Korean War After Action Reports
Lessons Learned Documents
6031 pages of United States Military documents dating from 1950 to1992, mostly from the early 1950's, composed of after actions reports, lesson learned bulletins, and other reports dealing with the assessment of combat activity during the Korean War, archived on CD-ROM
After Action Reports
3,567 pages of Korean War after action combat reports from various Naval vessels including: Air Task Group 1 & 2, Carrier Air Group 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, and 15, USS Antietam, USS Badoeng Strait, USS Bairoko, USS Bataan, USS Bon Homme Richard, USS Boxer, USS Essex, USS Kearsarge, USS Lake Champlain, USS Leyte, USS Oriskany, USS Point Cruz, USS Princeton, USS Rendova, USS Sicily and USS Valley Forge.
Dissemination of Combat Information from Korea Bulletins
760 pages of Dissemination of Combat Information from Korea Bulletins, from November 1951 to December 1953. These bulletins are made up of extracts from previously confidential and secret command reports. The material cover problems, solutions, suggestions, and lessons learned from combat experience during the Korean War. Hundreds of topics cover every aspect of on the ground and in the air combat situations, from the effectiveness of major weapons systems, equipment, personnel, tactics, ammunition, to experiments with the use of plastic mess trays.
Operation Chromite - Inchon Landing - X Corps Report, Oct 1950
An October 1950 report on the September 1950 Inchon Invasion. On 15 September 1950, after hurling itself fruitlessly against the Pusan Perimeter for nearly a month and a half, the weakened North Korean army was suddenly confronted with a grave threat at its rear. U.S. Marines had landed at the western port city of Inchon, near Seoul, and were poised to move inland to retake the capital and decisively cut the already tenuous North Korean supply lines. This amphibious operation was conceived by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. Though strategically tempting, Inchon was a tactically challenging amphibious target, with long approaches through shallow channels, poor beaches and a tidal range that restricted landing operations to a few hours a day. It took all of General MacArthur's unparalleled powers of persuasion to sell his concept to doubting Army, Navy and Marine Corps commanders.
Forces gathered for the Inchon invasion included the First Marine Division, the Army's Seventh Infantry Division, some South Korean units, virtually every available amphibious ship, and dozens of other Navy warships. Most of the Marines had recently arrived from the U.S., while the rest were withdrawn from the Pusan Perimeter defenses. Preliminary naval gunfire and air bombardment began on 13 September. The 1st and 5th Marines went ashore on the morning of the 15th. Resistance and casualties were modest, and initial objectives were quickly secured. Over the next several days, as supplies and troops poured ashore at Inchon, the Marines moved relentlessly toward Seoul. Kimpo airfield was taken on 17 September and was in use to support operations two days later. On 29 September, after days of hard street fighting, Seoul was returned to the South Korean government.
Commentary on Infantry and Weapons, Korea, 1950-51
A report written in 1951, It focuses exclusively upon the campaign of the first winter in which 8th Army experienced its greatest and most prolonged stress. The conditions particular to that period provide the best opportunity for the clear profiling of weapons, tactical and leadership values in combat against the background of training methods and the armament program. Operations covered in this report include, Operation Punch, Battle of Chosen Resovir, and the Battle Chongchon River
The author of the report developed the post-combat company critique technique in the Central Pacific Theater and then applied it in European Theater during World War II. He used the same general method in Korea, beginning with the November 1950 battle. The report gives precise detail on the logistics of the infantry fight and place primary emphasis on the fighting characteristics of the new opponent.
The commentary is divided into three parts, the behavior of men in the use of weapons, the behavior of weapons as men use them, and the use of information in augmenting fighting power. The first draft of this work was studied and criticized by 43 divisional, regimental, and battalion commanders who had successfully led troops in the winter campaign. They were asked to give it the best of their attention, strengthening, sharpening, and refining it where needed.
The Employment of Armor in Korea Volume I
A 1951 report. The body of this report is largely concerned with armor activity during the period 1 July 1950 to 21 January 1951. Activity between 21 January 1951 and 8 April 1951. The report covers factors influencing the employment of tanks in Korea, including terrain and trafficability, tank-infantry teamwork and communications, cold weather operation and maintenance, and logistic support are also part of this discussion. In addition, sections have been devoted to recommendations and suggestions from personnel of armored units and on the suitability of the various types of tanks actually employed in Korea. Includes a brief study on the economies of the use of the M46 tanks, as compared with the then new medium tank T42.
Enemy Tactics, Techniques & Doctrine, Intelligence Studies, 1951
A group of studies compiled in 1951, which were previously published in Periodic Intelligence Reports of IX Corps and some of which at the time were being published for the first time.According to the report the individual works are a result of the collation of information from all sources. Where possible, intensive interrogations of prisoners of war were conducted in order to determine first hand, the actual tactics practiced and doctrine followed rather than to rely wholly upon captured documents, the contents of which, in many cases, were not adhered to.
Battle of Osan, 5 July 1950
A 1969 report on the Battle of Osan. The Battle of Osan was the first engagement of the Korean War involving American troops. It was fought by a battalion-size force to delay the opposition's advance while its parent unit, the 24th Infantry Division, entered Korea through the port of Pusan and assembled around Taejon in early July 1950, soon after the beginning of the North Korean Communist invasion of South Korea. The battle is of significance because it illustrates the importance of fire effectiveness, unit training, reliable equipment, leadership, and military discipline. The holding action at Osan revealed many weaknesses in the equipment and personnel of the American Army of 1950 and in its uses of fire and maneuver in a delaying action.
Battle of Chipyong-ni, February 1951.
A 1990 report on the battle at Chipyong-n. At Chipyong-ni, Chinese forces suffered their first tactical defeat since entering the Korean War in November 1950. An all-out Chinese offensive had been broken and their withdrawal from the crossroads village, a keystone of Eighth Army's central front, signaled a pullback all along the Chinese line of advance southward. If Chlpyong-ni had fallen, the entire United Nations Command front would have been severely endangered. General Ridgway regarded the defense of Chipyong-ni as the turning point in the Eighth Army's revitalization. After defeating the massive Chinese effort, the U.S. Army advanced steadily northward, recaptured Seoul by mid-March 1951, and by the first day of spring stood just below the 38th parallel.
Other Reports include:
Anti-Guerrilla Operations in Korea 1950, Memos, X Corps.
Enemy Tactics in Korea, Field Study, December 1951
Ineffective Soldier Performance Under Fire, Korea, 1951
North Korean Defensive Tactics, Reports, 1951
Psywar Operational Deficiencies Noted in Korea, Study, Aug 1953
Integration of Koreans into US Units, 1950-1953
Structure of a Battle: Analysis of a UN-UK Action North of Taegu, Korea, Sept 1950
United Nations Partisan Warfare Korea 1951-1954, Operations Research Report 1956
Task Force Smith at Osan as Leadership Failure, Paper, 1992.