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 Vietnam War Marine Corps Official History Volumes

Vietnam War
Marine Corps Official History Volumes

6,385 pages of official Marine Corps history of the Vietnam War, in 21 volumes, published by the United States Marine Corps' History and Museums Division, created from 1968 to 2009, archived on CD-ROM.

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Vietnam War Marine Corps Official History CD-ROM

History of the Marines Corps participation in the Vietnam War
Description of Titles on the CD-ROM
Sample Pages from the Volumes

History of the Marines Corps participation in the Vietnam War.

For the United States Marine Corps, involvement in the nation's longest war began on 2 August 1954 with the arrival of Lieutenant Colonel Victor J. Croizat as a liaison officer with the newly established United States Military Assistance and Advisory Group to the Republic of Vietnam. For the next eight years, Marine activities in Vietnam consisted mainly of advisory and staff responsibilities. This began to change in mid-April 1962 when Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 (HMM-362), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Archie Clapp, deployed to South Vietnam to provide combat service support for the fledgling South Vietnamese army. In the spring of 1964, Marine Detachment, Advisory Team One, commanded by Major Alfred M. Gray Jr., arrived to collect signals intelligence, thereby becoming the first Marine ground unit to arrive in the country. Following the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964, the Marine Corps commitment to Southeast Asia expanded further. The end of 1964 brought an end to the advisory and assistance phase of the Vietnam War. A crucial turning point had been reached and 1965 brought about a major escalation in Marine combat activities in Vietnam.

The Buildup 1965

On 22 February 1965, General William C. Westmoreland, USA, Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, requested two Marine battalions to protect the key airbase at Da Nang from increasing threat by the Viet Cong to U.S. installations. In response, on 8 March 1965, the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) landed at Da Nang. By the end of March, nearly 5,000 Marines were at Da Nang, including two infantry battalions, two helicopter squadrons and supply and logistics units. In April the U.S. Government agreed to deploy still more Marines to Vietnam and to permit those at Da Nang to engage in counterinsurgency operations. In June, Major General Lewis W. Walt arrived to take command of the newly formed III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF), comprising both the 3d Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW). By mid-summer, the Marines had moved outside their cantonment at Da Nang and expanded their Area of Responsibility (AOR) to include the Viet Cong infested villages to the south. Marines landed at Chu Lai, allowing the 1st Wing to expand to new facilities there and at Marble Mountain, home of Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 36, while MAG-16 remained at the airbase at Da Nang.

In August, Marines engaged in their first major offensives against the Viet Cong, Operation Starlite, which included the 7th Marines, the vanguard of the 1st Marine Division. The action destroyed one Viet Cong battalion and badly mauled a second. By the end of the year, Gen Walt commanded 42,000 Marines. Despite operational successes, pacification in the densely populated areas in the Marine's AOR remained a difficult process.

An Expanding War 1966

In 1966, the size of U.S. Marine forces in the Republic of Vietnam continued to increase as the remaining units of the 1st Marine Division, commanded by Major General Lewis J. "Jeff" Fields, arrived from Okinawa to assist in pacifying the southern areas of I Corps. Even with its influx of Marines, a manpower shortage plagued III MAF, compounding an already difficult mission. Senior Marine commanders expressed strong disagreement with the conduct of the war by the leadership of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The Marines pushed for a small-scale unit pacification program along the populated coastal areas, while the Army leadership in Saigon advocated large unit search and destroy operations against North Vietnamese units. These disagreements further hindered the ability of III MAF to conduct effective combat operations.

Despite these problems, the Marines continued to carry the fight with several operations, most notably Operations Utah and Texas in southern I Corps and Operation Prairie in the north of I Corps. The Marines continued to refine a novel organizational concept, Combined Action Platoons, which merged a local Vietnamese militia platoon with a Marine infantry squad. The month of March saw the first arrival of CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters as a replacement for the aging Sikorsky UH-34, when HMM-46 landed at Marble Mountain, deploying from the USS Valley Forge. Meanwhile, Marine fixed-wing aircraft continued to strike targets as far north as Hanoi and Haiphong.

The year had brought a major buildup of U.S. Marine forces in Vietnam. Nearly 70,000 Marines were now in country; almost double the number from the previous year. The hopes of the Marine commanders that increased troop strength would defeat the enemy proved unrealistic. The coming year would find the two divisions of III MAF fighting increasingly different wars. The 3d Marine Division was fighting a more conventional campaign against the North Vietnamese Army near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in the north of I Corps while the 1st Marine Division engaged in more counter-guerrilla operations in Southern I Corps.

Fighting the Vietnamese 1967

While Marines continued conducting pacification and counter-guerrilla operations, most of the heavy fighting in 1967 raged in the north of I Corps along the DMZ. The 3d Marine Division engaged in heavy conventional fighting around the former Special Forces camp at Khe Sanh in the northwestern I Corps, to "Leatherneck Square" in the eastern DMZ. Simultaneously, Marines began construction of the "McNamara Line," a series of strong points, sensors and obstacles designed to deter and detect Communist incursions across the DMZ. Never completed, the McNamara Line drained III MAF of scarce men and materiel. To counter it, the North Vietnamese conducted numerous attacks to destroy it in its infancy, all supported by heavy artillery fire. This resulted in several major engagements during the second half of 1967, most notably at Con Thien. All the while Marine air played a pivotal role in providing fire support, CH-46 and UH-34 helicopters remained the workhorses for logistics support, augmented that year by the first squadron of CH-53 Sea Stallions.

By year's end, III MAF had blunted the North Vietnamese push across the DMZ. In all, U.S. Marines conducted 11 major operations of battalion size or larger and more than 356,000 smaller unit patrols and killed nearly 18,000 enemy. But the cost had been high, with 3,000 Marines killed including the 3d Marine Division commander, Major General Bruno A. Hochmuth. Despite augmentation by the Army's Americal Division, III MAF remained stretched in both men and material. But the Marines believed they had made significant strides toward pacification during 1967. However, as 1968 approached, there were ominous indications of an even larger enemy invasion.

The Defining Year 1968

The year 1968 proved to be the decisive year for the Marines in Vietnam. Instead of the traditional cease-fire for the Tet Lunar New Year, the Communists launched a massive offensive against 105 cites and towns throughout South Vietnam. In the north, enemy forces attacked all the major population centers, including Da Nang and the old Imperial city of Hue. U.S. Marines and South Vietnamese forces repulsed all the attacks except at Hue. It would take 26 days of dogged house-to-house fighting to expel the North Vietnamese regulars from the city, as Marines, more accustomed to fighting in the steamy jungle, learned the difficult and bloody lessons of urban warfare.

While Tet raged, another drama was being played out at Khe Sanh. For 77 days the 26th Marines, commanded by Colonel David E. Lownds, held the embattled base against intense pressure by the North Vietnamese, who hurled as many as 1,000 shells a day into the Marine position. President Lyndon B. Johnson became so concerned over the siege that he had an exact model of the Khe Sanh base built to monitor the situation on the ground. But Marine tenacity and American air power inflicted grievous losses upon the enemy. On 6 April, the Army's 1st Cavalry Division broke the siege.

1968 marked a turning point for the war in Vietnam. While the enemy had been defeated on the battlefield, American public opinion turned against the war. Television images of the fighting in Hue and Khe Sanh, and even at the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, eroded public support for the war. After three years of fighting, the enemy still appeared far from beaten. For many Americans, thoughts turned from escalation to winding down war in Vietnam.

High Mobility and Stand Down 1969

Incrementally, the Marine Corps began redeploying units, and by the end of the year, the entire 3d Marine Division had returned to Okinawa.

As planning to reduce force level in Vietnam continued, Marines continued to engage the enemy throughout I Corps. Colonel Robert H. Barrow's 9th Marines began Operation Dewey Canyon, perhaps the most successful high-mobility regimental-sized action of the war. Over a two-month period, the Marines operated in the A Shau/Da Krong valleys. By 18 March, the enemy base area had been cleared out, killing more than 1,600 enemy. The Marine air-ground team proved its worth in greatly reducing enemy 122 mm rocket fire into Da Nang. Marine infantry, transported by helicopters, cleared out enemy positions in the rugged "Happy Valley" and "Charlie Ridges" areas, all supported by effective Marine fixed-wing aircraft.

Vietnamization and Redeployment 1970-1972

Throughout 1970, U.S. Marine forces continued to withdraw from Vietnam. The new policy emanating from Washington was "Vietnamization." With U.S. airpower and advisors, the ground war was increasingly turned over to the South Vietnamese. While the invasion of Cambodia was the major military undertaking of 1970, only a limited number of Marine aviation assets were involved. Marines still conducted aggressive campaigns against the enemy, most notably Colonel Edmund G. Derning's 7th Marines participation in Operation Pickens Forest and Colonel Paul X. Kelley's 1st Marines actions near Da Nang. But by the end of 1970, more Marines were leaving than arriving as replacements. On 14 April 1971, III MAF redeployed to Okinawa, and two months later the last ground troops, the 13,000 men of the 3d MAB, flew out from Da Nang.

Although Marine combat units were no longer in Vietnam, Marine advisors remained to assist the South Vietnamese. During the North Vietnamese 1972 Easter Offensive, Marine advisors played a pivotal role in repelling the Communist attacks. Captain John W. Ripley, Captain Ray L. Smith and Captain Lawrence H. Livingston each won the Navy Cross for their heroic contributions in stopping the enemy advances.

The Bitter End 1973-1975

Following the failure of the Communists' Easter Offensive and an intensive bombing campaign of North Vietnam, a peace treaty was finally signed in Paris on 27 January 1973. The U.S. agreed to withdraw all its forces from South Vietnam. The North, in turn, returned all the U.S. Prisoners of War, including 26 Marines. Unfortunately, peace was short lived in Vietnam, and in 1974 fighting resumed in both Cambodia and South Vietnam. By the spring of 1975, the situation became desperate for the U.S. backed governments in both Phnom Penh and Saigon. On 12 April, the 31st MAU, commanded by Colonel John F. Roche, executed a non-combatant evacuation, Operation Eagle Pull, the abandonment of the U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh prior to the city's capitulation to Communist Khmer Rouge forces. Three weeks later, Marines were called upon to evacuate another embassy, this time in Saigon. Marines of the 9th MAB successfully executed Operation Frequent Wind, which safely removed hundreds of Americans and Vietnamese civilians prior to the fall of South Vietnam.

No sooner had the Marines evacuated the embassies than they were ordered by President Gerald R. Ford to rescue the crew of the USS Mayaguez, which had been taken by the Khmer Rouge. On 15 May, a Marine Task Force under the command of Colonel John M. Johnson recovered the Mayaguez and her crew, but not without high losses.

America's longest war was costly to the U.S. Marine Corps. From 1965 to 1975, nearly 500,000 Marines served in Southeast Asia. Of these, nearly 13,000 were killed and 52,000 wounded; nearly a third of all American causalities sustained during the war.
Source: Reference Section of the Marine Corps History and Museums Division

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The titles in this set include:

The Marines in Vietnam 1954-1973 an Anthology and Annotated Bibliography

The Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1973, An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography, is based on articles that appeared in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review, and Marine Corp's Gazette. E.H. Simmons Brigadier General, Director of Marine Corps History and Museum wrote that this volume served well as an interim reference on the Vietnam War. According to Simmons it both complemented and supplemented official histories on Marine operations in Vietnam.

It was originally published in 1974. This updated edition was published in 1985. This expanded edition extends the coverage of the anthology to 1975 and the entries in the bibliography to 1984. The editors have added 10 articles to the 13 that appeared in the first edition. The first 16 accounts give a chronological presentation of the Marine participation in the Vietnam War, from one lone Marine advisor in 1954, through the buildup and withdrawal of major forces, the "Easter Offensive" of 1972, the evacuation of U.S. citizens from both Phnom Penh and Saigon, and the Mayaguez incident in May 1975. In the second group, the remaining six articles are arranged topically. They concern aviation, logistics, civil affairs, Navy medical support, amphibious doctrine, and maritime support. Part II of the publication is an annotated bibliography of articles from 1954 to 1984, prepared by the Vietnam writers in the Marine Corps Histories Section.



U.S. Marines in Vietnam - The Landing and the Buildup 1965

This volume details the Marine activities during 1965, the year the war escalated and major American combat units were committed to the conflict. The narrative traces the landing of the nearly 5,000-man 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and its transformation into the III Marine Amphibious Force, which by the end of the year contained over 38,000 Marines. During this period, the Marines established three enclaves in South Vietnam's northernmost corps area, I Corps, and their mission expanded from defense of the Da Nang Airbase to a strategy involving base defense, offensive operations, and pacification.



A Chronology of the United States Marine Corps 1965-1969

This chronology was produced as a ready reference to Marine Corps activities during 1965-1969 when the United States was deeply involved in the war in Vietnam. Throughout this chronology, geographic locations are used to introduce each entry to enable the reader to locate the event with greater ease.



US Marines in Vietnam an Expanding War 1966

This volume details the continued buildup in 1966 of the III Marine Amphibious Force in South Vietnam's northernmost corps area, I Corps, and the accelerated tempo of fighting during the year. The result was an "expanding war." The III Marine Amphibious Force had established three enclaves in I Corps during 1965. Employing what they believed was a balanced strategy base defense, offensive operations, and pacification. The Marines planned to consolidate their base areas in 1966.

At the beginning of 1966. The 1st Marine Division reinforced the 3d Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in Vietnam. By the end of the year, the III Marine Amphibious Force had nearly doubled in size. Two separate events, however, were to dash the high hopes held by the Marines in 1966. An internal political crisis in the spring halted the Marine pacification campaign south of the large Da Nang Air base. In July, the North Vietnamese Army launched an incursion through the Demilitarized Zone and Marines went north to counter the enemy thrust. By December 1966, Marine units were stretched thin along the 265-mile length of I Corps. The volume quotes one Marine commander who observed, "too much real estate do not have enough men."



U.S. Marines in Vietnam Fighting the North Vietnamese 1967

This volume concentrates on the ground war in I Corps and III MAF's perspective of the Vietnam War as an entity. It also covers the Marine Corps participation in the advisory effort, the operations of the two Special Landing Forces of the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet, and the services of Marines with the staff of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. There are additional chapters on supporting arms and logistics, and a discussion of the Marine role in Vietnam in relation to the overall American effort.

U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967 is largely based on the holdings of the Marine Corps Historical Center. These official files include the monthly unit command chronologies, after action reports, messages, units' daily journal files, the oral history collection, comment files, and previously classified studies prepared by members of the division. The authors supplemented these sources with research in the records of the other Services and pertinent published primary and secondary sources. Although none of the information in this history is classified, some of the documentation on which it is based still has a classified designation. More than 250 reviewers, most of whom were participants in the events described in this volume, read a comment edition of the manuscript. Their comments, where applicable, have been incorporated into the text. A list of all those who commented is included in the appendices. All ranks used in the body of the text are those held by the individuals in 1967.



US Marines in Vietnam the Defining Year 1968

The year 1968 was the year of the Tet Offensive including Khe Sanh and Hue City. These were momentous events in the course of the war and they occurred in the first three months of the year. This book, however, documents that 1968 was more than just the Tet Offensive. The bloodiest month of the war for the U.S. forces was neither January nor February 1968, but May 1968 when the Communists launched what was called their "Mini-Tet" offensive. This was followed by a second "Mini-Tet" offensive during the late summer which also was repulsed at heavy cost to both sides. By the end of the year, the U.S. forces in South Vietnam's I Corps, under the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), had regained the offensive. By December, enemy-initiated attacks had fallen to their lowest level in two years. Still, there was no talk of victory. The Communist forces remained a formidable foe and a limit had been drawn on the level of American participation in the war.



U.S. Marines in Vietnam High Mobility and Standown 1969

The author of this volume, Charles R. Smith, served in Vietnam with the 101st Airborne Division (Air-mobile) in 1968 and 1969, first as an artilleryman and then as a historian. This volume details the change in United States policy for the Vietnam War. President Richard M. Nixon adopted a policy of seeking to end United States military involvement in Vietnam either through negotiations or, failing that, turning the combat role over to the South Vietnamese. It was this decision that began the Vietnamization of the war in the summer of 1969 and which would soon greatly reduce and then end the Marine Corps' combat role in the war.

Although written from the perspective of III MAF and the Marine ground war in I Corps, an attempt has been made to place the Marine role in relation to the overall American effort. The volume also treats the Marine Corps' participation in the advisory effort, the operations of the Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force, and, to a lesser extent, the activities of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), 23d Infantry (Americal) Division, and 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized). There are separate chapters on Marine air, artillery, surveillance, and logistics.



U.S. Marines in Vietnam Vietmanization and Redeployment 1970-1971

This volume details the gradual withdrawal in 1970-1971 of Marine combat forces from South Vietnam's northernmost corps area, I Corps, as part of an overall American strategy of turning the ground war against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong over to the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam. Marines in this period accomplished a number of difficult tasks. The III Marine Amphibious Force transferred most of its responsibilities in I Corps to the Army XXIV Corps, which became the senior U.S. command in that military region. III MAF continued a full range of military and pacification activities within Quang Nam Province, its remaining area of responsibility. The force continued to protect the city of Da Nang, fighting guerrillas and supporting pacification efforts. At the same time, its strength steadily diminished as Marines redeployed in a series of increments until, in April 1971, the III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters itself departed and was replaced for the last month of Marine ground combat by the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade. During the redeployments, Marine logisticians successfully withdrew huge quantities of equipment and dismantled installations or turned them over to the South Vietnamese.

Yet this was also a time of troubles for Marines. The strains on the Armed Services of a lengthy, inconclusive war and the social and racial conflicts tormenting American society adversely affected Marine discipline and cohesion, posing complex, intractable problems of leadership and command. Marines departed Vietnam with a sense that they had done their duty, but also that they were leaving behind many problems unsolved and tasks not completed. Although written from the perspective of III MAF and the ground war in I Corps, the volume treats the activities of Marine advisors to the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, the Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force, and Marines on the staff of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, in Saigon. There are separate chapters on Marine air, artillery, and logistics. An attempt has been made to place the Marine role in relation to the overall effort.



U.S. Marines in Vietnam - The War That Would Not End 1971-1973

This volume details the activities of Marine Corps units after the departure from Vietnam in 1971 of III Marine Amphibious Force, through to the 1973 ceasefire, and includes the return of Marine prisoners of war from North Vietnam. Written from diverse views and sources, the common thread in this narrative is the continued resistance of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, in particular the Vietnamese Marine Corps, to Communist. This book is written from the perspective of the American Marines who assisted them in their efforts.

By July 1971, less than 500 U.S. Marines, mostly advisors, communicators, and supporting arms specialists remained in Vietnam. It was thought at the time that the success of "Vietnamization" of the war would lessen even this small number, as it was hoped that the South Vietnamese could continue fighting successfully. This hope vanished in spring 1972, dashed by a full-scale North Vietnamese Army invasion. The renewed combat saw the U.S. Marines return once more to Southeast Asia in a continuation of the war that now seemed to have no end. The fighting proceeded into the fall, and only ceased with the signing of peace accords in Paris in January 1973.



U.S. Marines in Vietnam - The Bitter End 1973-1975

This volume details the final chapter in the Marine Corps' involvement in Southeast Asia, including chapters on Cambodia, the refugees, and the recovery of the container ship SS Mayaguez. In January 1973, the United States signed the Paris Peace Accords. The accords intended to establish peace in Vietnam and an end to the Vietnam War, ending direct U.S. military involvement. It temporarily stopped the fighting between North and South Vietnam. The governments of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), and the United States, as well as the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) that represented indigenous South Vietnamese revolutionaries, signed the Agreement on January 27, 1973.

The result was not a rewarding experience for America nor its allies. By March 1975, democracy was on the retreat in Southeast Asia and the U.S. was preparing for the worst, the simultaneous evacuation of Americans and key officials from Cambodia and South Vietnam. With Operation Eagle Pull and Operation Frequent Wind, the United States accomplished that task in April 1975 using Navy ships, Marine Corps helicopters, and the Marines of the III Marine Amphibious Force. When the last helicopter touched down on the deck of the USS Okinawa at 0825 on the morning of 30 April, the U.S. Marine Corps' involvement in South Vietnam ended.

However, one more encounter with the Communists in Southeast Asia remained. After the seizure of the SS Mayaguez on 12 May 1975, the United States decided to recover that vessel using armed force. Senior commanders in the Western Pacific chose the Marine Corps to act as the security force for the recovery. Marines of 2d Battalion, 9th Marines and 1st Battalion, 4th Marines played a key role in the events of 15 May 1975 when America regained control of the ship and recovered its crew, concluding American combat in Indochina.

This volume's authors, Major George R. Dunham and Colonel David A. Quinlan described this volumes by writing, "U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End 1973-1973 is a story about commitment, sacrifice, and the price America and its ally, South Vietnam, paid. It answers no questions, places no blame, and offers no prophetic judgment, but provides an historical account of the end of a state and the beginning of new lives for those fortunate enough to escape that upheaval. This description of the United States Marine Corps' involvement at the bitter end of America's military presence in Southeast Asia also traces the effects of uncontrolled fear on a society fighting for its survival."



Marine Advisors with the Vietnamese Marine Corps

This volume covers U.S. Marine Corps interaction with South Vietnamese amphibious forces, the Vietnamese Marine Corps or Thuy Quan Luc Chien (TQLC). This history provides documents on the topics of the Vietnamese Marines and the U.S. Marine Advisory Unit.



Leadership Lessons and Remembrances from Vietnam

This volume contains a series of articles that Lieutenant General Herman Nickerson, Jr., wrote in 1969-1970 while he was Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), which were published in Sea Tiger, the weekly newspaper distributed throughout the III MAF area of northern South Vietnam. General Nickerson commanded the 1st Marine Division in Vietnam from 1 October 1966 to 31 May 1967 and returned to command the III MAF from 27 March 1969 through 9 March 1970. During this latter tour of duty, in order to make up in part for an in-person briefing and welcome he used to give incoming officers and staff non-commissioned officers of the 1st Division, he began writing a series of articles for publication in Sea Tiger. In these short pieces, he covered a wide range of topics, some related to combat service in Vietnam, many others concerning the Vietnamese people.



Chaplains with Marines in Vietnam 1962-1971

The approach of the writer of this volume was to provide basic history of the war in Vietnam and to use it as the framework for dealing with the overall experiences and contributions of the chaplains involved and for highlighting the work of some individual chaplains. For the former, he used books, articles, and news releases; for the latter he used chaplains' end-of-tour reports, interviews, and correspondence addressed to the Chief of Chaplains and the Chaplain Corps historian. No attempt was made to chronicle the known work of every chaplain who served, or even of those who submitted materials concerning their work. What is presented is that which was judged most significant historically, most representative of the whole, and most interesting.



Marines and Helicopters 1962-1973

This 275 page, 1978 history by the History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, traces the development of helicopters in the Marine Corps from 1962 to 1973. In the period covered by this volume, the Marines at last acquired helicopters fully capable of carrying out an amphibious vertical assault, and they further elaborated their helicopter doctrines and tactics.

The documentary basis for this monograph was primarily the official records of the Marine Corps and Navy Department, but considerable use was made of interviews and correspondence with key individuals involved in all phases of helicopter development. Lieutenant Colonel William R. Fails, USMC (Ret), the author, Marine Corps aviation experience includes tours with fixed-wing fighter and attack squadrons, as a flight instructor, and as a helicopter pilot and aircraft maintenance officer. He served in Vietnam in 1965-66 with HMM-263 and again in 1970-71 as S-4 of MAG-16 and facility manager for Marble Mountain Airfield.


The Battle for KHE SANH

The Battle for Khe Sanh stands as one of the most crucial and bitterly contested struggles in the Vietnam War. This report provides a detailed and graphic account of events as they unfolded. It centers on the 26th Marine Regiment, the main defenders of the Khe Sanh area, who held off its opposition during the two-and-one-half-month siege.



Marine Advisors with the Vietnamese Provincial Reconnaissance Units 1966-1970

During the latter stages of the Vietnam War, small teams of Vietnamese special police, led by American military and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel, fought against the political leadership of the Communist insurgency. These special police units were called Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs). These units were created, trained, equipped, and managed by the CIA, and worked in secret. According to the author of this volume, Andrew R. Finlayson, this status led to myths and falsehoods about their activities.



Marines and Military Law in Vietnam Trial by Fire

This history examines the Marine Corps lawyer's role in Vietnam and how that role evolved. Also considered is the effectiveness of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in a combat environment.



A History of the Women Marines 1946-1977

This history is drawn from official reports, documents, personal interviews, and transcribed reminiscences collected by the author and preserved by the Oral History and Archives Sections of the Marine Corps History and Museums Division.




Combat Casualties among U.S. Marine Corps Personnel in Vietnam: 1964-1972

A 16 page, 1985, Naval Health Research Center paper on Marine combat causalities during the Vietnam War. The objective of the paper is to provide a descriptive account of four distinct aspects of combat casualties among Marine Corps personnel in Vietnam between 1964 and 172: (1) types of personnel injured in battle; (2) types of injuries; (3) wounding agents; and (4) the flow of patients into and from medical facilities in Vietnam.

This paper provides a descriptive account of combat casualties among Marine Corps personnel in Vietnam between 1964 and 1972.  The Marine Corps Inpatient Medical Data File at the Naval Health Research Center was searched for all hospital admissions which were identified as a battle wound or injury. The records of 78,756 Marines who were wounded or injured in combat in Vietnam were identified. These individuals accounted for 120,017 battle-related diagnoses of accidents, poisonings and violence.

Most of the wounded Marines were young (under the age of 25), junior enlisted infantrymen with one year or less of service. The First and Third Marine Divisions accounted for the majority of casualties. Multiple open wounds and open wounds of the lower limbs were the most common primary diagnoses, bullets mines, and booby traps were responsible for more than half of the wounds and injuries. Most casualties were treated at a naval hospital, hospital ship, dispensary, or the Naval Support Activity in Da Nang. Marine battalion aid stations and field hospitals accounted for the second largest percentage of casualties treated. The mortality rate of wounded patients was much lower than has been reported for Army casualties in Vietnam or casualties in previous conflicts.



Other volumes include:

USMC Civic Action Effort in Vietnam March 1965 - March 1966

U.S. MARINE CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS IN I CORPS REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM APRIL 66-67

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Vietnam War Marine Corps Official History Volumes Sample Page 1
Vietnam War Marine Corps Official History Volumes Sample Page 2
Vietnam War Marine Corps Official History Volumes Sample Page 3
Vietnam War Marine Corps Official History Volumes Sample Page 4
Vietnam War Marine Corps Official History Volumes Sample Page 5
Vietnam War Marine Corps Official History Volumes Sample Page 6

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