that I was anxious to see my family in Manila. When we arrived in the house, he departed with his men and promised to give me all the protection needed for my trip. Making arrangement with the Chinese merchant to pick me up at

the neighboring barrio, I left at twelve o'clock that same night. At eight o'clock in the morning, I boarded the Chinese sailboat, which was loaded with lumber, firewood, and cassava flour. I told the Chinese to declare that I was his partner in case we were caught by the Japanese at sea.

Our first stop was Bulan, a Japanese naval base. There were no ships in view in the bay except for two small launches and two submarines, but there was considerable activity of these launches and motor boats. It looked more like a patrol boat pool than a base. We were met at the pier by a Japanese constabulary and were subjected to a comparatively light inspection and questioning. Then everybody was told to go to shore with an escort of two Japanese guards with fixed bayonets. It was October 14, 1943, but nobody knew what was going on until we were told that it was the Inauguration of the Japanese Puppet Philippine Independence. We were marched to the public plaza and were required to bow to every Japanese sentinel. The place was packed with men, women, and children. The atmosphere was tense with fear and sad foreboding. Every number in the program was applauded mechanically, not enthusiastically. After the program three shouts of Banzai, led by a man on the platform, gave the sign to disperse. Then everybody was allowed free movement around the town but still had to bow to every Japanese soldier he met. I was on my way to the boat when I was hailed by a man on a bicycle, shouting at the top of his voice, "Cruz! Cruz! I am very glad to see you. When did you come? How is everything with you?" he asked excitedly. Before I could utter a word, my hands were shaken violently by my old classmate, Dr. Castro. I don't remember exactly how I got rid of him, but I certainly did it quickly. I lost no time in getting back to the boat and stayed there most of the time. I learned that there was a Japanese naval garrison stationed in Bulan of from 200 to 300 men under a Capt. Kuroda. They were constructing an airfield about three miles to the south of the town.

The next day we set sail for Lucena. We had been sailing for two days and were making good progress when we met a Japanese patrol boat near Tablas Island. I bundled together all the personal letters of President Quezon, which at that time I was trying to commit to memory, weighted them with a small stone, and threw them into the sea. The Japanese boarded our ship, and all of us were made to kneel on the outrigger of the boat. They searched the boat and every one of us carefully. Then they asked where we were going. Our pilot said Lucena and showed the Japanese pass for the boat. With the help of two fat hens, we were allowed to proceed on our way.

It was low tide when we entered Lucena bay. It was necessary to ride in a banca to get to the shore. With my basketful of chickens and bundles of firewood we rode upstream for two and a half hours to the shore, a busy barrio named Cota. There was a great demand for chicken and firewood. Among the buyers were some Japanese soldiers. I sold my wares to the Japanese.

In Lucena I stayed in the New Banahaw Hotel, which was located near the railroad station. The officers of the Japanese garrison ate their meals at that hotel. I learned from the manager of the hotel that the Japanese were fond of shrimps. Early one morning, I went to barrio Cota and bought all the shrimps and eggs in the place and sold them to the Japanese soldiers, keeping some of the good shrimps which I took to the hotel with me. I had the shrimps cooked the way the Japanese like and asked the hotel manager to invite the officers to be my guests that noon. We had a hearty luncheon complete with Japanese beer. After a few more days of trading with the Japanese with eggs and fish, we became quite friendly and I was invited to visit the Japanese garrison, which I did.

The captain of the garrison, Capt. Ando, gave me a letter of recommendation when I told him that I wanted to sell my chickens and eggs to Manila.

On October 22, 1943, I boarded the train from Lucena to Manila. With my basketful of chickens I got off at the Blumentrit railroad station just outside of the City of Manila. I went directly to the house of my sister-in-law, Mrs. Cuyugan, in Sampaloc, Manila. After the first shock which they felt due to my sudden appearance, my sister-in-law and her husband, Judge Antonio Cuyugan, informed me that my wife was in the city but that we would have to be very careful, because the Japanese had made several inquiries about me in that house and also in Arayat, my home town. My wife was shocked too when she first saw me but after praying a few minutes to the image of our Holy Virgin Mother she became brave and composed. She was dumbfounded and speechless, keeping a tight hold on me and trying to convince herself that I was really myself and not a product of her imagination. It took a long time before either one of us was able to talk. She told me of the horrible things the Japanese had been doing, the wanton and indiscriminate killing of men, women, and children and destruction of property. She described her terrible experiences in the mountains where she took our six children to escape the Japanese atrocities. She had been questioned by the Japanese about me several times. Her only answer was that I was killed in Bataan. She told me that she saw Mr. Manuel Gonzales in Quiapo Church. Manuel Gonzales is a nephew of Mrs. Quezon. Through him I was able to see the sisters and other relatives of the Quezons. Mrs. Enriqueta Amador, a niece of Mrs. Quezon, arranged my contact with Gen. Manuel Roxas.

I met Gen. Manuel Roxas on the night of October 25, 1943, in a house at 893 Lepanto Street, Sampaloc, Manila. I transmitted the message of Pres. Quezon: his faith and confidence in the capabilities, integrity, loyalty, and patriotism of Roxas and other leaders of the Philippines, and how he singled out Roxas as the "only man in whose abilities, courage, and patriotism I could entrust the destiny of my country," and the strong desire of Pres. Quezon that Gen. Roxas should join him in Washington, D. C. I also asked Gen. Roxas the information which Pres. Quezon wanted me to obtain regarding the reactions of other Filipino leaders and the people in general towards Quezon's departure to the United States; the present attitude of the government leaders and the people in general toward the United States and Japan. Then I informed Gen. Roxas of what Pres. Quezon and his cabinet had been doing since we arrived in America; the promise of President Roosevelt of complete rehabilitation of the Philippines; the guarantee of our complete independence, and the protection of same from foreign powers. I told him of the tremendous war production of the United States, and the opinion of President Quezon that America would certainly win the war by the latter part of 1945 or the early part of 1946. I also told Gen. Roxas of Gen. MacArthur's instructions for all underground workers to lie low and refrain from indiscreet killings of Japanese and Japanese spies to avoid painful retaliations. Lastly I asked Gen. Roxas what his opinion was on the question of whether or not Vice-President Osmena should succeed President Quezon at the expiration of the latter's term of office on November 14, 1943, as provided for in our Constitution. To this matter Gen. Roxas said that in his opinion Pres. Quezon should continue as President regardless of the Constitution because the expediency of war needed his services as such. Gen. Roxas appreciated the high regard Pres. Quezon had for him, but declined with regret to go to Washington because he had a very important work to do. He was the only one who was in a position to advise the underground men and to stop them

from manifesting their intense hatred for the Japanese and the men working for them. Besides there were planted men who are apparently cooperating with the Japanese like Pirovano, Juan Elizalde, Alejo Valdez, Gen. Francisco, and many others who were looked upon with suspicion by some guerrilla groups. He further said that he had an understanding with Gen. Francisco that in case there would be conscription of Filipinos into the Japanese Army, loyal Filipinos would be placed in key positions so that they could turn the whole conscripted army against the Japanese. Gen. Roxas also said that he had connections with several guerrilla leaders such as Marking, San Agustin, Ramsey, Peralta, Fertig, and others and was in constant contact with them. He could also communicate with Mindanao through José Ozamis. He told me that there were at that time 120,000 Japanese soldiers distributed in Batangas, Cavite, Bataan, Manila, Pangasinan, Tarlac, and Pangasinan. "All indications show that they will try to hold Manila," he said. "Tell the President and General MacArthur that there is no doubt about the loyalty of the Filipinos including those who are holding positions in the Government. It can be safely stated that 95 percent of the entire Filipino people are loyal to America and the leadership of Pres. Quezon."

He wanted to get out of the Islands before the invasion; so he told me to request Gen. MacArthur to get him (Roxas) out one month before the expected invasion of the Islands. I later transmitted all this to Gen. MacArthur and President Quezon. Gen. Roxas warned me not to stay more than five days in the city because the Japanese already knew of my arrival in the Philippines via submarine and it would be only a question of days before they would start looking for me in Manila. I told him that I had letters for him from the President but had to throw them into the sea with the others, including the letter of Vice-President Osmena to Mrs. Osmena, when I was apprehended.

The next day I met Speaker Yulo, Secretary Rafael Alunan, Ramon and Amado Arraneta in Mr. Yulo's house. I transmitted Pres. Quezon's message and asked the information which the President desired. All of them wanted the President to continue except Mr. Rafael Alunan, who thought the Constitution should be respected and obeyed. Mr. Yulo wanted some more advice from some older men; so he asked me to see him again the next day, which I did. My contact with Mr. Yulo was made through the help of Mr. Jose Razon, who also accompanied Gen. Roxas when I contacted him. Razon and Amado Arraneta picked me up in the latter's car at the Quiapo Church about seven o'clock in the evening. We cruised around for an hour, passing through the Luneta and Dewey Boulevard to observe the Japanese boats in the harbor. To my great surprise I saw only two tankers, one cruiser, and two destroyers. There were several launches and a well-lighted hospital ship. We sat for a while on the rocks on the beach and observed that the boulevard was practically deserted except for a few pedestrians, mostly Japanese soldiers and civilians, and occasional automobiles loaded with Japanese.

The next day I met Col. Rafael Jalandoni, now Major General. He was working as a clerk in Malacanan compiling the census of Filipino war prisoners. He said that Capt. Pedro Molina, a nephew of Pres. Quezon, was working with him. He also said that 43,000 Filipino officers and men reached Camp O'Donnell (concentration camp) alive but 29,000 of them died in the camp. He could not tell how many more died after they were sent out. He however assured me that all of the Bataan boys were loyal and anxious and willing to take up arms against the enemy any time despite their harrowing experience. He was living miserably with his wife and a daughter, and the forty pesos a month he was receiving was not even enough to buy a sack of camotes. My younger brother, Rafael Cruz, who

located and brought Jalandoni to me, said that he found him (Jalandoni) and his family living in a small dilapidated hut. Yet in spite of his miseries he refused to accept the many responsible jobs offered him including the office of Senior Aide to Vargas and then to Laurel. For his continued and repeated refusal, he was suspected and closely watched. I offered to take him back with me but he refused. He would rather suffer and wait, then fight the enemy again when the time comes. That night my younger brother, Rafael, contacted Mr. Jose Razon again to find out where I could meet him. Mr. Razon set the time for seven-thirty in the same old Quiapo Church. I had a hard time eluding the people I knew, but my brother and I were in the church five minutes before the appointed time. Razon and Amado Arraneta came twenty minutes later. They were delayed because of the bundle which Gen. Roxas wanted me to take to the United States for the President. I found out when I reached home that the bundle comprised a complete set of the Philippine Gazette, which contained the reports and records of all the bureaus and departments of the Philippine Government, including the speeches of the Government officials.

I met Speaker Yulo for the second time in the house of Ramon Arraneta on the night of October 28, 1943. Justice Avancena was also of the opinion that Pres. Quezon should continue regardless of the Constitution. His opinion was that the President of the United States or the Congress had the power to appoint President Quezon to succeed himself as an emergency measure -- or anybody else, for that matter, in whom the President of the United States had confidence in times of extreme emergency like war. I then asked Speaker Yulo to help me contact Sec. Vargas because so far I had failed to contact him. I observed that Mr. Yulo was irritated. He told me to desist from seeing Vargas even though Pres. Quezon ordered me to see him. "I forbid you, as head of the party in power who is responsible to the people. Tell the President that I take all the responsibilities of your failure to see Vargas. He has become helpless in the hands of Kihara and the Japanese militarists and now he is aspiring to be appointed as Minister Plenipotentiary to Japan. When the Japanese gathered all the Filipino leaders and told us that they were not interested in the Philippine Government but wanted only to drive the Americans away, they asked me to head the Filipino participation as Chairman of the Executive Council. I refused because I was holding an elective position and did not want to compromise the people. In fact none of us wanted to have anything to do with the Japanese. But when we found out that Benigno Aquino, Pio Duran, and Benigno Ramos were aspiring to be appointed, I suggested the name of Vargas because he was only an appointed employee and did not represent and would not compromise the people. After having been pestered and threatened, I chose to be chief of the Supreme Court in order to avoid any active participation in the Government. You tell these things to the President. Vargas allowed himself to be a helpless fool of Kihara and the Japanese. When this Japanese Philippine Republic was organized, I told Vargas that he had the chance to get out and stay out of the Government. He however disregarded my advice but instead he asked Kihara and Tojo to make him minister to Japan."

Yulo advised me to get out of the city as soon as possible because many people already knew of my presence in Manila, and it would only be a matter of days before the Japanese learned about it. In spite of these things I made other attempts to contact Mr. Vargas. Disguised as a vegetable seller, I entered the garden of Mr. Vargas to see him and let him see me. But there were Japanese soldiers in his garden, and in the house I had no chance to see him. By that time, my supply of Japanese money was running low; so I re-

requested Mr. Yulo to give me 2,000 pesos. He readily consented, and the money was delivered to me the next day at San Sebastian Church by Amado and Ramon Arraneta. Amado Arraneta said that he had a pass to go in and out of the prison and concentration camps. He said that in Muntinglupa prison there were about 5,000 to 10,000 prisoners, all Filipinos and mostly political prisoners. They were miserably treated and practically starved. The American civilians in Santo Tomas University were better off because food and money could be smuggled in to them. The American prisoners in the Port Area were in worse condition, sick and emaciated beyond recognition. He also informed me that the Japanese were constructing wooden barges in Pandacan at the rate of seven a day and that the Japanese war tanks were being assembled in the warehouse of the Mori Bicycle Co. at Santa Mesa.

The same afternoon, October 28, 1943, I contacted Gen. Lim in the Philippine General Hospital. He and Gen. Roxas were the only two who had not yet signed the oath of allegiance to the Japanese. Gen. Lim succeeded in pretending to be more sick than he really was and was waiting for a chance to escape and join the guerrillas.

I stayed in the city several more days, contacting some of the other men I was told to contact. With the official Gazette given me by Gen. Roxas hidden in the bottom of a bamboo trunk and covered by boxes of cigars, handbags, and wooden shoes, I left the city for Lucena in the train. I left Lucena in a small sailboat on November 8, 1943, bound for Negros. A typhoon overtook us and we were stranded in the islands of Gigatangan, Leyte. Here in this island I wrote my message in longhand and sent it to Col. Peralta by courier to be transmitted to Australia. I arrived on the northern tip of Negros on the night of December 3, 1943. From Cadiz, I sent another identical message, which was relayed by radio through Col. Edwin Andrews to Australia. On February 12, 1944, I was picked up by the USS Narwhal.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
South West Pacific Area

PHILIPPINE MONTHLY COMBINED SITUATION REPORT

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

PHILIPPINE MONTHLY COMBINED SITUATION REPORT

No. 16

DATE: 15 April 1944

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CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:
By Authority of AC/SC-2 FEB
Date 27 Feb 47
Signature [Signature]

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ORIENTATION: BACKGROUND OF DEVELOPMENT
OF PRESENT PI GUERRILLA SITUATION

1. General Situation:

a. Guerrilla organizations were initially formed by Filipinos as a police force to check the wave of lawlessness following the break-down of civil police due to Jap occupation. (This applies to rural areas only.) The guerrilla organizations were in reality local community police units. Later these police units took on the added responsibility of protecting the communities from the Jap.

b. Guerrilla organizations were supported by the communities which they protected. In free areas facilities of towns such as power plants, machine shops, coconut oil plants and distillation units were made available to the guerrilla forces. Coconut oil was produced to run diesel engines in launches and coconut milk was distilled for the alcohol for the few motor vehicles available. In the more populated areas, civil administrators were established. As the Americans who had not surrendered came down from the hills, they developed command units to unify larger areas. As a result, inter-community trade and liaison were established, and defense became an area matter instead of local. Plans were made to increase the production of food, supply officers were appointed to procure it, and a currency was established to purchase it. The civil administration, working with guerrilla authorities, is now firmly established in many areas. Gradually island areas became unified and were recognized as Military Districts (area divisions of the Philippine Army with which Filipinos were familiar). (See following map)

c. The power of guerrilla organizations at present varies in different islands. Generally speaking, they are strongest in the islands which have the poorest road systems. The strength depends pretty much on the extent of Japanese penetration. Jap activity is centered in the more highly developed and productive islands.

d. Luzon: Organized guerrilla activity here on a large scale is negligible. Recent reliable information shows the existence of numerous anti-Jap units, actively supported by the civil populace, but as yet tactically unorganized. The excellent system of roads permits the Japs to police all areas and to deny large groups of guerrillas the use of food producing areas. It will be difficult to organize a combat unit in Luzon. While the populace is extremely loyal, all activity in Luzon must be carried on with extreme care. Intelligence and sabotage activities only will be possible.

e. Visayan Islands: Mindoro, Panay, Negros, Cebu, Bohol, Leyte and Samar are under varying stages of guerrilla control. Guerrilla strength varies from 300 in Mindoro to 14,000 in Panay. The Japs are most active in Panay, Negros and Cebu, the richest and most productive islands in the group. As our forces approach the PI, the Japanese will undoubtedly intensify their efforts to reduce the combat efficiency of the guerrillas in these areas, and will meet with considerable success. The activities of the guerrilla units in the Visayas will be reduced to intelligence, harassing, ambushing and sabotage. These functions the guerrillas can carry out. Japanese are ruthless in their destruction of guerrilla supporting communities in these areas. Whole communities evacuate to the hills when the Japs approach. In the mountains Jap patrols find the going too expensive. It will be impossible for the Japanese to eradicate all resistance, although they can and probably will keep it disorganized. At present, the Visayan Islands are the bases from which intelligence activities are carried on in Luzon.

f. Mindanao:

(1) This island is ideal for guerrilla organizations. The size of the island, the limited number of cross island roads, the mountainous nature of the terrain and the large number of inland agricultural communities provide guerrilla units with food, protection and maneuver room. Japs now occupy in force the cities of Davao, Cotabato,

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Zamboanga and Cagayan; with smaller units (100-800) in other communities. Outside of Davao proper, Jap penetrations are possible only in force. Jap forces in Mindanao total about 22,000 men.

(2) The guerrilla organization here has over 20,000 men, of whom half are armed. About 80 Americans hold key positions and run the extensive radio net. The Americans there are mostly enlisted men of the Air Corps, Infantry, and Navy who were able to avoid capture. Their experience and vision is limited. They are tired, have been on the defense too long, and are in need of assistance if the latent power of the guerrilla units is to be fully developed.

(3) The nuclei of combat groups already exist. Divisional, regimental and battalion areas are recognized and accepted. Boundaries between units are definite. Units have definite missions. Commanders are known to each other. Terrain studies are being made. A carabao transport system has been established to facilitate the distribution of food. All units are in radio or courier touch with the 10th MD Headquarters. Airfields are being built. American prestige is high.

2. Characteristics of Guerrillas:

a. Units are skilled at ambushing the enemy. They will attack a column or convoy and run away, awaiting another opportunity. They are not accustomed to bombing or shelling. Either type of activity will disperse them.

b. Units are extremely mobile, within a few days walking distance from source of supply. Unit headquarters consist of commander and a few messengers. To concentrate a large force in a particular area will require time to build up food supplies in the area.

c. Units have maximum fighting efficiency in their own areas.

(1) They know the trails thoroughly. A force unfamiliar with the area will have extreme difficulty in making progress even without opposition.

(2) Nearby communities are extremely loyal to the units. When units are withdrawn to the hills, the people move with them.

(3) They have effectively cut roads and trails leading into their areas by burning bridges, constructing road blocks and machine gun nests, and active patrolling. Jap forays do little damage. Jap casualties raise the morale of the guerrilla units, and the civilians are further convinced of the usefulness of supporting the guerrilla forces. Such delaying operations are now being accomplished with a limited ammunition supply, 30 cal. rifles, a few machine guns, etc.

(4) The lengthy coast lines of all the islands make inter-island traffic fairly secure. Jap patrol boats cannot stop all the native bancas using the inland seas, as distances are short enough to be covered in a few hours of darkness. The overwhelming loyalty of the Filipino people assures assistance and shelter to Filipinos and Americans. It can be stated with reasonable certainty that the mass of Filipino people will assist our forces against the Japs. Their assistance will become evident when enemy forces are dispersed and take to the hills. No Jap is or will be safe in a Filipino community, unless he is backed by a strong force. Individual Japs, or small groups, will be unable to exist in the mountains as is now possible for them in New Guinea and Bougainville.

3. Guerrilla Organization of Mindanao:

a. Headquarters 10th Military District is the directing agency of U.S. Forces in Mindanao. It is commanded by Col. W. Fertig, Corps of Engineers. At the surrender in 1942 he fled to the hills and later came down and assumed command of guerrilla forces. He established communication with GHQ, and has gradually extended his control to cover all guerrilla forces in the island.

b. With the assistance of AIB parties, he has established an excellent coastwatcher system and a large radio net. He is gradually expanding his intelligence system to cover the island. It must be remembered that the guerrilla movement was a spontaneous and

individual affair. Island leaders are still not trustful of each other. Col. Fertig's influence at present stems from his being the source of supplies from the SWPA, and that he is the officially recognized CO of the 10th MD.

c. Civil authorities in guerrilla areas were delighted to cooperate, as the guerrillas were the sole law enforcement agencies. Civil provincial governors, judges, etc., who held those jobs prior to the war were allowed to continue. Those civil officials who had cooperated with the Japs were liquidated by the civilians, or took refuge in Jap occupied territory. The Japanese receive little cooperation from civil authorities in the occupied cities of Mindanao. Such cooperation is merely a means to survival. The people, who see their properties taken over by the Jap military and civilians, are firmly resolved to wait it out, are keeping their bolos sharpened, and continue to maintain contact with guerrilla forces. The Jap version of the Gestapo, the "Kempei", makes sporadic attempts at exterminating subversive activities, but normally concentrates on the wealthier Filipinos whose properties can be appropriated. Civil administrators and currency committees are appointed by President Quezon, their powers are defined, and their activities will continue until a Commonwealth government is established. For our purposes, it can be assumed that civil officials will be available to step into jobs now held by puppets when re-occupation takes place. The Filipino civilians will have taken care of puppet officials prior to our arrival.

d. In 95% of Mindanao, civilian communities continue to live under normal conditions. Occasional Jap forays (about every 6 months) provide excitement to an otherwise placid existence. The island is practically self-sufficient. Coconut oil and distilled coconut milk serve as fuel; abaca furnishes the fiber for weaving cloth; the land will grow 3 crops of corn per year. Sugar, coffee, and cocoa are cultivated. There is sufficient rice, corn and camotes (a low grade sweet potato) for the people, while pigs and chickens are as numerous as ever. Sole civilian shortages are shoes (which rural Filipinos wear for adornment), matches, soap and medicines. Such items were never too plentiful in the rural districts, and their loss is not too great a hardship.

e. The present policy of GHQ towards the Philippines is to supply the guerrilla units with arms, medical supplies and radios, have guerrillas continue the organization and consolidation of positions, avoid any aggressive action which might bring Jap reinforcements into the area, and concentrate on developing coastwatcher stations and intelligence. This policy has encouraged and aided guerrilla forces and has resulted in a stable, organized civil government, and a military force which has the support of the civilians in the area. It has developed transport facilities for exchange of commodities, arranged for the planting of crops for guerrilla forces, established an authorized system of currency, set up a coastwatcher and intelligence system, divided the island into regimental areas, and in all respects, has justified the policy and faith of GHQ in the American and Filipino people living in the area.

4. Conclusions:

a. From the above discussion, certain conclusions can be drawn about Mindanao:

(1) The 10th Military District in Mindanao is a stable, well organized, well run unit of the U.S. Army.

(2) The possibility of its complete neutralization by the enemy prior to our invasion is remote.

(3) The extent of civilian support of guerrilla units, quite sizable at present, will increase in scope as our forces approach the Philippine Islands.

(4) The latent power of guerrilla and civilian units in the area will do much to assist our landings, save us thousand of lives, and months of time.

(5) Intelligent planning and direction will shorten the period of confusion following our occupation, establish civil government promptly, permit our mobilization of civil manpower for military use, and make the transition from Jap occupation to American occupation as rapid and as painless as possible.


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PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
 Military Intelligence Section
 General Staff

MILITARY DISTRICTS




15 APRIL 1944

Commanding officers recognized or appointed by GHQ, SWPA

- 6th District: Col. M. Peralta, PA
- 7th District: Lt. Col. S. Abcede, PA Res.
- 8th District: Maj. I. Inginierno (Bohol Area Commander)
 Lt. Col. Charles Cushing (Cebu Area Commander)
- 9th District: Lt. Col. R. Kangleon, PA (Leyte Area Commander)
- 10th District: Col. W. W. Fertig, AUS. (Mindanao)
 Lt. Col. Alejandro Suarez (Sulu Area Commander)

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SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

I GROUND:

1. Luzon, Mindoro, Marinduque, Masbate:
- a) Cagayan: Recd 27 Mar: Only coast near San Vicente, Gonzaga & Aparri prepared w/defenses, trenches & fox holes, area restricted.
 - b) La Union: Recd 27 Mar: Poro Pt., only, reported prepared w/defense posns, trenches & foxholes along beach, area restricted.
 - c) Manila: Recd 27 Mar: Japs being trained combat, camouflage, day & night movements & street fighting. Recd 16 Mar: Locations food dumps, bulk ordnance stores in Manila area. Recd 31 Mar: Hq JIF loc San Beda College.
 - d) Laguna: Recd 16 Mar: Army recuperation hospital filled.
 - e) Batangas: 20 Feb: 50 Japs Verde Id, sml garr only Batangas prov, largest 400 at Lipa.
 - f) Tayabas: 26 Feb: Japs connecting all strong points w/trails for supply & communication.
 - g) Camarines Sur: Recd 31 Mar: Japs fr Legaspi moved Pili. 12 Feb: 5000 Japs Pili.
 - h) Albay: 21 Feb: 30,000 Japs landed fr 25 transports Legaspi.* 31 Mar: 200 Japs Legaspi rest moved to Pili, Camarines Sur.

*COMMENTS: (1h) Report of arrival 30,000 at Legaspi is probably unreliable.

2. Palawan and Visayas:

- a) Panay: CAPIZ: 18 Mar: 200 Japs arr fr Japan. ILOILO: 25 Mar: 1000 Japs arr Iloilo City fr Manila. 12-16 Mar: 700 Japs arr Iloilo City, half fr Negros. 30 Mar: 1000 Japs arr 25 Mar departed for Cebu & then S.* 4 Apr: 1000 Japs arr on 1 med transport, left same night, 300 departed on 2 motor boats PM.
- b) Guimaras Id: 14 Apr: 300 Jap civilians moved to Jordan, Sml garr Buena Vista, w/patrols attempting to get rice.
- c) Negros: 23 Mar: Negros Or nearly cleared enemy; 12-20 in towns to control grain harvest.
- d) Cebu: 28 Mar: 2000 Japs arr for training. 2 Apr: Sml garr Japs S Cebu fr New Guinea; terror tactics & brutality reported. 9 Apr: 1000 Japs arr in 3 transports for training. 2 transports left S w/poss 600. Mil hosp filled to capacity w/dysentery cases & many private houses commandeered for segregation sick cases. Jap residents conscripted. 14 Apr: Transport NR 123 carrying troops fr Cebu to Cagayan, Mindanao.* 1 FT left AM for Mindanao w/landing barges & arms. 14 Apr: 3 transports fresh troops exp fr Manila before 21 Apr.
- e) Leyte: 31 Mar: 250 Japs Panaon Id, burned most barrios & bancas, armed w/hvy guns, extreme cruelty to civilians. 11 Apr: Japs Limasawa Id & Burgos. 14 Apr: Number Japs decr to Manila.
- f) Samar: 20 Mar: W coast strength Calbayog to Basey - 4/7000; S coast fr Balangiga to Pambujan Sur - 200; N coast fr Allen to Catarman - 210; no Japs Catarman to Taft. 21 Mar: 150 Japs reoccupy Taft, after rice. 25 Mar: poorly clad troops looting N Samar; new troops at Catbalogan incl 700 Koreans. 2 Apr: Catarman-Calbayog road bridges under repair; stated for moving troops overland fr Catarman thru Leyte & Samar, to Luzon.* Capul Id marines under Bicol command. 15 Apr: Greatly decr garr during month. W coast garr total less than 50 all towns, N coast about 100.

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*COMMENTS: (2a) Probably same as 2000 reported arrived Cebu 28 March. (2d) Departure of troops for Cagayan believed in connection with further activity in Agusan area. (2f) Possibly confirms map captured in Negros in January showing evacuation routes thru Visayas to Luzon via Samar.

3. Mindanao and Sulu:

- a) Tawi Tawi: 21 Mar: Main Jap garr (Naval) at Patkias, Sanga Sanga, 100M fr shore under coconut trees.
- b) Zamboanga: 21 Mar: Pagadian, Sindangan to Oroquieta clear. 28 Mar: In N terror tactics & outrages, 200 civilians killed. 30 Mar: Japs at Dipolog w/patrols active in area until 11 Apr. 15 Apr: No Japs Dipolog.
- c) Misamis Occ: 15 Apr: 2 SCs left 10 Apr w/supplies & troops; 300 remain at Misamis.
- d) Lanao: 16 Mar: Scattered landings N coast. 17 Mar Enemy landed Baroy in strength & advanced inland; w/drew to beach under hvy fire. 11 Apr: No Japs Lala area. 11 Apr: Japs left Kolambugan, 200 Liangan.
- e) Misamis Or: 21 Mar: Coast fr Initao to Opon clear. 2 Apr: Japs evac Iponan. 25 Mar: Blackout & camouflage Cagayan area, no AA except 50 cal; pill boxes, wire & trenches along beach covering dock at Macabalan & Lapasan. 10 Apr: Cagayan wharf area closed to civilians. 12 Apr, AM: Japs landed fr 800T ship.
- f) Bukidnon: 25 Mar: Sayre Highway passable, some troops moved S & few supplies brought N. Barracks & hosp Damulog; 20 trucks. 10 Apr: More troops expected fr Davao & Manila to take place of mobile unit now in Agusan. Mobile unit to go to Cagayan for attack against Sumilao area guerr.
- g) Agusan: 21 Mar: 300 Japs occupy Butuan, occupy coast fr Nasipit to W bank Agusan R. 17 Mar: Guerr defense posn capt below Amparo. 18 Mar: Occupation coast appears to be for control rice harvest & poss advance up river later. 26 Mar: Decr pressure along river.
- h) Davao: 25 Mar: Total strength equals 2 Divs, w/2 Regts, only, combat, others untrained or recently inducted Jap civilians.* Bayabas restricted area. 10 Apr: Gasoline, fuel oil & supplies dispersed in sml dumps along W side of road N fr Davao & about 100M under coconut trees fr Sasa N to Lasang. Concentrations Panakan, Ilanga, Bunawan & Lasang; light guards. 5 Apr: 16000 Japs, mostly good troops Davao prov. S tip Talikud Id fortified. Road proposed fr Malalag to Buayan to follow old trail. 10 Apr: Jap launch attempted landing Manay but w/drew after firing 12 shells. 11 Apr: Reinf garr along N coast road. 13 Apr: Reported Japs nervous over lack control E coast. 13 Apr: 3 150mm CA guns Sta Ana, same S end Talikud, Dumalag Pt & Sasa. Another defense area around Darong; rumors same in Bayabas area. 1 Apr: 12 tanks Davao: 4 Sasa, 12 Talomo R Plantation, 2 Licanan field; mostly light.
- i) Cotabato: 7 Apr: Garr Cotabato City incr to 3000. 12 Apr: Sml BC post to be estab Kisante, Kidapawan.

*COMMENTS: (3h) Total strength Davao not accurately known to guerrillas and given here only to show typical discrepancies in reports received on strengths in this area.

II AIR:

1. Luzon, Mindoro, Marinduque, Masbate:

- a) Pangasinan: 29 Jan: Landing field nearly compl w/cement runways $\frac{1}{2}$ km W prov capitol.

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- b) Pampanga: Recd 16 Mar: Palacol field betw Floridabanca & Angeles under constr.
- c) Batangas: Recd 26 Mar: Batangas airfield brightly lit, Lipa blacked out.* Recd 31 Mar: Japs claim Lipa largest PI airfield w/6 underground hangars for Fs.
- d) Rizal: Recd 16 Mar: Concrete runways being laid Rosario.
- e) Polillo Id: Recd 16 Mar: Airfield Alabat Id.*
- f) Manila: Recd 26 Mar: Light buoys fr breakwater in pattern of Luneta light system.* Recd 27 Mar: 2nd runway Neilson & parking strips concreted. Recd 31 Mar: Nichols field enlrg & 2 more runways added; TE Bs sta there. US insignia reported on 5 med Bs. Many air accidents due pilots in training.
- g) Cavite: 9 Feb: 5 navy FBs at former USN apron. Recd 26 Mar: Lights installed 500 yds fr coast in pattern of navy yard.*
- h) Camarines Sur: Recd 16 Mar: Naga field lengthened. Recd 31 Mar: Pili airfield reported being enlrg.

*COMMENTS: (1c) Lighting of Batangas field believed blind for activity at Lipa. (1e) Report considered of doubtful reliability. (1f & g) Placing of light buoys apparently to camouflage installations at Cavite and Luneta. Luneta area closed to civilians.

2. Palawan and Visayas:

- a) Panay: 14 Apr: Tiring airfield in oper condition.*
- b) Negros: Airfield constr N Negros w/forced labor.*
- c) Bohol: 4 Apr: Japs constr new landing field Danao, Panglao Id.
- d) Leyte: 11 Apr: Ormoc field being reconditioned & enlrg. New field Burauen & clearing at Valencia, 13 km N of Ormoc; work night & day.

*COMMENTS: (2a) Construction reported in December. Located between Sta Barbara and Cabatuan, Iloilo Province. No further details, but believed bomber length. (2b) Details of construction activity not received. Note report of improvement of Fabrica Field reported last month.

3. Mindanao and Sulu:

- a) Tawi Tawi: Bombing free areas continues. 10 Apr: Airfield 2 mi NE on Sanga Sanga one-third complete: 1 mi long, 300 ft wide; work by Chinese coolies & native forced labor.
- b) Basilan Id: 9 Apr: Seaplanes based near Isabela. 13 Apr: 2 seaplanes based Port Holland.
- c) Zamboanga: 6 Apr: Bombing free areas continues.
- d) Lanao: 13 Apr: Seaplanes occ use lower end Malabang Field.*
- e) Misamis Or: 31 Mar-2Apr: 6/9 Bs patrolling Macajalar Bay based Patag airfield. 4 Apr: Patag extended to W for Bs, but only 10 Fs on field; supply storage tunnels in hill to S; no revet. 9 Apr: 2 Fs Patag field. 10 Apr: 13 planes Patag field, 6 at Lumbia. Lumbia fighter field under constr, 2 months to finish at present rate, hideouts for 6 planes in forest, final capacity 20 planes, no tunnels yet, 4 barracks complete N end field.
- f) Bukidnon: Tankulan field being cleared. Malaybalay 2000M x 300M; revet for 24 planes in hill NW of field, no planes. Valencia 2: Same; partially tunnelled revet into hill to NW for 50. 12 Apr: Del Monte field recently used for emerg landing.
- g) Agusan: Bombing coastal towns late March. 13 Apr: Rizal field in condition to use.*
- h) Davao: 8 Apr: Sasa: 50 planes perm garr, only B field in Davao area in reg use. Licanan: 1000M x 100M, coral but ground soft, pursuit field not complete yet but

in use; 30 planes dispersal area in coconut trees to S; no revet; uncrated planes Bunawan wharf for assembly. Matina: Naval airfield under constr near Matina R betw road & coast. Baracoton: No recent info on condition, no planes. Tomagon: No recent info on condition, no planes. Hijo: Grass runway, pursuit field. Malalag: 1000M x 100M field under constr at Meral. Samal: Patrol Bs seen taking off.* 15 fields tot planned Davao area, incl Calinan, Bayabas & Darong. 10 Apr: Usually 4 SE FPs & 1 navy FB anchored naval yard, Santa Ana. 12 Apr: No underground hangars at any Davao fields.* Padada runway 100M x 1000M; 2 others proposed; strip located on Mindanao State Plantation Co.

- i) Cotabato: 23 Mar: Buayan airfield again being enlrg. 7 Apr: Airfield constr at Cotabato City not complete. 13 Apr: No airfields in upper Koronadal Valley. Buayan field 43 planes.* Dadiangas field being enlrg.

*COMMENTS: (3d) Information reads as received. Possibly means sea-planes light in Illana Bay off Malabang. (3g) Unconfirmed, and since field in poor location in rice paddy possibly not true. (3h) Confirms report of bomber length field on Samal Island received May 1943. Re underground hangars, previously reported at Sasa. (3i) Report of 43 planes at Buayan believed exaggerated. Last report in March indicated field still under construction.

PLANE SIGHTINGS REPORTED ON MINDANAO AIRFIELDS DURING MONTH

Name	Province or Id.	Sighting
Wolfe	Zamboanga	5 DBs & 2 FPs
Patag	Misamis Or.	2-13 Fs (total varied during month)
Lumbia	Misamis Or.	6 u/i (this first report of planes on this field)
Sasa	Davao	50 (mostly Bs)*
Santa Ana	Davao	4 FPs & 1 FB
Buayan	Cotabato	43 u/i (this is first report of planes this field. Report rated low in reliability)
Port Holland	Basilan Id.	2 FPs (first report this area)
Isabella	Basilan Id.	2 FPs (first report this area)
Jolo	Jolo Id.	2 Bs, 3-5 FPs *
Tawi Tawi	Tawi Tawi	2-5 FPs *

*Only sightings so indicated can be considered as usual number of planes stationed in area. Other sightings are probably transient totals.

Summary totals:

Fs	2-13
Bs	52
DBs	5
FPs	15-20
FBs	1
u/i	49
Total	124-140

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MOUNTAIN PROV:
Jap recruits reported training Camp John Hay.

N & C LUZON:
All bridges C to N Luzon good condition.

MANILA:
18 Jul: Tanker burned Pier 5.
25 Jul: Navy fuel stored in port sabotaged. Doubtful rept Marshal TERAJUCHI commands army & navy in P.I.

LAGUNA:
26 Jun: Guerr attack Muntinglupa POW camp, release 60 POW, capture all arms & ammo.

BOHOL:
18 Jul: 70,000 Cavans rice capt fr guerr.

ZAMBO. NG.:
No Japs rptd w coast.

ZAMBO. NG.:
19 Jul: 14 six-inch guns reported in city and beaches.

IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS TOKYO

SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES

MANILA

- N. LUZON
- C. LUZON
- S. LUZON 33 I.M.
- S. LUZON 32 I.M.
- CEBU 31 I.M.
- N. LEYTE 16
- N. MINDANAO ?
- D.V.O 30 I.M.
- D.V.O ? 2 Amph

S.M.M.R.:
20 Jul: All East & North coast garrisons, except Taft in E. & Loang in N. hurriedly evacuated by Japs.

LEYTE:
Wharf under construction at Dulag.


SURIGAO:
Enem mapping area 6 miles inland from Tandag.

D.V.O.:
18 Jul: High military officials hold important conference Licanan D. Jap wounded unloaded during blackout.

D.V.O.:
21 Jul: Malalag beaches reported heavily defended including electrified wires.

Enclosure No. 1 PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
Military Intelligence Section
General Staff
ENEMY GROUND ACTIVITIES
23 - 29 July 1944
For Summary No. 10



ENEMY GROUND DISPOSITIONS REPORTED DURING THE WEEK

Location	Japs	BC	Remarks
LUZON			
San Fernando, La Union	2,000		Not previously reported.
Misc towns, La Union	1,000		
Daet, Faracale, Zamboanga, Cam. Norte	3,000		
S.M.M.R.			
Loang	900		
Taft	500		
Calbayog, Catbalogan	5,000		Prob greatly exaggerated.
MINDANAO			
Zamboanga Zamboanga	700	400	BC prev 150
Fagedian Zamboanga	500		
Surigao Prov	10,000		El new div.



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Enclosure No. 2
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
Military Intelligence Section
General Staff
AIR SIGHTINGS & SIGNIFICANT
DEVELOPMENTS
23 - 29 July 1944
For Summary No. 10



AIRCRAFT ON P.I. FIELDS AS REPORTED DURING WEEK

Field	Date	A/C
LUZON		
Nichols	10 Jul	14 T/E, 47 S/E, 39 Fs
Neilson	10 Jul	36 T/E, 70 S/E, 43 Fs
Lipa	10 Jul	50 T/E, 52 Fs
LEYTE		
Valencia	10 Jul	1 S/E
Cataisan	25 Jul	4 T/E
Anibong	25 Jul	2 Seaplanes
Panay		
Tiring	25 Jul	13 Fs
Mandurriao	25 Jul	4 Fs under repair
San Fernando	25 Jul	2 T/E, 30 S/E
CEBU		
Kawit	18 Jul	6 F/P, 4 E F/B
MINDANAO		
Sasa	16 Jul	3 4 E F/B
Matina	16 Jul	3 Bs
Padada	25 Jul	20 to 90 Bs & Fs
San Roque	22 Jul	9 Bs
Lumbia	25 Jul	1 B



SUMMARY OF AIRCRAFT SIGHTINGS REPORTED

VISAYAS: Total to SE & S, 78 A/C
 Total to N & NW, 16 A/C
 MINDANAO: Total to SE & S, 48 A/C
 Total to N & NW, 7 A/C

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Enclosure No. 3
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
Military Intelligence Section
General Staff
MERCHANT VESSEL SIGHTINGS
23 - 29 July 1944
For Summary No. 10



MOMFOG PASS:
25 Jul: 7 ships
39,000T cse S.

CEBU HBR:
26 Jul: 5 ships
18,500T anchored.

BOHOL STRAIT:
23-26 Jul: 6 ships
3,000T cse S.
26 Jul: 11 ships
57,000T cse N.

SOUTHERN NEGROS:
27-28 Jul: 6 ships
8,000T cse SW.
28 Jul: 1 ship
4,000T cse NE.

ZAMBOANGA NW:
23-28 Jul: 6 ships
5,500 T cse SW.
22-27 Jul: 2 ships
7,000T cse N.

ZAMBOANGA SE:
24 Jul: 1 ship
2,000T cse S.

SARANGANI BAY:
22 Jul: 2 ships
3,000T cse S.
25-27 Jul: 10 ships
55,000T cse N.

PANAY ILOILO NE:
26-29 Jul: 10 ships
32,500T cse SW.
27 Jul: 1 ship
3,000T cse N.

CAMOTES SEA:
23-26 Jul: 6 ships
10,650T cse S.
23 Jul: 6 ships
10,000T cse E.
23-28 Jul: 22 ships
54,000T cse N.

TACLOBAN:
26 Jul: 2 ships
9,000T cse S.

CANIGAO CHAN:
26 Jul: 1 ship
5,500T cse S.

CAGAYAN:
29 Jul: 1 ship
500T cse E.

DAVAO GULF:
25 Jul: 4 ships
19,000T cse S.

MERCHANT SHIPPING AS COMPARED WITH PREVIOUS WEEK

Place	16-22 July Revised		23-29 July Prelim.	
	Ships	Tons	Ships	Tons
MINDANAO				
Misamis Or.	4	7,600	1	500
Davao	5	12,500	4	19,000
Cotabato	27	21,210	12	58,000
Zamboanga NW	6	28,000	8	12,500
Zamboanga SE	32	12,810	1	2,000
Zamboanga City	2	8,000	-	--
Total	76	90,120	26	92,000
CEBU				
Bohol Strait	-	--	17	60,000
Cebu Hbr.	6	20,000	5	18,500
Camotes Sea	7	11,000	34	74,650
Total	13	31,000	56	153,150
LEYTE				
Canigao Chan.	-	--	1	5,500
Tacloban	3	11,000	2	9,000
Total	3	11,000	3	14,500
NEGROS				
South Coast	-	--	7	12,000
Bacolod	9	9,000	-	--
Total	9	9,000	7	12,000
PANAY				
Iloilo NE	41	146,000	11	35,500
Total	41	146,000	11	35,500
LUZON				
Tayabas,				
Momfog Pass	-	--	7	39,000
Total	-	--	7	39,000
TOTAL	142	287,120	110	346,150

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
DAILY SUMMARY OF ENEMY INTELLIGENCE

NO:

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DATE:

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

DAILY SUMMARY OF ENEMY INTELLIGENCE

I: MINDANAO: GROUND - AIR - NAVY

II: VISAYAS: GROUND - AIR - NAVY

III: LUZON: GROUND - AIR - NAVY

No.
53

DATE
25 Sep/44

PARA

CONTENTS

- | | | |
|------|------------|---|
| *1. | Davao | Report of highway and ferry destruction |
| 2. | Davao | Occupation of Davao Penal Colony by our units |
| 3. | Agusan | Agusan River clear of Japs as far as Butuan |
| 4. | Bukidnon | Large concentration of troops Maramag-Damalog |
| 5. | Cotabato | Encounter with Japs vicinity Sarangani Bay |
| 6. | Zamboanga | Aircraft sightings over Zamboanga, Basilan Id. |
| 7. | Misamis Or | Harbor report Cagayan, week ending 21 Sep |
| 8. | Surigao | Report of air-naval attack on Jap convoy |
| 9. | Cebu | Enemy strength Cebu City and vicinity |
| *10. | Mindoro | Additional report on plane approach patterns |
| 11. | Panay | Allied air attack Iloilo and Guimaras Id |
| 12. | Iloilo | 54 Allied planes attack Tabuganhan Id |
| 13. | Iloilo | Shipping observed anchored off Concepcion |
| 14. | Cebu | Weekly report of shipping activity, Cebu Harbor |
| *15. | Cebu | Report of torpedo boats, activity and armament |
| 16. | Leyte | Report of torpedo boat sinkings |
| *17. | Pangasinan | Report on defenses NW tip Lingayen Gulf |
| 18. | Tayabas | Jap garrison vicinity of Baler |

*Significant items

* * * * *

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Msg
No.

MINDANAO

Ground Activity

Davao:

Fer
901

(1) 23 Sep: We have stopped destruction hwy between km 43 and km 106 in order to use trucks abandoned by Japs. We occupy garrisons at Kahamaynan and Anibongan railways and have destroyed Bincongan Ferry.

COMMENT: This action is the result of the abandonment by the Japs of outlying garrisons in Davao Province and points to quick exploitation by our guerrillas.

Fer
905

(2) 24 Sep: Our troops have occupied Davao Penal Colony and will utilize it for Filipino civilians who are fleeing from occupied territory. Road junction National Highway and Penal Colony Road at km 39 is an enemy bivouac area. Agent believes that complete neutralization of Linganán by repeated raids will result in enemy withdrawing S to km 19 North road.

COMMENT: Davao Penal Colony was used at first for American PW. After American PW were removed the Penal Colony was used for Filipino political prisoners.

Agusan:

Fer
906

(3) 24 Sep: Agusan River is clear down to Butuan, Agusan. Enemy is removing troops and supplies secretly by launches at night from Butuan, Agusan. Destruction of Rizal Field, used occasionally by Bettys, and Bancasi (Butuan Cadre) Field, used by fighters, would hasten this evacuation.

COMMENT: In PI Daily Nr 51, Item 3, an extensive comment was made on the evacuation of the Agusan Valley as far as San Mateo; since San Mateo is in the municipality of Butuan the same comment applies. The gist of the comment is that the enemy appears to be concentrating some of his troops in NE Mindanao for an apparently expected invasion.

Bukidnon:

Fer
907

(4) 24 Sep: Large concentration of troops between Maramag and Damalog. This area was not raided. Between Valencia, Bukidnon, and Davao Province boundary 500 Jap casualties during raids.

COMMENT: Indication that enemy troops from bombed areas are partly concentrated in the Maramag-Dumalog area. It must not be overlooked however that the central location of this area makes it suitable for the concentration of reserves for the defense of southern Mindanao, and that such concentrations in this vicinity have been formerly reported. (See PI Daily Nr 50, Item 1)

Cotabato:

Fer
903

(5) 24 Sep: Agent reports 16th Sep encounter with Japs, vicinity Sarangani Bay, 3 Japs killed for loss one our men. Captured 75 grenades, 6,000 rounds .25 calibre ammo and 100 Jap stokes-mortar shells.

Air Activity

Zamboanga:

Fer
904

(6) 23 Sep: Basilan Id reported 2 bombers, 9 fighters bound SE, 4 fighters southbound, 14 fighters circling over-head, 1 bomber to SE, all hostile. Zamboanga saw 3 fighters going N.

Naval Activity

Misamis Or:

Fer
903

(7) 24 Sep: Cagayan Hbr report week ending 21 Sep: 2 MV, 2 SA, 5 SC, 7 small craft.

COMMENT: Routine.

Surigao:

Fer
908

(8) 24 Sep: Competent American officer reports on air naval attack Jap convoy 9 Sep. 21 Jap ships believed sunk Hinatuan as counted from individual fires seen by civilians; Jap warship escort repeatedly bombed. Two Jap planes approached but fled S. Bombing and cannon fire heard both N and S Hinatuan. One cargo ship beached off Tidman, much oil and army supplies, this ship nbr 143. 8 ships partly sunk on beaches Mawes Id, many new Jap graves this island and Hinatuan, Surigao. Civilians reported 24 ships stranded on coast near Lianga, civilian looting has been stopped, guards posted, and we have started salvage of available cargo. Jap survivors along coast and

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MINDANAO (Cont'd) Naval Activity

Surigao:

Mawas Id picked up by launches. Some ships this convoy were evacuating large garrisons from Hinatuan and Lianga. Japs out of Hinatuan, left minor defenses such as brick pillboxes. No effort observed of Japs attempting salvage.

COMMENT: This message confirms the reported evacuation of Lianga Bay and for the first time reports the evacuation of Hinatuan. The former was discussed in PI Daily Nr 49, item 6, and the same comment would apply to the evacuation of Hinatuan. The gist of the comment was that the abandonment of this area would be, if true, the resultant of both its exposed position and the need for redistribution that our poised threat to the south would appear to dictate.

VISAYAS Ground Activity

Cebu:

Cus 159 (9) 24 Sep: Additional report as of 24 Sep on enemy strength: Guadalupe Elementary School, Cebu City, 200; in front of Basak Elementary School in civilian houses, 150; Talisay Elementary School, 200; Talisay Sugar Central, 150; Lauaan Minglanilla, 150; Carcar Cebu, 100; Mactan Island, approx 1,000; Cebu City, approx 2,000; Consolacion, scattered at Tajusan and Bagacay Point, 300. A/A gun emplacement at PooC Talisay, ammunition stored at Talisay Elementary School building, mines kept in Lauaan area Minglanilla.

Air Activity

Mindoro:

Row 121 (10) 24 Sep: There are 3 distinct funnels for planes to and from S. No. 1 was described in our Nr 70. Nr 2, planes from all directions to San Jose, then abrupt left turn to 5 miles off Mindoro, then N to Bataan; planes from N in reverse. Nr 3, planes from S including SW avoid San Jose, enter funnel around Buyallao Id and fly straight route to Tubile, thence to destination, from N in reverse. One funnel used 3 or 4 days, then changed to another.

COMMENT: This message refers to the traffic pattern used by enemy aircraft in order to be recognized as friendly by the enemy. (See PI Daily Nr 30, item 15 for comment.)

Naval Activity

Panay:

Per 709 (11) 24 Sep: Starting 0950/H, American planes attacked vessels at Iloilo Port, Iloilo Strait and vicinity Guimaras Id, Tiring and Mandurriao airfields, vicinity Tigbuan and Guimbal towns. River area Iloilo City, depot Mandurriao airfield and vessels around Bondulan Point, Guimaras set on fire. One u/i plane crashed aflame vicinity Tigbuan.

COMMENT: The above are ground observers report of damage caused by U.S. Navy carrier planes on 24 Sep.

Iloilo:

Per 710 (12) 24 Sep: 1030/H Bagongon, Tagubanhon Id bombed by 54 Allied planes, A/A guns answered. North of Igbon Id 3 transports bombed and set afire. 1040/H one of 4 vessels S of Jintotolo Id (Masbate) set afire, 1400/H two vessels bombed and sunk, another set afire around Pan de Azucar Id. Explosion from Masbate heard.

COMMENT: See comment in item 11.

Per 711 (13) 24 Sep: 1035/H 7 auxiliary cargo vessels medium load and 1 FTC anchored off Concepcion. 1030/H same date one medium transport light load anchored off Concepcion.

COMMENT: These vessels may be anchoring while awaiting orders as to destination or because of dislocation of dock facilities due to our recent air strikes.

Cebu:

Cus 155 (14) 22 Sep: Weekly summary report of enemy vessels sighted entering port of Cebu ending Thursday 21 Sep: 3 FTC, 1 FTD, 1 FU, 2 SC, 1 MV, 3 patrol crafts, 1 DD, 1 CL u/i and 20 naval landing crafts.

COMMENT: This is a small weekly total for this important harbor and probably results from the destruction of docks, etc., in our recent air strikes.

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VISAYAS (Cont'd)

Naval Activity

Cebu:

Cus
159

(15) 24 Sep: (Correction of msg 18 Sep) Motorboats armament follows: 1 37mm A/A, 1 heavy machine gun approx 7.7, 2 torpedo tubes, 2 depth charges chutes at stern and men with German luggers. Fuel and supply facilities taken from Liloan Cebu. 3 Queen boats and several barges hiding among mangroves near bridge Jubay Liloan. Area has 2 A/A guns, 1 machine gun. Reported Queen boats patrol up to Bagacay Point daily. One queen boat was observed patrolling Cebu north channel and shelters among mangroves in Casaga Bay. Some landing crafts also hiding here. One queen boat was observed patrolling vicinity Kawit Island. Silot Bay Liloan still hiding place for landing craft and barges.

COMMENT: See PI Daily Nr 50, item 11.

Leyte:

Kan
-

(16) 24 Sep: Reference your special Nr 10, 1 torpedo boat was seen hit and sunk by carrier planes at Dulag water front during bombing 12 Sep. Others might have been destroyed or sunk as they are no longer seen at base in Tacloban Port. No more floating craft seen in Tacloban Port since 15 Sep.

LUZON

Ground Activity

Pangasinan:

Lap
2

(17) 24 Sep: Report as of 7 Sep, Cape Bolinao: 1 observation post N of town at end of only main road and another at tip of point NW of town, trenches and dugouts from Port Picucuban to NW of township along shore. Trenchera Pt (low hill NE of town). Three 50 cal MGs mounted on emplacements bored through hill connected with deep runways, center MG at higher elevation than other two, barbed wires along point, NW corner of Bolinao Elementary School is ammo dump. Santiago Id: Ammo dump at point S of barrio Lucero close to shore under coconut grove. Trenches along shore bank from Barrio Ducoy to SE of Binalbalian. MG emplacement at some strategic points, one 50 cal at NW point of island at Picucuban Strait, between island and Bolinao. Capital and cargo vessels sometimes anchor following life buoys. SW and SE of barrio Liciente and directly S of Luna are coast arty emplacements for 155's. Along ridge on opposite side of ravine about 150 meters from right of Zag Zag road between barrio Zaragoza and Lambes are trenches and MG nest. From Agno, truck road constructed to barrio Sabangan and Kiboar. Cargo and capital (?) ships sometimes unload supplies at Sabangan. Barbed wires along Sabangan Pt to Kiboar.

COMMENT: The preparation of defenses in Cape Bolianao and off-laying Santiago Id, the northwestern end of Lingayen Gulf shows the enemy's concern and preparations for the defense of the Lingayen area. Though the reported defenses do not appear to be anything but defensive outposts, it must be borne in mind that they are probably in the developmental stage.


Tayabas:

Tor
-

(18) 22 Sep: Jap garrison located at Detaki 247 degrees 30 minutes true azimuth from Baler distance of 18 and one half km. Garrison located N side of road going to Bongabong. Native huts used as quarters. 100 civilians employed daily except Sunday. Another Jap garrison at Dibucao 269 degrees true azimuth from Baler distance 10 and one quarter km.


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PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
 Military Intelligence Section
 General Staff
 Keyed Map to Accompany
 F.I. Daily Int. Summary
 Nr. 53 25 Sep/44



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

DAILY PHILIPPINE MESSAGE SHEET

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

DAILY PHILIPPINE MESSAGE SHEET

No.
184

DATE
24 Nov 1944

MINDANAO

Fer 534 Misamis Or: 19 Nov: Two Jap ships aground on coral reef 2 miles W Cubontagan, MEAS (near?) Balingasag, Misamis Oriental. Troops unloaded.

Fer 535 Mati, Davao: 22 Nov: Following boundaries enclose area LH (of?) important Jap supplies. Strafing and fragmentation bombing would eliminate total Jap material this part Davao: Follow sides of a triangle, each side 50 yards long. Base of triangle shore line. Left side from Municipal Building to schoolhouse. Radio station near school in former Domestic Science Building.

Fer 536 Bukidnon: 21 Nov: Reported Nips broke through 2nd Bn of 111th (Regiment) (Bukidnon) causing him evacuate his rear installations.

Fer 540 Davao: 22 Nov: Malagamot, Davao Province, filled with many important untouched targets. Matina Field repaired after every bombing by Jap civilians.

14 Nov: Two fighters destroyed bombing Matina. Electrically controlled mines 3 meters from and parallel to N Road from Km 11 to 16.

Fer 540 Agusan: 22 Nov: Following men from 13th Bomb Command, 13th Air Force, bailed TELA due fuel shortage. Now proceeding this headquarters. S/Sgts Leroy CARTWRIGHT, ASN 35217251. John KIRK, ASN 33646881. Will notify you upon their arrival.

NEGROS

Abc 398 Negros Occ: 19 Nov: 20 Oscars and Zekes in Singcang, Bacolod, as of 19 Nov. 3 Sonia, 2 Lily, 1 Sally and 1 Betty now being repaired at Guia Lumber Yard, Bacolod.

Abc 401 Negros Occ: 22 Nov: Planes from Lanog Lanog dispersed at barrio Tabigue 2 KM along Provincial Road S of Saravia proper, planes towed on Provincial Road to this barrio for refueling and bombloading.
14 Tony, 10 Zeke and 3 Sonia, total 27, at La Carlota Airfield dispersed in area S of and between school house and La Carlota to San Enrique Road and under bamboo thickets at N end of runway. Gasoline and oil deposit under orchard $\frac{1}{2}$ Km W of S end of runway. At Bacolod total 21 Oscar and Tony at Singcang under coconut trees $\frac{1}{2}$ Km NW of Magsungay bridge.

All information as of 22 Nov.

Abc 403 Negros Occ: 23 Nov: Bacolod Murcia Mill in Oco Japs making bamboo rafts each good for one soldier, dimensions one meter wide, $2\frac{1}{2}$ meters long. Multiple pompoms installed at Lanog Lanog, Naga and Tanza Airfields.

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P.I. Message Sheet 184, 24 Nov 44 (Cont'd)

Abc
404 Negros Occ: 23 Nov: 16 German pilots at headquarters Cagay, one Km N of Tanza proper, assigned to Tanza Airfield.

Abc
405 Negros: 23 Nov: Measurements of cracked up Tony: Wing span 40 feet and 3/4 inch, length of fuselage 29 feet, 7 1/4 inches. Jap pilot prisoner of war claims 1200 horsepower.

PANAY

Per
14 Iloilo: 18 Nov: As of 1 a.m., Pan de Azucar Island clear. All Nips boarded unknown number motor boats and proceeded SE.
 18 Nov: 11 a.m., one Allied 4 engined seaplane landed at position 11° 28' N, 123° 14' E while 8 others same types landed above that place. Upon landing, one banca contacted seaplane and after 30 minutes the plane took off with 8 others headed NE.

Per
15 Capiz: 20 Nov: All 3 motor launches docked at Culasi Point, Capiz, left 6:00 p.m. with food supplies.

LUZON

Vol
55 Ilocos Sur: 23 Nov: Radiogram dated 21 Nov says one destroyer, 2 light cruisers, 1 FB armed with two 75 guns and two 50 caliber guns, anchored in Santiago Cove which is point two.

Vol
59 Manila, 23 Oct: Following information is from leader of Chinese Unit in Manila, reliability unknown:
 Results of September bombing at Nichols Field runway A/A positions and trenches completely blasted, over 50 grounded planes destroyed, over 1,000 soldiers and laborers killed or wounded. In Fort McKinley all except few small barracks destroyed, large quantity ammunition destroyed, over 1000 persons killed or wounded. At Makati Airfield (?) all installations blasted, over 70 grounded planes destroyed, approximately 1000 persons killed or wounded.
 Engineer Island completely blasted, steel bridge erected. In port area, piers 3 and 7 completely destroyed, all except few small warehouses on piers 1 and 5 destroyed. In Manila Bay, 30 ships sunk, 10 damaged, aircraft supply ship with over ten planes also sunk.
 Moved war supplies from suburbs into central part of city including buildings between Tivoli Theater and Star Restaurant of Plaza Santa Cruz, Blackout Nite Club on Alonso Street, Santa Cruz, Tung Po (repeated Pu) Aiti Club on Ongpin Street, Capitol Theater. Fuel stores at Pandacan and San Nicholas which were missed by Allied planes were distributed to small warehouses thruout city. Arms transferred to 2 churches in Santa Cruz and Tondo. During raid, American PWs Nrs 1107, 1500 and 1700 were shot and killed by Jap guards because they were accused of giving signals to planes with their cigarettes, were buried by Communications Ministry which furnished this information. This ministry also says that at 1030 President LAUREL received telegram Nr 68 from Jap government thru Jap Embassy which reading is, "2,122,936 prisoners surrendered in Bataan and Corregidor and were released in 1942. Except for approximately 5700 who are in Constabulary, these men are free. Your government is hereby ordered to draft these men into military service. Report of names and addresses will first be submitted to Jap Army. Evaders will be treated as guerrillas. Families of deserters will be taken as hostages. Immediate compliance is enforced. Release of above to newspapers is forbidden".

 Both N and S railways now used exclusively for military transport. Rice costs 3500 Jap military pesos a sack. Headquarters of Jap military police is now in residence of President OSMENA. Engrotaeg Tibay and El Poagtelpo Shoe Factories used by enemy for manufacture of military supplies. Jap captain killed with own sword in San Pedro Makati, was attached to 1351 Division.

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P. I. Message Sheet 184, 24 Nov 44 (Cont'd)

LUZON

Tor 20 Nueva Ecija: 18 Oct: A-1. Results of U.S. raids on Bangad, Cabanatuan Airfield for fourth time on 18 Oct. Slight on field, one Jap casualty and no planes destroyed on ground. Since then some fighter planes use airfield for hiding when there is air raid.

Mil 4 Rizal and Laguna: 22 Nov: Following observations: MARKINGS Units control Rizal and eastern Laguna through mutual agreement with other units. Discipline, morale, organization good. Full cooperation with US policies. Strength reports to be forwarded: Estimate 10,000 trained, 10% serviceably armed. Supplies of weapons, ammunition, clothing, medicine, emergency rations needed. Only source now available through ANDERSON via usual channels plus 15 days mountain hand carry. Site for air drop with good security available in rear vicinity here. Please advise.

PALAWAN

Cabais 6 Palawan, 21 Nov: KENDEN (?) detachment moved overland to tip of Pandanan Point. Strength 40 men, well armed, killing natives.

Cabais 5 Palawan: 22 Nov: American fliers in my area 11. None of injured requires immediate evacuation. Physical condition satisfactory. No alternate rendezvous point available due to local conditions and enemy activities. Previously selected point, 119° 38' E, 10° 26' N (Pagdanan Point), most secure.

Cabais 6 Palawan: 22 Nov: Name, rank, and serial number of personnel to be evacuated reference your Nr 5 message dated 21 Nov are contained in messages Nr 3 dated 19 Nov in 3 parts, and Nr 4 dated 18 Nov in 2 parts, sent from this station. Physical conditions satisfactory. Personnel assembled near rendezvous site and are alerted from dawn to dusk. Food supplies badly needed. Request evacuating plane bring us dire necessities such as sugar, flour, baking powder, coffee, powdered milk, chocolate, emergency ration, and cigarettes.

MINDANAO

Fer 544

Misamis Or: 21st Nov: Nip strength:

Cugman	600
Puerto	2,000
Bugo	500
Agusan	1,000
ALAE	700
Tagoloan	2,500
Bolonsiri	150
Del Monte	2,000
Dalirig to Dalwangan	2,500

Total for Prov. 11,950. Largest garrisons as follows:

Fer 545

Bukidnon: 21 Nov: Strength ^{11,950} Malay (Malaybalay?) area 3,000, S Bukidnon unchecked. Troops reported N on 14 Nov partly offset by 2,000 to Malay on 13 Nov.

CEBU

Cus 2

Cebu: 18 Nov: B-1. Enemy movements: As of 2410/Z, 150 Japs infantry with 2 machine guns moved out by trucks from Tabunok to Buhisan.

Cebu City: At 0100/Z, 5 carts of supplies were taken to city from Tabunok. At 0730/Z, 70 Japs engineer moved out to Pandan Naga by trucks from city. At 2340/Z, 5 trucks fully loaded supplies left

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P. I. Message Sheet 184, 24 Nov 44 (Cont'd)

Cushing Nr 2 (Cont'd)

Tabunok bound city.

19 Nov: At 2440/Z, 60 Japs moved by foot bound city from Tabunok escorting 6 carts supplies. At 0100/Z, another 60 Japs escorted several carts supplies from Tabunok to city. At 0215/Z, 5 trucks full supplies left Lawaan bound city.

21 Nov: B-2. Maruchi Gumi drydocks, San Nicolas, Cebu City, supplying lumber for Jap Army.

NEGROS

Abc 397 Negros: 18 Nov: 13 planes 2 Km E of field on road to Murcia as of 18 Nov; 7 planes and spare parts SW of second bridge N of field as of 18th....(part missing)..hours.

Dumaguete, planes under coconut trees SE of Silliman University occupied by Jap troops with bulk concentrated in area between pier and field. Col OIE back in Dumaguete with one battalion Nip soldiers from Cebu. At least one squadron Nip planes patrol at very high altitude over airfield N Negros daily.

Abc 402 Negros Occ: 23 Nov: 4 mobile A/A guns at Manapla Sugar Central. Correction our Nr 401, (see page 1) re barrio Tabigue 2 Kms along Provincial Road SW of Lanog Lanog Field and not S of Sarauta proper.

Abc 406 Negros: 22 Nov: Aircraft summary:
B 2300/Z VLJ 9416003 XX 15
C 2343/Z VLJ 8927503 PX 15
E 0200/Z ALO 8995000 XX 00
G 0220/Z VLT 9148821 BF 01

Received late from observer WOI 28 flights flashed to K71.

PANAY

Per 19 Manila: 21 Nov: 250 American PW sent to Corregidor on labor assignment. About 500 Filipino laborers in piers and port area, Manila, executed by the enemy up to 16 Oct on charges of sabotage and looting. Estimated 10,000 Nip troops moved to Antipolo in Rizal 3rd week Oct. Heavy tank concentration finished their military training and assigned with their regular troops.

Per 24 Capiz: 23 Nov: Refer to your Nr 4 and in addition our Nr 21 (see PI Message Sheet 183, Page 3, 23 Nov 44). It mentions Loctugan Airfield: 30 meters wide by 700 meters long. Direction of runway N 14 degrees E. Clearance approach NE trees 6 meters high and 2 houses 7 meters high. Railroad station 5 meters high all ranging 120 to 180 meters from NE end runway. Clearance SW approach, hills 100 meters high from sea level about 150 meters from S end runway to present condition of runway cove with grass 1/2 to 1 foot high, depressions on SW and eastern parts of runway. Type of paving: Rock foundation covered with sand and earth binders rolled by 10 ton roller. Constructed in year 1937 by Bureau of Aeronautics, Used by Army and INAEC (?) before war. Reconditioning needs 3,000 man hours. If extended to 1 Km long and 100 meters wide, 470,000 man hours needed. Jap improvements: Fillings on proposed extension 200 meters long and 40 meters wide on SE end but not finished due soft ground. We are already clearing grasses, filling depression, and cutting down obstructions NE end runway. Will report when completely reconditioned.

Per 25 Iloilo: 18 Nov: The 3 American airmen reported in our 983 were picked up by Catalina flying boat morning 18th. Same flying boat reported in our Nr 14 (see page 2).

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P. I. Message Sheet 184, 24 Nov 44 (Cont'd)

Per 26 Capiz: 23 Nov: There are 12 American airmen and one sub crew in this area, all in Libertad Pandan. None reported needing immediate evacuation because of physical condition. Sites recommended are Libertad in Pandan and Caticlan in Buruanga in order of priority. Ref your Sp Nr 5.

MINDORO

Row 233 Mindoro: 23 Nov: One SC anchored in cove near Baeto Point was machine gunned by Liberator this morning but was not sunk. Will advise more later.

Row 234 Mindoro: 23 Nov: Liberator bombed small launch at small Galatero (rpt Balatero) Cove yesterday morning but missed entirely. We finished job yesterday afternoon as it interfered with our supply ships.

LUZON

Vol 17 Rizal: 21 Nov: (Message incomplete)on Plaza Gaité filled to the roof with ammo the Oriental Cabaret in Maypajo district all filled with ammo. The Chinese and Laloma cemeteries are gasoline dumps barrels arranged in length of 5 x 4 x 2 meters so look like tombs spread all over.....

Vol 19 Ilocos Sur: 14 Oct: Information from captured prisoner captured Ilocos Sur on Jap organization and equipment: 1 Buntai (section), 12 men, 1 Shotai (platoon) has 4 Buntai or 48 men, 1 Chutai (company) has 4 Shotai or 180 men including 4 officers and 10 noncoms. 1 Daitai (battalion) has 4 rifle....(part two here)....mm caliber, new model short rifle machine gun and automatic rifle with tripod and 7.7 mm caliber. Prisoner who is new arrival from Formosa was trained in use of rifle, bayonet and gas mask and in grenade throwing was not trained in trench fighting or A/A defense, was in no maneuvers. Only instructions received was to follow orders. (Message incomplete)

Vol 38 Ilocos Sur: 20 Oct: Fragmentary: At Salomague Port 316 infantry CNALTPP.....11, 131 Japs passed Narvacan toward S in 12 wagons 14 Oct. 1,000 Jap civilian, old men, women, children landed Lapog 7 Oct transported S. 5 small motorboats at barrio Solotsolot, Lapog, used to rescue survivors of ships. (Message incomplete)

Vol 63 La Union: 25 Oct: (Message incomplete) Information from Jap prisoner who deserted and surrendered to our units at Bacnotan, La Union.....whipped and given water cure when he could not drill because of blistered feet, does not like the war, people in Tacan imprisoned if they discuss war. In Aumari in mountains not far from town are 2 factories which produce ammunition, rifles, tanks and trucks, in N part of Aumari 4 Kms N of center of town is airfield 2 Km square at which single engine fighters are stationed (will attempt to secure sketches of these installations).

Caban 291 Bulacan: 22 Nov: Baliuag, Bulacan, Catholic church and convent, Santa Barbara elementary school (210 degrees and 1.25 miles from the church) and Sabang elementary school (42 degrees and 1 mile from the church) are occupied by 500 Jap military police and infantry men. Refer to map Luzon Nr 22. These are very prominent from the air. These soldiers are exercising strict supervision on the harvest of rice in the vicinity and our civilians and guerrillas are deprived of the food supplies. They also have put up a strict cordon of guards on entry towards our mountains. Request that they be bombed immediately so that the Nips will leave the area.

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P. I. Message Sheet Nr 184, 24 Nov 44 (Cont'd)

Caban 295 Bulacan, 23 Nov: At 0300/H, 2,000 HUKBALAJAPS, all armed, are concentrating at barrio Talaksan, 1 mile E of San Rafael, Bulacan. Nips are concentrating at San Ildefonso Church, school houses, and near the railroad station. Refer to map Luzon, Nr 22 and 23. Also concentrating in Baliuag. All are moving towards Ackley then to our headquarters. Request that the Nips be bombed immediately and we take care of the HUKBALAJAPS.

Caban 296 Bulacan: 23 Nov: JUKBALAJAPS and Nips are scattered among the towns and barrios of Bulacan Province to supervise and loot the rice harvest now in progress. They have surrounded us and prevent our passage. Leaflets believed will pacify the HUKBALAJAPS. Reiterate request for dropping of leaflets and bombing of Nips in Baliuag and San Ildefonso towns. HUKBALAJAPS reinforcement coming continuously from near by towns for campaign towards our headquarters.

Mil 5 Manila: 14 Nov: US raid of 14 Nov on Manila destroyed the following targets: Earnshaw Dry Dock, Earnshaw Machine Shop, Earnshaw Garage. A-2.

PANAY

Per 22 Manila: 23 Nov: Names ranking officials that stayed Manila Hotel different dates this year per hotel room orderlies to our agents.

1-10 Sep: Generals YAMAMOTO, IARASE (?), KIMURA, TERAMOTO, MANIMOTO (MARUMOTO?); Colonels IWAMOTO, MAKINO, MURAKAMI, NONOGAKA, SHIMIYASO (?), KAMHTA (KAMADA?), KUA, SIMADA (SHIMAU), ICHINAGAWA (ICHINOGAWA?), ONTSUBO (OTSUBO?), SHIRAKA (?), FUKNAGA (FUKUNAGA), DAGUTCHI (DEGUCHI?), MATSUNAGA, SEGUCHI, IISDAR (IIZUYA?), NAKAMURA, SHIMADA, YOSHII, NISHARA (NISHIHARA), SHIGAKA (?), FUYUNAGA, YANAGI, ODESKI (OTSUKI?), ONADA (ONADA?).

13-20 Sep: Generals ITAMI SHIGEMI, PAULINO SANTOS, YANAGATA, TSUDA, SATO, MARAORA (?); Colonels HAYAKAWA, NOSE, DEGUCHI, AGAWA, YOSHIMAZO (YOSHIMATSU?), RANDO (?), OKAMOTO, KAMEDA, MATSUURA, RAMADA (?), WATASE, YAKIMATA (?), AOKI, FUJHHI (FUJII?), SHIRTSHI (?), OBAM (?), ASARA (?), MOSTI (?), RAKAGUCHI (NAKAGUCHI?).

1-10 Sep: Commanders T. OTANI, HAYASHI, NOMURA, HASHIMOTO, NAGASE, HIGASHI, SUGIYAMA, TAKAOKA and IWANAKA; Admirals SHIGUGA (?) and SAITO.

Manila guest list per our agents as of 21 Oct: Major General AKI-BAMA (AKIYAMA?) and SUZUKI. Colonels KAMADA, KINO and SHIMADA; Lt Colonels MASCOGAWA MISAWA, NATO KAWAKITA, KIRINKI (?), MURANANA (?), MIRONIYA (MINOMIYA?), YOKEE (?), ONGA (ODA?), ONISHI, SAITO, AEKI (AIKIORAOKI?), FUKUMARA (FUKUMURA?), DASUGUWA (?), HISAWA (?), KATO, KERINSUKI (?), MITSUI, MOTAYAWA (MOTOYAMA?).

CEBU

Navy 200526 Disposition Cebu Harbor and vicinity: 19 Nov: 2200/Z, 3 MV, 2 at 200 GT ea, 1 at 80 GT, at Mabolo Basin. 2 VA (100 GT ea) at Subang Daku Mandawe. 1 steel barge (250' length) and 3 VB (25 GT ea), 2 NV (7 GT ea) at Mandawe Wharf. 1 landing barge (150' length) E of Mandawe Wharf. 1 VA (600 GT) at Varadero Basin. 4 VB (25 GT ea) at Osmena wharf. 2 NV (50 GT ea) between Varadero and Caltez. 1 MV (60 GT N of Caltez. 6 VB (15 GT ea) at Tayud River, Liloan.

MINDANAO

Navy 200804 Zamboanga: Marine contact mines between Matanal Point, Basilan, and Cocos Island. Density field unknown. Believed protection Lamitan Harbor. Osaka Maru in June sunk at "Tar" hitting mine this area.

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PANAY

Navy

200030 Iloilo: 19 Nov: 1 VA, light load slow to SW. Position 11° 15' N, 123° 11' E.

Navy Iloilo: 19 Nov: 2 VB, light load, slow to S, position 11° 26' N, 200255 123° 14' E.

PALAWAN

Navy Palawan: 3 MV anchored, approximate position 8° 45' N, 117° 49' 200441 E at 2230/Z, 19 Nov.

(Messages typed to 1600, 24 Nov 44)

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