

President Richard Nixon - Pat Buchanan Papers

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President Richard Nixon - Pat Buchanan Papers

Patrick Joseph "Pat" Buchanan (born November 2, 1938) is an American conservative political commentator, author, syndicated columnist, politician and broadcaster. Buchanan was a senior adviser to American Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Ronald Reagan, and was an original host on CNN's Crossfire. He sought the Republican presidential nomination in 1992 and 1996. He ran on the Reform Party ticket in the 2000 presidential election.

He has worked as a political commentator on the MSNBC cable network, including the show Morning Joe. He is a regular on The McLaughlin Group.

In 1966, Buchanan was the first adviser hired to Nixon's presidential campaign. He worked primarily as an opposition researcher. For his speeches aimed at dedicated supporters, he was soon nicknamed "Mr. Inside." When Nixon took the Oval Office in 1969, Buchanan worked as a White House adviser and speechwriter for Nixon and vice president Spiro Agnew. Buchanan coined the phrase Silent Majority and helped shape the strategy that drew millions of Democrats to Nixon; in a 1972 memo he suggested the White House "should move to re-capture the anti-Establishment tradition or theme in American politics."

Section 1

Section 1 contains a wide range of papers to, from, or mentioning Buchanan.

Section 2

Section 2 contains political papers from the White House Special Files. Most material is from before the 1968 election to the days soon after the 1969 inauguration.

President Richard Nixon - Pat Buchanan Papers

SECTION 1

BACM RESEARCH

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Haynsworth

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WILLIAM LOEB
PRESIDENT AND PUBLISHER

*Okay
11/3/69*

October 29, 1969
(dict. Oct. 27)

Mr. Harry Dent
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Harry:

Pat Buchanan phoned me the other day and asked for help in connection with Senator Prouty of Vermont on the Haynsworth appointment. I wrote Prouty a letter, copy of which is attached, as well as a photocopy of his reply and copy of my further letter to him, and a copy of my letter to Pat Buchanan.

If it were not in the interest of the United States to have Haynsworth on the Supreme Court, I would tell you guys to go to hell because you have not done a damn thing for me in connectinn with my request regarding Mr. Hoffa. I don't see why there should be any reciprocity on my part.

If it had not been for my persuading Henry Salvatori, Reagan's chief financial backer and advisor, to keep Reagan out of New Hampshire, Nixon would not have received the backing he did in New Hampshire and Reagan might have come close to beating him, and you fellows would not be in the White House now. But you show all the gratitude of a passel of rattlesnakes.

Very sincerely,

Bill

William Loeb
President

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 3, 1970

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM TO H. R. HALDEMAN

From several sources conversant with the situation at Treasury and the IRS, there come some alarming reports of actions taken that could reflect adversely on the President and the Administration.

1. Inquiries are being made about the new tax forms prepared by LBJ's people but used this year by us; forms which are producing a great number of complaints and which lend themselves to exploitation by the Democrats in the Senate -- Senator Moss is reportedly looking into the situation for political capital.

2. There was reportedly a cost overrun on printing of the new tax forms, which is being carefully covered up, but which could well leak out.

3. I have one report that one of LBJ's cronies with connections to the TV industry was slipped in as head of a "service center" of IRS in Austin, in the same building with LBJ's office, and there are even some reports of official hanky-pank with Texas oil men.

4. You are probably by now aware of the gun control film prepared by liberal Democrat, Mr. Rosapepe, who is the information officer over there, who produced a piece of footage so anti- the sportsmen lobby that a number of conservative Senators' noses were severely wrenched out of joint, when Rosapepe staged a showing for the liberal anti-gun control types on the Hill.

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Authority EO 12356
BY NSR NSR Date 7/14/81

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

5. I have two separate reports that the IRS is running through tax-exemptions for black militant groups -- some of whom have chieftains with criminal records. Also, that Percy and Brooke are pressuring some of these tax-exemptions and that the Commissioner, who is in clear sympathy with the cause of the blacks, feels this is the right course of action to follow.

6. Another unverified report is that Rosapepe -- father and son -- were seen lunching with Jack Anderson on Monday.

These are areas where the President could be damaged if a scandal broke.

There are other points to be made that should be.

There is no office in government touching on more people than the IRS and one report I get is that there are 175 super-grade jobs over there -- and we have not appointed one.

Secondly, our man Thrower spends much of his time on the road making speeches and his mail is currently opened by an Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner and routed thru the Deputy Commissioner, neither of whom is our man. The Deputy Commissioner reportedly runs the Department, an extremely able and liberal fellow named William Smith, who uses the Commissioner as a front man, while making all the decisions himself -- Smith is the protege of Bertrand Harding, the screaming liberal over at the FAA. Harding has an interesting background of his own -- having apparently been at OEO and then moved out to get in on the consulting fees via his consultation firm.

This fellow Smith (G.S. 18) is so highly valued by Thrower that the latter has nominated him for the Rockefeller Award as Civil Servant of the Year -- or whatever that award is for.

The tax-exempt division is apparently a nest of liberals.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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UNCLASSIFIED

Apparently, the only two men we have appointed to the Internal Revenue at all are the Commissioner himself and one other fellow whose name I can't find in my notes; I think he is the Counsel.

This is a portion of what I have been told; if half of it is true, then the place needs a pre-emptive strike -- and perhaps a scandal of minor sorts would be what we needed to clean house. I have been told that to take effective control of it we need probably 10 men of competence and loyalty to the President.

As for Thrower -- from his handling of that private schools issue alone -- he seems to be a prime candidate for canning.

The individuals from whom I got some of this report are concerned about a scandal of sorts; they would like, I think, to see an investigation by Mollenhoff. Assuredly, something like this is desperately needed.

PAT BUCHANAN

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

E.O. 12356, Section 1.1

By RP NARS, Date 6/2/82

cc: H. R. Haldeman

May 21, 1970

MEDIA MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: Patrick J. Buchanan

Reflections from bedside after a fortnight of reading the Post and Times news summaries and watching the networks. How we have conducted ourselves and what we can expect.

1. The media, the left, the liberal academic community, the Senate doves -- whom we overran and routed in November -- in one of the most effective political offensives of recent memory, have regained the initiative.

Apparently, there are still members of our own White House Staff here who do not realize that what these people want is not some modus vivendi with President Nixon, some consensual agreement on progress. Rather, they want to dominate, discredit and drive this Administration out of power two years hence -- and then write us off as a gang of ineffectual interim caretakers who failed dismally.

Our response to their renewed assault has not been in the November character; it has generally been in the disastrous Johnsonian tradition; too pleading, too conciliatory, gestures of virtual appeasement to our ideological enemies. Word goes forth from the environs of the White House that we will tone down the rhetoric of the Vice President if that will help; that we will promise to have American troops out of Cambodia by July 1, that we will move no further than 30 kilometers

within the country; we will never go back. We place stringent unilateral limits on our own freedom of action -- and to what avail?

What have all these gestures accomplished -- but to re-double the enthusiasm of those who despise us and who hope that the President's Cambodian venture will fail ignominously?

The only thing wrong with the President's move into Cambodia was that Johnson should have done it four years ago -- we have nothing to apologize for or be defensive about; it is something to be vocally aggressive about. Yet, many of our spokesmen one sees and hears seem defensive.

Again, was it not because they were massed and raucous here in D. C. that scores of students were invited in to see and talk with the White House Staff members? -- They were not all lovable children at the Monument grounds from what I heard from those with whom I spoke; many were close-minded, arrogant and intransigent and engaged in gutter obscenities against the President of the United States.

When we literally ignored the marchers in October and November and let them have their parades and speeches -- we won the support of the American people. Now, when we suddenly threw open all our doors to anyone who wanted to come in and vent his views here, we gain an appearance of openness but also of a lack of certainty, of being a bit panicked and we merited the increased contempt of those who can spot weakness and uncertainty a mile off. We also confused the millions of

Americans who believed deeply the President's strong stand is right.

There is merit in the President and staff making themselves available to students and other groups with differing points of view -- but the merit lies solely in the public impression conveyed; that we are listening. But, why must it be the most vocal and disorderly dissenters who are the ones given the publicity and the audience -- as though a loud mouth and a lot of violence is one measure of the justice of a cause.

Having said this, we must begin to take inventory of the country which the President now governs.

THE UNIVERSITIES. Under attack from their own student leaders and student bodies, many of these institutions have capitulated and allowed themselves to become politicalized. (See attached Evans-Novak.) Rather than risk the wrath of their students, rather than take unpopular positions, which would make daily life miserable for them, university leaders around the country -- with Kingman Brewster the quintessential example of the craven coward -- have decided to throw in with the students, to blame his inability to maintain a spirit of academic freedom on his campus on the war in Vietnam, on white racism, on the Black Panther trial, on anything but Kingman Brewster's lack of courage. Seeking desperately to curry favor with the radical majority, these men have taken political positions as institutions and endorsed strikes on campus, refused to punish violent disorders -- in effect abandoned the academic freedom and the

traditional neutrality of these bodies for students and teachers alike to hold and express publicly unpopular and heretical views. Some of these universities are now publicly taking what amounts to a party line -- and in that sense are ceasing to be universities as we knew them.

This is something the President inherited; something about which we can do little other than to search constantly and find those university presidents and teachers with the courage to stand up and provide them with all the moral and other backing and exposure we can muster. Let's bring the professors and administrators with guts in to see the President. To allow the politicalization of the universities means State Legislatures will react, dissenting views will be shouted and a new "McCarthyism" will prevail under the auspices of bankrupt liberalism.

THE MEDIA. Some of the television I have witnessed in the last two weeks -- conscious efforts to seek out soldiers who didn't want to go into Cambodia, the failure to give the maximum coverage to the tremendous success of our military operation -- have raised genuine questions in my mind whether we can seriously continue to let this sort of thing go on without concerted counterattacks. I recall, however, one splendid piece on ABC, showing American tanks and trucks carting off supplies; there have been some excellent stories on back pages of papers like the Star. But they have not been given the enormous treatment they deserve. Had this type of thing gone on during World War II -- with American cameramen night after night looking for soldiers naturally

frightened and concerned with the war, one wonders how well we could have sustained it.

The left now so dominates the media that they can very nearly neutralize a Presidential presentation or even a military operation as conspicuously successful as the Cambodian venture has been to date. (The national magazines are becoming an increasingly serious hostile and constant source of concern here. They almost acted in concert on the Carswell thing -- neutralizing the President's statement, The networks did the same.)

Vic Lasky make a suggestion which appeals to me. When this operation is over the President ought to take live time, five minutes to explain just what we captured and destroyed in there -- it ought to be tough and straight -- and maybe we ought to fly home the kind of things we captured -- rockets, mortars, etc to show them to the American people.

My feeling is that the media from our post-November efforts has been partially discredited in the eyes of the country; that we should not hesitate to attack and attack hard when it steps out of bounds; and we ought to give consideration to ways and means if necessary to acquire either a government or other network through which we can tell our story to the country.

The lens through which our message gets through is a distorted lens -- in the national press and the network media, with the exceptions mentioned

previously. (A night ago, 1000 N.Y. lawyers here in D.C. got equal time with 150,000 hard hats in N.Y. backing RN and the Veep.)

THE PRESIDENT. With the media, the articulate voices of the Senate, the bulk of the academic community, the great foundations, the men of prominence in law and those who have left government service all adamantly against us -- we must begin, I believe again elevate the people to use more fully and more often the great but few weapons we have, the President and the Vice President and the Cabinet in an aggressive manner. We have the majority of the people of this country with us yet I still believe. But they are men and women who do not understand sophisticated ideas and the workability of programs and plans -- they distrust in men and they trust in leaders and our presence is not visible or if we present to the nation any lack of certitude or a lack of conviction in what we are doing -- then with all the other pressures boring in, more assuredly they, too, will doubt that they are right. In this regard, it is a major and unnecessary concession to our enemies to attempt to muzzle the Vice President, who, even when his rhetoric veers off the mark, brings to these people that feeling of strength and conviction and certitude in values they have not heard defended in thirty years.

Neither the President nor the Vice President's statement which are tough are causes of any national problem here -- they are explicit response to outrages -- and by suggesting or hinting, as some of our aides do, that; yes; we'll quiet down; may be we are talking too loud -- we give

in effect tacit admission that somehow we are responsible.

THE HARD HATS -- Last week a group of construction workers came up Wall Street and beat the living hell out of some demonstrators who were desecrating the American flag in their little demonstration for "peace." Whether one condones this kind of violence or not, probably half the living rooms in America were in standing applause at the spectacle. Yesterday the hard hats marched down Broadway in support of Nixon and Agnew -- something no union man would have done for Vice President Richard Nixon for a weekend off ten years ago. There is a great ferment in American politics; these, quite candidly, are our people now -- just as the Republican suburbs are. The most insane suggestion I have heard about here in recent days was to the effect that we should somehow go prosecute the hard hats to win favor with the kiddies who are screaming about everything we are doing.

My suggestion was -- send the Vice President right up to New York, have him say in 200 words that our kids are wiping out sanctuaries that were killing their buddies, that we are marching peacefully, that we are protesting in their behalf, and this is going to be a peaceful demonstration. The message would have hit every blue collar worker in the country and these are our people now -- if we want them -- and frankly, they are better patriots and more pro-Nixon than the little knot of Riponers we have sought to cultivate since we came into office.

One point I would make here -- what have all our efforts and labors to win over the Fulbrights and the lefts, to show them we are resonable, accomplished? With one decision in Cambodia, it went out the window in a flash -- the virulence of the attacks on the President, the genuine brutality of the political assault, must by now tell us we have no converts there now worth the great investment we have made on that side of the fence.

It should be our focus to constantly speak to, to assure, to win, to aid, to promote the President's natural constituency -- which is now the working men and women of the country, the common man, the Roosevelt New Dealer. When in trouble, that is where we should turn, not try to find a common ground with our adversaries.

Let me add here -- I do not rule out; I strongly endorse symbolic gestures toward groups especially the blacks where symbols count for so much -- because the President is President of all the people and while they will never vote for us, we must never let them come to believe we don't give a damn about them -- or that they are outside our province of concern.

I argue only for a sense of realism, a recognition of who our friends are, where they are and that they being our base -- remain our constant course of attention.

THE GOVERNMENT -- In point of fact we failed to take control in depth

of the Federal Government which is ours by right of victory -- and we are paying a heavy price for it now, with State Department letters of protest, with Hickel publicly airing internal squabbles on the national networks, the civil rights revolt at Justice, with Finch and Veneman being called to account for their actions by their own employees, with Thrower refusing to use the political power of his office. We have neither been ruthless enough in eliminating those lower echelon employees who disagree with the President, in rooting out endemic disloyalty, in ridding ourselves of those who -- once the President has decided to act -- refuse to go out and fight for his position, whether they agreed with it to begin with or not.

The tragedy that has plagued us through this Administration is our well-motivated attempt to bring into positions of responsibility gentlemen like Dr. Allen -- who have never agreed with the President on anything. This was based on RN's idea of a "coalition" of point of view. But when there is a lack of discipline among our troops -- primarily in the Departments, but also even within the White House where we find types more than willing to cry on the shoulder of a Stu Loory just the way Bill Moyers used to tell the press the terrible time he was having convincing the President to do the right thing. So, they loved Moyers and loathed Johnson.

RECOMMENDATIONS -- Thus far, the Presidential posture has been that the Chief Executive, the master arbiter of contesting forces within Society -- a task performed with skill and brilliance. On occasions, like the November encounter, the President raised the silhouette assumed the

role of "leader of the people" and rallied the nation to his banner. This power of the Office in my opinion may have to be used with great regularity and intensity than it has in the past -- if the attacks against us stay at the same level. We cannot rely on the Kleins and Zieglers and even the Cabinet types to carry the battle; essentially, their function is less the attack than it is the defense, the rebuttal.

Secondly, we are paying a terrible price now for the appointment or retention in high, but more important, middle public office of men who have never supported the President, and for failing to remove, demote, transfer or fire those individuals who are not first and foremost Presidential loyalists. Dr. Allen has been nothing but a disaster; and the Administration is almost on a suicidal course when it hires at \$10,000 a year twerp like Moffett for our Youth Office over at HEW -- so that when he resigns, a slobbering and indulgent press puts him on Face the Nation to tell the country that the President does not give a damn about youth.

Third, we have kept the door open to everyone, etc., but keep constantly in mind that nothing will ever come of this other than a little refurbishing of image about "open administration," etc. The Youth Conference we are holding should gather and hail every "square" youth organization and solid kid we can find and keep out every hard anti-Nixon leftist -- and if we can't accomplish that, we ought to can the whole damn thing.

Fourth, hard evidence I think indicates clearly that by providing Cabinet officers with a full franchise, turning over the power of appointments

to any number of our Cabinet heads -- we have gotten some bad returns and now have a government not only hostile in segments to the President -- but openly defiant and rebellious. If it takes far-reaching removal of sub-Cabinet types to regain more WH control, I would recommend this kind of dramatic stroke, for if we cannot get greater control of this government, we can accomplish nothing. We can only expect further blow-ups of internal dissent by the media in future months.

Under normal times, the coalition concept of a Cabinet -- with everybody popping off -- is a fine thing, with different views. But we are an army under fire now -- and the actions of Secretary Hickel in publicly airing grievances about WH staffers of the innermost nature on a nationwide television show -- in effect scoring points for himself with the liberal press at the expense of his President -- is simply inexcusable.

The President and his Cabinet and his staff must present a greater posture of solid unanimity and strength and confidence than we have to date. There is too much weeping on the shoulders of the press, appearing all over. For Bob Finch to have allowed that slob from the Welfare Rights Organization to occupy his office for two hours was a disgrace -- and can only earn us the contempt of those who despise us and the utter bewilderment of those who still believe and respect the American government.

This is no argument for having National Guardsmen shooting 19-year-old girls in the head with an M-1 -- but we desperately have to present to the nation the impression of a strong government, led by tough people,

who know exactly where they are going, and who are not going to be deterred an inch by any crowd of idealistic mixed-up kids running around the streets. It seems that in most speeches one hears from a Cabinet officer, or report of a conversation by a White House staffer, we are pleading with somebody or apologizing for something.

In that evening with Irving Kristol, Henry Kissinger made a point that needs re-making. What we don't need is dialogue and consultation -- what the United States needs is a victory. I have read -- and it is my earnest hope that it is not true -- that the President had an operation ready against the North Vietnamese, which we have called off because because of the domestic turmoil. From experience, it seems we gain nothing by denying ourselves military opportunities to tone down a Senator Fulbright or one of the other -- who would be destroyed as politicians if Richard Nixon won this war.

So, with regard to our enemies, we need spokesmen -- more of them, younger, more aggressive, who will get up when Whitney Young says RN and Agnew were responsible for killing those students -- and call him a goddam liar.

Young's Urban League as I understand, feeds high on the Federal trough -- has any consideration been given to telling him to fire his fanny or look elsewhere for their fat contracts.

Finally, though this is a discursive and rambling memo, I see us as under very real attack from our enemies within the society, who have

many powerful and influential weapons, who are attempting to impose ground rules upon our political warfare they do not impose upon themselves -- that our future, if it is going to be successful, may lie in the FDR pattern of engaging them openly in heated political warfare, of not cooling off our supporters but of stirring the fires and passions often. It seems to me here that we are in a contest over the soul of the country now and the decision will not be some middle compromise -- it will be their kind of society or ours; we will prevail or they shall prevail. I know these incomplete thoughts and suggestions do not square at all with the calm, cool, dispassionate, orderly executive administration the President has conducted thus far, ably and well. But I think that clearly while the issue is not black and white, the decision is whether we shall be a fighting President in the mold of FDR or the presiding President in the manner of Ike.

f

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~Regretfully~~
~~and fully~~
concur.

June 16, 1970

H.

URGENT & IMMEDIATE

MEMORANDUM TO H. R. HALDEMAN

When in Florida I first read of the constituency of our "commission" to study Kent State and campus disorders; I was appalled. The last two days have convinced me that a serious mistake has been made that will be damaging to the President when the report comes out, and may be used against us both on the campuses, and in the fall elections.

1. Attached is a New York Times article on the young black we named -- we have some idea of what we can expect from him. Banfield of Harvard, with whom I spoke yesterday, author of "The Unheavenly City," told me he was himself appalled by this appointment, felt the commission itself a dreadful mistake, and that we had invited serious trouble as a result of the report.

2. The obvious and flagrant over-representation of blacks is ludicrous -- not only that, but every vocal black these days is a captive of his black constituency. (Note Mr. Cheek's comments in today's News Summary.) It is simply not realistic to expect any one of them -- with the constituencies they have to serve -- to come up with other than the stock conclusions, which I predict will be:

-- The campuses are alienated; Nixon has his priorities mixed up; we have to get out of Vietnam now; too much is being spent on defense; the youth do not feel they can participate in the democracy; they are losing confidence in their leaders; ad nauseam.

3. We have invited upon the President's head the same thunder that fell in on LBJ when he let that Kerner Commission blame America's problems on "white racism:" a commission which never even credited Johnson with the enormous steps he had taken.

4. Our group is undistinguished in terms of the prestige of its people.

5. Why was not the Sidney Hook Academic Group -- which has gathered hundreds of professors, liberals of prestige among them, from around the country who are speaking up for an open campus and academic freedom brought in -- indeed, why do they not dominate it.

6. There must be some inherent suicidal tendency or death wish which would allow the creation of the kind of animal we have put together to report on the problems of the campus. The reason this is sent to you rather than the President is simply that right now I don't know just what the hell we can do about this commission -- now that we have announced it; RN has enough things to worry about right now -- but it sure as hell is something we ought to be worrying about.

7. What about this -- one proposal -- let me see if I can get lined up some four or five top flight academicians -- there is a group meeting regularly with the Veep, which has real credentials -- and then paste them on. Other alternatives: circumscribe the operations of this little group to perhaps Kent State, and get another group to report later on the larger problem.

Pat

PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

Do this - fast -

and I can probably get them added on.

f

THE WHITE HOUSE
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~~and fully~~
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PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

Do this - fast -

and I can probably get them added on.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 22, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM THE PRESIDENT

I have now had the opportunity to read all the memoranda submitted by members of the staff on the '70 campaign, and the period immediately ahead, and also to bring together some of my own thoughts on those subjects. This memorandum will deal with the problem generally and, in certain cases, quite specifically. You will note that in several instances, it will require definite follow-through. Where that is the case, I would like for you to give me a report on what has or has not been accomplished. I do not expect you to follow through in every respect, in most cases it will be a matter of your delegating the project to someone you have confidence in. This brings me to my first recommendation for the next two years.

1. I can think of nothing more important than for you to have four top-notch aides of the quality of Ed Morgan and Colson, who will carry out the policies we may decide are appropriate. I am suggesting here not people who are burdened down, as will be the Ehrlichman staff with the problems of programs. This is the least difficult of our assignments, because programs in one Administration or another will always somehow be handled - sometimes better, sometimes worse. We probably will do them better. But, in the final analysis, elections are not won or lost by programs. They are won or lost on how these programs are presented to the country, and how all the political and public relations considerations are handled. Ed Morgan is an ideal man for one of these posts - Colson may be, to an extent, another, although he may be tied down with too many other assignments. It is vitally important that you get four, or preferably even five, men who are completely selfless, who will swear on a bible that they will never talk to the press under any circumstances, and who will work together for our common goals. Each of them should have three or four under them, of exactly the same quality, with the same commitment. I cannot emphasize too strongly that the major weakness of our

White House staff has been the almost unbelievable passion, which so many otherwise very good men have, for giving some tidbit to the press. This would be understandable if it were in the Kennedy Administration, when the press was friendly. When the press is unfriendly, it is absolutely inexcusable and self-defeating. The latest example of this, of course, was the leak on Romney. This could have only come from someone who had been told about it - probably not in Romney's shop, although that will be the excuse I know you will hear from members of the staff who were familiar with what we were going to do. It simply wouldn't have served his interests to put it out.

In any event, I emphasize again, able men like Morgan selfless men who are not seeking anything, except to get the job done, and completely anonymous men who will only show up in what they do, and not because they are trying to make points with the press by appearing to be in on the know. This is one of the items I would like for you to report to me personally on, perhaps within thirty or sixty days, as to what men you have selected that we can depend upon for specific assignments who will meet these specifications.

With regard to the memoranda submitted by members of the staff, my first reaction which is most reassuring, is that each of them has shown in his own way a great deal of understanding of all the problems involved and has made some significant recommendations which we should consider. I will comment on each of them as we go along in this memorandum, but, all in all, I think you might well profit by bringing this group together from time to time, probably through having them submit such memoranda in advance and then having a meeting with them without my being present, in which you distill their major recommendations and adopt a line to be followed. I couldn't agree more that having people in a meeting without forcing them to think the problem through, and putting it down in writing, is useless and a waste of everyone's time. On the other hand, once they have put it down in writing, you can then get four, five, six, or maybe even seven major issues clearly delineated - bring the whole group together so that they will have a feeling of participation and contribution and discuss the policy to be adopted.

As I consider the memoranda, as well as the news columns which are prepared in the news summaries, and my own reading since the campaign, these conclusions seem inescapable.

1. The rebroadcast of the Phoenix speech was an inexcusable, technical error. On this score, I have already discussed with you the heart of the problem - never let a speechwriter have a vested interest in determining whether that speech is to be used on television. He will always make the wrong decision - even a man as experienced and as devoted to our success as Safire is. The whole press campaign with regard to "tone" of our activities in 22 states has grown out of that one broadcast. For example, several of the press commentators, prior to the time that that broadcast appeared, were writing that the President's campaign was very different from the Vice President's campaign - high-level, no personalities, etc. You will recall that I urged you to get Ziegler, Klein, et al, to emphasize this point. I know they tried, but obviously they failed to get it across. The fault was not theirs - the one broadcast allowed all of our enemies of the press to color the entire campaign with that one failure. Completely forgotten was the fact that in state after state, I never mentioned a Democratic Senator by name, I never attacked the Democratic Party, I always distinguished on the basis of the issues, as in Utah, in the closing speech. I said over and over again, that the choice was between two men who honestly disagreed on those issues. This would have been the lasting impression of the campaign had it not been for the final broadcast and, in that connection, the technical factor was decisive. The content of the speech that Safire wrote was actually recognized by the press, who had been through the traumatic experience at San Jose, as being one in which I had said some things that needed to be said, but as a result of all the technical imperfections our enemies in the press were able to seize on this one booboo and to color our entire campaign efforts with it.

2. There is a good lesson out of this - apart from the fact that we must never again allow a speechwriter have anything to do with production. It is that in this age of television, technical quality is probably more important than the content of what is said. We learned this from the first debate with Kennedy, and now we have had to relearn it in fortunately a less decisive forum in our handling of this particular matter. The important thing is for us not to brush it off as something that "wasn't all that bad", but to recognize that it was a mistake and to be very

sure that kind of mistake is not made again. In that connection, on an urgent basis, I want a full-time television man, even if it costs \$100,000 to \$150,000 a year to have him. This is the name of the game, and it is ridiculous for us to do this on a hit and miss basis, as has been the case too often over the past two years. The man from California seems to me to be perfectly adequate if he will do the job. If not, we could take Scott, who is unimaginative, but at least modestly competent and easy to get along with. This is one of the items that I would like a report on from you as soon as you have a recommendation to make.

3. It would be well to have Ron Ziegler read through these memoranda, because he, and perhaps Herb Klein as well, could get an idea as to where we need to do a more effective job of getting across, in a public relations sense, our areas of performance. For example, five of the memoranda recommended that the trips to Key Biscayne and to California should be taken only when there was some indication that there was some other purpose than going for a vacation. As you know, I have had a concern about this matter for the past year and a half, and have emphasized on a number of occasions the necessity to build up the "hardworking" President. I think that the reaction of all of our staff has been colored by the fact that our close friends say "the President is working too hard." On the other hand, where these people on our staff, who should know better, have the impression that we need to create a working image on these trips, then we have obviously failed rather dramatically. This does not pose any particular problem to me, because as time goes on I, more and more, prefer to go to Camp David for a day, or a day and a half, than to go all the way down to Florida for two and a half, three days. And, of course, as far as California is concerned, I would under no circumstances consider going there unless it was for a week, in which work would be the primary purpose. The problem in handling the trips to California and Florida is not great. In the future, I simply will not go either to California or Florida unless I am satisfied by what Ziegler is going to put out, that a working trip is going to be the outcome in the press. This will be easy as far as California is concerned, because we will always have a meeting out there. It should not be too difficult as far as Florida is concerned, for you can always have a staff briefing or a staff meeting, or something of that sort and perhaps run a picture with it, if necessary. It will simply mean that I will

not go to Florida quite as often - something which is not particularly a problem, due to the fact that I have now found Camp David to be just as relaxing as I pointed out above. But, in view of the fact that our trips to Florida and California, except for those few times when I fly over to Walker's Cay for 24 hours, have been primarily working trips, our failure to get this across to the press, and even members of our own staff, shows our virtually insurmountable media problem. We have to continue to work on it, but the best answer is simply not to give them something to shoot at. I think one mistake we have made is Ziegler's understandable desire to make it pleasant for them in both California and Florida - give them plenty of notice - let their families go, etc. In the future, in the case of both places, I am going to make decisions at the last moment as to when to go and let them pack their bags and go if they want, and then make it a working trip all the way.

The other side of this coin, however, is more fundamental. I think Ziegler simply has to do a more effective job of getting out my schedule in terms of its work prospects. Perhaps he should start putting out the time that I start in the morning. He could say that the President began his work day at 8 o'clock in the Residence, where he either had breakfast with somebody, or if that were not the case, he worked until 8:30 and was in the office and that he left the office at 7 o'clock at night - that he had dinner for an hour and worked from 8 until midnight in the EOB. I think just putting this out bland, without any attempt to oversell might have a salutary effect. In any event, except for your piece in U.S. News, this idea of the working President has thoroughly failed to get across and we have to take the responsibility for that failure since we were aware of what the press was doing to us on this score. This should be our easiest public relations problem in 1971 and 1972, because it happens that the facts are 180 degrees different from the myth. It is time for us to recognize that we have completely failed in getting across the facts, and have allowed a myth to be built up, not only in the press, but in the country at large, but one that is so effective that even members of our own staff are concerned about it.

4. The wisdom of our trying to get across our version of the campaign results is shown by the fact that over half of the staff memoranda understandably reflect the current mood among the columnists in Washington - that we had "lost" in 1970 - the gain of two in the Senate, the minimal loss of 9 in the House, obviously failed to get through to most of the people who listened to the media, including members of our staff, except for the political sophisticates like Chotiner and Dent. This means, again, emphasis needs to be given to what I have mentioned on several occasions previously - the need for staff members who work and live in Washington, and who are constantly exposed to the Washington press corps and the Washington chit chat, to get a balanced point of view. Otherwise, they are going to reflect the downbeat attitude of most of Washington to everything that we are doing. We went through this same thing on a much greater scale at the time of Cambodia, when only two of the group who submitted memoes on this occasion really supported what we were doing in Cambodia. That does not mean that the others were wrong - it simply means that they were completely overwhelmed by the public opposition, and it has taken them six months to recover from it. As a matter of fact, the failure of the great majority of our candidates to use their opponents' opposition to the Cambodian venture effectively is an indication of how we failed from a public relations standpoint to get this one across. Let me be very fair in pointing out that the failure is not due to a lack of trying, but to the insurmountable problems we face with the media. Again, however, we must recognize that our whole staff needs to be bucked up every day or they are going to buy the current media line. That is one of the reasons why I thought that a good editorial or column, or some other statement that is circulated virtually daily among members of the staff, with a particular mark on it, might be helpful. In addition to that, we need a holler guy on the staff who constantly speaks in an upbeat way about what we are doing, just as we need a holler guy on the Cabinet to do exactly the same thing.

I am now going to take each one of the memoranda and pick out those items I would like followed through on.

Timmons' memo is somewhat superficial, but it has a couple of points that are worth commenting upon. He suggests that a plan should be devised to divide the hostile working press, and comments that attacks on the media as a group solidifies their opposition. This comment has been made by others, and I agree with it. It is essential to develop a more coordinated and effective program of getting what Jim Keogh describes as calculated leaks to our friendly reporters, and don't limit them to newspapers - sometimes we might give one to ABC network, for example. And a plan also to have Cabinet Officers, and on occasion, White House staff, on a very controlled basis, give stories to friendly journalists. I cannot emphasize too strongly on this point that there must be absolute discipline in this respect. In the future, all members of the White House staff are to report to Ziegler before seeing members of the press, and if they see them socially, they are to give Ziegler a rundown so that he will not be caught with some story in which he has no advance information. Our attitude toward the press, however, should be cool, correct, and not belligerent. On an individual basis, we should be absolutely ruthless in not rewarding and punishing our enemies by not giving them special treatment, and rewarding our friends by giving them special treatment. Here it will be necessary to bring Klein in line so that he understands what the game is. Because it doesn't make sense to have Ziegler be tough, and then have Klein or other members of the White House staff like Finch, or Shultz go running off in the other direction.

All of the memoranda, including Timmons', make recommendations with regard to the Vice President. I shall touch upon each of these as I go through them, indicating those areas where I think the Vice President could effectively be used in those areas, and where he should not be used. In general, he should continue to speak in the South on the right kind of occasion, and should step up his contacts with Labor organizations where he has a national entre. In terms of his duties on the Hill, I think one area where he could be very useful is to cultivate good relations with all the Republicans, including even those doves who are not completely out in left field, and particularly with the senior Democrats who are Chairmen of committees in the Senate. They would be highly flattered if he were to pay some attention to them.

A number of the memoranda, including Timmons', comment upon Presidential travel. In general, I believe we should plan no foreign travel in 1971, unless some special event comes up which requires it. Insofar as travel within the U.S. is concerned, it should be to special functions, in accord with our bringing government to the people. In this instance, more emphasis on domestic issues would be in order. Timmons, of course, is completely wrong when he suggests that I should visit all fifty states by the time of the 1972 election. I should visit a couple of smaller states, just for symbolism purposes, but in the final analysis our efforts must be made in the big battleground states, and visits should be made to them primarily.

Rumsfeld, in his memo, emphasizes first the importance of quality candidates. He makes one suggestion that I think should be analyzed immediately. Where there are House, Senate or Gubernatorial incumbents who come up in 1972, who should not run again, efforts should be made now to offer them Federal jobs, or to move on them in other ways to keep them from running, and thereby to avoid a drain on the national ticket. In addition, a better program, probably through the National Committee and the Senate and House Campaign Committees, must be developed for selecting candidates - particularly for the House and the Senate. Don't waste time on the Governors, because we simply haven't got the kind of manpower to bring that about. In selecting candidates, have in mind the fact that in 1970, men like Dodd, Murphy, Tydings, McKneally, and the whole State ticket in Ohio, went down because of personal ethics problems. We cannot afford to have anybody on our ticket in 1972 who will pose this problem to us. We must be absolutely ruthless in bringing such matters to the attention of candidates and getting them cleaned up, or getting the candidate off the ticket if he has such a problem and cannot clean it up.

Rumsfeld also mentions that we have not done as effective a job as we might have in indicating the success of our Vietnam policy. I would like for him to talk to Kissinger on this to see what more can be done. My guess is that nothing more can be done, except by our announcements which are planned during the coming year. On the other hand, despite the fact that Kissinger will claim very properly that foreign policy was a plus for us in the last campaign, it was not nearly as great a plus as it might have been. The handling of Vietnam in the great crisis of October and November of 1969, the enormous success of the bold Cambodian venture, the handling of lesser problems like Jordan, etc. never really got across adequately. Safire covers this in his memorandum and indicates several steps that he thinks might be taken. I would suggest that Safire and Rumsfeld sit down with Kissinger and see if something can be done to develop a more effective program to play our strong suit

more effectively than we have as long as we have it to play.

Rumsfeld's constructive criticism that the positive theme in the domestic field has not come through is right on the mark. The Generation of Peace has come through - the positive theme with regard to our vision for America for the future at home has not come through. Our rhetoric should be forward-looking, emphasizing the hopes and aspirations for the future, not the disappointments of past. This cannot be done through programs to clean up the water and the air, which was our major thrust of last year. That is purely a holding action, but everyone of these memoranda, with the exception of two, recognizes that the environment issue is going to have a decreasing impact as the year goes out.

Rumsfeld's comment with regard to the Vice President is reflected by virtually every one of the memoes "he should maintain visibility so that people do not think he is trotted out to do a job, and then shelved". His speeches should remain bold, but the expressions should be carefully drawn and the subjects changed to positive, domestic needs. I will touch upon this more as I come to the other memoes.

As far as relationships with Congress are concerned, Rumsfeld follows exactly the line I have already laid down. It will be the responsibility of Finch, Colson, Ehrlichman, et al, to work with all the Republican Members of Congress, and to avoid any feuds with any of them, if possible. This, however, must be taken on as a special assignment at a very high-level, and not left to Timmons, who should have our complete backing as our Legislative Liaison man for the day-to-day votes, but who cannot be the man we rely on for the big plays with individual members of the Senate.

Len Garment makes a point which might be the subject of a column if we could get it across - that, ironically, between October 1969, when the White House was literally preparing for a siege, the authority and respect for the Presidency has been restored; mass demonstrations have faded; near agreement has emerged on issues, such as Vietnam; law and order, campus disruption, and virtually all successful candidates of both parties ran on a platform largely fashioned by the President. This, of course, is an overstatement insofar as economic issues are concerned, but it has a great deal of substance to it.

This leads me to another point that I think has been under-emphasized in our public relations effort. The restoration of respect for the Office of the Presidency at home and abroad. The fact that the President is able to travel at home and abroad, does travel at home and abroad, and is received with respect in the overwhelming majority of cases. This is a complete turnaround from what the situation was when we took office in January of 1969. How this can be gotten across I do not know, but it should be listed among those goals we should try to emphasize more in the next year.

Jim Keogh's memo is one of the best. Along with our Democratic friends, we probably went too far overboard on the Scammon/Wattenberg line. I am not referring to my own activities which were, of course, emphasizing the peace line, but to the advice that was given to candidates. Long after the Democratic candidates joined us in supporting that line our candidates were still hitting it, and they were really striking at straw men. His analysis of the Phoenix Rally was honest, and probably very well balanced. It was a bad blunder and it made the President seem angry, harsh, and almost mean, because of technical problems. It probably had little effect on the results, but it was damaging to the Presidential image in long-term if we don't rectify it. As I pointed out at the opening of this memorandum, we allowed the press to interpret the whole campaign as bitter and harsh. In that connection, going back to the earlier part of this memorandum, perhaps a small book on the campaign of 1970, and particularly the President's participation would be in order. When you look at what was actually said in each case, the tone was at a very high level, not personal, and on the issues throughout, as distinguished the Democratic campaigns, which were all-out assaults on our side through the years. In that connection, one good column subject would be the one that didn't get through in the press - the complete partisan and political tone of Kennedy's activities throughout 1962 until the Cuban missile confrontation. I think it would be well for some columnist to write the facts, which I understand you have with regard to the number of fund raising dinners he did, and the number of appearances that he made, and compare them with the number of days we were out. This is only a holding action, and should not be something that should come from the White House, but it is good column material for purposes of setting it in historical perspective.

One of Keogh's telling points, which I would like to have him discuss with Colson, is with regard to our efforts to woo the leaders of organized Labor. It may be that we have gone too far in this direction, and also it could well be that the leaders of organized Labor are not only unpopular with all the unorganized workers, but also with a great

of their own members. On the other hand, if we pick and choose, as in the case of Jim Suffridge, and perhaps some of the Building Trades people, unless we decide to take on Davis Bacon, which of course would be the great mistake if we moved entirely in the direction that Jim suggests. This could be a subject for discussion between Jim, Colson, George Shultz, and possibly Ehrlichman, if he has the time.

Keogh also makes a very telling point when he says that "it is no longer profitable to emphasize what the Administration is against, and that from now on the emphasis must be on what the Administration is for, what it has done, and is doing."

On the PR side he makes a suggestion which runs contrary to some of the recommendations that John Ehrlichman made in his memorandum. He says that he feels we have been using too many gimmicks - that we should be more straightforward. I am inclined to agree. I think we had too many scenarios and too many game plans. I realize that I, myself, have been talking about the need for better PR, but I think the PR failure has not been in what we have done, but actually in just not having one or two men on the staff who had the ability to quietly and effectively get it across to the press. When we do something very obvious like running out to the Negro Junior College, or something of that sort, I think it is a short-range story for the night TV, but probably a long-range _____ because everyone figures that it was done for exactly the reason it was suggested, show that we were concerned about Black education in the District of Columbia. I do not mean by that that we do not have an occasion bill signing outside of the White House, but, generally speaking, I would like to see less gimmickery in the months ahead, and a more effective job done in simply selling what we are doing. In a sense, this really puts the monkey on the back of the press man and members of the White House staff. I think their tendency is understandably one of saying "What will the President do to get a story across?" We simply cannot use the President for the purpose of getting a story across. When he acts, it is the responsibility of others to get it across. If they can't get it across, the story just isn't worth it.

Keogh makes a very strong point when he says that most of the media are against us and that "it is very difficult for us to put anything over on them - it is practically impossible for us to subvert them." I would suggest for the next two months we put our cases as straightforwardly as possible, that we not try to be cute and just see what the press does with it. I couldn't agree more, however, with Keogh's suggestion that we use the "honest-to-God calculated leak". This we have not done effectively in the past, and I think it is necessary for you to sit down with Klein, Ziegler, and others involved, and see where we can get a better break on some of our news stories through the calculated leak.

Klein's memo is somewhat superficial for the most part, stating the obvious. The only thought worth adding to what the others include in their memoes is to emphasize regional television with the major states coming up. An analysis should be made as to how appearances in Ohio, Illinois, Pennsylvania, New York, Wisconsin, Texas, Florida, California and Missouri on TV, or with very, very key newspaper types in those areas could be used by the Vice President, top White House personalities like Finch, Klein and by Cabinet people. I get back to my point to Klein's best use - in addition to occasional appearances on TV is to move around the country talking to top editors, publishers, and key people in TV. He is extremely capable in this respect and is listened to.

Among memoes from the staff is a strong recommendation that 1971 and most of 1972, at least until the late summer, should be Presidential and not political.

This, of course, is my own conclusion and I intended to follow it. Apparently, however, the fact that some columnist suggested that I might move in the other direction caused some of our own people to wonder. This brings me to a minor, but nevertheless important PR point - the fact that throughout 1969 and 1970 I did the absolute minimum that I could for Party functions - only one fund-raising event, a quick foray into New Jersey and Virginia in 1969, and the seven-day trip in 1970.

However, having failed to get across that point to the press, there is no use to try to sell it now. The PR line has already been set and the thing to do is go on and fight new battles. But, it is imperative now for us to get the politics out of the White House - something I felt should have been done even before the 1970 campaign, and either into the National Committee, the Senatorial or House Campaign Committees or in

possibly a National Citizens Group, if one is set up. This means the decision on Chotiner must be made soon and executed just as quickly as we possibly can in the first two weeks of December. I want to be in the position where I can honestly say the White House does not have its hand in the political maneuvering that is going to begin the moment the new Congress comes in session. This raises the question on Colson. He must be very careful not to be involved in strictly political activity and must keep his actions in the field or organizations across the party lines. As far as my own schedule is concerned, we must make a final decision now, that I am not going to do any Party functions in 1971. The only possible exception I can envisage would be to shake hands with some of the women when they come down for their conference. Under no circumstances will I do the big Republican fund raiser in 1971. I think we have to realize that if the money now can't be raised without my presence, it can't be raised at all. As far as my political activities are concerned, they must be limited to dinners that are private and remain private, like the one we had the other night, with Mulcahy et al. Whether this is possible remains to be seen. If it is not possible, let's not have any of those dinners until the Fall of 1971. We must not have any in the first six months of 1971.

The problem of the National Committee is still open until Bryce makes his decision. If he decides against taking it, I would be inclined to go to McGregor, rather than Bush, for the simple reason that I think McGregor would be less inhibited in cleaning up the staff, and also would be a better spokesman as against O'Brien. Houston points out very correctly in his memo that we were completely outgunned by O'Brien, not only in this campaign, but in 1968. We must not let this happen again. Rumsfeld also must be considered due to his brilliant organizational ability, but it might be possible that Rumsfeld would be a better man to handle the general campaign, assuming, of course, that we do not make a decision to have Romney leave HUD. If that happens, I think we are committed to have Rumsfeld go there. I want you to give particular attention and urgent attention to thinking up the proper position for Dole. Talk it over quietly with a few of our very top people. He would by far be the best Nixon man in the Senate that I want to give him a small staff, see him regularly, give him a title and turn him loose. Perhaps you, Ehrlichman, Mitchell, and Dent should sit down and talk about how we could put these players in their

proper positions. But above everything else when the recommendation comes to me, let it be a bold one, and not just the usual business as usual kind of approach.

Chotiner's memo, like Klein's, is somewhat superficial. One point he mentions that is worth following up on is with regard to off-the-record breakfasts, lunch and other meetings with bi-partisan GOP groups. I do not favor the breakfast and lunches, of course, but the afternoon 5 o'clock meetings in the Oval Office are a good idea, particularly prior to the time we get ready to launch our offensive with regard to the new fiscal policy. We really want to mobilize the troops on this one. His emphasis on GOP groups should not be the primary one, however. I should work as much as I possibly can with those Southern Democratic Chairmen and other Democratic leaders ~~for~~ whom we will have to turn for support on critical votes. They will be greatly complimented if we continue to keep contact with them. Even when they happen to be against us.

Nofziger's memo is punchy and to the point. His suggestion that the "posture with Congress should be one wanting to work with Congress, but at the same time refusing to surrender to it" is correct. However, our attitude should be one of cooperation so that Congress is in the position of appearing uncooperative rather than ours in the first instance. His suggestion that we meet with small groups of friendly columnists from time to time has possibilities, except for the fact that I again wonder whether this puts too much emphasis on the writing press, and not enough on the TV press. I like the idea of including a few reporters from friendly papers like Jack Jerrold (sp?), George Embrey (sp) Lou Heinrich (sp?), etc. where they come from states which matter to us. I think it is important, however, to find a way to include a fellow like Semple, and also a Harry Reasoner and Herb Kaplow should be considered. Also, in this connection, the possibility of bringing in a powerful regional commentator from Los Angeles, Chicago, or some other key city in a key state might be in order. Gunnerback (sp) of Philadelphia comes to mind in that respect. Here, what we need is a list which is really meaningful, and then we can sort the thing out and figure up occasions where I might want to have meetings with them. The purpose of such meetings would not be to get across a line, but really more to let them get out and positively talk about what kind of a man the President is, how his mind works, etc. This is

perhaps the most effective way to get across the idea of warmth, knowledge, etc., which sometimes we can't get across with the press conference device, due to the fact that a few leaders who are generally opposed to us set the line and the others rather slavishly follow it. I would suggest that you discuss this with Nofziger and possibly Klein and Moore and give me a recommendation.

His statement about the Cabinet seems almost cruel, but unfortunately it is correct. The fact that "not one has aroused enough excitement to be considered by the press as a possible successor to the Vice President, or as a possible Presidential nominee", is a devastating and perceptive conclusion. What we must do is to build up two or three Cabinet Officers as he suggests and maybe four or five members of the House and Senate, on a deliberately planned and executed effort. We need here a game plan which should be submitted to me within 30 to 60 days - the sooner, the better, of course. I think regarding Congressional relationships, in addition to strengthening Timmons' hand, and, incidentally, everybody agrees that he needs more staff - give him what he needs - we should see that our senior staff members, Cabinet members and sub-Cabinet members are more accessible, more cooperative and, where the White House is concerned, less abrasive. We must not get into the position we were in 1969 and 1970 where the President is called upon over and over again to try to save a situation on a close vote. It is particularly important that Kissinger, Rogers and Laird work on the new Republicans, as well as on the Democrats like Bentsen and Childs, as well as some of our Republican defectors in the past, like Percy. Brief them constantly and try to bring them into our orbit where we can. In that connection, the major thing I may be able to do is to see Aiken and Cooper - perhaps together on one occasion. This should be within the next two or three weeks. But they should be told now. A brief meeting with Percy, which I understand he has requested, is of course in order. In this case, however, Finch, who I would think would be our best contact, should see him first and bring him in. At such a meeting, a fellow like Ehrlichman and/or Shultz should be there, so that we can start enlisting Percy on some of our domestic programs.

Nofziger really hits the mark when he talks about our weakness in the research area. I strongly urge that paragraph 8 of his memorandum be read, and that some program be developed on a follow-through basis.

One thing that has occurred to me in this respect that we might consider, is a rather way-out idea - a column written by one of our own people like Buchanan or Nofziger which is sent out on a regular basis to editors and TV people throughout the country, as well as to members of the House and Senate. Here, just a straight-out presentation of the Administration position, as well as building up the President in those areas of hard work, concern for minorities, etc., might be enormously effective. You will recall Ralph de Toledano had such an operation for Goldwater which was quite effective in 1964. I am not thinking of setting up an outside office for this purpose, but I would like for you to talk with Nofziger, Buchanan and Keogh and see if they can come up with an idea as to how we can get our line across. What I really need here is something in writing quite regularly, which gives our side of the story without apology, and with great forthrightness. We have tried the other line of trying to plant the story with someone like Thimmesch and that, of course, should continue. But, I think more than that might be needed as we go along. I would be interested in whatever recommendation the group comes in with in this respect.

Colson's memorandum makes a point on page 3 which we should have in mind, "the proposed vast environmental program, new schemes to help the poor, expanded aid to the cities, give us absolutely nothing politically." Of course, I still buy the idea that a defensive action here in the field of the environment is needed, and I also buy the idea that I ought to have symbolic meetings with all types of minority groups, Negroes, Mexicans, Youth, as well as selected Labor groups. This is still in order in terms of the need for the President to be at least appearing to make an effort to communicate with all segments of the society, even when we know there is little to be accomplished with that particular group.

His recommendation with regard to an independent TV news service should also be considered - discuss this with Dick Moore and see what he thinks of it.

His suggestion of the meeting with the chief executives of the three networks might be considered but, again, more than anything this is not worthwhile. I would be willing to do so if there was any mileage in it.

Colson's suggestion with regard to the Vice President being the leading spokesman for the revenue sharing proposal is excellent, and should be among those items to give to the Vice President for his positive line. His comment to the effect that after Cambodia our standing in the polls had more effect with the Congressmen than anything else, is on the mark, but this, as we know, is something we cannot depend upon. Although, when we do get anything favorable in the polls we have to make the most of it.

In that connection, Ed Brooke is one that should be brought in at an early time. He has been very responsible since the election and, according to Chuck, he even supported our position on Goodell! I should like for Colson and Rumsfeld to sit down and discuss with Finch present where they think we ought to concentrate in order to have the greatest impact on the heavy industrialized states. Colson suggests the White ethnic middle-class working man family. Rumsfeld, on the other hand, puts primary emphasis on what he calls the suburbanite, who are not members of Labor unions and are generally White Collar.

Of vital importance there is no question but that we should continue to cultivate Catholics clearly apart from whether they are Labor or White Collar, and that we should work hard on the ethnics, particularly East Europeans and Italians. Here again, we need a plan which will make maximum use of my time and have maximum impact with these groups.

On a completely unrelated subject, I would like to have John Connally come in for a private visit to discuss his appointment, ostensibly, to the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which will give me an opportunity to get his views on the reorganization plan, as well as some of the political problems. Here again, it is vitally important that the cover be a clear one, so that there is no speculation to the effect that the purpose is solely political. I want to see Connally everytime he comes into the city for one of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board things. Usually the meeting should be off-the-record - something he will completely approve of and understand.

Houston's memorandum is more perceptive than I expected it to be. He is correct when he says we take the media too seriously, and when he says that we make a mistake in assuming that ideologically hostility can be overcome by advertising techniques. Above everything else, as he points out, we should use the media to portray ~~RN as~~ a working President in a way that conveys candor. I, as you know, have already approved more press conferences, and we shall examine the possibility of another discussion with network commentators, fireside chat is a possibility that can be considered, but I think we need considerably more study before we jump into that one.

His comments in regard to the Vice President is on the mark when he says that he should de-escalate the rhetoric without de-escalating the substance of his message. He should not be concerned with national coverage over the next few months, because he can have an enormous impact in regional visits, something that I think he can very properly undertake, while at the same time spending considerably more time in the Senate, meeting with leading Democratic Chairmen, as well as with some of our Republicans. He does not have to go overboard, however, in ~~s~~"sticking to his job" in the Senate. This is a charge that is always made about Vice Presidents and it ~~seldom~~ has had too much effect. What does have effect is the charge that the Vice President's activities are solely partisan and political, and do not deal with substance. I avoided this by having some pretty substantive assignments and comments in the foreign policy field, as well as on domestic problems like settling the steel strike. We must find some areas where the Vice President can have similar opportunities.

Nofziger is correct in pointing out that a line may eventually have to be drawn with Congress in foreign and defense policy. However, we must not draw this line until it becomes apparent that we are faced with straight-out opposition, and then we must draw it in a statesmanlike way, in which we lay the choices before the people and indicate why we have chosen one line, and why that line, regardless of partisanship, should be followed by the Congress. His rather ruthless suggestions with regard for the need for a purge in sub-Cabinet level and in the Party organization, of course, are already underway. We must move on the Allison problem just as soon as we can get the Morton assignment worked out. Allison's appearance the morning after the election and his press comments generally have really broken it off, and where

we should not say anything about it, once Morton moves, the new Chairman should come in and simply insist on bringing a new staff with him. His conclusion that we need "a national Chairman who is a fighter, who is effective on the stump, who can use the media, who is loyal to the President, but not too closely identified with him personally, who is a good administrator, and who will do as he is told" is exactly what I am looking for. That is why I tend to lean more to a McGregor or a Rumsfeld, than to a Bush or a Harlow, although the latter two have assets that we must not overlook. This is another one of those subjects which should be discussed with you, Ehrlichman, Finch and Mitchell, with a recommendation made to me.

His suggestion with regard to getting such people as Kevin Phillips, John Sears and other young, intellectuals to make recommendations may have some merit, but this must be very carefully handled outside the White House, and the advice must be given to whomever is Chairman of the National Committee and, of course, made available to us. The major purpose of this is not so much to get their views as it is to enlist them as advocates as we go into the next two years, making use of the Buckley organization, including Cliff White, of course, in this same category.

With regard to organization, generally, I emphasize again the necessity of having one man in charge of each of the major target states. This requires 8 or 10 men - they can be in or out of the White House, provided any political activities they engage in are clearly independent of the White House. I would like for you to work up, along with the other key political people, a plan for each of the states I have mentioned previously, so that we will have someone in the case of each major state who is in charge and on whom we can put responsibility. For example, Harry Dent will be in charge of a number of Southern states and possibly we will want a special man in charge of Florida. However, this is a matter on which I will await your recommendations. Incidentally, I believe that you could include Harry Dent in the small group that you talk with in regard to organization, but I would not include Chotiner. We know that Dent will not leak and Chotiner might. Dent

Dent's memorandum makes one suggestion that I would like followed up. I share his high regard for Dick Richards of Utah and he should be enlisted for the National Committee at an early date. Dent also suggests that an effort should be made to organize and get out the 18-year-old vote. This is a mixed bag, however, and under no circumstances should it be done through the Republican National Committee because the Republican Party has less popularity with the 18-year olds than the President has. However, Finch, LeTendre, and some of the rest of you should be thinking about this since it will be a problem with which we are confronted in 1972. Dent made a couple of other suggestions that might be worth considering - the obvious one that we should try to get some friends to invest in news media purchases. Some follow-up with people like Helen Hill might be in order here, but only where the purchases are in states that matter to us. His suggestion of a Black PR assistant to work on the Black news media might be considered, provided we have one for Mexicans and also one for Italians. But, in any event, if there is such an assistant it should be in the National Committee and not in the White House. With regard to Cabinet meetings, Dent makes a useful suggestion. I think the idea of the regular monthly Cabinet meeting probably is in order since we can only in that way keep the Cabinet involved and informed. On the other hand, I think the Cabinet might have another meeting each month in which the Vice President presides and you also should talk to Kissinger with regard as to whether there could not be some National Security Council meetings where the Vice President could preside. President Eisenhower worked this out with me to my great advantage, and the fact that I had presided over Cabinet and NSC meetings at the President's request had considerable effect. I realize that we are doing this to an extent with our domestic council setup, but I am wondering if the mid-monthly Cabinet meeting and an NSC meeting about once a month might be used for the purpose of giving the Vice President a chance to preside, and also for the purpose of bringing the Cabinet into closer relations with the White House. Henry will object to any NSC meeting unless I am present, but I am thinking of some of the NSC studies, like those meetings where the Vice President might well preside and I can attend when the matter gets closer to a decision.

Dent properly suggests that we might try to find a Democrat to work on Democrats in the Congress. This could be of great assistance to Timmons, if we could find one. A man like Jack Marsh comes to mind, but he has an outside assignment which everyone thinks is more important. At least let's look into it to see what we might develop. Dent's idea of a few Congressional friends who secretly listen for us on the Hill is a good one, if it can be implemented without getting the leadership out of sorts - also having some Nixon talkers in the cloakrooms makes sense. Timmons, Dent and you, as well as Finch, might have a talk on this point.

Dent makes a point that there should be "more political input" on White House dinners, entertainment and church. I thought we were doing quite well in this respect, but I am inclined to think that we need a shakeup here. Perhaps you should put Butterfield in charge and have him ride herd until we get the proper input. For example, with the Church Service Sunday, at least a third of those present had been recommended by Dent. This, of course, is alright insofar as I am concerned, except at a Catholic service I would have loaded it more with Italians and others who would have appreciated the fact that we had the head of the Catholic War Veterans, probably through Colson's recommendation, and the two Conservatives from New York. But, generally speaking, we were long on Protestants and short on Catholics, at a service which gave us a great opportunity to bring some of our potential Catholic supporters from Philadelphia, from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Connecticut, as well as New York, into the White House. We should have another Catholic soon and when we do, let's rectify this mistake. I think the problem with a church service is an activist like Dent or one like Colson get their names in and a lot of others who have responsibilities in this respect simply do not come through.

Dent's criticism with regard to the need to project a warmer and more human image hits the mark. The problem here, however, is definitely simply one of not getting across what we have been doing until it practically runs out of our ears - not just the Thanksgiving Dinner, but the boat rides on the Potomac, the infinite number of events Mrs. Nixon has in the White House for underprivileged groups, etc. have been handled by Connie and filtered through the women's press with very little national effect. The fact that Dent was not aware of some of these things is an indication of our failure. I want to continue to have

events of this type, but we must find a more effective way of getting across our point.

Dent's final point about the need for some humor is also constructive. It gets back to my constant emphasis on the need for more E. Q. (enthusiasm quotient) to match the high I. Q. of our White House staff and our Administration generally. Perhaps it is necessary for the White House staff and the Cabinet to have functions in which the press has a chance to peak in that are really more upbeat. Also, of course, along this line it gets back to the need on our White House staff for people like Bush, McGregor, etc., who will be upbeat and act as if they were having some fun in carrying out assignments. Dent makes the point that the Buckley family has been very successful in projecting a positive and human image, while being conservative. Perhaps we ought to examine our situation there. Dick Moore might be the man to make this study for us.

It seems to me that as we look over the past two years, we have had more events in two years than previous Administrations have had in four, including our Evenings at the White House, our special Christmas parties, etc. etc. But somehow, perhaps due to our inadequate press relations (not the fault, of course, of our press people), we don't get much of this across to the people generally. Perhaps it is not possible to do so, but at least we ought to examine the problem and see what can be done. This must be done incidentally without trying to make the President a laughing boy, and without having Martha Mitchell appear to be the only one who seems to enjoy being in Washington! With her going on the cover of TIME, I think we may be running into some dangerous waters here, because she obviously is in one of her rather erratic moods - this time her Friday A.M. telephone call to Connie Stuart.

Safire's memorandum is excellent, particularly in regard to his recommendation that we press our strength. In this respect I think, again, we must have people other than the President and the President's immediate staff, who can get across the idea of the restoration of dignity, respect for the U.S. at home and abroad, etc. In addition to hard-working and sure-footedness in foreign affairs and a deep concern for the well-being of all people. I think one of the major assets that we have not properly exploited is the fact that the President is willing to step up and be bold when a problem presents itself. Cambodia

of course is the most striking example, and we tended to be driven off at high ground because of the initial press criticism. But there are other examples, such as the decision to submit the New Federalism program, including the Family Assistance, the decision to fight it out on ABM, etc. The people like a warm President and a competent one, but they also want one who is a courageous, bold leader who will step up and hit the hard ones. I am inclined to think that we have made a pretty good record in that respect, but even in the foreign policy area, where the record is outstanding, it just hasn't come through. Incidentally, when I earlier suggested that you talk to Moore and others about PR matters, I think Safire could be included in that group with safety provided he has absolutely sworn to keep his mouth shut and not to talk to some press man about the meeting. He has a weakness in this respect. Safire makes an excellent suggestion on page 6 of his memorandum as to how to continue to hit the theme of a "Full Generation of Peace" - the idea of a USIA documentary, a book of foreign policy speeches, of Rogers' speeches, etc. His idea of tying it into the Bicentennial is worth considering and, of course, it should be the theme of the White House Conference on Children and Youth. Here naturally what happens in Vietnam and in our relations with the Soviet, as well as in the Mideast, will have a massive effect. But, again, we are not going to get the benefit of it unless we not only do well, but cast it in words that raise it above the pragmatic decisions made day-to-day, and put up an idealistic standard to sell people what to follow. I would like Safire to discuss with Shultz and McCracken his suggestion on page 9 (at the bottom of page 8 and the beginning of page 9) of his memo with regard to spelling out the employment figures in a more meaningful way, so that part-time teenagers, voluntarily unemployed job hunters, are separated from those who are really unemployed among the Veterans. The need to get these figures cast more in a way that will not be so damaging to us is imperative. I have been talking about it for the last year and a half, but it is time for us to go to work on it and I want them to really put their minds to it and come up with an answer.

On page 11 of his memorandum, Safire makes a suggestion that indicates that he is probably not familiar with the guest lists we've had for the Evenings at the White House. My recollection is that we have had some TV news editors, society columnists from out of Washington, sports reporters, etc., honoring sports greats. If this has not been the case, we should rectify this situation. If this has been the case, let's see that we emphasize it more in the future. It simply does not make many

points for us to have these events for the gratification of those who happen to attend.

I made a number of suggestions in here and, for my own purposes, if it doesn't cause too much paper work, would you simply list those in which some report to me might be made and return it to me. I don't need to see the whole memorandum, although one could be made available for my file. I would like to see a check list of the various things I have suggested here so that I could follow up as to what action has been taken on them.

Safire's general recommendations with regard to the Bicentennial should be given very serious consideration because they do provide an opportunity for the hope and idealism theme. Also, his suggestion for a National Youth Service to come out of the Conference on Children and Youth should be given serious consideration since it was something we promised in the 1968 campaign. This could only be done if we could get some projects based on voluntarism.

Harlow's memorandum shows very good perspective and balance, as we might expect. One point which he made which John Ehrlichman has to consider in terms of our budget, is with regard to the necessity to try to keep some of our support in the rural areas. That means emphasis on our rural development programs and the reconsideration of the budget decision on the Conservation program. I don't know exactly where we are going to come out with the farmers - we will not know until we see what happens to the current farm bill. It seems that we were trying to do everything possible to mitigate the opposition of the farm belt, but we obviously fell short of the mark, if the returns of the farm areas are any indication. Harlow, it seems to me, is one of the best ones to examine this problem for us and to make a recommendation. He makes the point, as others have made, that on the media we can overreact to the press, thereby consuming energies that might fruitfully be used in other directions. Perhaps we would be better advised to change our tactics, not with the idea of trying to win the press - he agrees that our relations should be cool, fair, and at arms-length - but simply for all to follow the line of not caring what the writers say, unless there is a clear misstatement of fact, in which case we have to correct the record hard and fast.

Most of the points in Buchanan's memorandum have been covered already in my previous comments. He perhaps shows the greatest intuition in

his conclusion that we tend to underestimate how much we can dominate the media during a campaign, and also to underestimate the possibility of overkill. He raises the point of having John Sears prepare a memorandum. I do not want to get into this, but if you want to talk to Pat about it and have Sears prepare a memorandum - no obligation on our part - I would have no objection. Sears, as you know, is useless if it comes to a well organized follow-through, but sometimes may have some ability on analysis. There is one point that he makes quite strongly that I would like to elaborate on. "We must not play into the hands of our opponents with top-level White House discussions of the campaign of '70 or the prospects of '72 in either party. We must get back exclusively to the business of governing the Nation". I agree with this insofar as I am concerned, and also as far as members of the White House staff are concerned. That is one of the reasons why it was necessary to remove someone like Chotiner, who is completely political, out of the White House as soon as possible. What is also vitally important is that Finch, Klein, Ehrlichman, Safire, and everybody else who talks to the press, simply put a muzzle on with regard to the political prospects for 1972. This will be the subject that everybody will want them to get into. Also, all of the commentators will want them to get into their estimates of the various Democratic challengers. The best way to handle all of them is just leave them alone for the next 8 or 10 months, insofar as we're concerned. They will have plenty of problems among themselves and, of course, there will be Republicans on the Hill whom we cannot control, who will have something to say. Above everything else, I would strongly direct that the entire White House staff avoid any discussions with the press on the record, off the record, at social occasions, and otherwise, with regard to 1970 and 1972. The 1970 campaign is over, the 1972 campaign has not yet begun.

His recommendation that we find occasion to demonstrate humanity and heart go along with those made by several others, but the key here is spontaneous, not planned meetings. How we can develop spontaneity is a problem, but in this connection, as I have emphasized previously, I think that we will want to get away from our great feeling of responsibility to the press, to inform the press of all of our movements in advance, and not catch them off guard. I think some of the most effective things I may have done in this field have been ones where I haven't told the press in advance, and have allowed them to discover what I was doing. This gets back to the point that we simply have too much gimmickery and the press and public, too, are frankly turned off

by it. Incidentally, in this connection, one thought that occurs to me is to make a visit to a prison, particularly where there a number of young people involved. The problem of prison reform is a national one, as Al Otten pointed out in a Wall Street Journal column of several months ago. Simply highlighting it with a Presidential visit might be very well in order. The Secret Service, John Mitchell and Edgar Hoover would probably go up the wall, but I have visited prisons often as a candidate before, both for the Senate and for Governor, and I see no reason why we could not work something out here. At least, put it in the hopper for consideration.

Buchanan is correct in saying that any future attacks on the media should be rifle shots for specific abuses, and not proceed in such a way as to roasting the entire corps. He is also correct in saying that we should give our primary leaks to Reasoner and Smith, even though they are not going to be with us the entire time. They will be with us more often than the other two networks, and even though they don't have near the listening audience, at least it will show that trying to give us a break pays off. I agree with him, too, that Herb Kaplow, as I indicated earlier in this memorandum, should be brought in for something on occasion, but that the Chancellors and the Vanocurs, and others of that type should simply be ignored.

His recommendation that the Vice President should be shown fighting for something and not just against something or somebody, is excellent. This is the posture we want to put him in. I particularly believe it is important for the Vice President to do more Q and A sessions with any groups, including minorities, youth, or what have you. He is extremely good in this form and should use it more often. His point on page 9 would seem to go contrary to what I have told you previously, but actually it does not. His idea that we should draw in our horns on the PR operations is correct. Our weakness here is not that we don't have a lot of people working on PR - actually we have too many. The problem is that we are not subtle enough - we don't have one big-timer who can handle the problem and we tend always to be promoting on a PR basis. Perhaps we were all at fault in getting Klein and in urging Klein, Finch, et al, to take the defensive with regard to the election returns. On the other hand, I feel that this is probably worthwhile because otherwise we couldn't possibly have muted what was becoming the almost unanimous conclusion that we had suffered a major loss in the elections, and it

was a major mistake, that our campaign at all levels was a major mistake, and particularly a major mistake for the President. However, having done our best to mitigate this situation it is time to leave it alone, except for the possibility of a book by someone like Keogh, or an article at a later time which would discuss it all in perspective when people will be ready to give it a more fair judgment.

John Ehrlichman has excellent ideas with regard to a better exploitation of the activities we engage in (incidentally, his memo was probably written before I had Humphrey and his wife in for a visit to welcome them back). The difficulty I find, however, with some of his recommendations is that they appear to exploit the events too much. I frankly think that with regard to a White House Thanksgiving Dinner, or a State visit, or the President's handling of a group that comes to see him in the Oval Office or in the Cabinet Room - all of these things have to be handled without being so obvious as bringing in the TV camera. I think what have been called our "dog and pony shows", like going out to see the dogs sniff the marijuana, turn people off. My reaction here may not be typical, but I just had an uneasy feeling about doing that, and I am not comfortable doing other things of the same type now. I think what I must do is to carry on my duties the way I think I properly should - to let the press cover them when we consider it proper to do so. When we do not have press there, then we simply have to have somebody there, other than Ziegler, who can go out and give them a fill-in. I do not believe that pushing a story at the press, forcing them to put an event on TV is a good idea. For example, several have suggested that we ought to have TV at a Cabinet meeting. We tried that once or twice in the Eisenhower Administration and I think Lyndon Johnson tried it once - they were utter disasters from the public relations standpoint.

His National Parks Tour may be something worth considering, if it doesn't appear to be too obvious. For example, Mike Mansfield wants me to come to Montana to dedicate a couple of dams in Sea Glacier Park (?) which I have never visited. This may not be a bad idea, but running around to four or five parks and spending about a week at it would seem to me would turn off a lot of people.

With regard to our relations with the press, I think we have one asset that has not been properly exploited. I mentioned this to Ziegler and Klein, but I don't think either of them have got it through. The fact that in my entire public career, I have never berated a reporter, his publisher, or his editor, and that I do not do so as President. I, from time to time, will mention a column or story to a reporter, but usually when it is one involving a member of the family - seldom does it involve myself. This is in such direct contrast to what both Kennedy and Johnson did, that I think we could make a point or two here. I've put this one out before but you may toss it about with your PR types, including Safire and Moore, and see if a column making this point may not be in order. This might be one where we would have to have our own Administration columnist write and circulate broadly. Perhaps no one who has been in this office has been more badgered by the press than I have - than has been under more deadly and continued assault by the press than I have been, and yet no one who has held the office has acted less personally to these assaults.

John Ehrlichman's suggestion with regard to entertaining Congressional families, rather than members makes sense. Here I want the Church Service used through the year. We should be able to get most of the members of the House and Senate to the White House with their families. In this connection, incidentally, I would invite even the Democratic Presidential candidates. The Church Service is a perfect instrument for this purpose, because we do not allow the press to take pictures and they are not supposed to ask questions. On the other hand, we would not invite them to State Dinners, or to Evenings at the White House, where the possibility of pictures or the press people talking to them is much increased.

Ehrlichman makes a very good suggestion with regard to setting up task forces of younger Congressmen to give them schooling on key issues. This should be explored. I would include, however, not just younger Congressmen, but all Congressmen and Senators, particularly those on our side and on whom we are going to have to count on to see us through the battle on revenue sharing, taxes, etc. John makes a very good point when he says that under no circumstances must I become a candidate or a manager of the campaign before the time the Convention acts. However, he is wrong in believing I would be disposed to do so. That was the strength of my position for 1968, and it will continue to be our strength now.

The purpose of this memorandum is to give you, and others who will have the responsibility in this field, my own thinking on some key decisions. From now on, I simply don't want to hear about how you implement those decisions and I, of course, would be the last one ever to comment publicly or privately on those decisions.

This will, of course, drive the press up the wall and it will particularly do so if we can get the rest of the White House staff to follow exactly the same line. What I am really suggesting here is that, except for those who go over to the National Committee, everybody on the White House staff simply declare a moratorium on political discussion with the press, or with anybody who might talk to the press. I will expect you to try to carry out this injunction to the letter.

I think Ray Price's memorandum better sums up my attitude as to the posture we should take over the next two years, than any of the rest. He understands the mystique of the Presidency in a profound way that most others really are searching for. I would suggest that you re-read it so that this can color your own instructions to others in the political arena when you have discussions with them.

Now for some odds and ends. With regard to the press we have covered that pretty thoroughly, but I think one point should be made which I feel very strongly about. I recall, against my better judgment, I've seen over the last three years, people like Whitcover, Wills, Sidey, with results that we might anticipate. I simply don't think we ought to waste Presidential time on any individual with that type when we know that in the final analysis, regardless of something positive they might write, the article and those that follow it generally will turn out to be negative. With a Dick Wilson or a Stewart Alsop we have honest men who will honestly disagree with my position, and from time to time it is worth seeing one of them, but not people that we know are hopelessly in the other camp. Up at Camp David this weekend I saw a football game and then later on another program. What struck me was how I was turned off by a repetition of a commercial. I think that we should be developing now thoughts with regard to our commercials, so that if we repeat them they not be on the same network on the same day. I think we need a large variety of commercials and not have repetition, particularly where that repetition should involve me or my participation in any respect.

A final thought. Keep this memorandum for your own file only.
Discuss pertinent points with those who need to know only.

My final tape (?) is that if this long memorandum puts a much
too great burden on you, with all the other things you have to
do, it is not my thought -----

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 11, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM THE PRESIDENT

I think you are going to find it necessary to divide up your staff in terms of those projects which require "charging them up". You have first our true-believing Liberals like Garment, Price, Huebner, et al. Their attitude is completely understandable - they naturally didn't like the answer on forced-housing integration and they are more concerned about the kind of nonsense that Bob Semple holds about - bringing the country together - rather than thinking realistically about the fact that we are always going to have differences ^{that} in bringing the country together and we're doing is to try to de-escalate the rhetoric. What I think you will want to do is give them separate treatment and separate projects - men don't change at their age and it is really unfair to try to change them. They are warm, decent, humanitarian liberals and if it weren't for the fact that we were in power and that they have a strong personal relationship - particularly Garment and Price - with me, they would be out rooting and tooting with the likes of Gardner, Kingman Brewster and Scranton.

We need such men on our staff because they give leaven to the hard-nosed people like Buchanan. On the other hand, they can be useful on the staff only if they are treated separately, having in mind their totally different viewpoint on the PR front.

What you need to do on the other side of the coin is really charge up those who are willing to be charged up. I don't mean to charge them up so that they all go off and be two-bit Agnews. Charge them up so that they know that politics over the next two years is not a question of bringing in Blacks, and Liberal Senators and making them feel that they are "wanted" but it is going to be cold steel with the amenities engaged in only for purposes of appearance and not for purposes of action.

This basically is the trouble with most of our Cabinet. They simply do not understand how to get into a fight and win it - win it gracefully, win it as gracefully and as non-belligerently as possible - but, above all, to play the game hard and strong so that we finally come up with the votes.

As a special favor to me I want you to get Nofziger, Buchanan, Huston, and anybody else who has the steel to play the game, to take personal charge launching an all-out offensive against the press after their infantile buildup on the press conference and then falling on their faces.

H. R. Haldeman

- 3 -

Dont bring Ziegler in because he's got to get along with them, and don't bring in Klein because he is too soft. Use him of course -

. On this one give me a complete report as to what you accomplish.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 21, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM THE PRESIDENT

I have been doing a lot of thinking with regard to our White House staff as we enter the next two years, and I am passing on some thoughts to you for guidance as we make some critical decisions over the next two or three weeks.

Two years ago, shortly before he died, former Ambassador Bill Bullitt gave me some advice that I think we should have in mind on all the decisions we make with regard to the White House staff and top appointments in the Cabinet and in the Administration as we come into this critical period.

He said: "The greatest mistake most Presidents make is to allow themselves, because of sentiment, to be surrounded in some top positions by first-rate, second-rate men."

As I apply that standard to our White House staff I come up with some conclusions that I am sure you will agree with. We have absolutely first-rate men in Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Shultz and Kissinger. At a second level we have first-rate men in Weinberger for the budget, Kalmbach handling my personal affairs, and, at another level, John Davies handling the Visitors to the White House and Rex Scouten in his position as Chief Usher.

Beyond that we have to take a good, hard look. What particularly concerns me is a conversation I had with Bob Finch in which he strongly urged that we keep Bob Hitt at the National Committee. You know my great affection for Bob and Pat Hitt, but I think you will agree that this is a good example of a first-rate second-rate man. We must not allow sentiment to lead us to continuing with an individual who simply doesn't measure up to the standard that is essential if we are going to meet the great challenge we have in the next two years.

The conversation I had with Shultz with regard to our Economic team brings this home with a great impact. McCracken, and even Dr. Burns, simply aren't the best men we could have had for these positions. What we will try to do here is to continue to work with Shultz to strengthen the Council of Economic Advisers. As far as Burns is concerned we will have to depend on Connally to provide the strength that we have not had in this field over the past two years.

When we look at our research team we find a number of star players but not a leader. Jim Keogh very honestly recognized this fact when he said that he really wondered whether he had been able to do the job that needed to be done in this field. I think he did the best he possibly could have done, recognizing the problems that we have - but now it's a new ball game with Price, Buchanan and Safire we have first-rate men, but still no man to lead the team.

In the television field we have made the move that we should have made long ago, by bringing Carruthers in. We should not have gone along for the time that we have with Roger Ailes and Scott - they really aren't the first-rate men that we could have in this field. I think Carruthers however will fill this need and we should give him all possible backing on this front.

When we come to the PR field generally and the Press Office specifically, I have reluctantly concluded that we have to make some pretty hard choices. Ziegler should stay on, ~~officially~~ it is recognized that he is to stay on as a briefing officer. The idea that we could keep Klein and still have Colson be the man in charge of implementing the Administration's information policy simply won't work. It would mean that Klein, regardless of what we told him, would feel that he had to be in charge and this kind of divided authority has never worked in any organization and will not work over the next two years. If Klein will not move to the National Committee, I think we have to move him to Mexico.

Moving Colson into the position of Director of Information, or whatever we want to call the spot, will break a lot of china, but unless he has the title and the authority he isn't going to be able to do the job - particularly if he has Klein looking over his shoulder all the time sitting in the meetings, with Cabinet Officers and Congressional Leaders not knowing where to look for decisions. We simply can't have two men in charge of this vital responsibility.

What we have to recognize is that over the past two years all that has really come true in terms of the many admirable accomplishments of our Administration has been the decisions we have made in foreign policy. In the field of domestic policy and, even more important, the field of getting across the personal qualities of leadership, boldness, courage, hard work, humanity, etc., we have simply struck out and we shouldn't kid ourselves on this score. It is tempting to blame all of this on the fact that we have an economic downturn and that once the economy starts turning up that all these things will be cured. But the test of a team is not whether it is able to look good when everything goes well, but whether it comes through when things are tough. I think when we examine our team in the PR and research field we will have to agree in all honesty that we have too many first-rate second-rate men.

The best indication of how weak we are in this field is that virtually all of the memoranda that we received after the election dealt with the question of "what RN could do to get the Administration more support". The real question that needs to be answered is "what can others do apart from what RN does to get across some of the very effective actions we have taken in so many fields."

This brings me to some of the decision we have to make. In addition to moving Klein, and putting Ziegler in the spot where we will not depend on him for more than he can be expected to accomplish, we must move immediately on such individuals as Chotiner. The suggestion that he move to the Vice President's staff to handle Federal-State relations is a good one. However, if that is done you must have a straight, hard-line talk with Agnew, pointing out Chotiner's weaknesses as well as his strengths so that the Vice President is not saddled with someone who might lead him in the wrong direction. Of course, from our standpoint the important thing is to get Chotiner out of the White House and I would agree that in this instance, the Vice President's office is probably the best move anybody has come up with. Carry this out, but carry it out in a way that will protect Agnew and also keep Chotiner on a proper leash.

I think Dent is the right man for the assignment we have given him and I think Timmons, with the MacGregor appointment, is the right man for the assignment we have given him. I believe Colson is probably the best man we have come up with to run the Information Office.

The big hole, as we both recognize, is still the need for a top man who can not only be a spokesman who will have great credibility with the press, with the Cabinet, with the Congressional Leaders, but who also will have my confidence and whose views I will respect when the big plays have to be made. Beyond that there is, of course, the need for someone to tpullly research and speechwriting team together and to lead it.

One top man could do both jobs and I realize that tit is almost impossible to find one that will fit this assignment, but I think our goal must be to move in that direction.

With regard to Finch I think that he is in about the right spot. He should be a Counsellor to the President and should act like a free safety to handle special assignments, but we should always recognize his weakness in being to implement , coordinate or manage any program. In fact as we look at the Cabinet appointments, we reluctantly have to conclude that his appointment was a mistake in the first instance. For example onthe Domestic side, our strongest Cabinet Officer is probably Richardson considering the magnitude of the job and the capability that he has to do that job.

Mitchell of course is a special case and we should continue to rely on him to do exactly what he is doing, but I don't believe we should think of him in any other capacity except as a top adviser to the President when the big plays have to be made.

Rumsfeld presents a particularly difficult problem because we simply don't have an assignment for him. I think your idea of letting him free-wheel for the next three to six months is probably a good one. I doubt however that we could put him in charge of Information over Colson, Ziegler, et al and have it work. On the other hand he may be the only man that we could find who could do that job. This is a matter for further discussion.

My final thought is that in determining what we do on all three fronts - the Chairmanship of the National Committee, the top PR man, and the top Director of Information man, as well as the top man in the field of speechwriting, etc., is that we be absolutely candid and honest with ourselves in determining whether we are going forward with the best we can possibly find, or whether we are settling for sentimental or other reasons for "a first-rate second-rate man.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 20, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM THE PRESIDENT

I have just read the long memorandum which Buchanan wrote to me with regard to the conservatives and it leaves me somewhat mystified because apparently some of the instructions I have given to you and Ehrlichman and others on this very subject have not been carried out.

The basic problem with any splinter group and any radical group who have no place to go but with us is not to take them for granted -- to pay some attention to them. I knew that when Martin Anderson left that it was necessary to fill that void with somebody who was known to be a conservative. And, as you may recall, I have explored with you the possibility of bringing Robert Nesbett in to take the Moynihan spot or somebody with credentials like that. If Vermont Royster would come on full time, that would answer the problem to an extent but not completely because he is not far enough on the right to satisfy those who have strong conservative feelings.

What I am now directing is that at the staff level we can mute much of the conservative criticism by simply having someone at a high rank, who is known to be sympathetic to their views and who also is known to have the respect of the President -- Robert Nesbett is one good possibility although I would check this with Buchanan to see whether or not he would meet the test. Another would be Vermont Royster. Perhaps on that list of intellectuals you sent to me a few days ago you can find someone else but I want immediate action taken to fill this need. Also, I feel the staff will be better balanced to have someone of this type on the staff. After all, Finch, Rumsfeld and Shultz all pull in varying degrees to the left of center. We need somebody who will balance them on the right of center. Ehrlichman, of course, should stay right in the center where he is.

Now to reply directly to the Buchanan memorandum, I think you should write him a memorandum incorporating the following points in a hard-hitting direct way and ask him to carry the line. As a matter

of fact, the best thing to do is to get in his group of White House conservatives and give them all the word -- probably orally rather than in memorandum form, or in memorandum form if you think it is secure. In that connection, I again urge that a meeting be held with Buchanan, Nofsiger, Timmons, Dent et al, so that the conservative group on the White House staff doesn't feel that they are out in rightfield - or clear over the fence. I think we have all been so busy that you have been unable to carry out that directive which, as you may recall, I have been urging for some time.

In your memorandum - or discussion - with this group, these points should be made: (Incidentally, it might be well to include the Vice President in the group when it meets since he is still considered to be one of them. Also it is time to knock down the absolutely silly idea that we are trying to mute the Vice President or downgrade him. As a matter of fact, against great pressures, and this is one of the points you should make to this group, RN has in every press conference refused to join in the chorus of criticism of the Vice President, he has defended him at every turn, he has given him assignments far beyond what any Vice President has ever received before, and has given him assignments in the domestic field because he feels the Vice President really needs this in order to broaden his base for support in 1972).

If the conservatives want to know some actions we have taken that lean in their direction, why not emphasize these points:

1. My opposition to forced integration of housing.
2. My insistence that our health program have a requirement for everybody who can afford to to pay something rather than to make it an entirely free paid program which, of course, is what the socialized medicine advocates want.
3. My veto of the 1970 ^{WPA} ~~TRIA~~ Bill" even though it had the Administration's manpower proposal attached to it. This was probably one of my most difficult vetoes due to the fact that it came when unemployment was high and would have allowed mayors and other local officials to put 300,000 or so people on leaf raking jobs in cities and counties.
4. My veto of other big spending bills - vetoes which will continue whenever they exceed the full capacity budget requests that I will be sending to the Congress.

5. My court appointments and my standing by them -- not only at the Federal level but at the circuit court and district court levels. We have gotten very little credit for the latter and they have changed the courts as much as anything else. My fight for Haynsworth, for Carswell - the fact that the court actually has begun to turn right and that fact that I have reiterated my intention to appoint a Southern, strict constructionist to the court when the next vacancy occurs -- the conservatives seem to have forgotten this.
6. My standing by Dole as Chairman of the National Committee despite the strong efforts of the Eastern group to put in somebody more acceptable to them. No one certainly can question Dole's conservative credentials. The best way to sell this to the conservatives is that he was fought right to the last minute by Scott.
7. My support of Agnew - previously mentioned.
8. My refusal in my letter to Scranton, despite the fact that it was couched as it should have been in conciliatory terms, to endorse his commission's idea that the cause of student unrest was solely or even primarily the war, etc. The conservatives concern about my having mentioned Kent State and Jackson is pure rubbish. Where any American President cannot be concerned about the deaths of people (in the case of Jackson, completely innocent people) then that man just isn't fit to be President. Of course, the difficulty with the conservatives is that they have a totally hard-hearted attitude where human problems and any compassion is concerned. Just as their counterparts on the liberal left have a similar totally hard-hearted attitude insofar as people as individuals are concerned despite their protestations that they like people in the mass.

In the field of foreign policy, it is absolutely ridiculous for Buchanan's group to raise any questions whatever. After all, this is the President who went into Cambodia; this is the President that conceived and ordered the Santoy raid; this is the President that fought the ABM through and spent more hours of his time talking to individual Senators to get that one vote majority than any President in history; this is the President that fought the cuts in the Defense budget and got through the supplemental for Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam; this is the President that went to the

hustings all over the country against those who had taken the left liberal line and for those who opposed them; this is the President who has refused to go to the Summit or to make any other concession to the Russians unless there is a quid-pro-quo; this is the President who by firm, strong diplomacy averted a war in the Mid-East by facing up to the Russians with our movements of the Sixth Fleet; this is the President who by similar quiet and effective diplomacy prevailed upon the Russians to desist in their program for building a nuclear submarine base in Cuba. (Why aren't some of the conservatives who were squealing about this base when they didn't have the intelligence information as to what was really there now praising the Administration for standing firm when everybody knows that the submarine has gone back to Russia)?

All in all, I see in the Buchanan memorandum the same defensive, unimaginative attitude which seems to have prevailed in the early months of our Congressional relations activities and too often even among some of our activities with the press over the entire two years. We hold the hands of our critics and tut-tut about those "other people" on the White House staff who are giving the President bad advice. The net impression of this is to show the President up as a weak man who is buffeted and pulled and turned and hauled by whoever happens to get his ear at a certain time.

What has to happen here is that all the members of our staff have simply got to get off their cans and be more aggressive in talking up for the President, both on his policies and on what kind of a man he is. I thought that the two year summaries in LIFE and NEWSWEEK pointed up our grave problem in this respect. I know that members of the White House staff spent hours with Griffith of ~~LIFE~~ and with Elson and Hubbard who collaborated in doing the piece for NEWSWEEK. Yet nothing got through except a little prattling about minor successes in foreign policy and the fact that the President "loves the trappings of the job" which is apparently what they seem to have gotten from their conversations with Herb Klein when he said "RN loves to be President," but is "uncomfortable" in his handling of the job, in his dealings with the Congress, with the press, with the people, etc. I would have come on hard and tough with these people on the fundamental point that I have been trying to make all along and that none of you really have ever gotten across, -- That we came into the White House with almost unanimous opposition from the working press, that we have continued to have that kind of opposition; that the President has taken it without flinching, with great poise, has handled his press conferences with the greatest skill of any President in memory and that despite the chorus of disapproval of virtually everything he has done by the Press corps he has maintained majority support of the people by going over their heads directly to the people.

The Buchanan memo coupled with the pieces in LIFE and NEWSWEEK point up it seems to me, the very serious weakness of the entire White House and Cabinet operation on the PR side. It has been defensive and many times self-serving and in sum, almost totally inadequate and unless we reverse it quite dramatically we are doing to be in very deep trouble over the next two years when the going is going to get rougher and when the President going on television isn't going to be enough.

A good example of the weakness that I have been trying to point up for the past several weeks is a memorandum which Alex sent over to me last night prior to the meeting this morning in which Klein and Ziegler were asked to recount what I had said at the Cabinet meeting. Klein's memo read as if he hadn't been there at all. It gave his ideas as to what he would advise me to say if I were to speak before such a group. Ziegler's, on the other hand, was a perfectly adequate - although mediocre job - of reporting some of the things that I said. Neither, of course, got anywhere near the spirit of the meeting and missed the most colorful quotes which they could have reminded me of. In that entire room then I guess we have to assume we didn't have one man who had the capacity for remembering what was said and could give both the words and the color to me if I wanted to refer to it at a later point -- and, just as important, have the words and the color for our White House records. If you ask Rumsfeld or Finch, for example, they can tell you that "gee, it was great," but neither of them, of course, should be expected to remember what was said because that was not their job. The need for one man on this staff who has the capacity in this respect and who will cover every event in a very low key way is now quite apparent. What a Walters couldn't have done, for example, with that meeting and with perhaps a dozen other meetings of that type that we have had over the past two years and which have gone almost totally unnoticed due to the fact that we had no one there who was able to go out and enthusiastically report the proceedings. I have decided that the idea of having a different man cover different meetings simply won't work because a man is either a good reporter or he isn't a good reporter and Finch, Rumsfeld, Klein, etc., do not have that capacity and should not be expected to - except possibly for Klein who can never develop it at this time.

Moore probably could have done the job earlier but I don't think he has the memory capability at this time to do it and he would feel uncomfortable and make me uncomfortable if he were scribbling notes furiously throughout every meeting that I had.

I don't know the answer but I know that we certainly don't have anyone presently in sight who can do the job.

Having dictated all of this just before 12 o'clock on January 20, I again reiterate what I said at the staff meeting -- this is the best White House staff in history in terms of IQ and BQ. It still has a great deal to go in terms of developing some EQ. We shouldn't hold people responsible for not having EQ if they are not that kind of person but perhaps in that whole PR complex we could find just one who could convey the spirit and the enthusiasm of a meeting after it takes place to others in a way that they then will report it.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION
January 29, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *K*
SUBJECT: Secretary Stans' Report on his Trip to
Nicaragua

Attached at Tab B is a report from Secretary Stans on his trip to Nicaragua, December 8-10. You will recall that President Somoza had requested a visit of this nature during his visit to Washington for the State Dinner honoring Heads of State attending the UN General Assembly.

Secretary Stans' trip was extremely successful, serving to reinforce our friendly relations with Nicaragua and reassure President Somoza of our interest in his country and in Central America. During the visit President Somoza made the following requests or observations:

- That the US raise Nicaragua's sugar quota;
- That the US exert its influence to resolve some of the differences between countries in the Central American Common Market;
- That the US continue its military assistance to Nicaragua, especially in the fields of equipment and schooling;
- That in the future AID projects show a closer identification with his own development objectives which emphasize agricultural diversification;
- That Nicaragua is a promising area for US private investment in the fields of protein production development (i. e. cattle and fish), lumbering, and mineral exploration.

Secretary Stans reports that he has already taken steps to respond to Somoza's problems or requests insofar as they fall within his

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*NSC Country Files - Latin America
Box # 790
Nicaragua
Vol I (1969-1974)*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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area of responsibility and has undertaken coordination with other agencies in some instances where this is required.

Attached at Tab A is a letter from you to Secretary Stans thanking him for his report and commending him on the success of his mission to Nicaragua.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter to Secretary Stans at Tab A. The letter has been cleared with Pat Buchanan.

Attachments:

- Tab A - Letter to Secretary Stans
- Tab B - Memo from Stans

*NSC CURRENT FILES - LATIN AMERICA
BOX # 790
NICARAGUA
VOL I
(1969-1974)*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 8, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN

FROM THE PRESIDENT

Sometime ago I pointed up the importance of unmasking Muskie's moderate image and I urged that this particularly be done in the South.

In talking to Billy Graham Sunday he came at this point very strongly and said that Muskie was becoming increasingly acceptable in the South because most southerners thought that he was a moderate, both domestically and in the field of foreign policy.

The purpose of this memorandum is two-fold:

What happened to the suggestion that I made with regard to getting the true facts across in the South?

And, second, can we put somebody on this project now who will follow through on it effectively?

Dent, of course, can be helpful, but I was thinking of somebody on the PR side like Buchanan. And, of course, everything should be worked through Nofziger and Dole. The Muskie record, for example, voting against both Haynsworth and Carswell; his record of opposition on Cambodia and supporting peace groups generally; and anything else that might be helpful in getting the true picture across in the South should be developed as effectively as possible.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

file

May 7, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
SUBJECT: Political Memorandum

Evident from the attached, there is a new strain of bitterness, frustration and alienation among younger conservatives, toward the Administration. Increasingly, it has focused on the White House Staff -- especially in attacks directed at John Ehrlichman and his staff.

Basically, these are the reasons for it:

First, younger conservatives, more True Believer than the older National Review columnists crowd, are distressed at the departure from the White House staff of conservatives Burns, Harlow, Freeman, Anderson, Allen, Nofziger, Huston, Mollenhoff, etc. They do not see anyone replacing the departing conservative voices.

Second, they are convinced that the White House staff has been structured to systematically exclude "conservative" input in domestic policy - thus, the recent attacks on John Ehrlichman from the Right in recent months.

Third, they believe that the President makes his decisions, not on the basis of who he sees, but what he reads; and they contend there is no conservative view presented in the day-to-day paper going in and out of the President's office. They feel that the President's instincts are basically conservative, but he just does not get enough conservative proposals, and conservative views; and they feel this is the reason for what they see as the mistakes (i. e. FAP) of the Administration. As for conservative ideas

*news summary
is liberal?*

(i. e. special revenue sharing) these seem to them to be dying without any major Administration concern.

Fourth, they believe that the golden opportunity to build a "new Republican majority" of conservative Democrats, and regular Republicans, is being lost -- because of the Administration's domestic policies, which they see as by and large extensions and refinements of the Great Society, only more so.

Fifth, they are all Nixonites -- but they contend that if the President is re-elected with his existing staff structure without conservative representation -- then, they will have totally lost their leverage with the President and Administration -- the dream of the New Republican Majority will be gone forever, "we will be out of the ball game completely."

In short, they are convinced with Richard Goodwin that "structure is policy," and with those Congressmen who believe that the "White House Staff" is responsible for the leftward direction of an Administration whose President has basically conservative instincts.

What they have in mind, if they don't see some changes, is to try to co-ordinate a conservative attack on the White House staff, to persuade some of the older columnists to join it; in the hope that the attacks will bring about some changes in the present staff structure, perhaps force the addition of political conservatives to the President's top staff.

While the number of individuals involved in the effort is not great, they do have at least one columnist among them -- and they are determined to win as many Congressmen and columnists and publications to their effort as possible. Some of the far right anti-Nixon conservatives would probably join the effort.

The whole effort has been building for months. We have managed to stave it off -- arguing that the exercise would be counter-productive, that you cannot attack the President's staff without striking the President; and that any damage done to the

President only enhances the possibility that a Muskie or Kennedy will be sitting in the White House in two years; and if that happens, the Western World can close up shop.

All of those involved, incidentally, were to my knowledge Nixon Conservatives in 1968, not Reagan conservatives.

I have passed this along, as these fellows consider me their "conduit" to the President; and as I think their present spirit, mood and plans could present us with some serious problems in the months ahead.

ie who are they?

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 8, 1971

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

L. HIGBY *L*

I talked to Colson on Brookings and he will handle with Ehrlichman.

He wanted you to know that Buchanan will not do the job. He would now like to work with Malek in finding a suitable candidate. *ask E*

He also indicates that the next step is getting Hecht positioned on the Hill. He wants to know if you want to do this or if you want to be involved. *ask E*

Colson would also like to now get Malek into the BLS if that is possible (I have now checked with Bill Horton and he indicates that Malek is not Jewish so you may want to proceed with this). *NO*

On another subject, Colson requests your help regarding getting a story on the dignity of the White House, etc., (one that you have been requesting for quite some time) in Family Circle magazine. Colson said that everything had been worked out and agreed to on this by Ziegler and Stuart and now that they are moving ahead with the story, Connie Stuart has reported back that she does not think Mrs. Nixon will agree with doing the story. He requests that you speak with ~~Mrs. Nixon~~. *Connie & if necessary of Mrs. N.*

~~(I will get all the facts on the story)~~

See attachment

*Someone else has to tell -
C Klein*

Chron F

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 4, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT: Staff Operations

As you requested, I have reviewed the present operations of my office, how it can be more effectively directed to the campaign year ahead and the personnel situation.

The priority activities of this office are at the present time:

1. News Planning and Coordination. This involves not only planning but most importantly ensuring that events are executed as planned.

Essential to this effort has been a major undertaking to politicize and make more effective the departmental PIO/PR operations.

2. Major Administrative PR Initiatives and Political Project Follow Through. The development of major themes and carrying out of the activities to support them -- such as the Man of Peace, the economic issue, etc.
3. Political Liaison and Cultivation of Interest Groups and Key Individuals.
4. The Counter Attack Against our Critics.
5. Maximize Media Coverage for the Political Promotion of the President -- TV Specials, Articles, Columns, etc.
6. Maximize Administration Resources (in support of 1. and 2. above) and Dessiminate Information Throughout the Administration.

The foregoing does not include frequent project assignments which I take on involving specific and generally somewhat political issues. It has been my goal to see that my staff is able to handle much of the day to day operations in the six categories above, leaving me free for more time for specific assignments from you or the President. I have not been as successful in this to date as I would like; it is coming along now, however.

In general, all of these areas are, in my opinion, directed to the President's reelection, so that I would not propose to delete any of these broad areas of effort.

The following is an analysis of each of these activities, how well we are or are not doing, how they can be further limited to activities with a political pay-off next year and how well the present staff meets these requirements.

1. News Planning, Coordination and Execution.

The news planning group consists of Scali, Chapin, Ziegler, Moore, Safire, Buchanan, Barker and myself. Dick Howard acts as the Secretary of the group and maintains the news calendar.

Some meetings have been excellent; others unproductive. We need to constantly improve this process. Although I am not a believer in big meetings, this group has from time to time produced some very good work. We also have frequent meetings in between of smaller groups to keep the news moving. Clearly it has been a useful tool in coordination.

It is Scali's function to see that the planned news events involving Defense and State are properly executed, that the people involved are briefed, that the media is alerted and that the right line is taken. John has been very effective with Laird and Rogers in this role and I think works well with Ziegler programming foreign policy activities that take place here in the White House. Barker has the responsibility for execution on the domestic side. He doesn't have Scali's clout or expertise and he has, therefore, been slower to get things moving. He is getting better by the day. For example, this afternoon he programmed the Cost of Living Council press conference to get maximum mileage out of the Wholesale Price Index figures. He has

worked well with Shumway and Snyder to maximize media coverage of Administration news events. In the domestic area, I have had to deal with the Cabinet officers myself, but Barker has done a very professional job of following through with the staffs. In this area, he has a mammoth undertaking as you can surmise from my memo to you regarding tomorrow's Cabinet meeting (copy attached) and by definition progress in this area will be slow because we just have to keep chipping away piece by piece.

In summary, the major object of the news planning and coordination process has been to provide Administration news on days when flow from the White House is light, to maximize the coverage, to guide the agencies or individuals responsible and to ensure that the news is properly covered. The latter point is terribly important and it is in this area that we rely heavily on Snyder and Shumway. Many times we have averted or turned around a bad story and/or maximized the impact of a good one.

2. Major Administrative Political Initiatives.

Through use of the news planning group or by individual assignment, we constantly develop plans for handling specific projects ranging from general economic plans to specific hot issues like the foreign aid bill. Our task is to develop the strategy, the major themes and then to see that they are carried out. It's in this area that we can do considerable streamlining over the next 12 months. Bill Rhatican is the principal project man for follow through. A good half of his time over the past year has been spent working on projects that may not have a major political impact next year, revenue sharing, reorganization and environment. I have been gradually weaning Bill away from these, concentrating his efforts on the economy and to a lesser extent on drugs and crime. Bill is able, has handled all of the Administration road shows, coordinating with Pat O'Donnell for speakers, Snyder for local TV and Shumway for local press. He also, for example, handled the NAM closed circuit TV, the Advertising Council activities in support of the Cost of Living Council and the Citizens Committee.

We need to identify the gut issues for next year and then not permit this phase of our operation to be side tracked into things that are not politically profitable.

We have tried to develop major strategy plans involving major issues and then fit them into our news planning meetings to ensure that in our planning process, we take into account the major strategic political goals. In short, we try to mesh this activity with that described in Number 1 above.

3. Political Cultivation of Interest Groups and Individuals.

I have finally succeeded in delegating almost all of this area to George Bell who concentrates on individuals and Henry Cashen who concentrates on groups. This operation is in part election-oriented and in part a service function to the rest of the White House. For example, Timmons acknowledges that Henry Cashen's effort with organized groups was critical in the recent federal pay deferral veto issue.

Henry has developed a good working relationship with most of the groups that I had cultivated in my first year and has used them frequently and effectively. We have a very good handle on where our strengths and weaknesses are with organized groups and have penetrated almost all that can have political impact next year. In one way or another, we have also engineered initiatives which have been important to many of the most powerful groups and the follow up has been very good. We have the techniques well established for getting extensive coverage in trade associations, veterans, aging and other journals and publications.

George Bell's contact program has been perfected probably as well as we can expect. He presently has several thousand names categorized. Almost all of the key people have had White House invitations of one kind or another (all major contributors have been to major functions). We make frequent use of the list for mailings and for the phone call program. In short, the major movers and shakers across the country have felt some kind of continuous contact with the White House. This is an ongoing program that we will want to intensify next year.

The youth effort is, of course, a key part of our interest group cultivation. McLane, with a lot of very able help from Hallett, has this finally off the ground. I am by no means fully satisfied with McLane's performance and I am riding him extremely hard. The biggest limitation here is his own deficiency in not sensing political priorities. His attitude problem is coming around slowly. Hallett on the other hand, has been exceptionally good.

If anything, our efforts with the aging should be expanded rather than cut back. We are now doing a fair job of cultivating the organized aging groups, initiating PR efforts with senior citizens and ramming through some of the policy moves that are necessary to get to this key group. It's been handled, however, by George in a part time effort with some assistance from McLane on the policy side and with the help of a young detailee who will soon be leaving us. I personally feel that there is more political potential here than with the youth but we can probably continue to do the job necessary even though it's a part time effort.

Another critical area is labor. As you know, I recommended a year ago that we bring a labor specialist and liaison man on to the staff. Labor should not be written off. Anything can happen, George Meany might die, the Democrats might nominate McGovern, even Kennedy could be vulnerable with labor. But most importantly we need an effort with the second tier of labor leadership, the Brennans of New York, the DeLucas of Pennsylvania, etc. George Bell has done a very good job in this area but once again, it's but one of several responsibilities he has. Also, except when I can find time, no one really battles within the White House staff the policy issues that can be critically important to gaining rank and file support.

Catholics are another special case. Cashen, Buchanan and I have done a lot of work in this area. There is a good deal of political potential. In fact, it's probably our area of greatest possible gain over 1968. Cashen is handling this effectively and if we make our move on aid to parochial schools, we probably do not need any beefing up here.

As to the ethnic groups, Bell, myself to a lesser extent, and John Volpe have identified and have established good contact with most of the ethnic organizations. While we have done some of the obvious stroking, we need to do much more in the PR exploitation.

As to celebrities, you are aware of the present situation which will not improve until someone at 1701 actively steps in.

4. Counter Attack Against our Critics. This is one area that I simply have not been able to delegate or get effective help from MacGregor's shop. Almost every major counter attack on the Hill has required extensive personal involvement on my part and I have had to, of course, talk to Cabinet members who have thus far been responsive

(for your information, principally Bush, Laird, Richardson, Volpe and Stans). Karalekas writes most of the material with some help from Hallett. He does it very well, but simply doesn't have the stature to line up spokesmen, coordinate the press arrangements and handle it as a full time project assignment. He is also very busy writing talking papers, speech inserts and fact sheets. As you well know, I believe that we need one man to replace Nofziger, not to do what Nofziger was doing, that is, write speeches for the Congressional Record, but rather to organize well publicized counter attacks. Unless MacGregor can make Korologos available, we should recruit someone in this area. I assume Buchanan and Khachigian will be watching daily for attacks of the opposition. One man should be available to be alerted by Buchanan, to write the replies for use either on the Hill or within the Administration and then to fully orchestrate the counter attack. Needless to say, I can continue to do it myself, but this is another effort that should increase rather than decrease over the coming year. The way Ted Kennedy has been going of late, we could almost use a full time man plugging in daily replies to him.

5. Maximizing Media Coverage for the Political Promotion of the President.

This again is a function which should not be curtailed in scope. Snyder spends full time placing Administration speakers, arranging local coverage when they go on the road and working on various TV specials. We have developed plans for several TV specials over the next several months and we will push to accomplish as many of these as possible. Shumway devotes full time to pumping our line out to columnists, arranging local press coverage for Administration spokesmen on the road, handling background briefings out of Klein's office for various White House and Administration officials and shepherding through articles like those under way for the Digest, the one Wilson is doing (for someone now that Look has folded) and the one Thimmesch is doing. Shumway is good but he is by no means able to do all the things I have assigned him. For example, we still don't have an adequate distribution system for the ethnic press or the various special interest groups. Barker is taking most of this over trying to engineer it through the agencies and has made some progress although we need more cooperation from the agencies in politicizing the stuff that they distribute to the special interest press that they serve.

6. Maximizing Administration Resources.

The speaker operation which Pat O'Donnell handles is a full time task and then some. Pat fully understands the priorities. The Chamber of Commerce in Vermont is very low on his scale; a key labor group in Ohio is very high. Pat not only responds to invitations and Presidential "rejects", but also seeks out important forums which he monitors. He then ties the speaker in with Snyder and Shumway to maximize coverage, particularly when we are relying on a speech to give us the Administration news story of the day. We are concentrating entirely on important groups and key states.

We have a major youth speakers program which Allen Hall handles, working with Doug Hallett and Pat O'Donnell. This is just now getting rolling but has considerable promise.

You are familiar with the mailing operation and have expressed some doubts about its effectiveness. We know that the Klein mailings to editors are productive because we see the results in the news clips. Most of the other mailings we look at with a very hard political eye. Believe me, we do not mail much about revenue sharing, but we have had some damn good mailings on busing, the President's peace initiatives, the Efron book and under cover names, material adverse to potential Democratic opponents. Kathleen Balsdon handles the mailing operation in coordination with the National Committee and has the mailing lists in outstanding condition. We can, by pressing a button, get to 50,000 key people almost overnight and the categories are very well structured politically.

The distribution of fact sheets and material to the Cabinet and key Administration spokesmen is, in my opinion, an important service both in keeping them informed and in ensuring that we are taking a coordinated line. As noted above, Karalekas does most of the writing for the mailings, the fact sheets and speech inserts.

The Present Staff

Dick Howard doubles as my number two and as staff coordinator and manager of all administrative operations, mailings, fact sheets, etc. He also supervises the day to day work of O'Donnell, Karalekas, Rhatican, Hallett, Hall and Balsdon. Dick is very solid, efficient and dependable -- also, fully occupied.

Barker and Scali, if they do their jobs right, are also well occupied. Scali has an occasional tendency to drift over into the more ethereal activities of the Kissinger shop but has been worth his weight in gold in handling the operational side discussed above and has a very considerable capacity for work; he can do more in certain areas.

(He should be used more in terms of planning the strategy of our foreign policy initiatives from a PR standpoint. This depends, of course, completely on the extent to which Kissinger or the President want to involve him.) I feel his instincts are good, his knowledge of media excellent, his anticipation of media reaction excellent, his creativity very good and his judgment normally excellent except when he gets overly emotional.

Obviously O'Donnell, Cashen, Bell, Karalekas and McLane cannot be expected to take on any more than they are handling. Each has the kind of job that is infinite, that is, there is always more to do than time to do it in. Rhatican has been, on the other hand, underutilized by the standard of what is election oriented. I have over the past few months begun to reorient his efforts and will do more of it soon and he may be able, therefore, to take on more of the assignments discussed above which are not now being adequately covered.

Allen Hall is a willing, but inexperienced young man who has been handling certain non-priority project assignments, assisting in the youth project and helping on scheduling. We could probably do without him if he could be replaced with someone of more experience and expertise who might be available to take on the counter attack function.

Hallett is a real sleeper, extraordinarily bright and creative. He is also abrasive and tough to handle, although I personally enjoy him. He has an almost insatiable capacity for work and is eager and willing. He has literally come up with as many good creative ideas as either Moore or Safire. For a young man, he has remarkably good political instincts though no political judgment. I think the people at 1701 agree that he did a superb job in putting together the Middle America, labor, ethnic, Spanish-American and veterans campaign strategy plans. Hallett should not have an operational responsibility. I intend to continue to use him in his present role to make the most of his creativity, ability in writing and development of plans which others execute.

Summary

In my judgment, very few of the foregoing activities should be curtailed in an election year although as you review this you might judge otherwise. In one area we can and should cut back, that is, some of the domestic initiatives which simply are not going to be gut issues in the election (I hasten to add there may be new ones like the tax and school proposal which will require major PR efforts in the next year). In fact, I think that some of the activities need more emphasis particularly in the counter attack department and in the cultivation of key voting blocs, specifically labor, aging and ethnics. The cultivation of these groups will become particularly significant as the campaign organization is structured. If it is to try to reach these groups, it will need a major effort here in cooperation.

[133-1702] Magruder
133

COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
(202) 333-0920

January 7, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: JEB S. MAGRUDER

Evidentially, there has recently been some discussion regarding whether or not 1701 has been "raiding" the White House staff and/or offering salaries higher than those which are paid at the White House -- which is untrue -- our general rule is to pick up people at their present salary level.

In the event that you are asked about this alleged "raiding," I thought the following list of those White House employees who have come here since May might be of interest to you:

1. Rob Odle. Rob had worked with me in Klein's office, and as you know, both Colson and Klein agreed to his coming here.
2. Gene Roberts. Gene came to the White House as my secretary.
3. Bart Porter. Porter had worked briefly for Colson and Klein, and as you know, it was agreed by both that he might come here. There was the problem with his salary at the time he moved here, and that difficulty can be attributed to me.
4. Martha Duncan. Martha Duncan had served as Bart's secretary for some months.
5. Ken Smith. Ken had mentioned to Rob Odle several times that he desired to leave the Allin/Buchanan news summary staff, and intended to leave the White House regardless of whether or not he found a job here. He also wrote of his desire to join the staff here in a letter to the Attorney General. Both Pat Buchanan and Mort Allin strongly indorsed his coming here, and urged us to take him. Incidentally, since he has come, he has done a very outstanding job.

CONFIDENTIAL

6. Gordon Liddy. It was John Dean's idea that Liddy come here as General Counsel, and this was agreed upon by Dean and the Attorney General. Although I felt it was too high, I did not set his salary.

There is a number of other former White House employees who either are now working in other divisions of the campaign which do not report to me, or came here after intervening employment between their White House positions and their beginning here. These are:

1. Harry Flemming. As you know, he resigned from the White House staff, went into private business, and came here later.
2. Al Kaupinen. He came directly here from the White House as Harry Flemming's assistant and at Harry's request.
3. Hugh Sloan. You are aware of the situation here.
4. Dolores Ulman. She worked for Flemming at the White House, left when he did, and came to the committee several weeks after he began here.
5. Kathy O'Melia. Kathy left John Ehrlichman's staff to travel in Europe for an extended time. Many members of John's staff urged Rob to take Kathy on here after her return, and she also has done an outstanding job as our switchboard operator-receptionist.

There is also the prospect of Van Shumway, and his secretary Karen Koon, leaving to come here. When this was first discussed, it was agreed by a member of your staff, Cliff Miller, and me, that Miller should work with Colson and Klein in arranging this. I was then told that Van's departure had been cleared with Colson, Klein, and your office, and his salary cleared as well by your office.

In my mind, Shumway's date of departure and salary are not settled matters as yet and only will be when your office sets the date and the salary. In other words, we want to do here whatever you think is appropriate.

Also, on this subject, I should mention that several people from the White House, both professional and secretarial, have indicated their desire to join the campaign staff, but we have informed them that we cannot even discuss such a possibility unless it is cleared first at the White House.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 6, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN

FROM THE PRESIDENT



Julie and Tricia were asking me over the weekend what kind of answers they can give now that the Democratic nomination seems to be pretty much a foregone conclusion when asked their opinion on the man or his stands.

My advice off the top of my head was for them to decline to get into personalities, but to simply say that they didn't know much about it except that from listening to the debates and what Humphrey and other Democrats had said that it would appear that McGovern might have a problem in uniting his party.

What I want you to direct Buchanan to do is to figure out all the tough political questions that are likely to be put to Tricia and Julie when they appear on talk shows over the next few months and for him to prepare suggested answers for them which will keep them from getting involved personally, but which will avoid their appearing to be totally non-responsive when such a question is raised. It is vitally important, of course, that they not get headlines which indicates that the daughters of the President are attacking the Democratic nominee. The more off-hand, subtle kind of answer is what I have in mind. This is not generally Buchanan's approach, but I think if you explain it to him he will find ways to tackle the problem that could be very effective. I want you to look over the Q & A after he prepares it before sending it on to Tricia and Julie. This should be done before the end of this week because they are both going to be on shows next week and the week after, as I understand it. They have done extremely well winging it on their own on these political questions up to this point, although I realize they have had considerable help from the staff on substantive matters on

Preservation Copy

where do I stand on environment, welfare, etc. In view of the Moscow trip I told Julie and Tricia that if they were asked what the major issue of 1972 would be that they should respond that while the domestic issues were, of course, extremely important, that where the Presidency was concerned it would be their opinion that most young people, as well as other voters, would be primarily interested in which of the two candidates was best qualified to lead the United States in international affairs and to build on the great peace initiatives we have begun in China and the Soviet Union. In any event, I want some more intensive thinking done on how they should respond to such questions in the light of our recent Moscow trip, having in mind the fact that we want to keep them and all of our speakers talking about our issue which is international affairs, and except for domestic issues that have a real appeal like busing, amnesty and pot to stay off of the domestic issues.

I think the materials prepared for them so far have probably put a little too much emphasis on the environment, welfare reform, revenue sharing, etc. These are good, safe things to talk about but they are relatively dull and will become rather irrelevant as the campaign heats up.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 17, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN DEAN
FROM: KEN KHACHIGIAN 

We have a potential problem that we may be faced with in the fall and need to get an opinion before the fur starts flying.

There is a great deal of valuable videotape footage on the networks which would be useful for us to use in ads. E. g., the California debates where HHH beat McGovern over the head on the issues and some of the interview shows where Wilbur Mills, Scoop Jackson and others have been pounding away at McG. Obviously, it would help us to be able to use these to prove that McGovern is not liked even by his own party.

However, as you know, these materials (though we have them on tape) are the property of the networks, and it is my understanding that copyright laws stand in the way of their use. Moreover, it is also my understanding that the networks will not give permission for use of these tapes to one candidate to use against another candidate.

Let me pose some questions and fact situations along these lines:

Suppose we ran an ad in October which used footage from "Meet the Press" -- showing Scoop Jackson attacking McGovern. Suppose, also, that we did not credit the tape to the network. What would be the possible consequences? Keep in mind that we are going to have 1701 make these tapes and not drag Signal Corps into the process.

What happens if we run the ad and at the bottom say: "NBC film -- Meet the Press?" Is the network likely to be less apt to take legal action against the Re-Elect committee?

Assume the ad runs with the credit line at the bottom and NBC seeks legal action. Would an injunction be their first act? If they seek an injunction, and we comply, and let's say the ad ran only two or three times nationally, would the network be in a position to seek damages, and if so what would the amounts possibly be?

Generally, do you see the problems as being so insurmountable as to militate against any use of network tapes in the fashion I suggest? Consider these points. Let's say they seek an injunction, and we say: "O.K., we will pull it off the air, and regret using your tape. But we don't see how anyone can be angry about using someone's public statements. We felt that Meet the Press was an excellent source of information and we used it." Of course, if there is a public outburst on this, it only draws more attention to the ad itself -- to our benefit I believe.

I am least concerned about the injunction. It wouldn't be so bad -- moreover, I am not sure the networks would be all that upset over the free advertisement of their interview shows. But I would be concerned about monetary damages, and it is in this area where I would think we might want to focus.

Obviously no action will be or would be taken until we have some idea about how to proceed.

cc: Fred Fielding
Pat Buchanan

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 23, 1972

*Saw - Felt
with Carter
Under Look + Keep*

MEMORANDUM TO: CHARLES COLSON

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

Let's get together and make a determination as to how we can get this material investigated fully -- and then gotten out of here. Also, the timing. Perhaps it should come rolling out, in the fall or in October.

Buchanan

*Pat - no need to
talk about it; I've already
taken care of it -
me*

KRUPNICK & ASSOCIATES, INC.

Sales Betterment through research, marketing and

Advertising

BOULEVARD BLDG
SAINT LOUIS, MO. 63103
533-1723

July 19, 1972

Hello Rose:

I want to acknowledge your July 15 letter and tell you it's always good to hear from you.

About the Tom Eagleton picture. I think McGovern made a bad blunder. For in the city of St. Louis, especially, Mark Eagleton, Tom's father, was very well known. And many of us, through the years, have come to know Tom rather well, also.

And what we know would add up to about this:

1. Mark (Tom's father) was a political conniver of a very unsavory nature. He once expressed to Joe Holland, now deceased, his readiness to spend a million dollars to get Tom into the Senate. Mark's loose ethical conduct extended even to his domestic life. I was told by Joe Holland that Mark's Will provided half of his estate to go to his secretary...the other half to his widow. And from what I heard from many sources...his secretary was really his mistress through the years.
2. Tom, as I just told Jack Steel who called me from Washington...has been in and out of Malcolm Bliss several times. Malcolm Bliss is a mental hospital here in town and Tom was suffering from acute alcoholism. He still has a whiskey voice. He came by it honestly.
3. There is a very strong likelihood...as I suggested to Jack Steel for his checking...that Morrie Shenker

Note

probably has been as deeply involved with Tom Eagleton... as he was with the unlamented former Senator Mr. Long. Morrie has been deeply involved with labor representation (Jimmy Hoffa, for example) and this might have been an influence in Tom's selection.

He's a very bright and articulate young man. Photogenic, too. But in the city of St. Louis, his background will hurt him...hurt the ticket, not help it. What it will be outstate is questionable unless the story about him gets out...and then, under such circumstances, it would hurt him dramatically.

So, to sum up my view about his contribution to the ticket in this state...no real contribution...and, very likely, detrimental to the ticket if the story about him gets out...and I'm sure it will.

One aspect of the upcoming campaigning pleases me. It will be fought, I believe, on issues...not personalities. And the mood of the country, Rose, is quite sober. Issues, then, will have impact.

As witness, precisely that situation of the indicated Jewish vote. I continue to be exposed to pro-Nixon comments. I attended a Trustees meeting, for example, at the Jewish Community Center the other evening...and several pro-Nixon statements were made by four or five people talking to each other. And the underlying comment: "I hope to hell the Republicans don't get too cock sure...and that they remember the Wilkie-Truman campaign. This country simply cannot afford to see a McGovern philosophy come in. It would be a disaster."

Rose...without embellishment...it was not only the feeling...those were, as nearly as I can remember, the exact words of Howard Hersch...president of a national envelope manufacturing company with headquarters here in town.

Naturally, as an individual, I want to see R.N. re-elected. And that is personal. But, additionally, just as a citizen genuinely concerned about his country, the desire to see R.N. re-elected is fortified many times over that that concern.

I will be a long time forgetting the seemingly \$44 billion dollar error in the miscalculations of McGovern's "give-away" program. And I bemoan the fact that we seem to be getting further and further away from

a sense of individual, first person I, responsibility for our families; for our careers; for our futures. This most certainly is not the spirit which built this country. And built it into the finest in the world, bar none.

note One more thought about Tom Eagleton which just comes to mind. He's a very impetuous person, and the combination of his drinking and his impetuosity got him into serious trouble at home. He and his wife were separated for a time. This I know.

All good to you, Rose.

Incidentally, I got a phone call from Bob. He's in Washington now. He'll be our house guest Friday night and will then head back to the West Coast Saturday. I'm looking forward to the visit.

My warmest regards.

Sincerely,



Sam Krupnick

Miss Rose Mary Woods,
Personal Secretary
to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

SK/jp

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 26, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

The letters operation which we helped put together two years ago, and which has functioned well, is in danger of becoming bureaucratized over at 1701. This is one instrument both Colson and I have used to move the "negative" on McGovern -- safely -- into the media. We had planned to continue using it in this fashion -- as we should; to have our people writing letters in support of revenue sharing is, in my view, a waste of a resource. That stuff is going to be decided on the Hill. The imperative thing is to make sure that the McGovern extremist material is being constantly put before the public, as the public view on McGovern is beginning to harden.

As an example, we had that bit from Von Hoffman, where Kimmelman was telling Polish jokes in his suite -- and were moving it to all papers via letters to the editor in cities with large Polish populations. This was halted by 1701 as "too negative." The point is that a) it was totally legitimate and b) the letters don't go out on 1701 stationery. In any event, the tendency to fold the letters operation into the overall strategy is not wise, because of the nature of letters, and because this should be a negative function. Negative letters are the most needed now, the most likely to get printed now, and the most important as McGovern's impression is hardening in the public mind.

We can use other sources to praise revenue sharing. But the letters operation should go back to what it was doing. This indicates, in my view, again, a need to get some organization and structure on the anti-campaign.

Buchanan

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 6, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT (Per HRH As Requested)

FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

Have received the poll briefing and while the findings on the issue are unexceptional, the conclusions that are drawn are wrong, I think -- if I do not mistake them. Our surrogates and the Vice President should not spend a disproportionate amount of their time defending our record on unemployment, and economic management. By most everyone's judgment, our record is not considered as that good; this is our "weakest" point -- and a national debate over whether we managed the economy well is perhaps the one debate with McGovern we can lose.

Agreed that Vietnam, inflation, etc. are the crucial issues. We can win on these issues by not so much verbally defending our record, but by portraying McGovern as disasterous to the stock market, disasterous to the job market with his budget cuts in defense and space, disasterous to the security of the U.S., disasterous to the price situation, because of his \$1000 program, or his \$6500 welfare giveaway. In short, let's not so much defend our record, which is subject to criticism, as to attack McGovern with being a clear and present danger to the prosperity we now have.

The point is this: If the Democrats had nominated Harpo Marx, the Teeter polls would have said Vietnam, economy, inflation are the major issues. Would we, in a race with Harpo, talk about those issues -- or would the winning issues rather be the manifest lack of qualification of their candidate -- despite our record.

The decision in November and our rhetoric must not focus upon their issues -- i. e., "unemployment" and the unequal economic record of the last four years -- it must focus upon our issues -- i. e., the extremism, elitism, radicalism, kookism, of McGovern's person, campaign, and programs, against the solid, strong, effective leadership of the President. The first campaign described above is the only way we can lose in 1972 -- and if I am not mistaken,

this is something close to what the Teeter folks recommend, when they say we ought to talk up the economy, and spend an inordinate amount of time defending our record on unemployment.

Nor should we forget the capacity of a candidate (i. e. , Kennedy and the "missile gap, " Goldwater and "extremism") to create issues, on which elections turn, sometimes legitimate issues, sometimes illegitimate. When we portray McGovern's ideas as preposterous, foolish, and even dangerous to U.S. security and the nation's economy, we are right now pushing against an open door -- with the media at large, as well as the country.

The campaign should turn, we should make it turn, upon the manifest unqualification of this character and his ilk to even be in the Presidential contest -- not whether a damn referendum in our spotty economic performance, which talking, talking, talking about the economy and jobs, and unemployment would make it. So, I disagree strongly with what I view as the central thrust of recommendations of the Teeter polls.

Buchanan

Budg an

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 31, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHUCK COLSON

FROM: KEN KHACHIGIAN

Have worked up a brief line on Shriver's Confederate ancestors, and also included a note from Post story indicating that Shriver's family were slaveholders.

Gave it to Stan Scott and he is trying to get the story fed into certain segments of Black media and will give it to Black surrogates.

cc: Buchanan
Stan Scott

President Richard Nixon - Pat Buchanan Papers

SECTION 2

BACM RESEARCH

WWW.PAPERLESSARCHIVES.COM

01/10/1969

Memo from Buchanan to RN RE: Stans cocktail party/dinner. Handwritten notes added by unknown.

JK

MEMO TO: The President-Elect

FROM: Buchanan

January 10, 1969

Personal

*File
Appearance*

THOUGHTS FOR THE STANS COCKTAIL PARTY/DINNER

Maury is one of those members of the Cabinet whom I had specifically in mind when I referred to an "extra dimension". He has the capacities to be Director of the Budget --- and has been --- Secretary of the Treasury, or Secretary of Commerce. He has a brilliant history in the business community and an impressive background in party politics. He is the best fund-raiser of them all --- and I can testify to that.

When we were considering the qualifications of the fellow we wanted as finance chairman of the primary campaign and the general election, two considerations were paramount.

First, he had to have the gimlet eye of an accountant --- keep his eyes on the pennies --- and Maury is a fellow who fits that admirably as Dwight Eisenhower will testify.

Secondly, we need what we call in politics a "big game hunter". A finance chairman in a presidential campaign can't waste his time on the squirrels and rabbits. He's got to go for the Big Game. And as I look down the table here at Elmer and Clem and some of the others --- I have to say, Maury, that, for a fundraiser, this is one hell of a trophy room.

If you want to find out who your true and best friends are I have always believed that the time to take inventory is when times are tough and the number is smallest. Let me say that it was in those times that I counted upon Maury Stans --- and he was always there --- and that is why we are leaving town in a few days and that is why I am here tonight.

Napoleon used to say that an army marches on its stomach. Well, food is not the most important commodity in a political campaign. Frankly, it is capital. You can have the best candidate in the country, and the best organization in the land. But if you lack the money to put your message across and to take your show on the road, you're finished.

This is where you gentlemen provided the lubricants without which the wheels of the bandwagon would never have begun to roll last February. This was perhaps the best financed campaign in American political history and that is what we needed to win office from an incumbent Administration.

As I look around the room at all the distinguished gentlemen here, I am convinced, Maury, that the way to keep the economy moving along is to make sure that nobody in here retires.

I will say that Maury has a great reputation as a worrier. It is always, "Dick, are you sure we want to do this", or "Dick, I'm concerned about the reaction to that". That Cassandra streak seems always to be present. I notice tonight that we are dining for instance here in the Louis XVI Room who, as I recall, was the only King of France who ever had his head cut off by his constituents. "Maury, are you trying to warn me about something?"

- Our problem
- ① 2790 - ^{####} was Pope
 - ② House + Senate -
 - ③ Incumbent Ed. Adcox -
 - ④ Bomb Power

01/11/1969

Memo from Buchanan to RN containing a requested quote from Kissinger.

MEMO TO THE PRESIDENT ELECT

From Buchanan

January 11, 1968

Kissinger Quote as Requested:

"To Most Americans the Significant Reality is what they see around them. For most of the world the significant reality is what they wish to bring about."

06/12/1972

Memo from RN to Mitchell, cc: Haldeman, Colson re: Buchanan's critical assessment of '72 campaign organization (compared to '68).

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 12, 1972

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN MITCHELL

COPIES FOR Bob Haldeman
 Chuck Colson

FROM THE PRESIDENT 

In reading Buchanan's analysis, you will note he is highly critical of our organization compared to what we had in 1968. I am inclined to think that some of his criticism may be justified and that some of it may miss the mark, but at least we should have it in mind as we build the organization for the future.

In 1968 when we were the outs we naturally had more volunteers and more zeal and determination than we perhaps have in 1972. On the other hand, there is no reason why we cannot have in 1972 a considerable degree of fire and enthusiasm if we can only charge up the troops effectively. I think one danger that must be guarded against is to over-pay people or to have staffs that are too large. It is certainly true that too large a paid staff means a staff that is somewhat fat and lazy. I am not suggesting that ours is either at this point, but the Buchanan criticism is something that must be examined.

I am not, incidentally, so impressed with his argument that our conservative foot soldiers were the ones who beat the union troops in 1968. As a matter of fact, the conservatives weren't all that enthusiastic about us in 1968 as Pat probably will remember if he examines the situation pretty carefully and objectively. Nevertheless, there is a need for having a lean, hard-hitting, enthusiastic organization to combat the McGovern organization. I think the way we can do it is to have people who not only are for us but also by having people in our organization who are really stirred up about the great danger

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

of McGovern becoming President and who will get out and work their heads off in order to beat him. People can get far more excited working against a candidate than they can working for one.

On another subject, I think it is important to keep the Republican organization and the Citizens for Nixon or Democrats for Nixon, or whatever we are going to call it, separated wherever possible. We should give them each separate tasks and then have them work both sides of the street.

No Date

**Memo Draft of memo from RN to Mitchell, cc: Haldeman, Colson re:
Buchanan's critical assessment of '72 campaign organization**

Mitchell copy to ~~Haldeman~~ Haldeman and Colson

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Republican organization and the Citizens for Nixon or
Democrats for Nixon or whatever we are going to call it
organizations separated wherever possible. We should give
them each separate tasks and then have them work both sides
of the street.

NO DATE

Letter Christmas card from Shelley and Pat Buchanan to RN and PN.



*May the joy and peace of Christmas
stay with you
throughout the New Year*

SHELLEY and PAT BUCHANAN

12/11/1968

Memo from Rose Mary Woods to Pat Buchanan RE: Attached message requests.

December 11, 1968

TO: Pat Buchanan
FROM: Rose Mary Woods

Attached are some message requests. Could you please draft something appropriate in your usual fine fashion.

Thanks

11/03/1968

Transcript of question posed to RN regarding his program for black America and RN's reply. The name Buchanan in parentheses at the top of page.

11/3/68 (Buchanan)

MR. NIXON: What is your program for black Americans?

First, I intend to begin this Administration by telling black Americans and the rest of Americans the truth -- by declaring a moratorium on false promises and pie-in-the-sky pledges. These are the things responsible for the current disillusionment in the ghettos of America, in my view.

Secondly, I am going to propose new programs the purpose of which will be to get people off welfare rolls and onto payrolls in this country. The Welfare State of Mr. Humphrey is old and obsolete; it is not good enough for the New Society.

Third, I intend to propose programs whereby it will be easier for black Americans and Mexican Americans and other groups in this country who have been blocked off from opportunity -- to enable them to move off the payrolls into the offices of management -- as owners and businessmen in their own right.

Now, let me make this clear. We are not going to have overnight harmony and prosperity in the Negro Community. But we are going to have progress and it's going to be in the right direction. And we are going to have an Administration that is willing to listen to the justified complaints of black America, an Administration whose heart is in the right place, an Administration that is going to be tough and firm in many

things -- but an Administration that will be compassionate. There is no conflict between justice and order in this country. In my view, they are complimentary.

#

11/03/1968

Transcript of question posed to RN regarding crime and RN's reply. The name Buchanan in parentheses at the top of page. Handwritten comments by unknown author at bottom.

11/3/68 (Buchanan)

MR. NIXON: What can a President do about crime in the streets of this country? Law enforcement is essentially a local problem.

Yes, it is a local problem -- but it is also a national crisis. And a President can do many things. He can give the moral leadership that this country hasn't had in recent years in the war against crime. He can put priority in legislation going up to the Hill on crime control measures that haven't been gotten the priority they deserve. He can appoint an Attorney General who will be an aggressive general in the war against crime and not a conscientious objector. He can name to the United States Supreme Court men who understand just what is happening to the security on the streets of this country, who will recognize that the millions of victims of this country have rights just as the criminals do. If you want to see what a President can accomplish to bring peace and security to the streets and cities of America -- I suggest you elect me and you'll find out -- Give us the mandate and we shall do the job.

Narrative - # 1/2 #
Original memo -
D.C.
Court

11/04/1968

Transcript of question posed to RN regarding Vietnam and Law and Order and RN's reply. The name Buchanan in parentheses at the top of page.

11/4/68 (Buchanan)

MR. NIXON: What do you consider the most important issue of the 1968 election? Vietnam or Law and Order? And which one should the people vote on?

The most basic issue is even more overriding than that. It is the question of whether the United States can continue for four more years with the men who have sat while peace collapsed in the United States, while security disappeared from our cities and streets. A choice between men who have for four years been unable to bring an honorable end to the war in Vietnam. A choice between that and new leadership. A new coalition of Republicans and Democrats and Independents is desperately needed, in my view, to lead this country out of the current crisis. That is the issue. Whether the men responsible for America's problems, the men who couldn't solve them should be given another four years. I don't think their record shows America can afford them for four more years. That is the issue -- more of the same or a new beginning in dealing with these crises.

#

11/04/1968

Memo from Buchanan to DC RE: Gut Lines to Hit. Subjects include George Wallace, narcotics, pornography, religion-affiliated schools for children, leadership, gun control, and Hubert Humphrey.

November 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: DC

FROM: Buchanan

RE: Gut Lines to Hit

George Wallace, if the polls are right, may be the man who re-elected this Administration. It is a choice between Nixon and Humphrey. Those who vote for Wallace let others make that choice. They protest this Administration; but they are taking the risk of letting other re-elect it.

Narcotics and pronography are two areas where the Federal Government can move to protect the children of this country -- and we are going to start moving in these areas just as soon as we win this election.

The parents of Catholic and Protestant and Jewish children who save the taxpayers dollars by educating their own children are doing a national service -- and it is time in my view that government at every level recognized that service.

The basic issue in this election is can we survive four more years of the kind of leadership that has plagued this country the last four years. When voters step into that booth -- ask themselves do we need a change from what we have had. You will not get a change by voting for this man of this Administration, this man of the past.

The men who could not keep order in their own convention in Chicago cannot bring order to the cities of America. The men who could not even unite their own party cannot unite the American people. That is why we must have new leadership.

On gun control, my opponent Mr. Humphrey as always seeks to have a massive new bureaucracy created to register and locate every gun in the country and keep the files in Washington. I think that the states have responsibility here as elsewhere; and that is why I favor this function, like other functions, to the states. There is a difference between California and Colorado in terms of need for gun registration, and I think that California and Colorado should make that decision.

NO DATE

Memo from Buchanan to Bob Haldeman RE: Buchanan and Price's remaining Cabinet appointees and introduction speech.

*File
Cabinet
Announcement*

MEMO TO BOB HALDEMAN

From Buchanan

The final three will be up there just as soon as they are done.

Buchanan

Various memos

RE: Points that might be made during the introduction of the new Cabinet appointees.

12/11/68
JOHN MITCHELL
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

The new Attorney General is a brilliant lawyer and the one of the best administrators in the country, and I can personally attest to both facts. He is John Mitchell of New York, my partner both in work and politics.

I selected him because I believe his enormous capabilities and competence are what is needed to marshal the resources of the Department of Justice in an effort to make new ground -- especially against organized crime.

During the campaign, I stated ~~time~~ and again my belief that one of America's first priorities is to restore security to the streets of this country; and freedom from fear to the America's homes. In naming John Mitchell the chief law enforcement officer of the United States, I think we have a strong man in most demanding job.

Justice in our system implies respect for the rights of all, guilty and innocent alike; it implies social justice as well as criminal justice. In John Mitchell we have a man with recognition of that fact.

12/11/68
JOHN VOLPE
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

The youngest Department in our Government is the Department of Transportation. It is really an infant as far as Government Departments are concerned. It was established in recognition of the modern problems of travel which affecting the great cities of America.

It was established in recognition of the problems of air and sea and surface travel in America; recognition of the interrelationship of these modes of travel and recognition of need for planning for America's future.

The man I have chosen for this post is the former United States Highway Administrator under President Eisenhower. He is the man who launched the \$40 billion Federal highway program, which has been called the rightly one of the greatest construction projects ever undertaken by man; he is the Governor of Massachusetts, John Volpe.

I would like to add a personal note about Governor Volpe, the new Secretary. He is a living example of the promise of America. His parents were Italian immigrants, and Governor Volpe reached where he has today through courage and determination and hard work.

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12/11/68
GEORGE ROMNEY
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

During the campaign I said time and again that there was no ground more important than the ground we stand on. The crisis of the American city is really the crisis of America. How we resolve it will determine what kind of future our children have.

No Department is more intimately involved in that crisis than the Department of Housing and Urban Development. It is the Department of the cities and the man I have chosen to lead it the next four years is Governor George Romney of Michigan.

In all my years of public life I have never met a man who worked harder or who was more deeply committed to the cause of social justice in this country. But we need more than commitment in HUD. We need a man of action, a doer and not just a talker, a man who understands and has already established in his own state an example for the nation of what can be done by volunteer action working with government.

To solve these problems of America's cities, to bring Americans together, to move this country forward with progress for every American, this is a task we have to accomplish, it is a task to which we most devote twenty-four hours a day. I think that in George Romney the nation has a man who will approach

this task with the kind of missionary zeal that it requires today.

###

12/11/68
CLIFFORD HARDIN
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

During the presidential campaign I told the American farmer that if elected I would name to the Department of Agriculture a man who would speak for them to the President of the United States and not the other way around. I think I have found that man in Nebraska.

Clifford Hardin, the next Secretary of Agriculture, is chancellor of the University of Nebraska, and formerly dean of the school of Agriculture at Michigan State University.

His educational background stretching back over thirty years has been exclusively in the field of agriculture and related problems. He will not be the chosen representative of any one particular farm group; he will not just represent one particular farm crop.

He brings to his position a tremendous scope and range in the field of agriculture; he will be the spokesman for all of America's farmers in the Councils of government; he will be the Cabinet's voice of rural America.

With his knowledge and background we expect more of him than we expect from a normal Secretary. We are going to depend on him to keep the country aware not only of the problems of rural poverty and unemployment, the problems of farm income and crop surpluses; but more than that we will expect from him

ideas and initiatives on how to put America's plenty on the dinner table of the world's hungry.

###

12/11/68
WINTON BLOUNT
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

The next Postmaster General of the United States hails from Union Springs, Alabama. He is Winton Blount, currently President of the United States Chamber of Commerce.

In naming Red Blount to this post we are hoping to put an end to the tradition of naming political and party leaders to this office in the Cabinet. I have chosen Mr. Blount because of his brilliant background as a business executive and because I believe that the postal service in the United States today can be dramatically improved in terms of speed and efficiency. We are going to try to introduce to the United States Post Office the modern business practices and we mean to improve the mail service and reorganize the Department to see if we can't make it a going concern. So, when the letters don't get there on time, this will be the man to call.

*I have given him
completely responsibility*

12/11/68
WILLIAM ROGERS
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

In my acceptance speech for the Republican nomination, I stated that it was my belief that we are about to enter into an era of negotiations with the Soviet Union, and that within the term of the New Administration, the dialogue with mainland China would have to begin.

With these considerations foremost in my mind that I have chosen William Rogers to be the next Secretary of State of the United States.

He is the best qualified man I know to sit across the table from friend and adversaries alike and represents the legitimate interests of the United States. He is a brilliant attorney, the most capable negotiator I have ever met; he has spent a lifetime in public service he is a former Attorney General of the United States under President Eisenhower; he was an able administrator at the Department of Justice -- something we need today at the Department of States; he will be the youngest Secretary of State in the century. He will make a brilliant advocate for his new client -- the United States.

Cool
judgment
quiet confidence

###

12/11/68
WALTER HICKEL
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

In this modern era, the Secretary of the Interior of the United States has no more important role to play than to serve as custodian of America's natural resources. The rivers and forests and mountains and wilderness lands of America are unmatched anywhere in the world. They were God's gift to the people who first came to this land. It is our intention to hand that heritage down secure for future generation. The man I have chosen for that assignment is able suited. He is a man of the West, the Governor of America's largest state, our last frontier of Alaska.

Walter Hickel is a young Secretary of the Interior. He went to Alaska as something of a pioneer, without a dime in his pocket, thirty years ago. He helped to build Alaska into the great state and land of opportunity it is today. He will bring to his position in our Cabinet an ingrained love of this country and its outdoors. He will be great and effective Trustee of America's Natural Resources.

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12/11/68
MELVIN LAIRD
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

The Secretary of Defense will be the youngest in the nation's history; and yet he will bring more experience in the field of national security to that job than any other of his predecessors with the sole exception of General Marshall. He is Congressman Melvin Laird of Wisconsin, a veteran of 16 years in the House of Representatives, a man whom even his Democratic colleagues regards as one of the most brilliant in the Congress.

He will name as Deputy Secretary of Defense will be names an executive with full responsibility for managing the Pentagon.

Congressman Laird, rather Secretary Laird will be the man on whom I will depend to determine the national security needs of this country. I know of no more ideal man for this post. He blends years of experience in national security affairs; he shares my views completely with the need to keep America second to none in terms of military strength; and he shares my concern last too much of America's resources be wasted on arms that are not needed and taken from the more profitable pursuit of the words of peace.

XXX

12/11/68

Patrick Buchanan
Secretary of Commerce

The new Secretary of Commerce brings with him to that post a tremendous reputation in the American business community. He is a certified public accountant who once handled the largest account in the world in the late fifties when he was budget Director of the United States under President Eisenhower.

I will count upon Secretary Stans as I have in the past for advice and counsel on the domestic economy, and will call upon him for ideas in dealing with the problems of poverty and unemployment. He is an able counsellor, a man of great integrity, a good friend and he will make a great Secretary of Commerce.

MEMO TO BOB HALDEMAN

From Buchanan

Attached are the remnants of Buchanan and Price's Stuff
on the Cabinet guys and introduction.

Buchanan

MEMO TO: RN

FROM: Buchanan

Points that might be made in the introduction:

1) RN has selected a Cabinet of men, nearly all of whom grew to manhood in the years of the Depression and the World War, as RN did. They know the meaning of poverty in this nation; they know the ravages of war first hand; they are committed to social justice; they know the requirements of peace.

2) RN might well take note that while every section of America can claim at least one of these men; some five of them hail from the Midwest.

3) In selecting these men, RN sought to bring men with special capacities for their particular job, but also men with knowledge and understanding and background in other areas; a Secretary of State who was also an Attorney General; a Secretary of Defense who was minority whip and one of the most brilliant men in the House of Representatives; a university dean who is also a businessman as Secretary of Labor; a university chancellor who is also one of the nations most knowledgeable men in agriculture.

RN feels that the cross fertilization of ideas and experience will make the whole Cabinet really greater than simply the sum of its parts.

4) They are men of RN's generation.

12/11/68
GEORGE P. SHULTZE
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

Some of the most imaginative thinking in the nation today-- for new approaches for America's social problems - is taking place at the University of Chicago. The new Administration intends to tap that source; and we have named to the Cabinet as Secretary of Labor, George P. Shultze, the Dean of the Graduate School of Business.

Dean Shulz has a doctorate in economics, an outstanding record in the academic community, as well as broad experience as a business executive.

His job will be the implementation of the long-range programs of which we talked during the campaign. He will have a hand in the development of our concept of black capitalism for the urban slums, and the creation of the national computer job bank to enable anyone in the nation in the need of a job to find one.

We look to him for ideas as well as for administration and arbitration if disputes; we look to him as a transmissionbelt to the academic community; we look to him to speak up for the interests of the American workingman organized and independent.

12/11/68
ROBERT FINCH
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare in the new Cabinet, will be one of this Administration's two ranking ambassadors to and attorneys for those Americans who, because of discrimination or poverty, have been denied a full and fair share of this country's blessings.

The man who holds that post must be "afflicted with a special conscience," and deeply committed to social justice for every American.

The man I have chosen brings that kind of conscience to his job--and a great deal more. He is Lieutenant Governor Robert Finch of California.

He will come into office with new ideas, a passion for reform of America's welfare structure, the experience of twenty years in public life and two years as Lieutenant Governor of the largest state in the Union.

I have known Bob Finch since he got out of college and there is no man in whom I have more confidence in his imagination and ability, character and compassion. I believe that he is the man to make progress with a crisis that has so far resisted the best of intentions and billions of dollars.

12/11/68
DAVE KENNEDY
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

The senior member of the Cabinet is the new Secretary of the Treasury, David M. Kennedy.

He is the chairman of the board and former president of the Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago. He has in the past been an assistant Secretary of the Treasury and he spent 16 years on the staff of the Federal Reserve Board, before and during World War II.

The endorsements and recommendations of Dave Kennedy for the post of Treasury Secretary not only came from American bankers but from bankers in Europe and around the world.

I have chosen him for this post for three basic reasons. First, he is a brilliant economist on fiscal matters; secondly, he has an intimate working knowledge of international monetary problems; and third, he brings a touch of that midwestern conservatism to the job that we like to see in the men who handle the taxpayers money.

In candor, the problems of inflation and employment here in the United States, and the crisis of the dollar and the free world monetary system abroad are among the most critical the next Administration will confront. They are more difficult to resolve today than they have been for thirty years. That is why I have chosen a man who understands international finance, as well as the fiscal matters at home. That is why I have selected Dave Kennedy for one of the most difficult and challenging jobs in this Administration.

12/17/68
SUGGESTED COMMENTS
NIXON MUDGE DINNER
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

It was a little more than five years ago that I joined the firm here. It seems longer than that right now. I remember coming east as a struggling young California lawyer, with a mixed won-and-loss record, looking to relocate. I think that I have benefited greatly, speaking in a personal sense, from the associations here--and I trust that you gentlemen have as well.

Certainly, we've both come up in the world since then.

I shall take to Washington many fond memories of New York and the men with whom I worked for five years.

I remember when I first arrived. I came, as you recall from California after the press and I at a get-together after the gubernatorial campaign had decided that the law rather than politics held out the greater promise in the way of a career.

Anyhow, I arrived here in New York, and although I had been the Vice President, I had few personal friends here. Most of them were in California or Washington.

It was then that Bob Guthrie took me in tow and said, "Dick you have to forget about California and get to know a new crowd of folks here in New York. They're great fellows here. Get out and play some golf. Let me introduce to the Country Club set. So, with his advice and sponsorship, I joined Baltusrol County Club.
(pause)

There as the years went by my interest turned back again to the political arena, which I must say in candor has

remained my first love. But in moving back into the arena I shall never forget the support, the cooperation and the understanding of you gentlemen in this room. Without them we could never have hoped to be successful.

I recall Milton Rose suffering in silence while Midwestern and Southern politicians lounged in the lobby, turning these hallowed legal halls into smoke-filled rooms.

Bob Guthrie and John Mitchell raised no voice in protest when politicians took their daughters off to work from dawn to midnight in the campaign---and sometimes beyond.

And John Alexander even volunteered to write a major speech on tax reform for use late in the campaign -- that speech should be ready any day now, John?

There were no complaints when we hauled John Sears off to be a political theoretician and liaison with Governor Agnew, when we hauled off Tom Evans to run the Citizens operation, when we took Marty Pollner off to handle our law and order research, when we took Len Garment out of the Litigation Department to handle the Media Campaign, when we took Frank Lincoln off to manage the transition, and when we took off one of the name partners, John Mitchell, to be the new Attorney General.

Like William Pitt, I can say I thank you and the nation thanks you as well. Never before in the history of political conflict has so much been done by one law firm for so little in the way of return.

The only rewards "Nixon, Mudge" has received to my knowledge is some free national publicity from Drew Pearson.

A minute ago, I mentioned our new Attorney General, John Mitchell. We almost didn't get him. If you gentlemen will recall late in the campaign John felt a little embarrassed by the generosity of some of our contributors, and decided not to report those contributions to the Clerk of the House. As least that is what my friends in the press tell me.

Although John's intentions were the best I am sure, technically that constituted a violation of the Corrupt Practices Act, which my good friend Mr. Ramsey Clark, has enthusiastically pointed out.

So, we may yet see a first here, an outgoing Attorney General prosecuting his successor.

If we need a lawyer for John we'll be back to the firm here. My own view is that Ramsey Clark ought to go ahead with it, because there's been too much permissiveness lately, and we've got to crack down on it.

In seriousness, speaking not only for me, but for those others of the staff -- the non-lawyers -- who worked here with the firm for months, some of them years, I appreciate the contributions you have all made to our success, and the time you have given to our efforts.

Jack Kennedy once said after he was elected in 1960, and when some papers were criticizing him for his choice of friends, that "A President doesn't make new friends; he has to keep the ones he's got." I think, I know, that ~~in~~ this room, I have many good friends, and I shall keep them in the years ahead.

Thank you.

####

from Buchanan
Spel

✓

Department of Defense

Sen. Henry Jackson

Department of State

Robert Murphy (appointment extremely well received)

✓ Walter Judd (His naming as Asst. Sec. for Far East would be very well received; has more recommendations from the right than almost anyone)

amb Bob Hill (has support among conservatives)

Department of Agriculture

Bryce? Dean Earl Butts (RN knows him) - *quire Farm Bureau*

Don Paarlburg

Shuman of the Farm Bureau

FOREIGN POLICY GENERALLY & Defense

Frank Armbruster

Herman Kahn

Stefan Possony

Harold Brown, Secretary of the Air Force,

Franz Michel, Sino-Soviet Institute at G.W.

~~David Nelson~~ Rowe at Yale, Asian Affairs

Frank Trager, NYU

Age ~~Ellis Briggs~~, former Ambassador

Paul Bethel, on Cuba, former Foreign Service Officer

Walter McConaughy

Dr. Stepehn Tan, President of East Asia Research Institute

Joe Blatchford, California, good in Latin America, worked out a private Peace Corps type thing which was heraled in the 1950s.

John W. Haynes, head of the Bureau of Security and Consular affairs under Ike

? John Haynes?

~~██████████~~
Negroes

Dr. Tom Matthews, Black Capitalism man

Rev. Leon Sullivan

Arthur Fletcher, RN's friend who lost in Washington

Wesley Williams, former president of the D.C. Board of Education
his son is on the city council there under Fauntroy. Wesley Williams Jr., voted for RN in D.C.

LABOR

good ~~MIKE~~ Mike Bernstein, head of the Minorities Staff on the House Education and Labor Committee, Wants to be on the NLRB

Education

Carl Hansen, bounced from the D.C. school system

Max Rafferty (how do you like that one?)

James Coleman, author of the Controversial Coleman report, Buchanan's believes he is highly regarded.

BLACK CAPITALISM

Chad McClellan, Reagan's man

Dick Cornuelle

Other names recommended by Conservatives

M. Stanton Evans of the Indianapolis News

Bill Rickenbacker, who has written books on silver and gold
for a lower position at the Treasury

Bill Mittendorf for a lesser position at Treasury

Governor Tim Babcock

Tom Curtis, with the exception of Judd, Curtis gets as many plaudits
as anyone else

Tom Miller, CBS young Executive,

Dr. Harold Demsetz, University of Chicago for Economics

Bruno Auginstien, vice president for research at the Rand Corporation

Patrick Boarman, took over Pendergast's job at the House Conference
Committee. (professor, with good conservative credentials)

Otto Otepka, back to his own job (?)

Allen Wallis, Rochester University,

December 28, 1968

MEMO TO: President-Elect Richard M. Nixon

FROM: Pat Buchanan

Below are some random thoughts on the Chicago Kennedy-Shultz drill.

It is a pleasure being back in the city of Chicago, a city that has been good to me, one about which I have the fondest of memories. I was nominated for Vice President here in 1952, nominated for President of the United States in 1960, and 600,000 Chicagoans gave me the greatest political welcome I have ever received here three months ago.

I would have been back here sooner to thank Illinois for going Republican this fall, but I wanted to wait until all the returns have come in from Cook County.

I can say candidly that no other city in America has done as much for the Nixon Administration as Chicago -- they have given me a Budget Director, a Secretary of Labor and a Secretary of the Treasury.

What Missouri did for Truman, what Massachusetts did for Kennedy, what Texas did for Johnson, the Mid-West is going to do for the Nixon Administration -- We have five Cabinet members from here, more than any other area in the United States.

GEORGE SHULTZ

Recognition of the higher interest of the national need and the national good that convinced Dave Kennedy to make the sacrifice he has -- to work in the United States Treasury.

Similar motivations I think propelled George Shultz from the Groves of Academe to the Department of Labor.

With the enormous concentration of economic power today in corporations and unions, when they collide there must be an impartial and just man to oversee and look out for the interest of the common man. George Shultz is such a man. He has the respect of business, the academic community and the American labor community.

In addition, George has gotten experience in confrontation politics. He knows all about sit-down strikes and sit-ins and violence along the picket lines and things of that nature. He has had the best training grounds for political and social combat that I know of today -- the Dean's office at a major university.

As Dean of Business, George Shultz has been refereeing fights between faculty members and professors -- we are just moving him up now to referee some of the heavyweight fights -- and we are confident he will do a fine job -- for the Administration and for the Country.

The State of Illinois was the closest State in the 1960 Election and it was the linchpin of our 1968 victory. For that, as well as for two Cabinet members and a Budget Director, you have my thanks.

DAVE KENNEDY - BAREFOOT BOY OF THE LOOP

I read in the paper the other day the enormous amount of money that Dave Kennedy is going to have to give up to take a job in Government. I think it is a credit to him that he is willing to make this kind of sacrifice for his Nation -- it needs him. It needs that streak of Mid-Western conservatism that I referred to when I introduced him to the country last month. Incidentally, President Johnson read about all the money that Dave is giving up -- he called me and said, "Dick, you can't do that --- if Kennedy quits working there will be a minor recession."

Frankly, I wish that Lyndon had been running the Treasury as well as Dave has been running his bank -- there might be a little something for us to work with when we get there.

Aboard Air Force One

January 3, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: President-Elect and Mrs. Richard M. Nixon

FROM: Don Hughes

SUBJECT: Stone Dinner, Chicago

1. At 6:45 PM, Mr. Stone will escort you to the Reception Suite where Charles Percy, Mayor & Mrs. Daly, Governor-Elect & Mrs. **Ogilvie** will be present (and possibly Mr. & Mrs. Kennedy and Mr. & Mrs. Shultz, along with Mr. & Mrs. Mayo). RN will greet this group briefly then proceed with the group to the Grand Ballroom.

2. At the dinner, Mr. Stone will introduce Governor Shapiro and Mayor Daly who will welcome the Nixons to Chicago. Cardinal Cody will deliver Invocation. "American Liberty Singers" will sing the National Anthem.

3. After the dinner:

a. Mr. Stone will call on Governor-Elect Ogilvie, who will introduce Edward Levi, Chancellor of the University of Chicago. Mr. Levi will introduce Kennedy, Shultz and Mayo for brief remarks. Mrs. Stone will present Mrs. Nixon with an orchid which has been labelled "The Pat Nixon Orchid".

b. There will be a 6-8-minute Piano Concert by a 10-year-old girl, Rita Reichman, a student of Interlochen School of Music which Mr. Stone is a greater contributor to and supporter of.

c. Mr. Stone will then introduce RN for brief remarks.

d. Dr. Joseph H. Jackson, President of the National Baptist Congregation, will deliver the Benediction.

01/07/1969

Memo from John D. Ehrlichman to John Sears RE: RN request to establish a procedure to generate letters and telephone calls to radio and television stations when necessary. Handwritten notes re Buchanan's similar enterprise.

Xc - John Sears

Ehrlichman

To: John Sears

Date: January 7, 1969

From: John D. Ehrlichman

RN asks that a procedure be established to insure necessary letters to the editor, calls to radio and television stations, etc., be generated whenever necessary.

This should be a Nixon apparatus rather than dependent upon the national committee or state organizations.

Would you please give this some thought and telephone me as soon as you are ready to implement the President-elect's request.

I am going to give him a progress report on this project on January 15.

John D. Ehrlichman

JDE:sw

I think Buckman may
be engaged in a similar or
identical enterprise - so
he & John should communicate!

H

September 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: JOHN EHRLICHMAN

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

Theodore White would like to join us on the next full trip out. Please arrange that he has a good seat on the plane. Thanks,

BASIC STAFF LIST
(for hotel room assignments)

RN	
*PN	
*Tricia Nixon	
*Julie Nixon	
*David Eisenhower	
✓ Rose Mary Woods	Candidate's personal secretary
✓ Dwight Chapin	Candidate's personal aide
○ John Davies	Mrs. Nixon's personal aide
✓ Bob Haldeman	Chief of Staff
✓ Larry Higby	Aide to Haldeman
✓ John Ehrlichman	Tour Director
✓ Vern Olson	Asst. Tour Director
✓ Shelley Scarney	Secretary
✓ Marge Acker	Secretary
✓ Jeanette Lerner	Secretary
✓ Linda Underwood	Secretary
✓ James Keogh	Dir., Research and Writing
○ Pat Buchanan	Research and Writing
✓ Ray Price	Research and Writing
✓ William Safire	Research and Writing
✓ Martin Anderson	Research and Writing

Political Aides:

✓ Lt. Gov. Bob Finch
 ✓ Congressman Mel Laird
 ✓ Senator Thruston Morton
 ✓ Charles McWhorter
 ✓ Richard Moore
 ✓ Robert Ellsworth

TV/Advertising:

○ Frank Shakespeare or Len Garment

Press Aides:

✓ Ron Ziegler
 ✓ Bruce Whelehan
 ✓ Alan Woods

Press Secy's.:

✓ Mary Alice Passman
 ✓ Susan Reinecke

○ Jack Caulfield	Staff Security
○ Ed McDaniel	Public Address and Sound
✓ Ben Folmer	Western Union
✓ Messrs. Gorman <u>or</u> Oberg	Masseur
✓ Marvin Snead	Communications
DAVID SHIELDS - - - - -	Expediter (Baggage, etc.)
	Doctor
✓ Larry Hennefeld - - - - -	Airlines representative
✓ Joe Alston - - - - -	Court Reporter Stenotypist
RN Office	Court Reporter Stenotypist
Tour Office	
Working Press room	

Jas. Fanto UAL

RV

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 29, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
SUBJECT: PRIMARY STRATEGY

Have given thought to 1972; and preliminary returns indicate to me that RN should:

1. Let Reagan and Rockefeller know early that he, RN, is going after the nomination, that he is not dropping out under any condition, and that RN is going to secure the nomination, and run in 1972, and that decision is irrevocable.

WHY: Both Governors are now "positioning" themselves to be the beneficiary of a "Dump Nixon" movement. I don't believe either is promoting or supporting same -- but if "Dump Nixon" should succeed, then either Rockefeller or Reagan would become the nominee; and right now, they would be foolish not to alert their staff to the long-shot possibility that in 1972, the nomination may be open.

If, however, the President makes it known to both, in no uncertain terms, that regardless of the left-right division in the party, regardless of the blood spilled -- he is going after and taking that nomination -- then the interest of both Governors becomes to help make sure the President wins.

In short, for either Governor to have a distant chance at the nomination -- the President must voluntarily pull out. If the President goes for it, he has it, regardless of what happens in a few Eastern Primaries. So, if they know for certain RN is going for it -- they are more likely to forget any lingering hopes.

2. The President's name should be on the ballot in the early contested primaries -- not some stand-in.

WHY: The President would run stronger for himself than any other stand-in; and if a McCloskey ran well against a stand-in or beat him in, say, Rhode Island, or New Hampshire -- the press will treat it as if the stand-in had beaten the President anyhow.

Secondly, by using the President's name in the early primaries -- there are a good deal more of them -- we can blunt any momentum built up in, say, Rhode Island by McCloskey -- by whipping him soundly in North Carolina, in Indiana, in Nebraska, in Florida, etc. This way -- even if McCloskey gets some initial momentum, we can give the country the appearance that the President has now stepped out, taken this challenge, and then smashed it in one primary state after another.

Further, because we have money, resources and organization, and they do not, we should take on McCloskey in not simply one or two primaries -- but whip him in one primary after another by triumphal margins. Force him to spread his limited resources. Thus, we could turn McCloskey's candidacy to our advantage, by showing the President -- a la 1968 -- the unmistakable choice of his party for President of the United States, and provide us in passing some good media from the string of victories run up.

Third, if we duck the primary challenge, we will open ourselves to all manner of negative media, about seeking a "bossed" convention, about refusing to go to the people, etc.

ALTERNATE STRATEGY

There might be some merit in -- after in-depth polls -- using a stand-in only in one or two states where the polls show the President running very weak, and where McCloskey might do very well. If we did that and McCloskey did well, we could point to the other primaries where the President himself was entered and was undefeated, untied and un-scored upon. But, this might be too clever by half.

3. The President should not rule out two or three appearances in major primary states -- in which he is entered. I am not sure what benefits accrue from saying, "Well, we never visited that state," as compared with the disadvantages if we do not do well. I do not argue for a stump speech -- but an appearance or two, and a Presidential address in New Hampshire I would not rule out. ("He cared enough to come.")

4. The above early primary strategy argues strongly that we send top-flight political operatives now into the early primary states, that we not wait -- especially on states like N.H., where the media is already focusing. If we wait too long, we will have to set our organizational machinery right in the hot light of national publicity.

Others have surely thought this through also. I am not averse to them seeing it and knocking down the arguments -- but, if they share these views, then we might well be moving on the Primary Road.

January 28, 1972

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-5
APR 11 1982
By BA/Johnson, Date 2/10/82

VERY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM TO: CHUCK COLSON

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

Talked with Vic Lasky. Bantam books is doing his book; they will go in with 10,000 hard cover or thereabouts, and 50,000 paperbacks. Vic is dealing with Oscar Dystel up at Bantam. What is needed now is some guarantee, through Jack Drown, that Bantam will be able to sell the original shipment of books, or get an even break on their investment. Can we get someone with authority here to make the commitment to Drown, and have him contact Dystel, or his contact at Bantam, and commit to subsidize the original investment -- so that Bantam is not facing a possible large loss when they come out with the book. Vic is in New York. He says that is what is needed right now.

Also, Vic is going to need someone in the White House with authority to co-ordinate this thing. He asked if we can get in touch with Drown -- pronto, if possible.

Thanks.

Buchanan

NO DATE

Draft of speech by Buchanan Re: appreciation for a toast in his honor, and the desire for the Republican Party to work to gain the majority of political support.

DRAFT
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
REPUBLICAN GOVERNOR'S CONFERENCE

It is an honor to be roasted by the man who holds the one political job that I wanted and was never able to get (pause). They did give me a consolation prize in November, however. (pause) But, for the longest time I had the impression that Governor Reagan wanted the consolation prize, too. (pause)

In seriousness, I would like to address you for a very few minutes on the objective that I believe that we, as Republicans should set for ourselves, in the coming four years. We go to Washington and find that for the first time in a century, the opposition controls both Houses of the Congress. We look at any sample of public opinion in the nation and we find that in terms of allegiance of the electorate, we are far and away still the minority party in this nation.

One of the objectives of this Administration will be to change that. One of the objectives of this new Administration is to build the New Majority, the successor coalition to the political alliance formed by Franklin Roosevelt which has governed America and held the allegiance of the American electorate for the last of this century.

The final third of this century, we must make the Republican restoration. We hold in our collective hands, in this room, enough of the instruments of government power, to accomplish that objective. We hold the Chief Executive office of the United States and of six of seven of its greatest and most populous states.

We have the White House and the State Houses in New York, California, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois and Michigan, and more than a score of other states. We will not win an opportunity like this again, if we forfeit the one we have today.

It will take co-ordination and co-operation between us, as we have not had in the past. It will take a concerted effort for the Republican Party as a political instrument to win back the allegiance of hundreds of thousands of black Americans who are disillusioned

with our party today. We need to win back the workingmen and working women of America, union and non-union, to the Republican banner. We must inter forever in the history books the myth that the Republican Party is enemy to the common man. We must build in addition to the Republican heartland between the Appalachians and the Rockies, an impregnable Republican fortress of the modern South.

To accomplish this, we must open our party to new men and women, to the young. We must make our party the center forum in which the great foreign and domestic debates of the future are conducted.

To build this historic New Majority in American politics will require far more than effective and efficient party work at the precinct level in every state in America. It will depend how men who bear the Republican label conduct themselves in public office. This is our opportunity; and it is one of the missions to which I have committed myself for the next four years: it is a mission that will not succeed without your help and your assistance, that is what I ask today.

C
Phone call
RV

MEMO TO HALDEMAN

FROM BUCHANN

Just a reminder to set something up at least with Peter Clark when we get to Detroit on the Thirtieth of this month. Whether it be a phone a=calll or a meeting.

Bichanan

~~C~~
C
RN call

memo to Robert Haldeman

From Buchanan

Not all press are hostile. Last night when we delivered the NATO statement I had a talk with J. TerHorst who seems to be an active collaborate in the Nixon cause. Extremely bright. He said that RN might well win the support of the Detroit News for which he works by a properly timed phone call to Peter Clark the President----as well as to Marfin Hayden. Clark is a young guy of thirty six or so, extremely sharp. They have been for Lyndon but Terhosrt says they would be extremely receptive to an RN phone cal.;. Suggest calling both when they are in the area. I have a copy of Clark's speech to a graduating class of which he is quite proud, which I might draft of note of praise for from PN--- very briefing saying RN had been given it by an aid, and RN might borrow some lines or ideas from it. You might mention to RN about Terhorst that we seem to have found one just man in Gomorrah.

Buchanan

07/28/1968

Memo Buchanan to RN re: Jeff Bell's Memo on Vietnam.

MEMO TO RN

From Buchanan

July 28, 1968



A) Could you give Jeff Bell's excellent memo a reading before our meeting at four.

B) I confess to a good degree of apprehension over this Vietnam thing. Some headlines are invariably going to say "Nixon Softens Viet Position" or Nixon Shifts Vietnam Position, or something akin to that. For instance, De-Americanization is a code word for a more doveish position than we now have---and it would be legitimate for a writer to say our new position is more doveish. My concern is this. The conservatives, led by Cliff White, might well raise hell on this Vietnam thing, saying RN is making a new "apertura a sinistra" that we are seeing the old Nixon swing to the left, once the right gives him the nomination---and I wonder what the reaction of Thurmond et al in the South will be. In short, I am wondering if our carving out a more doveish position---right now---might not anger some of our hawk delegates in the South---and generate enough erosion to jeopardize the nomination. I thought I should pass this along to you before getting together this afternoon.

Buchanan

July 25, 1968

MEMORANDUM FROM BELL

Re: Vietnam

I. IS IT WORTH IT?

My own feeling is that the Vietnam intervention--assuming it is reasonably successfully concluded--will come to be regarded as one of the most important and influential enterprises this country has ever undertaken. For the moment, I am not making a judgment on the conduct of the war -- only on the beneficial effects the war has had on the Asian continent and beyond.

The extent to which non-communist Asia has been stabilized is remarkable. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand have boom economies. The two island empires -- Indonesia and the Philippines -- have special administrative and economic problems, but in both nations promising leadership has emerged. Further south, Australia and New Zealand have repudiated their tacitly anti-Asian isolationism of the past and for the first time are taking a positive role in non-communist Asia.

The United States intervened on a large scale in Vietnam in 1965. Every one of the ten nations I have mentioned has endorsed that intervention as in its own national interest. Furthermore -- and this is the striking fact -- not a single one of these countries has had a change of government since 1965. That is a statement that can be made about no other region of the non-communist world.

Closer to the rim of communist Asia, the situation is more mixed-- but the political trends have been the same. Laos is under direct attack from Hanoi, and has lost considerable territory. But the originally neutralist government in Vientiane has broadened its political base, acquitted itself well against the indigenous Pathet Lao before Hanoi intervened in force, and has turned to the west in foreign policy. Burma, the only non-communist Asian nation with a rigidly socialist economy, is stagnant internally. On the other hand, its once idyllic relations with Peking have been suspended, and the military government is now taking a hard line against communist-backed ethnic guerrillas. The little-noticed 1966 elections in Cambodia returned a firmly anti-communist, pro-western majority-- so much so that Prince Sihanouk had to dismiss his new premier within a week. Since that election, Sihanouk has taken a noticeably harder line toward the communist-backed Khmer guerrillas, has issued a surprising number of attacks on Chinese expansionism, and has been considerably more muted in his criticism of U.S. intervention in Vietnam-- despite the substantial North Vietnamese and VC presence within his own borders. Economically, the trend in these beleaguered nations has been not toward Chinese ties and aid, but toward association with the promising new economic alliances, such as ASEAN, that have recently sprung up in non-communist Asia. Japan, not China, is emerging as the pan-Asian economic power-- the rich uncle and patron of emerging economies. This development was, to say the least, not widely predicted as recently as five years ago.

Five years ago, indeed, it was China that seemed to have the momentum. Newly divorced from Russia and on the verge of its own atomic era, China had already launched a bold and effective invasion of eastern India; its brand of communism was widely believed to be in the ascendant in the parties of the non-communist world; and its inroads into Africa and non-communist Asia, particularly Indonesia, seemed considerable. At home, the threat of a nationalist return had receded almost out of sight and the government seemed well entrenched and reasonably stable.

Today, the situation is radically changed. As a clique of ultra-Maoists has progressively tightened its hold on China's foreign relations, government after government has sent Chinese diplomats and advisers packing. Today, less than a dozen nations have normal diplomatic relations with Peking. A series of Peking-backed attempted coups have failed miserably in both Africa and Asia. The most notable instance was Indonesia, where an anti-communist counter-coup eventually ousted President Sukarno and decimated that nation's huge Communist Party, possibly beyond repair. Pro-Peking political parties have lost ground and leverage in democratic countries such as Japan and Ceylon. Most black African leaders, including Jomo Kenyatta, have called for the elimination of the Chinese presence from their continent, although China retains influence in Tanzania and Congo-Brazzaville. Today, in Africa, Taiwan far outstrips Peking both in influence and in UN votes for seating.

At home, it is now clear that China is experiencing a full-fledged civil war. This is not the place to speculate on its meaning, or on the nature of the government that will eventually emerge--if one ever does. I do want to make two relevant points. First, the three-million-man Chinese Army is spread thin throughout the country trying to keep a semblance of order. Second, the Peking Government--which five years ago seemed the wave of the future--has been totally discredited in the eyes of the entire world, including in all probability its own citizens. Irresponsible and uncivilized in its foreign policy, it has forfeited at home the only virtue of totalitarianism--the ability to maintain order.

It is easy to argue that this development has nothing to do with the American presence in Vietnam, or the successful containment of China throughout the world--just as it has been argued that the Indonesian countercoup of 1965 had nothing to do with the large U.S. buildup in Vietnam earlier the same year. I realize that one event's following another does not establish a cause-and-effect relationship.

But there is such a thing as "tide in the affairs of men"--and nations. Nations in trouble at home often find themselves in trouble abroad--and vice-versa. It seems to me a reasonable conjecture that if North Vietnam had won the war in 1965, as it would have without the U.S. intervention, Peking would have gained enormous prestige,

at home and abroad, vis-a-vis not only the United States but the Soviet Union. In an area where "face" is still an important factor in any political equation, the Maoists might well have looked potent if not irresistible to their neighbors and--more important--the Chinese population, and tended to disarm internal opponents. The other point of view--that the strife in China would have occurred regardless of what happened in Vietnam--is tenable; but it is a historical fact that rapidly expanding nations rarely collapse overnight into widespread civil strife.

There is one other positive aspect of the war which is rarely mentioned by anyone, least of all our own government: the counterinsurgency techniques learned by the U.S. Army in Vietnam have proved extremely helpful in other parts of the world.

Take Bolivia. Che Guevara started out, initially, with a more favorable revolutionary situation than he and Castro had had in Cuba ten years before. The country was poorer, it had a pro-communist working class, its army was much smaller than Batista's. And yet a single battalion of the Bolivian Army--trained and advised by Vietnam-experienced U.S. Rangers--crushed the insurrection before it could get off the ground.

Admittedly, other factors were at play in Bolivia which hurt the guerrillas--e.g., land reform had taken place in an earlier non-communist revolution, and in Cuba Castro

and Guevara had successfully camouflaged the communist domination of their movement until they had won power.

But on balance, Guevara's revolt posed a significant and well-planned threat to the government. It is reasonable to believe that without the successful transfer and application of counterinsurgency techniques learned by our Army in Vietnam, Bolivia's government might have fallen.

Five years ago, Castroite guerrilla warfare seemed the wave of the future in Latin America. Today, most such movements have either been crushed, as in Venezuela and Bolivia, or successfully contained as in Guatemala and Colombia. The Latin governments have learned, with U.S. help, how to defeat "wars of national liberation" in their early stages, and fears of "new Castros" have largely receded. Some of the credit for this must go to our involvement in Vietnam.

In my view, then, there are three central reasons why the intervention has been beneficial both to the United States and the world: the stabilization of non-communist Asia, the successful containment of Peking and the partially resultant collapse of that government's authority at home and abroad, and the widely successful application of Vietnam's Mistakes Made and Lessons Learned to potentially revolutionary situations in other parts of the world. No doubt some of these benefits would remain even if the United States were to accept a less than honorable

settlement now. It is Herman Kahn's view, for example, that if the United States withdrew "the dominoes would probably stop at Thailand"--something which he says was probably not true in 1965. However, other benefits would quickly evaporate--including, possibly, the present moral weakness of Peking, and without question the belief of many world leaders that the United States is a nation which honors its commitments even when the going gets rough. The last consideration alone is enough for some hawks--the ones who say "We shouldn't have gone in, but now that we're there..." That view, in my opinion, is wrong and ignorant. If the commitment is morally untenable, or has served no significant national interest, then it ought to be abandoned. The truth is that the Vietnam intervention, however badly handled, has served the national interest, is continuing to serve it, and cannot be abandoned without serious negative consequences not only in Asia but around the world.

II. WHAT IS THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM?

The history of American's involvement in South Vietnam is fairly familiar in its broad outlines: our support of Ngo Dinh Diem in his overthrow of the French-backed Emperor Bao Dai, Diem's suppression of the religious and localist sects and parties, the rapid economic expansion of the middle and late fifties, the beginnings of communist guerrilla activities in 1959-60, the Kennedy buildup of adviser and logistic support, Diem's conflict with the radical Buddhists, his resultant overthrow by the army with tacit U.S. backing, politicization of the army, the military deterioration and threat of total defeat in 1964-65, President Johnson's decision to try to save the situation by means of bombing and direct troop deployments, the steady increase of both the North Vietnamese and American presence in the South, the seeming U.S. gains of 1966-67, the reasonably successful elections of 1967, the Tet offensive and the resultant loss of morale both in Vietnam and (more important) the United States, the withdrawal of Johnson and the Paris peace talks. Running through all of the stages since 1965, of course, have been the avowed and probably sincere optimism of the administration and its military commanders, the failure of the administration to make a convincing case for the intervention, and the central belief that a process of killing the enemy, verified by body counts, would be enough to force Hanoi to accept a

compromise settlement short of victory.

The turning point--both for administration optimism and home-front morale--was the Tet offensive. In fairness, no one in the administration or the military had been maintaining that enemy strength was declining, or that enemy equipment and logistics had ceased to improve. On the contrary, it was widely realized that Hanoi's continually accelerating infiltration had more than made up for enemy losses in the south--and that the Soviet Union and China were providing arms and equipment of a quality and quantity previously unmatched, and outstripping our own weapons support of the South Vietnamese Army. In the year before Tet, arms caches of unprecedented size were being found as far south as the Delta.

What did shock our planners was that the VC were capable of moving on such a scale into the cities of South Vietnam--which had, except for isolated terrorist incidents, gone largely untouched by the war. Also shocking was the loss of life the enemy was apparently willing to accept to achieve what turned out to be a series of temporary occupations. In the United States, the Tet offensive was convincingly seized on by war critics as proof that the huge American investment in money and human life had failed to make a significant dent in VC strength.

In the year before Tet, I participated in about two dozen American-supported South Vietnamese Army (ARVN)

operations, eight of them at battalion level or below. In the vast majority of these operations, the enemy went to great pains to avoid direct contact. If a VC unit was detected, it would leave a squad behind to pin down the government soldiers while the main body got away. More often, the enemy would successfully disperse without a shot being fired.

Nor were the VC notably more offense-minded against government outposts and strong points. The number of VC-initiated incidents in our seven-province area declined markedly in the year before Tet. For a period of eight months, the enemy did not launch a single significant attack against an encamped ARVN battalion. This was in a fertile area with a population greater than that of Israel.

Some of this decline, particularly in the latter months, was undoubtedly attributable to the VC's desire to conserve their manpower in preparation for the coming urban offensive. But when a downward trend continues for much longer than a year, in an area without large American combat units, it is reasonable for government planners to assume that progress is being made. In the same area in 1964, several government battalions had been massacred and outposts fell like ripe apples.

Was all of this progress illusory? Not entirely. The 9th ARVN Division, to which I was attached, was now capable with American air support of vanquishing the enemy in any battle in which the two sides had comparable numbers of men. That continued to be the case throughout the entire country

even during Tet. Not a single government battalion was wiped out, and not a single squad is known to have gone over to the enemy. This had not been true in 1964.

But the progress was illusory in this sense: even while the military equation was improving, nothing was being done to ensure that the VC could not mass in force at will. Large tracts of territory were conceded to the enemy except during search-and-destroy operations, and other elements of authority--particularly roads--were abandoned at night. The 59-man Revolutionary Development teams concentrated on building pig-pens and town council buildings--often at the expense of hamlet security. And the enemy could, and did, mass for what might be called "little Tets"--the overpowering of a hamlet or village, and the killing of pro-government civilians, by concentration of brute force in a given area. When the enemy successfully occupied a government hamlet--usually for no more than part of a night--all new buildings and self-help projects--the symbols of government concern and aid--were systematically destroyed. Even in many villages that remained government-occupied and reasonably secure, there was no clear-cut police program for separating the hard-core VC from the rest of the residents.

Indeed, it was the lack of any concept of police action--treating the VC as the criminals and plunderers they are--that struck me repeatedly during my year in Vietnam. A division operation would sweep an area, and bring in a hundred VC suspects. They would be questioned and, in 99 cases out of 100--released. For the shocking fact is that

there are virtually no jails in South Vietnam. In my area, there was little photographing and no fingerprinting of suspects.

And yet, contrary to the accepted American myth that "you can't tell your enemies from your friends," there is little difficulty in learning through informants who the VC in a given area are, when a reasonable effort is made. On a visit to a remote province capital, I saw an American intelligence specialist leafing through a box of file cards. I asked him what he was doing. The answer: he was sorting out a list of every VC cadreman in every hamlet in the province. I asked him if this huge file was ever used. The answer: as far as he knew, no.

As Herman Kahn has pointed out, any rural society anywhere on earth is gossip-prone. Contrary to the situation in cities, in a village everyone knows who everyone else is and what he does. The more sparsely populated an area, the more detailed is the inhabitants' knowledge. And, also contrary to American mythology, most rural Vietnamese are quite open and talkative about who is VC and who isn't, unless it involves the safety of an immediate family member. Even in instances where the necessary information was readily available, no effort was being made to sort out the VC from the non-communist population and permanently separate the two groups. Even if someone had wanted to make the effort, confirmed VC would have to be shot en masse-- which is both morally unacceptable and so repugnant that

it could probably not be carried out without dehumanizing one's own soldiers--or sent a hundred miles north to Saigon--the location of the nearest large jail.

The lesson of the Tet offensive, then, was that a purely military improvement can keep you from losing, but that you can neither win the war, nor significantly retard enemy morale, nor have a policy that is explicable to the American taxpayers who must support the war, unless you move systematically against the VC infrastructure and expand the territory controlled--day and night--by the Government. President Johnson and General Westmoreland deserve credit for saving the military situation in 1965, thus making possible the significant extra-Vietnam gains I outlined in Part I. But both men have consistently failed to see that "body counts" and a hoped-for break in enemy morale are no substitute for a joint military-police program that produces a reasonable, checkable expansion in government authority, and which systematically separates the VC from the people. As the Hudson Institute planners have pointed out, the best way to break enemy morale is to proclaim and pursue a plan which can contain, isolate, and remove the enemy whether or not his morale breaks. Such a plan exists: Frank Armbruster's constantly expanding Ambush Belt, coupled with rear-echelon constabulary forces. Such a plan can be carried out, along with a number of concomitant reforms which are also available and spelled out in detail, without escalation and without significantly more ARVN and allied soldiers than

are now available. There is no reason to believe that any plan will go off without a hitch, but it is also true that once you have a plan you can make necessary adjustments to fit individual circumstances or unforeseen developments.

This may sound like some sort of magic plan. But-- based on my own experience in Vietnam--it is really nothing more than common sense. Nearly every successful counter-guerrilla plan--including our own in other countries at this moment--has been in large part a police plan. The use of police is both more sensible and more economical, by any measure. In Vietnam, General Westmoreland has failed to implement "lessons learned" that Army advisors are successfully implementing in other countries.

*Amtrak
hills*

The greatest American myth about Vietnam is that everything has been tried. The truth is that almost nothing has been tried. President Johnson and General Westmoreland have consistently ignored evidence that the "attrition-pressure-ouch" theory of warfare is ineffective. Neither has acted decisively to restore the South Vietnamese police to the high level of planning they enjoyed before the military coup of 1963, when South Vietnam's generals abandoned Diem's extreme but potentially effective Strategic Hamlets program.

Instead, the Army has operated on a "business-as-usual" basis. Battlefield promotions are rare--time in

grade is still the overwhelming criterion for officer and NCO promotion. An officer who does an outstanding job gets neither promotion nor any incentive to stay on the job for more than a year. Too often, he is rotated before he has more than a few days to break in his replacement--or, in some cases, before his replacement arrives. This "business-as-usual" attitude--predicated, of course, on the assumption that victory or successful negotiation is right around the corner--is unlike any that has ever prevailed in the U.S. Army in time of war, and inexcusable in the fourth largest war we have ever fought.

And yet, in spite of the military and police failures I have mentioned above (and the list could continue, of course, for many more pages), the situation in South Vietnam is by no means bleak. A war has two sides, and although the United States has procrastinated and bungled, the insurgents have had their fiascos as well. Most interesting has been the VC's consistent failure to expand their base of popular support to anything approaching a majority of the population. These are the words of Takashi Oka, who is a critic both of Saigon and of the U.S. intervention, writing in the March 23 New Republic: "Even at this late date, neither city folk nor the rural peasantry actively prefer Communist to non-Communist rule. I am certain that if the Communists today really commanded the loyal adherence of the majority of South Vietnamese, we

would have seen long ago the kind of phenomena that heralded the final days of the Chiang Kai-Shek regime on the mainland of China: whole armies deserting to the Communists, well-known intellectuals, politicians, and professional leaders flocking to the Communist cause. No amount of American troops would suffice, in such a case, to turn the tide...The Communists have not won so far because they demonstrably lack the support of the majority of the population."

Moreover, the Tet offensive itself, shocking as it was to the prevailing administration theorists and to the nation that had half believed them, was by no means an unmixed military success. VC advance intelligence was decidedly spotty; many units were marooned in untenable positions. Advance objectives were chosen for their symbolic significance, rather than their military-political importance. In the area of the national palace, the VC assaulted the one spot that was heavily fortified instead of circling around to win more strategic objectives.

In all, the communists lost 12,000 weapons and an estimated 35,000 men. Who were they? In large part, they were men who could blend easily into the festive population without attracting too much attention: native southerners. How much of the eventual loss came from village and hamlet infrastructures, and to what extent the local infrastructures have been depleted as a result, is far from certain. If the infrastructure was badly damaged, however, the VC short-term strategy may tend to undermine long-term staying power. According to Beverly Deepe of

the Christian Science Monitor, for the first time more than half of the communist troops in the south are northerners who cannot be integrated into the infrastructure, and although the rate of infiltration continued high until recently, the quality of the replacements' training has declined. The loss of many of the most dedicated native VC--inevitable, given the Tet strategy--could well close off some of Hanoi's previous options.

Indeed, one of the chief critics of the Tet offensive has been none other than General Vo Nguyen Giap--the man knowingly cover-storied by Time as the architect of the operation. Several weeks after the offensive--before the profound psychological impact on the United States was clear--Giap gave a press conference in Prague to a number of communist journalists in which he attacked the whole concept of the operation and described as unacceptable the physical losses Hanoi had sustained. Admittedly, Vietnamese are a notoriously factional people, and Giap's pop-off could have been a human reaction to the fact that he is no longer at the center of war planning (most evidence indicates that he has been out since 1964 or 1965, when the late General Nguyen Chi Thanh won control of Hanoi's southern command). But it is interesting that not all of the North Vietnamese leaders are clear on the ultimate military meaning, and may help to account for Hanoi's readiness to go to Paris.

But perhaps the most surprising and encouraging post-Tet development has been the performance of the Thieu government. At long last, a national mobilization law has been signed which will raise South Vietnam's armed forces close to or past the million mark. The five-year term of service has been suspended for the duration. The draft now starts at 18, and no one under 33 is discharged. Corrupt or inefficient district and province chiefs are being dismissed at an amazing and unprecedented rate. The Revolutionary Development program has switched its emphasis from showy construction to hamlet security. The army, buoyed by its impressive performance during Tet and by our promise to upgrade ARVN equipment, has shown more inclination to pursue the enemy and the generals are keeping out of politics for the first time since 1963, although the election also had something to do with this.

It's gotten to the point where the New York Times--which does not usually let its news stories go against the grain of its editorials--today carried the front-page headline, "Saigon Is Building More Vital Regime."

President Thieu could not have done all this without help. And the help, surprisingly, is coming from South Vietnam's much-maligned but surprisingly large and well-trained middle class. Tet brought death and destruction into the previously placid and rapidly expanding cities for the first time on a large scale. The reaction has not, however, been despair or cowardice, but a new and wide-

spread determination to get down to the business of winning the war. The VC and NVA invasion of the cities made communist victory at the same moment more conceivable and less desirable. Whatever else it was or was not, the Tet offensive was not designed to win the popular majority the VC have never had, and may actually have reduced the solid minority they do have.

In summary, then, both sides have made serious errors and miscalculations. Neither side has ever had a tenable victory plan, the United States putting its hope in a VC "break in morale" and Hanoi counting on a 1954-like collapse in U.S. national determination. In my opinion, neither has yet occurred, although the Tet offensive may have brought either, or both, measurably closer. Given the improvement in Saigon's effectiveness, and assuming the U.S.'s continued commitment, there is no way the allies can lose unless China or Russia intervenes in force. If the U.S. withdraws, and Hanoi does not, Saigon will put up a much better fight than it did in 1964. As Herman Kahn has pointed out, South Vietnam has the second best army in Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, however, Hanoi still has the best, and given continued Russian aid Hanoi and the VC could probably defeat Saigon and unite the country, if Saigon stood alone. If Hanoi withdraws and the VC continue to fight, my guess is that Saigon would win in a very brutal mop-up operation, with thousands of civilians dying unnecessarily. It is hard to exaggerate the hate non-communist and communist Vietnamese

feel for each other. The Vietnamese are a more ideological and less racist people than either the United States or Russia.

If, however, the participants remain the same and neither side escalates, the United States can win this war on the ground in South Vietnam and leave behind a viable, thriving government on the model of South Korea. Indeed, both the Hudson Institute and the Lilienthal study group see South Vietnam as potentially a very rich industrial nation, with growth rates even higher than Seoul's.

The United States and Saigon can combine to win or force an acceptable settlement by converting the "war of attrition" into a war for territory and population. This can be done by setting up a constantly expanding and interweaving network of ambush belts, and upgrading police operations to the coordinate status (equal, that is, with the military) that they deserve. With such a strategy, a President or his Defense Secretary would not have to set deadlines for the beginning of American withdrawal. The visible and checkable progress that would come would convince even hostile reporters that the momentum is with the Washington-Saigon alliance, and eventually win either an honorable settlement or a military/police victory in a war that has been vital to this country's interests from the beginning.

III. WHAT SHOULD RN DO?

RN should support, as he always has, President Johnson's decision to intervene in force. However, he should spell out in more detail--as I have done in Part I of this paper--exactly why and how the war has served our national interest. This LBJ has never done and Hubert is not morally or mentally equipped to do. RN should explicitly endorse the concept of containment, and go into detail as to why, as in the case of Vietnam and China, containing an imperialist power tends to put great strains on that power's internal structure. RN should question why Hubert has repudiated containment at the precise time when it is showing dramatic effects, in Europe no less than Asia. RN should further emphasize, in the ringing tones of the New Candor, that a great nation must honor its difficult and costly commitments as well as the relatively painless ones. Finally--and this is where the Gut vote lives--he should say he is not one of those who believes 25,000 American soldiers have died in vain.

~~On the other hand, the Johnson-Westmoreland leadership should not get off lightly. RN should criticize the administration for failing to perceive the dimensions of the problem, and for failure to get down to the common-sense problem of systematically separating the VC from the non-communist majority of the population. Is this too subtle a point for voters to get? Somehow I don't think so. The Gut voter knows that when you have a criminal problem the police are supposed to handle it, and that the idea~~

is to put the crooks in jail. Why, when we are putting out \$30 billion a year, RN can ask, did the Johnson-Humphrey administration fail to build a single jail?

"Gradualism--fuel of wars" should continue to get its knocks, though perhaps not quite so frequently. RN should continue to oppose a coalition government, while keeping silence on what the administration should offer in Paris. Most important--and here again the New Candor comes into play--RN should hit the hard truth that you can't have a viable peace plan unless you also have a viable war plan. Hanoi will not give us reasonable terms until and unless we show them we are prepared to carry through to victory if they do not. Both Reagan and Wallace have received tremendous response whenever they have hit this theme, though it is true they are talking about escalation rather than a systematic plan to police the country mile by mile.

How much of the plan to reveal is a matter of national security as well as good politics, and I would agree with Whalen that we don't want to reveal too much of our hand, either to the Democrats or Hanoi. However, a reasonable outline will be sufficient to convince most voters that we know what we are doing, and that we really do have in mind a new approach which can win the war or force meaningful concessions.

This, then, is a viable position for the rest of the campaign. By following this course, RN does not contradict anything he has said in the past, appeals to the patriotism of most Americans, hits the Johnson-Humphrey administration for its shortsighted handling of the problem, and--most important--by outlining a viable war plan, avoids the specter of "more of

the same" that we were having trouble avoiding before the Johnson dropout. This is an approach which can not only end the war, but help us end the present administration as well.

MEMORANDUM

TO: General Goodpaster

FROM: H.R. Haldeman's Office

RE: Attached memo from Buchanan dated January 14, 1969

The attached memo is for your information and retention.

encl.

Kissinger

① ~~Pass~~ to good part for info

② file

MEMO TO RN

From Buchanan/Ex Tom Huston

December 14, 1968

TALKED WITH HUSTON RE SENIOR MILITARY OFFICER TO SERVE AS NUMBER 12 man at CIA.

The first recommendation of Huston's contacts and Huston is that Admiral Rufus Taylor be kept. Honest, Top-Flight Administrator, and excellent man on the Job.

If Taylor continues in his wish to retire, the following were recommended.

Admiral Showers (Donald), who is asst. Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, and comes highly recommended. He holds the number four job in DIA, the Navy's highest ranking intelligence officer. Also, his training is as an intelligence officer, and this is vitally important in this job. You must get someone who is known and respected in the intelligence community, because of his dual functions as in-house Administrator, and coordinator

General James Stewart, Air Force, heads up the MOL Program; he runs the operation to develop and deploy MOL, has been successful in working out problems into which the program has run. MOL is the most heavily budgeted single item in DDR & E. He is an excellent administrator---his weakness would be that he is not thoroughly known in the intelligence community. Huston says to be a little leary of Air Force types--because the AIR FORCE is currently trying to take over aerial reconnaissance, which is today the most serious of the inter-service rivalries.)

However, Huston thinks that Stewart or Showers would make a first-class choice.

Third fellow is Army General John Davis, suggested by a friend of Huston's whose judgment he respects. At one time with NSA--he is a guy you would want to look into, if you go further than the first two.

Fourth Choice is General Robert Glass--again Army. Number Three man at DIA, chief of staff. Some of Huston's people at DIA give him high marks for competence and fair-mindedness. If one of the others doesn't work out--get a better reading on this guy.

Huston's first choices are Showers and Stewart. There are lots of first-rate general officers floating around, but they don't have the intelligence background. Definitely Stay away from Service intelligence types, with an ax to grind for their own particular service.

General McChristian---don't have anything to do with this guy. He is a self-promoter from Westy's staff. Set up the Intelligence Community in Vietnam, over did it, according to TCH's intelligence.

Important that the choice be a) fair-minded and even-handed, because the Number 2 man at CIA sits on the United States Intelligence Board, and in the absence of Helms he ~~owns~~ chairs it. Everyone thus has to have respect for his intelligence background and for his fairness.

BUCHANAN

MEMORANDUM

January 13, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: JIM KEOGH

FROM: BOB HALDEMAN

At RN's request, Pat Buchanan has contacted Tom Huston regarding his coming onto our staff, and we have requested an early release from the service for him in order to enable him to report for duty as soon as possible with us in the research and writing area. He will function as a general policy research assistant and also can help on some writing. I know that this procedure is irregular but, as I mentioned at the outset, it was done at RN's request and unfortunately we get some of those. His salary will be \$20,000, and his title should be Staff Assistant.

HRH

MEMORANDUM

January 13, 1969

TO: PAT BUCHANAN

FROM: BOB HALDEMAN

Okay on your recommended salary for Huston.

HRH

MEMO TO HALDEMAN

From Buchanan


January 6, 1968

I talked with Huston about the assignment and gave him the outlines. As for Salary it seems to me, and to him after talking it over, that a Lawyer, who graduated First in his Class, Phi Beta Kappa from Indiana, with his credentials, with his record of assisting RN for three years, and with his two additional years in a sensitive post in the Military Intelligence Agency, working with the Joint Chiefs should get in the neighborhood of \$20,000 per year. He is about 28 years old.

Also, wife and child. In addition, this salary seems commensurate with others on the White House staff, as well as being correct in terms of the title of the job he will have.

Buchanan

MEMORANDUM



December 20, 1968

TO: PAT BUCHANAN

FROM: BOB HALDEMAN

RN asked for your counsel on whether Leo Cherne should be asked to serve on an advisory board or used for some other purpose.



HRL

MEMO TO H.R. HALDEMAN

From Buchanan

I have never met Leo Cherne; RN knows him far better than I do; I only know him by way of information, all of which is good. He is an anti-communist, level-headed Liberal thinker. About his personality I know nothing. Good writer, extremely intelligent man.

Buchanan

MEMORANDUM

December 19, 1968

TO: PAT BUCHANAN

FROM: BOB HALDEMAN

RN said to tell you that the speech suggestions for the law firm dinner were excellent as were your thoughts for the Cardinal McIntyre dinner in Los Angeles.

In both cases they were exactly the kind of thing he wants, and he said to tell you you did a great job.

HRH

Copy to:
Jim Keogh

MEMORANDUM

December 17, 1968

TO: HENRY KISSINGER
BILL ROGERS

FROM: BOB HALDEMAN

RN asked Pat Buchanan to check out a Foreign Service Officer by the name of Bob Blake in whom RN had some interest.

Buchanan's rough report is attached and I am sending it to you since RN may want further consideration of this man for a particular post, either in State or the National Security staff.

HRH

Encl:
Buchanan's memo of Dec 10, 1968

MEMO TO HALDEMAN

From Buchanan

December 10, 1968

(FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER FROM WHITTIER)

Got that report on Bob Blake. Had Kent Crane check with a wide range of sources within State and Blake comes off quite well. "Smelling like a rose."

He has an excellent reputation, for being aggressive and fast-moving. Very effective both with foreigners and with others in the service. Considered tough by some of the professionals. He is divorced, and remarried to some girl who is quite close to the Kennedy women. He also has social connections with the Kennedys. He was handpicked by Shriver, after his Congo tour, to be DCM at Paris, which is quite a job. This would confirm the reports about connections with the Kennedys.

His previous record is good at State, and good experience including a stint at Moscow.

(Anyhow, relay to RN that this report seems to challenge our earlier readings about Blake being a "lightweight." I know RN liked the guy, and he will be interested to know his peers think him, at least some of them, first-rate.)

Buchanan



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

12/8/68

Dear Bob,

I would like to say initially what a pleasure it was to meet you at last and how much I appreciate your taking the time from your crush of appointments to chat with me.

Pursuant to our meeting, I thought at some length about what data would be of the most value to you..... the results are enclosed. I trust it will be of assistance.

After you have perused the enclosures, I hope you will appreciate their sensitivity. In most cases there were few if any copies made and I am the only one who could be responsible. I would, therefore, be most grateful if you would take appropriate protective steps and destroy the documents when you have finished with them.

Again, I would like to say that I am at your disposal here in Washington pending your arrival. In any event, I look forward to serving in the new administration and seeing you again in the near future.

Best personal regards,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Hudson".

Hudson B. Drake

MEMORANDUM

December 11, 1968

TO: PAT BUCHANAN
FROM: BOB HALDEMAN
RE: PERSONNEL: CIA

Would you check with Tom Houston regarding any ideas he might have in the way of a senior Military Officer to serve as the No. 2 man in the CIA.

MEMORANDUM

December 8, 1968

TO: PAT BUCHANAN
FROM: BOB HALDEMAN
RE: CONSERVATIVE NAMES

Thanks for the conservative names; they were 200 proof plus.
Not very realistic, however, in most cases.

MEMORANDUM

December 8, 1968

TO: PAT BUCHANAN
FROM: BOB HALDEMAN
RE: HOUSTON--DOD

I have passed Houston's memo on to the DOD talent search people per yours and his request.

MEMORANDUM

December 2, 1968

TO: PAT BUCHANAN
FROM: BOB HALDEMAN
RE: PERSONNEL: I. Kristol

You suggested Irving Kristol as a valuable addition to the White House staff.

RN would like you to follow up on him as a possible special assistant in the writing area. If you feel Kristol would be interested in this would you please make the preliminary steps.

MEMORANDUM

December 2, 1968

TO: PAT BUCHANAN
FROM: BOB HALDEMAN
RE: RN REMARKS IN CALIFORNIA, December 5 and 6

RN would like you to give him some general thoughts regarding his remarks to the Cardinal McIntyre dinner on Thursday night, December 5th, and his remarks to the Republican Governors' Conference on Friday night, December 6th.

In each case RN will speak for no more than five minutes, and his remarks will be in the form of greetings on Thursday night and response to a toast from Governor Reagan on Friday night.

Please check Chapin for background on these two events, and have your thoughts in to RN by Wednesday noon.

November 29, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: J. Keogh
P. Buchanan
R. Price
FROM: H. R. HALDEMAN
RE: INAUGURAL ADDRESS

I assume all of you, with the assistance of the other writer and research people, are proceeding full tilt with collection of ideas for and preparation of initial drafts of the Inaugural address and following that a State of the Union message which will present the new President's legislative program.

Obviously, you don't have adequate input and guidance at this stage for finishing these things up, but I know that RN is going to be turning to you with the expectation that a lot of preliminary thinking will have been completed. I expect this will happen about mid-December, after he has completed the naming of the Cabinet and is able to turn some of his attention to program development.

The best possible use of your time during this period, as I have suggested earlier, is in this area. At this point, there is nothing to be gained from sitting around the White House finding out what the other people do, because all of the studies we have been able to make indicate that ninety percent of what they do isn't the way we are going to do it.

Various key policy appointments will be made in the very near future and, as they are, these people should be able to sit down with you and start work productively on policy and program development. Obviously, this will require coordination with the task forces and their input, but there's a lot to be done on the basis of the campaign promises, the Republican platform and your own recommendations as to the nature and thrust of the new President's program.

H. R. H.

:ew

MEMO TO: P.J.M. Buchanan

October 2, 1968

FROM: Agnes Waldron

cc: Greenspan/Allen

RE: Administration Actions to Influence the 1966 Election

The following material was prepared by Dick McCormack.

1. August 11. President Johnson assigned Harriman to explore any and all signs of peaceful intentions by Hanoi, no matter how faint.
2. August 24. Johnson endorsed proposals for an all Asian conference to settle the Vietnam war, but cautions that "we do not want to make it appear that we are trying to direct it or force it."
3. Sept. 5. Johnson said that a U.S. troop withdrawal from South Vietnam is dependant upon a pull-out of Communist forces.
4. Sept. 11. South Vietnam voters (80.8% of those eligible) elected a 117 member constituent assembly to draft a new constitution and pave the way for restoration of civilian rule in 1967.
5. Sept. 14. "Encouraged" by what he called a "vote of confidence" from the people of South Vietnam, President Johnson hailed today the "real progress and growing momentum" in that nation's economic and social rehabilitation. Johnson also made public an 18,000 word report by Robert Komer reviewing the accomplishment in non-military programs run jointly by the U.S. and S. Vietnamese.
6. Sept. 22. Ambassador Goldberg stated that the U.S. will halt the bombing of North Vietnam when it received assurances, privately or otherwise that Hanoi would respond by a reduction of its war effort. The U.S. would then be prepared to participate in a mutual withdrawal of military forces under international supervision.
7. Sept. 27. President Johnson announced that he had accepted the invitation of President Marcos of the Philippines to attend a heads of government conference in Manila to discuss the Vietnam conflict.
8. October 4. Official leaks reported that French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville had told President Johnson that North Vietnam no longer believes it can achieve a military victory, but that it was not yet in a mood for negotiations. (Probably came from a State Dept. backgrounder)
9. October 3. Johnson ruled out ending the bombing of North Vietnam without an indication that Hanoi will, in turn, deescalate its military activities in South Vietnam.
10. October 6. Johnson left for a 17-day trip to the Far East to include attending the Manila Conference. Also visited New Zealand, Australia, Thailand, Korea, Malasia and South Vietnam. Surprise

visit to Cam Ranh Bay. "With 700 correspondents chronicling the mutual back-scratching with Asian politicians, the finely honed 'joint communiques', the not so secret 'background briefings', there can be no doubt that Johnson will dominate the American headlines for two weeks." (Carl Rowan, 10/19/66)

In the background briefings, the "peace search" aspect of the Johnson journey received heavy emphasis.

"But one official accompanying the President noted that not much time was available for planning the mission or for identifying the areas where real movement is likely." (Star 11/19/66)

11. October 18. "Johnson Sees Asia at 'Turning Point' ...Voices Confidence at First Stop of 17-Day Tour of the Far East". (NYT) Johnson speech reasserted the United States pledge of military aid to the area "as long as danger threatens". But it (his speech) renounced again all interest in special status, privilege, territory or perpetual base rights. It looked ahead to the day when Asians would provide more and more for their own defense." (10/18/66) NYT Speech offered olive branch to communist China.
12. October 26. Johnson pledges troops at Cam Ranh Bay. "We shall never let you down, nor your fighting comrades, nor the 15 million people of South Vietnam nor the hundreds of millions of Asians who are counting on us to show here - here in South Vietnam that aggression doesn't pay and that aggression can't succeed."
At the Manila Conference itself the communique mentioned that: "The Government of Vietnam described the significant military progress being made against aggression."
Both Ky and Westmoreland made optimistic humanitarian speeches about progress in Vietnam.
13. November 5. Secretary McNamara flew to the Texas White House to announce a dramatic reduction in draft calls three days before the election. This in fact took place. In October, 49,000 men were drafted, in November, 37,600, December, 12,100. McNamara also announced that the number of troops in Vietnam would continue to grow at a lower rate than in 1966.

FURTHER AMPLIFICATION ON ANY OF THESE POINTS CAN BE PROVIDED WITHIN A FEW HOURS.

Sept 20

TO GAT BUCHANAN
FROM DICK MCCORMACK

PROPOSED STATEMENT BY NIXON ON HUMPHREY'S BOMB STOP PROPOSAL

I AM DEEPLY SADDENED TONIGHT TO LEARN OF VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY'S WILLINGNESS TO TRADE YOUNG AMERICAN LIVES IN VIETNAM IN RETURN FOR A FEW CHEAP POLITICAL POINTS.

ON SEPTEMBER X MR. HUMPHREY CALLED ON ME TO ~~LET~~ JOIN HIM IN A PLEDGE THAT NEITHER HE NOR I WOULD OFFER HANOI SOFTER PEACE TERMS AFTER THE ELECTION.

A FEW DAYS LATER HE STATED THAT HE WOULD NOT SAY ANYTHING THAT WOULD TEMPT THE MEN IN HANOI TO DRAG THIS WAR ON IN THE HOPE THAT THEY'LL GET A BETTER DEAL OUT OF ME JAN. 21.

TODAY BY ANNOUNCING THAT HE WOULD STOP THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM IF HE IS ELECTED, MR. HUMPHREY IS DOING EXACTLY WHAT HE PLEDGED HE WOULD NOT DO. HE IS COMPLETELY CUTTING THE GROUND FROM UNDERNEATH OUR NEGOTIATORS IN PARIS.

FOR MONTHS NOW OUR NEGOTIATORS HAVE OFFERED TO STOP THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM, IF HANOI WOULD OFFER SOME RECIPROCAL DEESCALATION, SOME INDICATION THAT THE LEVEL OF FIGHTING IN SOUTH VIETNAM WOULD BE REDUCED. THIS THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE CONSISTENTLY REFUSED TO DO.

MR. HUMPHREY IS AWARE THAT WE HAVE ALREADY SUSPENDED THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM EIGHT TIMES, ONCE FOR MORE THAN FIVE WEEKS. BUT NONE OF THESE BOMBING PAUSES HAS BROUGHT PEACE. INSTEAD EACH HAS BEEN USED BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TO RUSH TRUCK LOADS OF TROOPS AND AMMUNITION TO THE BORDERS OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

ON MARCH 31 THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED A BOMBING SUSPENSION OVER MORE THAN 75% OF NORTH VIETNAM'S TERRITORY. HANOI'S ONLY REACTION TO THIS HAS BEEN TO DOUBLE THE RATE OF SUPPLIES AND WAR MATERIAL COMING IN THROUGH THE PORT OF HAIPHONG AND TO STEP UP THEIR ATTACKS AND TERRORISM IN THE SOUTH.

FOR SOME TIME NOW, NORTH VIETNAM HAS ATTEMPTED TO MASS ENOUGH TROOPS AND AMMUNITION ACROSS THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE TO LAUNCH A MASSIVE ATTACK ON SOUTH VIETNAM'S NORTHERN TWO PROVINCES. THUS FAR WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO FORESTALL THIS BY AGGRESSIVELY BOMBING ALL SUCH TROOP BUILDS UPS. MR. HUMPHREY NOW PROPOSES TO GIVE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE A PRIVILEGED SANCTUARY FROM WHICH TO LAUNCH ATTACKS AGAINST OUR MEN FIGHTING MEN IN THE SOUTH.

BY ANNOUNCING NOW THAT HE WILL STOP THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM FOUR MONTHS FROM NOW IF ELECTED, HUMPHREY IS GIVING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE CLEAR NOTICE THAT ALL THEY HAVE TO DO IS WAIT AND THEY WILL GET WHAT THEY HAVE BEEN DEMANDING FOR MANY MONTHS IN PARIS. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE CAN HARDLY EXPECT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY NOW.

THIS IS A GROSSLY IRRESPONSIBLE ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF A MAN WHO WANTS TO BE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. I CALL ON HIM TO WEIGH CAREFULLY THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS ANNOUNCEMENTS, RETHINK HIS POSITION ON VIETNAM ONCE AGAIN, AND RETRACT HIS STATEMENT.

END OF PROPOSED STATEMENT.

I SUGGEST THAT WE TREAT THIS ASPECT OF THE HUMPHREY SPEECH SUA SEPARATELY, AND HAVE SOME OTHER NIXON SPOKESMAN DEAL WITH THE REST OF HIS COMMENTS AND DISTORTIONS.

END.

RMN-DT

M C A NY

URGENT MEMO FOR PAT BUCHANAN

1 October 1968

MEMORANDUM TO BUCHANAN

RE: Post-November Planning

file

In view of the likelihood of victory in November, I know that ultimately some serious attention is going to be given to identifying those people who will serve in a new administration. I want to pass along a few thoughts in this regard.

One of the few benefits of my job during the last year and a half has been the opportunity to observe at rather close range the activities of the top DOD management. In some areas I have been appalled by the incompetency, e.g., Systems Analysis; but in others I've been impressed.

I am not convinced that it would be wise to sweep the place clean in January. At least two Assistant Secretaries should be retained if at all possible: Robert C. Moot (Comptroller) and Dr. John S. Foster (DDR&E). Moot is a career bureaucrat, but an exceptionally competent one. He hasn't been here long, but he comes with an excellent reputation and from what I have seen, a well deserved one. Foster is, in my opinion, first-rate. He is terribly concerned about our failure not to spend more for strategic R&D and has fought as hard as possible within the inner-councils as well as on the Hill for more funds. He is sharp, diligent, and practical. He is hawkish as hell on the question of U.S.-Soviet strategic strength, particularly in areas of nuclear weaponry. He opposed the Test Ban Treaty and still believes privately that the Soviets would not hesitate to resume testing in the atmosphere if it were to their advantage to do so.

The basic decision, I suppose, must be whether we should retain some of the "old team". My belief is that we should where we can do so consistent with the Boss's long-range plans, i.e., where those whom we wish to keep can work comfortably with a new Administration. There is also the question of continuity, which I think ought to carry some weight.

There is yet another consideration. When Kennedy appointed McNamara it was with the understanding that he could appoint his own team. I understand this was McNamara's price, but it was too high a one. I think the President should retain the

RIGHT CO

prerogative to appoint directly key sub-Cabinet officials where the nature of the job is such as to be of particular importance. This does not mean that you surround a Cabinet Secretary with a group of people with whom he can't work, but some jobs are too important to be filled by a Secretary's crony.

Such a job in DOD is Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs (ISA). This job will be of particular importance during the next few years since ISA is responsible at the DOD working level for operations in Vietnam and for the forthcoming strategic arms negotiations with the Soviets. This is one place where I would clean house completely, since what I have seen (particularly with regard to the proposed negotiations) scares me to death. Your friend Halperin should be one of the first to go.

I have noticed tremendous speculation in the press about Rocky for Secretary of Defense. For many reasons I hope it never gets beyond the speculation stage. My first choice would be Senator Henry Jackson. First, because I think politically it is imperative to have a Democrat in that slot, and second because it should be a Democrat who has good relations on the Hill. If we are to do what must be done, it will be vital to maintain close, warm relations with the key members of the House and Senate, and while we can hope for the best, it is likely that the Democrats will control at least the Senate.

My second choice for SecDef is Clark Clifford. All of us here have been impressed by him since he took over, and I think it would not be at all unacceptable if he were asked to remain. In such an event, you would want to appoint a Deputy Secretary who was youngish and administratively oriented: someone who could handle the day-to-day administrative responsibilities as Nitze now does. Nitze should go.

I have had several calls regarding the Newsweek story that McGeorge Bundy might get the Secretary of State job. The reactions were unusually bad. I pleaded ignorance (easy to do), but was surprised at the overt hostility. Scranton doesn't seem to excite people much one way or another.

I have been getting together the names of some younger types who are program-oriented who might be good in some staff slots but I suspect there will be an abundance of these types coming out of the campaign. I am afraid we might have trouble recruiting some of the more competent, idealistic yet practical people who

have been in the vanguard of the independent sector programming since there seems to be increasing disillusionment over the Boss's failure to be specific with regard to contemplated programs and a gut fear that a new Administration will be staffed by left-overs from the Eisenhower years. Again, this might not pose any problem if you already have an abundance of good people in the campaign organization who you can use.

Although this may sound like a broken record, I do think one area which must be given consideration when contemplating a new administration is locating people of broad organizational and administrative experience who can help tie the package together. This will be particularly important if the Boss is to retain a maximum degree of relief from becoming tied down in routine administrative matters. It is almost impossible to imagine the organizational nightmare of the federal bureaucracy unless you are in it, and the key to the President controlling it is delegation of broad administrative authority to trusted subordinates across Departmental lines. It really boils down to a matter of developing the eyes and ears the President needs if he is to prevail over the bureaucracy.

I am going out to Indianapolis the 13th to talk to my bosses in the law firm and to see about buying a house, but I should be back the 23rd and would be happy to discuss these matters and others with you or Greenspan should you desire.

CA
file

September 23, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: Haldeman, Chotiner, Counterattack Group
FROM: DC

I think it is vitally important that people other than RN go forward on an attack on Humphrey for attempting to get a three-way debate in which Wallace participates and point out that he is thereby trying to build up Wallace at the expense of the country and for the very cynical reason of defeating RN rather than really helping himself.

Also, the squib about the little sprig of olive branch should be hammered very very hard by all of our people for the next week. (this is attached.)

Also, on the same Max Frankel story on Page Two, maybe it's necessary for us to get out to all editors, radio commentators and so forth, a truth statement, or a hear are the facts (or call it what you like) and have it set up in an effective way.

For example, RN is for the Feed Grain Program, for Federal Aid to Education, for Medical care, for Aid to Higher Education, for the Wheat Program, has deliberately opposed Justice Fortas etc. and add to this the treat with regard to the charge by O'Brien that RN had called Truman a traitor etc. Lump all the Humphrey and O'Brien statements together and just say that the Humphrey - O'Brien group have charged --- bang, bang, bang, bang -- here is the truth. Call it the

worst campaign of smear and mis-representation in history, etc.

Again, I emphasize the tremendous effectiveness of getting around and having used the Cardinal Cushing quote to answer O'Brien's slur that RN waged a dirty campaign against John F. Kennedy.

It seems to me that we are handling these things in a most ineffective way. By talking to Buchanan, he said that he had already sent this around in the Quote of the Day file. My guess is that that kind of stuff really isn't read by those who have seen it.

I think when we have something that is really effective, it must be hammered home to those who we want to use it, not only by sending it to them, but also following it up by a telephone call with those speakers who we think are important in urging them to use it.

What I have in mind here is to list Humphrey's and O'Brien's ten most outrageous charges and rebuke them each with a sentence, not with a long statement. For example, he says that RN is against Federal Aid to Education. RN has supported Federal Aid to education etc.

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MEMORANDUM

TO: Pat Buchanan
FROM: Agnes Waldron
RE: George Wallace

DATE: Sept. 22, 1968

1. Wallace has made an egregious error and we should exploit it. Today's Times carries a Wallace interview in which he reportedly said: that "if he was not elected President there would be such a wide public outcry against the Federal Government's school desegregation efforts that the states would take over the schools. "He said he foresaw large rallies of 15,000 and 20,000 persons in cities around the country where people would pour out their anger against the Federal Government.

After that, he said, the states would begin to invoke their police powers for protecting the health, safety, and morals of the population and would physically take over the schools.

Alabama is one state where that would happen.

He was asked how that could succeed if state armed forces were federalized....

He replied that the movement he is leading has reached

such proportions that the Federal Government now has to listen to him and the people with him, as it had heretofore listened to the 'anarchists'..". (NB - no direct quotes from GCW - quotes are from news story) In effect Wallace is:

- (1) Asking Americans to accept his mob for black mobs and/or left wing mobs
- (2) Threatening revolution if he is not elected

In any event he has departed from anything that could even remotely be described as a law and order position. He has put himself in bed with the anarchists because he too is advocating anarchy - his kind of anarchy.

2. Today's Times editorial section makes two points about Wallace:

- (1) A major aim of his campaign has been to gain "respectability" (Chandler was supposed to lend this, evidently GCW is finding it hard to find a respectable running mate)

- (2) Editorially the Times says: "The Wallace movement is an evil phenomenon. George Wallace is not fit to be president of the United States. He is not fit even to be discussed in Presidential terms. (emphasis added)

RN has implied this in his statements that he does not want to build up a third party candidate. But the Times editorial is much stronger. Interestingly, it does not touch on the effect of including Wallace in the TV Debates. Nothing would give him greater and broader respectability! While RN probably would not care to be so pointed, others - surrogates, friendly press - should warn of the monster that may be created by holding TV debates this year since it will give Wallace Respectability and a nationwide forum to call for his kind of revolution. House members should really have the heat turned on them to kill that bill - I think a great many liberals can be attracted to make this possible if the above line is used.

HHH is also vulnerable here since he was first to say that he would gladly debate GCW.

WEEKLY NEWS COVERAGE SUMMARY -- OCTOBER 21 - OCTOBER 25.

Hayden

	OCT. 21	OCT 22	OCT 23	OCT 24	OCT 25	TOTALS
	(NBC / CBS)					
NIXON	1:00/1:40	3:00/3:25	0:15/3:45	3:00/5:00	3:30/2:10	10:45/16:00
HHH	2:00/3:20	0:15/3:20	2:00/4:20	0/2:30	3:00/4:00	7:15/17:30
WALL.	0/1:20	0:15/2:10	2:30/3:00	0:15/1:50	2:30/3:40	5:30/12:00
AGNW	0/0	0/0	0:15/0	0:15/0	0/0	0:30/0
MUSKE	0/0	0/0	3:00/0	0/0	0:15/0	3:15/0
LEMAY	2:00/2:00	0/0:15	0/0:30	3:00/0	0/0	5:00/2:45

THE WEEK'S COVERAGE WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY CBS' JUXTAPOSING FILM OF THE THREE CANDIDATES ON VARIOUS ISSUES, THUS PROVIDING WHAT WALTER CRONKITE CALLED "A POOR SUBSTITUTE" OF A DEBATE. (THIS ALSO EXPLAINS CBS' INFLATED TIME SPENT ON POLITICAL COVERAGE THIS WEEK.) THE QUESTIONS WERE ON LAW AND ORDER, MONDAY; THE CITIES, TUESDAY; VIETNAM, WEDNESDAY; NATIONAL SECURITY (THE DROPT AND NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY), THURSDAY; AND ECONOMICS (COST OF LIVING AND INCOME TAX SURCHARGE), FRIDAY.

ON BALANCE, RN GOT SLIGHTLY MORE COVERAGE THAN HUMPHREY ON NBC DURING THE WEEK, SLIGHTLY LESS ON CBS. THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES TAPERED OFF DURING THE WEEK, ALTHOUGH BOTH CBS AND NBC ON MONDAY USED LEMAY'S STATEMENTS ON A BOMBING HALT EARLY IN THEIR NEWSCASTS.

ALL DURING THE WEEK THE PARIS PEACE TALKS AND A POSSIBLE BOMBING HALT DOMINATED THE TELECASTS IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. ON WEDNESDAY BOTH NETWORKS HAD SPECULATIVE STORIES ON THE POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS IN THE PARIS PEACE TALKS, WITHOUT TYING THIS INTO THE CAMPAIGN. ON THURSDAY BOTH NETWORKS LED WITH EXTENSIVE COVERAGE OF LBJ'S NEWS CONFERENCE AND HIS DENIAL OF ANY BREAKTHROUGH. ON FRIDAY, THE FLAP BETWEEN RN AND HHH OVER THIS BROKE INTO THE OPEN. BOTH NBC AND CBS USED AS THEIR FIRST ITEMS RN'S LEARNING TOP ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN DRIVING HARD FOR A BOMBING HALT IN THE NEAR FUTURE, AND FOLLOWED WITH HHH'S CHARGE THAT RN IS PLAYING POLITICS WITH NATIONAL SECURITY AND IS BEING IRRESPONSIBLE. BOTH NETWORKS ALSO HAD AT THE SAME TIME CLARK CLIFFORD'S DENIAL OF A MISSILE GAP, AND CBS USED LARRY O'BRIEN STATEMENT THAT RN OF OLD HAS EMERGED.

THESE STORIES GOT THE BEST COVERAGE DURING THE WEEK:

NIXON

TUESDAY--WHISTLESTOP THROUGH OHIO
 THURSDAY--WHISTLESTOP THROUGH PENNSYLVANIA
 FRIDAY--POSSIBLE CEASE-FIRE AND SECURITY GAP

HUMPHREY

MONDAY--NEW YORK ROLLY
 TUESDAY--BETTER RECEPTION IN TEXAS
 FRIDAY--REPLY TO RN ON SECURITY GAP

NBC'S JACK PERKINS MADE FAVORABLE COMMENTARIES ALL WEEK ON HUMPHREY. IN MONDAY COMMENTARY HE SAID HHH'S STRATEGY NOW WAS TO COME ON STRONG "AND THEY HAVE SOME REASON FOR HOPE." ON WEDNESDAY PERKINS SAID THAT THINGS "ARE GOING RIGHT IN TEXAS...CROWDS ARE GROWING, MONEY IS COMING IN, AND THE CANDIDATE IS RECHARGED."

HERB KAPLOW OF NBC HAD SEVERAL LONG, ANALYTICAL ITEMS ON RN, SOMEWHAT DISPASSIONATE IN NATURE. COMMENTATOR SAID WEDNESDAY THAT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RN IN 1960 AND 1968 IS THAT THIS YEAR HE IS AHEAD, GIVING MORE TIME FOR THOUGHT. KAPLOW HAD SPECIAL REPORTS ON THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, INTERVIEWING ELLSWORTH ON THURSDAY AND FRANK SHAKESPEARE ON FRIDAY.

END....THAT IS ALL FOR TONIGHT...GA OR END...

MANY TKS. END.N

OCTOBER 28, 1968 EVENING TV COVERAGE CBS

Haldeman

LEAD STORY WAS ON THE SPOT COVERAGE OF 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC SHOT IN PRAGUE.

FIRST POLITICAL STORY WAS AT 6:34 OR DAVID SCHUMACHER THAT MCCARTHY TO ENDORSE HUMPHREY, ALTHOUGH NOT TOO ENTHUSIASTICALLY. THERE IS A FEELING THAT RN'S CALL LAST WEEK FOR A HIKE IN DEFENSE SPENDING WAS A FACTOR IN MCCARTHY'S DECISION. SCHUMACHER SPECULATED MCCARTHY MAY LATER RESIGN FROM THE SENATE AND DEMOCRAT PARTY IN A DRAMATIC GESTURE AS FIRST STEP TOWARD BUILDING A THIRD FORCE.

CBS POLL SHOWS NIXON SCORING A SLIGHT GAIN IN ELECTORAL VOTES THIS PAST WEEK EVEN THOUGH HUMPHREY HAS PICKED UP IN POPULAR VOTES. CBS GIVES NIXON 28 STATES WITH 270 ELECTORAL VOTES, A GAIN OF 14 OVER LAST WEEK BY CHANGING OHIO FROM "TOSS-UP" TO NIXON, AND WEST VIRGINIA FROM NIXON TO "TOSS-UP."

AT 6:37 NIXON WAS SHOWN ON A 50 SEC FILM CLIP BEING GREETED IN NEW YORK BY ROCKY AND LATER DELIVERING SPEECH BACKING TEACHERS ("IT'S TIME WE RECOGNIZE TEACHERS RENDER US A SERVICE. . .") BILL PLANT COMMENTED NIXON STRIVING FOR A MANDATE TO GOVERN, AND THIS MANDATE COULD COME ONLY FROM HUMPHREY AND WALLACE SUPPORTERS, SO IN FINAL DAYS OF CAMPAIGN SPECIAL APPEALS WOULD BE MADE TO THESE GROUPS.

HUMPHREY GOT 1:45 COVERAGE IN OHIO APPEALING TO YOUTH TO GO OUT AND WORK FOR TICKET. "REMINDE OLDSTERS THAT NIXON OPPOSED MEDICARE, REMIND WORKING PEOPLE THAT. . . ETC. THINK WE'RE GOING TO WIN? WANT TO WIN? GONNA HELP ME WIN? SOCK IT TO 'EM//"

CRONKITE GAVE 20 SEC TO LEMAY'S CALL FOR HOT PURSUIT IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA.

JOHN HART NARRATED 7 MIN SPECIAL REPORT ON NIXON AIRBORNE STAFF WITH CLIPS AND SHORT INTERVIEWS OF SNEED, CHAPIN, ZIEGLER, BUCHANAN ET. AL., SPECULATING MANY OF THEM WOULD PROBABLY BE WHITE HOUSE STAFFERS, NIXON QUOTED AS SAYING HE WOULD HAVE THE YOUNGEST WHITE HOUSE STAFF IN HISTORY. MITCHELL, KLEIN, AND MCWHORTER INTERVIEWED ON ORDERLY PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THE CAMPAIGN IN CONTRAST TO 1960. IMPRESSION PROJECTED WAS ONE OF YOUTHFUL PASSIONLESS, PROFESSIONAL LOYALISTS STRIVING AND AWAITING FOR A PROGRAMMED VICTORY BY EMPLOYING ALL THE TECHNIQUES OF MODERN MERCHANDISING.

ERIC SEVAREID CONCLUDED WITH 2 MIN. ANALYSIS OF WHY LBJ HAS SUDDENLY DECIDED TO GET INTO THE POLITICAL FRAY. HE CLAIMS TWO RECENT STATEMENTS BY NIXON BROUGHT THE "HONEYMOON" BETWEEN THE TWO TO AN END: (1) NIXON'S URGING A STEP-UP IN OUR NUCLEAR ARSENAL AT THE TIME HE IS TRYING TO ARRANGE A VIET CEASE-FIRE WITH THE RUSSIANS; (2) NIXON'S ALLEGING THAT JOHNSONIAN LIEUTENANTS ARE CONSPIRING BEHIND HIS BACK TO ARRANGE A PHONEY PEACE.

NBC

LEAD STORY: PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN IN FEVERISH LAST WEEK. HUMPHREY AND NIXON CONCENTRATING ON MAJOR STATES.

NIXON: HERB KAPLOW FILM CLIP WITH NIXON IN ALBANY, N Y 3 MIN. RN DISPUTED HHH IS WINNING IN N Y. COMMENTARY BY KAPLOW THAT N Y REPUBLICANS ARE WORRIED THOUGH. ESCALATED ATTACKS ON HHH. "YOU'RE VOTING A NEW TEAM." "GIVE US THE MANDATE FOR CHANGE. . . AND WE WILL SHOW YOU." "THEY (DEMOCRATS) ARE GOING TO ATTACK BECAUSE THEY'RE AFRAID THEY ARE GOING TO LOSE."

HUMPHREY: JACK PERKINS REPORTS WITH HUMPHREY CAMP IN CANTON, OHIO, 2 MINS. SHOWS HHH WITH OLYMPIC GOLD MEDAL WINNER RONNIE HARRIS. HHH IS SLIGHTLY AHEAD IN OHIO. HHH SAYS THAT HE'S GOING TO GIVE THE GOP THE BIGGEST DEFEAT SINCE HARRY TRUMAN.

LEMAY: 45 SECS., COMMENTARY AND FILM, IN DES MOINES, IOWA. SAYS U.S. TROOPS SHOULD PURSUE ENEMY INTO CAMBODIA AND LAOS IF THESE COUNTRIES ARE GIVING THEM SANCTUARY. CRITICIZED CLIFFORD FOR RELEASING FIGURES OF U.S. NUCLEAR CAPABILITY, ETC.

WALLACE: 15 SECS., COMMENTARY ONLY, THAT HE WAS IN HANNIBAL, MISSOURI AND A BROOKWOOD THROWN AT HIM, BUT MISSED.

POLLS: 3 MIN. SPECIAL WITH JOHN CHANCELLOR ON POLLS. NIXON AIDES HAVE CHARGED THAT THE HARRIS POLL IS BEING UNFAIR IN THE ONES IT RELEASES. CHANCELLOR SHOWED BOTH THE HARRIS AND GALLUP POLL AND GAVE QUOTES FROM INTERVIEW WITH GEORGE GALLUP. "MOST UNUSUAL YEAR HE'S EVER SEEN." "SHIFTING OF VOTES MORE THAN EVER BEFORE IN HIS 30 YEARS' EXPERIENCE." CHANCELLOR POINTS OUT THAT POLLSERS ARE BEING PINNED TO THE WALL THIS YEAR, BECAUSE OF THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE FINAL OUTCOME. BOTH POLLS ARE WITHIN THE ERROR LIMIT OF 3-4% WHICH HE DEMONSTRATED. SANDER VANOCUR GAVE A SPECIAL 6 MIN. REPORT ON CAMPAIGN IN IOWA FOR SENATE. DEMOCRAT HAROLD HUGHES HAS A HARD BATTLE BECAUSE OF NIXON COATTAILS AND GOP TREND IN STATE. VIETNAM MAJOR ISSUE BETWEEN HAWKISH REPUBLICAN DAVE STANLEY AND THE DOVISH HUGHES.

ABC:

(HOWARD K SMITH FOR FRANK REYNOLDS)

LEAD STORY: VIETNAM

LBJ -- IN POLITICS NOW, REMAINED SILENT ALL THIS TIME, BECAUSE HE WAS A LIABILITY TO HHH. HIS POPULARITY HAS CHANGED FOR GOOD AND HHH HAS SENSED THIS . . . THUS HIS CALL FOR HELP FROM LBJ. ONE LBJ AID SAID: "YOU AIN'T HEARD THE LAST OF HIM YET." HE'LL BE BARNSTORMING THIS LAST WEEK TO GET BACK AT THE CRITICS, AFTER BEING SILENT SO LONG. TIME: 1 1/2 MIN.

HUMPHREY: 25 SECS., COMMENTARY ONLY, IS INCREASING ATTACK ON RN... WE SHOULD EXPECT GOP'S ATTACK TO BE DIRTIER.

NIXON: 30 SECS., COMMENTARY ONLY, THAT YOU'LL HEAR A LOT OF TRICKS FROM DEMOCRATS -- BUT THEY'RE GOING TO STILL LOSE.

N. Y. DAILY NEWS POLL SHOWS HHH PAST RN BY 4%: HHH - 46%; RMN - 42%; FCW - 8%. WALLACE: 15 SECS, COMMENTARY ONLY, THAT POLLS ARE LIERS. BACKGROUND OF WALLACE, FILM REPORT - 5 1/2 MINS. EARLY LIFE AND BACKGROUND. INTERVIEWED BROTHER, MOTHER AND FORMER SCHOOLMATE.

4 3/4 MIN. REPORT ON MINORITY PARTY CANDIDATES DICK GREGORY, ELDRIGE CLEVER, FRED HOLSTED AND CHORLENE MITCHELL.

DESCRIPTION OF IDEAL PRESIDENT BY GORE VIDAL AND WILLIAM BUCKLEY, JR.

HHH-2:00 HUNTLEY-BRINKLEY LED WITH HUMPHREY ENDORSEMENTS BY MCCARTHY, ABERNATHY, AND MRS. MARTIN LUTHER KING. HUMPHREY, 2 MINS., 6:34-6:36, SAYS MCCARTHY'S ENDORSEMENT "HELPFUL," ALSO FILM CLIP OF HUMPHREY IN PENNSYLVANIA TODAY WEARING STEEL HAT AND SAYING, "YESTERDAY MY OPPOSITION CANDIDATE WAS HERE, BUT TOAY THE AIR HAS CLEANED UP.2 TOMORROW, HHH IN NEW YORK.

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

W-2:00 WALLACE, 6:40-6:42, REPORTS \$6 MILLION EXPENDITURES TODAY. REPORTER DOUG KIKER, IN BEAUMONT, TEX., SAYS WALLACE RUNNING MORE AGAINST POLLSTERS AND PRESS THAN RN AND HHH. FILM CLIPS OF WALLACE BEING SNIDEST YET -- "THOSE POLLSTERS WANT TO MAKE PUBLIC OPINION, NOT REPORT IT." AND WHEN SOME HECKLERS STARTED IN, WALLACE SAID, "OK, YOU REPORTERS, RUN OVER AND GET THAT. AND WRITE ALL ABOUT THE 2-3 PICKETS, AND IGNORE THE THOUSANDS OF OTHER DECENT PEOPLE WHO ARE HERE."

ALSO, FILM CLIP OF TED KENNEDY ANNOUNCING FORMATION OF MEMORIAL FOUNDATION FOR ROBERT F. KENNEDY.

C B S

LEAD STORY - MCCARTHY "QUALIFIED ENDORSEMENT" OF HUMPHREY, 3 MINS. MADE CLEAR HIS CONTINUED DISENCHANTMENT WITH DEMOCRATIC PARTY. 2 MINS., 35 SECS OF THIS WAS FILM OF MCCARTHY MAKING HIS STATEMENT.

HHH-2:00 HUMPHREY- 2 MINS IN PITTSBURGH...ENTHUSIASTIC RECEPTION FROM HHH. FEELS GOOD ABOUT IT...HIGH SPIRITS. FILM OF HHH IN T.V. STUDIO BEING INTERVIEWED ON ENDORSEMENT.

RN 2:35 NIXON - BILL PLANTT REPORTING, 2 MINS., 20 SECS. FILM OF RN SAYING WHENEVER YOU SEE SOMEBODY ENGAGING IN PERSONALITIES IT IS BECAUSE THEY'RE AFRAID - AFRAID THEY'RE GOING TO LOSE. THE REAL ISSUE OF 1968 IS THAT LAST FOUR YEARS. THE DEMOCRATS TURNED DOWN THEIR CHANCE FOR NEW LEADERSHIP IN CHICAGO.

FILM OF NIXON AND ROMNEY IN DETROIT NEGRO AREA AT PRIVATE JOB PLACEMENT CENTER WITH BLACK EMPLOYEE OF THE CENTER EXPLAINING THE NEED FOR THIS TYPE OF OPERATION TO RESTORE PRIDE.

15 SEC. COMMENTARY THAT NIXON PEOPLE WITHDREW COMMERCIAL SHOWN LAST NIGHT ON NBC WHICH HAD PICTURE OF SMILING HHH OVER SCENES OF RIOTS AND WAR.

Agnew - :40 AGNEW - COMMENTARY THAT THE N.Y. TIMES EDITORIAL ON AGNEW BEING RUN AGAIN THIS MORNING STATING THAT JUST BECAUSE CHARGES ARE OLD DOES NOT MEAN THEY ARE NOT VALID STILL. AGNEW MADE A POINT-BY-POINT DENIAL OF CHARGES. AGNEW STAFF MEMBER STATED THAT THEY MAY SEEK LIBEL SUIT AGAINST THE TIMES. TIME: 40 SECS.

W-:25 WALLACE - ATTACKED NEWS MEDIA IN BEAUMONT, TEX., FILM CLIP, 25 SECS. SAYS THEY DON'T KNOW WHAT'S GOING ON IN THE COUNTRY...BUT WE DO KNOW. COMMENTARY THAT ACCORDING TO RECORDS FILED WALLACE'S EXPENSES HAVE BEEN \$5,800,000 AND HIS CONTRIBUTIONS HAVE BEEN \$5,200,000.

SPECIAL REPORT FROM LAS VEGAS, 4-1/2 MIN., WITH CHARLES KURALT REPORTING ON "JIMMIE THE GREEK." HE MAKES ODDS ON PRO FOOTBALL BAMES AND EVERY FOUR YEARS, POLITICS. HE EXPLAINED HOW HE PICKED, MUSKIE, AGNEW AND LEMAY AS THE CHOICES FOR VICE PRESIDENT BEFORE THEY WERE SELECTED. HE LISTS THE ODDS IN 1968 TO BE 5-1 NIXON. AN IN DEPTH STUDY OF NEWSPAPERS FROM AROUND COUNTRY, MAGAZINES, ETC. INDICATES THAT RN WILL GET ABOUT 330 ELECTORAL VOTES.

ERIC SEVEREID COMMENTARY - 3-1/2 MINS. ON EUGENE MCCARTHY AND HIS ENDORSEMENT OF HHH. CALLS IT A "QUASI:ENDORSEMENT" WHICH WAS RECEIVED WITH MUCH MORE ENTHUSIASM BY HHH THAN IT WAS GIVEN BY MCCARTHY. IN THE LAST WEEK OF THE CAMPAIGN NIXON IS GETTING TENSE, AS HHH HAS

A.B.C

(HOWARD K. SMITH FOR FRANK REYNOLDS)

LEAD STORY - MCCARTHY ENDORSEMENT OF HHH. "RELUCTANCE UNDISGUISED IN ENDORSEMENT. COMMENTARY, 25 SECS., FILM OF MCCARTHY MAKING STATEMENT, 40 SECS.

HHH-SD: HUMPHREY - FILM IN PITTSBURGH, 50 SECS. REPORTER SAYS ENDORSEMENT GIVES CAMPAIGN NEW MOMENTUM AND HHH OBVIOUSLY ENTHUSIASTIC. BUT FILM CLIP SHOWED HUMPHREY QUITE RESTRAINED, QUIETLY ACKNOWLEDGING HIS AND MCCARTHY'S LONG FRIENDSHIP, ETC.

RN-2:45: NIXON - 2 MINS., 45 SECS., "GAVE MCCARTHY KIND OF AN ENDORSEMENT. HE SAID TODAY THAT THE DEMOS COULD HAVE NOMINATED MCCARTHY... INSTEAD THEY NAMED SOMEBODY FROM THE SCHOOL OF OLD POLITICS." REPORTER TED KAPEL SAID RN'S CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN ATTEMPTING TO ATTRACT DEMOS AND INDEPENDENTS BUT THIS WEEK "HE HAS BEEN BRISTLING" AGAINST THE DEMO HIERARCHY; HAS ENDED SELF-IMPOSED MORATORIUM ON CHICAGO." "DISORGANIZED RABBLE AT THEIR CONVENTION SHOWS THAT WE CANNOT TRUST THEM." COMMENTATOR NOTES THAT "TRUST" IS THE KEY WORD IN HHH'S CAMPAIGN AND NOW RN IS USING IT HIMSELF AND TURNING THE TABLES. FILM CLIP OF NIXON WARNING AGAINST TRICKERY AMONG THE DEMOS: "THEY'RE PLAYING EVERY TRICK THEY KNOW...WE'VE ALL GROWN UP, WE DON'T PAY MUCH ATTENTION TO THAT ANYMORE...BUT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE GOING TO GET THE TREAT ON ELECTION DAY WHEN WE SAY TO THEM, 'GET OUT OF TOWN, WE'RE COMING IN.'"

WALLACE - 15 SECS., COMMENTARY ONLY, SAYING HE ATTACKED POLLSTERS AND NEWS MEDIA BUT IS NOW GETTING THE LARGEST AND MOST ENTHUSIASTIC CROWDS OF CAMPAIGN.

SPECIAL REPORT, 5 MINS., 50 SECS., WITH JOHN COLEMAN IN LAS VEGAS ON "JIMMIE THE GREEK." BEST KNOWN ODDS-MAKER. HE PINPOINTS EACH STATE AND MAKES PREDICTIONS: NIXON WITH ABOUT 330 ELECTORAL VOTES. ON POPULAR VOTES, HE ESTIMATES A TOTAL OF ABOUT 75 MILLION VOTES CAST. THE MINIMUM FOR NIXON WOULD BE 42% OR 31,500,000. THE MAXIMUM FOR HUMPHREY WOULD BE 38% OR 28,000,000 VOTES. THE MAXIMUM FOR WALLACE, WHICH IS DROPPING WOULD BE 20% OR 15,000,000. FEELS THE WORST FOR NIXON WILL BE A 3,000,000 VOTES MARGIN. CHANCES FOR UPSET ARE 1-5. UNDECIDED LESS THAN 3% AT THIS STAGE OF THE GAME.

GUEST COMMENTATOR, FRANK REYNOLDS, WITH HIS VIEW OF THE IDEAL PRESIDENT. 3 MINS., 15 SECS. HE MUST RECOGNIZE A LOT OF SILLY THINGS ARE GOING TO BE SAID ABOUT HIM -- MUST BE ABLE TO IGNORE THE IRRELEVANT.

ONLY HE WILL BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITIES. MUST BE A TEACHER -- AT TIMES MUST DELIVER LECTURES TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. WOULD BE IN WHITE HOUSE ONLY FOUR YEARS, BUT ACT AS IF HE'D BE THERE FOR A LIFETIME. WOULD HEREBY BAN THE WORDS "LAME DUCK." WILL NOT WASTE TIME WITH SILLY PEOPLE THAT NOW MANAGE THEIR WAY UNTO PRESIDENTIAL CALENDAR AND SPEND ALL HIS TIME KEEPING THE COUNTRY AT PEACE. "WILL LEAD COUNTRY AND IF NECESSARY DRAG IT AND TELL THOSE IN THE WAY WHERE TO GO...BUT NOT RUN THEM OVER WITH HIS CAR." "WOULD NOT TALK THE U.S. TO DEATH." "WOULD NOT BE JUST A CHEER LEADER." "WOULD NOT LOOK FOR SYMPATHY." "WOULD NOT DEMAND CONSTANT APPROVAL." FINALLY, "WOULD HAVE TO BE LUCKY... BECAUSE, HEAVEN KNOWS, HE'LL NEED IT." IMPRESSION; FAVORABLE TO RN.

END. THAT IS ALL FROM HERE TONIGHT...GOODNIGHT TO ONE AND ALL...END

TV EVENING NEWS 11/1/68 Total HHH RN W L M A
4:30 3:00 1:15 2:30 :20 0

BC -- HUNTLEY-BRINKLEY GAVE THE BOMBING HALT FIRST 20 MINS, UNTIL BRINKLEY, AT 6:48, SUMMARIZED POLITICAL NEWS OF DAY BY SAYING HUMPHREY WAS IN CHICAGO "PROMISING TO BIND UP THE WOUNDS, APPARENTLY THOSE THAT HAD BEEN OPENED IN CHICAGO EARLIER;" NIXON WAS IN TEXAS SAYING HE WOULD "SPEND A LOT MORE ON MILITARY HARDWARE;" AND CITING THE HARRIS POLL. HHH 2:00 HUMPHREY, 6:49-51, 2 MINS., FILM CLIP OF HHH LAST NIGHT SAYING LBJ'S ANNOUNCEMENT WAS "VERY MEANINGFUL, VERY HELPFUL, WE HOPE AND PRAY IT MAY RESULT IN THE PEACE EVERYONE LONGS FOR . . . VERY GOOD NEWS. THERE IS ALSO GOOD NEWS THAT SOMETHING IS HAPPENING ACROSS THIS COUNTRY," AND THEN HHH WENT INTO USUAL POLITICAL TALK. PERKINS SAID TODAY HHH UNMENTIONED BOMBING HALT TODAY. PERKINS SAID HHH AIDES CONFIDENT IT WILL HELP HHH, UNKNOWN HOW MUCH, AND THEY ARE CONVINCED" THE SLIGHTEST BOOST WOULD ELECT HUMPHREY."

RN 1:30 RN, 1 1/2 MINS., 6:51-53. REPORTED HERB KAPLOW SAYS RN CAMP "TRYING TO ASSESS THE AFFECT, AND NIXON'S REMARKS WERE THE SAME TODAY AS THEY HAVE BEEN FOR SEVERAL MONTHS." FILM CLIP OF RN SAYING HE WOULD NOT COMMENT, "BUT THERE IS THIS TO SAY: THERE HAS NOT BEEN BEEN ONE MOMENT OF PEACE DURING THE LAST FOUR YEARS. THE LAST REPUBLICAN ADMINISTRATION ENDED ONE WAR AND HEADED OFF OTHERS." RN ALSO SAID THE "UNITED STATES MUST ALWAYS BE FIRST. . .AND MUST NEGOTIATE FROM STRENGTH."

W-:15 WALLACE, 15 SEC., 6:53. WALLACE SAYS HE "HOES ANDPRAYS" THIS WILL LEAD TO PEACE; IF IT DOESN'T, THEN GO FOR MILITARY VICTORY.

L- 1:00 LEMAY, 1 MIN., 6:54-55, FILMCLIP OF LEMAY "PESSIMISTIC THAT THIS WILL RESULT IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. . . THE ODDS ARE STILL JUST ANOTHER STALLING TACTIC. . .THIS MAY BE DELIBERAT ATTEMPT BY HANOI TO INFLUENCE THE ELECTION. . .I DON'T THINK WE HAVE ANYTHING HERE AT ALL. . . THE WAR IN VIETNAM IS THE MAIN ISSUE OF THE CAMPAIGN." BRINKLEY, IN CLOSING COMMENT SAID, "IFT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY NOW IF THIS HELPS HUMPHREY A LITTLE, A LOT, AND IF SO, ENOUGH TO ELECTION HIM?. . . A SECOND QUESTION IS ON THE TIMING: IF IT IS GOOD TO STOP THE BOMBING NOW, WHY WASN'T IT GOOD FIVE MONTHS AGO? BUT IF IT STOPS THE KILLING OF AMERICAN BOYS, THEN IT IS A GOOD IDEA, EVEN IF IT WAS FOR THE WRONG REASONS. GOODNIGHT CHET."

ABC -- FRANK REYNOLDS GAVE

ABC - FRANK REYNOLDS GAVIE FIRST 12 MINUTES TO BOMBING HALT, (12 MINS) TO BOMBING HALT, AND THEN INCLUDED SEVERAL POLITICIANS' COMMENTS, INCLUDING GEORGE ROMNEY WHO WARNED AMERICAN PEOPLE AGAINST BEING "BRAINWASHED." THE FIRST OF THE CANDIATES TO BE QUOTED WAS CURT LEMAY, 1 MIN. 7:12-13, WHO SAID HE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO BACK THE PRESIDENT. FILM CLIP OF LEMAY WITH IDENTICAL QUOTES TO NBC. L- 1:00

W-:30 WALLACE, 30 SECS. 7:14, IF THE TALKS FAIL, "LET'S WIND IT UP MILITARYLY." FILMCLIP OF WALLACE SAYING HE HOPES THIS MEANS "A CESSATION OF HOSTILITITES...AND AN HONORABLE PEACE...IF THIS IS THE BEGINNING, I'M SO GLAD...REGARDLESS OF THE POLITICAL MOTIVE." RN, 1-1/2 MINS., 7:16-7:18, SAYS IN MADISON SQUARE GARDEN THAT HE HOPES THIS WILL BRING PROGRESS TO THE PARIS PEACE TALKS. AS LAST NIGHT, REPORTER TED KOBEL SAID, RN IN TEXAS TODAY "TOOK THE ATTITUDE THIS WAS A NON-PARTISAN MATTER, AND HE SEEMED TO PUT HIMSELF AT THE PRESIDENT'S RIGHT HAND." RN STRATEGISTS SAY THEY ALL FEEL RN IS GOING TO WIN ANYHOW, AND IF THE VIETNAM WAR SHOULD BE ENDED BY JANUARY, SO MUCH THE BETTER. RN 1:30

HHH 1:30 HUMPHREY, 1-1/2 MINS., 7:19-7:20, REPORTER LOU GIOFFI REPORTS ON HHH CAMPAIGN: "TWO MONTHS AGO EVERYBODY THOUGHT HUMPHREY WAS A POLITICAL CORPSE, TODAY HE IS ALIVE AND WELL...HHH SPARES NEITHER HIMSELF NOR HIS STAFF, TALKING, TALKING AND TALKING SOME MORE . . . THE CROWDS ARE RESPECTABLE, BUT NOT AN OUTPOURING, AND HIS WORDS ARE NOT ALWAYS THE MOST INSPIRING...HE PROBABLY IS THE COUNTRY'S MOST EFFECTIVE POLITICAL ORATOR, BUT SOMETIMES HE GETS CARRIED AWAY BY HIS OWN VOICE... WHAT THERE IS TO SAY IS THAT HUMPHREY IS BACK IN THE RACE, BUT HIS STRATEGISTS ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE LATE START. IT'S STILL AN UPHILL BATTLE."

CBS - LEAD STORY AND MAJOR NEWS COVERAGE GIVEN TO BOMBING HALT AND REACTION TO IT.

6:30 6 MINS., GIVEN TO DEAN RUSK'S PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY. FILM CLIP CONTAINS RUSK'S ANSWER TO REPORTERS QUESTION ABOUT POLITICAL MOTIVATION OF BOMBING HALT. RUSK DENIED ANY SUCH THING AND DOUBTS IT WOULD HAVE MUCH EFFECT ON U.S. POLITICAL SCENE.

M-:20 6:38 MUSKIE - 20 SECS. DISCOUNTED POLITICAL MOTIVE.

HHH 1:20 HHH - 1 MIN. - FILM CLIP FROM LAST NIGHT. HHH SAID HE SUPPORTS LBJ'S DECISION. HOPES NEGOTIATIONS CAN NOW MOVE FORWARD. ASKED IF IT WOULD HELP HIS CANDIDACY, REPLIED HE HOPED IT MIGHT HELP THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND HELP PEOPLE.

RN:30 NIXON - 30 SECS. FILM CLIP OF NIXON'S STATEMENT MADE AT MADISON SQUARE GARDEN RALLY.

W-:30 WALLACE - 30 SECS. - FILM CLIP - PRAYS AND HOPES IT BRINGS ABOUT HONORABLE PEACE.

L :30 LEMAY - 30 SECS. FILM CLIP - MORE PESSIMISTIC - STILL HAS SERIOUS QUESTIONS. MIGHT BE ANOTHER STALLING TACTIC.

NOTHING ON AGNEW

6:45 CRONKITE REVIEW OF HARRIS POLL - NIXON'S LEAD CUT TO 3%, ETC.

THEN FILM AND COMMENTARY ON WORLD REACTION TO BOMB HALT - PRES. THIEU REPORTEDLY UNHAPPY.

Chat

MEMO TO RN

From Buchanan

September 13, 1968

Hubert is starting to get pretty personal and pretty nasty here. I also note that Lawrence O'Brien seems to be getting a good press for his comments about RN. He is separate I believe from their operation. Our own stuff I think is as good or better, but they invariably fold Bob Ellsworth's comments in underneath your story----and it doesn't get the headline it should. Does RN think it might be possible for us to get someone apart from the campaign plane----in New York with a real instinct for the jugular who would issue these nut-cutting statements we are getting out. O'Brien is fortunate in that he is a former Cabinet official, a celebrity of sorts in his own right, and that he gets up there and gets out some pretty good stuff. Our surrogates are not getting the AP wire the way that O'Brien is. I am beginning to wonder if maybe we should have Spiro start firing off the gut-busters for the P.M.s or something. Why sure as hell sit up and take notice of the way he wraps them. He is making Muskie look feeble.

BUCHANAN

Chat

- try hanging on Klein?
- or who else - Rhyme?
- or both - simultaneous

attack O'Brien as
hatchet man -
jump from one
campaign to
another

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMO TO RN

From Buchanan

August 15, 1968

Strategy, Some Thoughts on

1) This period of tranquility, has like the days after the Oregon primary, lost us some momentum I think. I think that moratoriums have just about outlived their usefulness, when we consider it is 85 days to the finish. When we sit idle like this---without taking the offensive and holding it, we enable others like HHH, MCBCarthy, the Establishment on Thurmond, to start nit-picking us--and we have to answer them. Maybe this is inevitable during this period---but I think that, like the period between May and August, we are letting the others do the firing--and we are only defending, not an enviable political position.

2) I am inclined to go with RFK's theory of going "flat out to the finish line" in the fall. Throw Humphrey on the Defensive, and keep him right there until November. Indict this Administration for every ~~xxx~~ ~~sin~~ sin of which it is guilty and they are ~~many~~ many. I think we will be making a mortal error if we think that the Establishment is going to give RN points for running anything approaching a Goody-Two Shoes Campaign. I don't think we need to ever again say that HHH is a nice and honorable man, in whose hands the country would be well off. We don't have to be irresponsible---just candid---and as President this weasel would be a disaster.

3) The ancient complaint. I got a call from some character from Downey, Cal., who said that the tv spot he heard was an excerpt from RN's acceptance speech, promising something on law and order----followed by fifteen minutes of applause. It was general and not specific; he thought it very ineffective; so did his friends. I know this is old ground---but I think the spots we run ought to start clearly and tersely what the hell has happened in this country in the last five years---specifically, what RN is going to do---and then say, damn, it, elect him. Maybe we ought to write the spots ourselves---or get some of Reagan's ad guys to write them. Honestly, much as I like Len, he just doesn't have the instincts to cut the hell out of these people like HHH, or to make the gut issues that anger and concern people. They're all soft sell---telling them to start hitting gut issues, and making gut appeals is ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ like trying to get Mary Poppins to act like Eartha Kitt. They don't know how to do it.

4) The Republicans are far behind the Democrats in types of appearances. I am sure we are now scheduling speeches and rallies and the rest of the traditional crap. What we should realize is what the Democrats do so well---speak not only with their words but with their settings. Where RN appears sometimes says as much to the nation as what he says there. Because Democrats have lower income, lower education supporters, they have to use symbols to appeal to all the senses---as well as to the intellect with words. Thus LBJ wanders through Appalachia and RFK inspects an Indian reservation. So, too, Lindsay's tours through Harlem are essential symbols. By ~~making~~ walking, he is saying he gives a damn.

Thought should be given to issue-oriented appearances by RN. I have sent examples to Whitaker of a number of them. Maybe they are no good---but we should think in these terms. We can speak to poor people ---other than by the words from the candidate's mouth.

There will be pockets of unemployment in the Steel Industry in Nov. What about a visit to Union Hall, drop a statement there, talk to these guys about their problem. What about a visit to a prison--to talk about how these places are turning out as many criminals as we put it. What about a visit to some shipyards to talk with some idle workers about the decline in the Merchant Marine. The Computer Job bank thing is in North Carolina---What is RN went down to that thing--and gave the reporters a briefing on how it works--and how it can apply on a national scale.

RN has mentioned at times that a lot of people don't read the papers; they look at the pictures---this, pictures plus captions, is how a number of immigrants learned the language. RN can speak through pictures as well as through words---and there must be one hundred thousand good settings for RN to be in when he drops his statements---so that his surroundings reinforce what he has to say.

For example---RN might stroll into a Catholic School and lecture the fifth grade for a little while---and there drop some statement on the contribution of religious parents who take the burden of education etc. and that this contribution should be reflected and recognized by government.

A visit to a hospital might serve as a background for talking about Vietnam (if war wounded are there) or to talk with the staff about the shortages in doctors and nurses etc.

5) RN has talked about excitement in a campaign. One way to be exciting is to be controversial. I think we ought to give consideration to holding our fire on the likes of these bastards like Abernathy and others. Charges RN with racism etc. And just wait on them. And one day, get up on a high horse and kick the hell out of them. Ninety per cent of the people in this country think that Abernathy is a unpolished and disreputable clod. The same is true of those who are saying Thurmond is running the campaign. We ought to give thought to some occasion, when we can program a little righteous indignation against these clowns---which will score heavily I think, and stir up the enthusiasm. What we want to avoid is to allow the ~~Establishment~~ Establishment to be setting some sort of guidelines of niceness which we are supposed to follow in this thing.

For what they are worth.

I talked briefly with Timmons and the others who are going to be with the Truth Squad group in Chicago. I think I know RN's positions better than anyone---and can write up the attack material rapidly. So, I talked with them and I wondered if I might not be ~~more~~ more useful writing for those guys in Chicago during those days, than being in N.Y. watching it on television.

MEMO TO RN

From Buchanan

This is a memo prepared by an amazing political creature in Fino's office who wants to work for RN--and who has enormous depth and breadth of knowledge of the American electorate and voting patterns. He has told me he would be willing to be quizzed by our four top people on his ~~own~~ ability. Attached is a copy of a memo prepared by him at Len's request in ten minutes.

Buchanan

① RN agrees —
② Halderman + Lett
hire this guy

RN

Considerations in Assessing the Probable Pre-Convention
and Pre-Election Impact of the High Poll Showing and
Predicted November Strength of George C. Wallace

As the November campaign shapes up as one focusing the issues of law and order, George C. Wallace, the candidate whose public pronouncements cater to the hearts - if not the minds - of a large segment of the population, is rising in the polls.

There are reasons - see below - why Wallace's vote is liable to emerge as far less significant in November than now predicted, and this should be born in mind as far as pre-convention strategizing.

Point One: Wallace's poll strength is being falsely measured. The question posed in the polls asks voters whom they would like to see elected president - not whom they intend to vote for. Historically, voters have shrunk from third-party candidates in the general election, even though they prefer them, because such votes are wasted votes. Even if the question were modified to "whom do you now intend to vote for", it would still overstate Wallace's election day strength, but to ask who you like to see elected is to court a high Wallace vote by eliciting responses from conservatives who prefer Wallace's position (especially while Mr. Nixon is as yet somewhat inchoate) but who will not waste a vote on him. THE POLLS GROSSLY OVERSTATE WALLACE STRENGTH AND UNDERSTATE NIXON STRENGTH (TO BE PICKED UP FROM WALLACE).

Point Two: Much of the vote Wallace receives in the end is liable to come from disgruntled Democrats, while GOP voters hold ranks. One can analogize here to Wm F. Buckley's race in New York City, for while he took votes from both Beame and Lindsay, the last minute dropoff in Buckley support (confirmed by comparing Assembly District polls with actual votes) came in Republican districts and represented conservative Republicans edging back to Lindsay because of party ties. In the end, Wallace's vote is liable to be more Democratic than observers predict, and this trend (see following commentary) does not militate for Rockefeller but for Nixon because 1) a more conservative Republican will bring GOP voters back to the fold and 2) the Wallace split-off should be useful in marginal states like Michigan and Illinois (coming as it will from Democrats in bulk).

Thus, from the preconvention viewpoint, Nixon should not overreact to Wallace in either of two ways: 1) he should not move left and re-orient himself to a left-trending city appeal; and 2) he should not write off the South because Wallace will, in the end, not win much of it. These two refusals must be congruent - they are inter-dependent.

What Mr. Nixon should do is this: refrain from courting Wallace or affirming any Southern strategy because Rockefeller can make delegates edgy by raising the Goldwater spectre and simultaneously suggesting that Mr. Nixon is Goldwater's heir. But at the same time, the Nixon strategy should not embrace the Rockefeller style assertion that the campaign will be won or lost by a liberal pitch or the lack of it in the big cities. The Nixon strategy should take a middle of the road straddling position as follows to retain strength now and flexibility for the campaign.

Suggested Nixon strategy: 1) Accept thesis that big city states and urban voting is crucial to victory but do not accept thesis that liberal social programming is necessary; 2) Accept thesis that George Wallace's bloc should not be courted but minimize Wallace strength by citing historical analysis of third-party Southern behavior and explaining poll proclivity to overstate his strength; 3) Counterattack by showing how Nixon will overcome Wallace - use trend data again - in the modern Outer South (while Rockefeller would lose all South) and by showing gross weakness of Nelson Rockefeller in big cities, see enclosure, and showing real Nixon urban strength(see enclosure).

By this approach, no liberal positions will be taken which will offend Wallace poll backers who must be held - and will be - on election day, but at the same time, it will undercut Rockefeller's theme that urban votes are necessary and that 1) a liberal approach is necessary to get them, and that 2) Rockefeller must be nominated.

The enclosed short statements detail the following arguments
1) Nixon will be in good shape down South in November because the Wallace third-party phenomenon will not hold up; 2) Nixon can do well in the cities because of conservative and Catholic trend, explaining that much of his 1960 weakness was not linked to "Urban" behavior, but to Catholic voting (For JFK) which will not be a problem in 1968; and lastly 3) how Nelson Rockefeller, contrary to his propaganda, is not a good vote-getter in the cities (citing his great decay in urban New York).

See enclosed

Then, after Mr. Nixon is nominated, he should pursue a moderate conservative course sufficient to clearly differentiate himself from Hubert HphmOrhey on 1) social policies and 2) the war in Vietnam(ideal position is quasi-isolationist). This will strike the right balance between moderation and appeal to independents, and the needed "realm of plausibility" differentiation by which the Wallace vote will fall back in line for Mr. Nixon. Such an approach ought to reduce the Wallace vote to 3-5% nationally, with the electoral vote impact confined to 27 (Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana and much of the minimal Northern vote won from urban Demcrats (Lake County, Detroit, Milwaukee, Newark et al).

Mr. Nixon should... 5-8 of the two-...

July 13, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: RN
FROM: BUCHANAN

*Copy to Mitchell
Frank
Holden*
*This makes sense +
its essential to
see in detail in
photocopy*

Lying unnoticed before our eyes in the breakdown of the Gallup Poll is the answer to our riddle; RN's landslide victory is sitting right there in front of us. I have already documented the quintessential importance of RN winning the Wallace Protestants -- the other wing of RN's victory lies in the Humphrey Catholics.

Everyone is squealing about RN's 7 per cent of the black vote and RN's 4 per cent of the Jewish vote. The crisis and the opportunity both lie in RN's 27 per cent of the Catholic vote against HHH.

(Against McCarthy, a Catholic, RN gets 30 per cent of the Catholics) RN -- note the following statistics.

UNITED STATES POPULATION

<u>Jews</u>	<u>Negroes</u>	<u>Catholics</u>
5,800,000	22,000,000	46,000,000
	(Eligible to vote)	
3,500,000	11,000,000	26,000,000

(In allocating the "eligible to vote" I gave the Jews the highest percentage of eligible because they tend to smaller families and so an older average population ...)

the Catholic came second and the Negro third, as the latter has the youngest population. Statistically, it is said that half the American Negroes are under 21.)

(Probable Voters)

<u>Jews</u>	<u>Negroes</u>	<u>Catholics</u>
2,400,000	5, 500,000	17,000,000

(Again, the allocation was made that about 70 per cent of the eligible Jews will go to the polls in November, that about 65 per cent of the Catholics (national average) and about 50 per cent of the Negroes (historically true.)

Against HHH, RN is currently getting about 4 per cent of the Jewish vote which amounts to a paltry 100,000 votes nationally. He is getting seven per cent of the Negro vote nationally which is not quite 400,000 votes.

RN nationally today is getting fewer than 500,000 Negroes and Jews in these United States.

These statistics are telling us something that we can ignore only at the cost of victory this coming November.

First, let's take the Jewish vote. If we multiplied our present Jewish vote by five, we would be adding fewer than 400,000 new voters. In other words to go from 4 per cent of the Jewish vote to 20 per cent of the Jewish vote

would add to RN's total about 386,000 new supporters.

On the other hand, if RN increased his support among Catholics from 27 per cent which he has against HHH to 30 per cent (which RN already has against McC,) RN would be adding 510,000 new supporters to his cause.

That 3 percentage point increase that RN can easily pick up among Catholics also amounts to more than all the Jews and Negroes combined that RN has right now -- which as I pointed out from the current Gallup Poll is under 500,000.

Now let's look at the Catholic vote.

RN is currently running at 27 per cent of those 17,000,000 votes, which means RN is reaping about 4,600,000 Catholic votes, or just a shade under that figure. In other words, RN has 46 Catholics backing him for every Jew supporting him, and 10 Catholics for every Negro supporting. RN's Catholic support is nine times RN's Jewish and Negro support combined in terms of total votes.

These statistics are in themselves astounding. But more important is where we get the votes to win this election.

If we look at it cold-bloodedly, in terms of votes -- we should be putting seven times as much time and money

and media and writing in special interest appeals to Catholics as to Jews -- because they have seven times as many votes.

But even seven times the effort would not be sufficient if we argue from reason and logic -- because the Catholic is one hell of a lot easier voter to win over from Hubert than is the Jew or the Negro. The latter two are the most committed of Democrats. (JFK did better with Jews than he did with Catholics; and since 1964 the Negroes are lost to the Republicans for a generation.)

There is no reason on God's earth why in this day and age HHH, the liberal Protestant Druggist, should be getting twice as many Catholic votes as RN.

Let's put it this way.

Suppose RN has in mind making a speech like Black Capitalism, which is directed to our black friends, or perhaps writing a piece for the Zionist magazine which is directed to our Jewish friends. If RN's purpose is to raise his percentage among these groups he will find that:

An increase of 1 per cent among Jewish voters adds 24,000 new supporters to RN's ranks.

An increase of 1 per cent among Negro voters adds

55,000 more supporters to RN's ranks.

An increase of 1 per cent among Catholic voters adds 170,000 more supporters to RN's ranks.

My contention is further that it is easier for RN to pick up that 1 per cent among Catholics, than it is among the traditionally hostile Negro and Jewish communities. The logic seems to me to be undeniable; if we are going to make special group interest, minority interest appeals -- let's make them to the Catholics.

It is easier for RN to gain ground here; it is less risky in terms of backlash to make specific appeals to RCs as opposed to Jews and Negroes; and it is a thousand times more promising.

Let's remember too that Cardinal Cushing and Jack Kennedy won't be in this ball game; and Catholics in 1968 are one hell of a lot more conservative and receptive to an RN positions approach, than are the Negroes and the Jews.

In terms of votes, 50 per cent of the Catholic vote would mean more to a candidate than to get every Negro and Jewish vote in the United States.

If RN can raise his percentage of the Catholic vote 13 points -- from 27 per cent against HHH to 40 per cent

against HHH -- the votes he would add would be equivalent to raising himself from 7 per cent of the Negro vote to 37 per cent and from 4 per cent of the Jewish vote to 28 per cent.

It is utterly impossible for RN to get 37 per cent of the Negro vote; it is next to impossible for RN to get 28 per cent of the Jews -- but to jump from 27 per cent of the Catholics to 40 per cent is not impossible; and if we did it, we would have broken up the historic Democratic coalition and won a national landslide.

Hubert's Catholics have half of our victory and the Protestants of George Wallace have the other half. If we get one of these halves back, we win; if we get them both, we can win a landslide -- and the two objectives are not mutually exclusive:

It is time to ask ourselves -- what is the best we can do among Jews and Negroes. I would say 20 per cent of the Negroes and 20 per cent of the Jewish vote, given our current situation and only four months to go. If we made a Herculean, Jewish-Negro pitch and reached that percentage among both (it would cost us votes to Wallace) we would be adding some 1, 100,000 Negro and Jewish votes. We can get the same number of new votes -- 1,100,000 -- by

raising our Catholic total from 27 to 34 -- at little or no loss to Wallace. This seems incredible but the statistics are there.

What do we conclude from this memo?

1) Hubert Humphrey will be looking for a Catholic, if he is thinking, to put on that ticket with him -- and the case for Teddy Kennedy becomes even more convincing.

2) If RN intends any future special interest appeals -- for God's sake, let us give the Catholics some consideration.

3) RN's research staff should find out what is the gut 'Catholics' issue which unites them -- and I would think it is the question of parochial schools and some of tax relief for what they feel is an excessive burden of supporting both their own and their neighbors school. If we go with the tax credit idea -- let's make sure we put the Catholics and Lutheran Schools up high in the copy.

4) Let's stop looking around so hard for what the Negroes want to hear, and what the Jews want RN to say on the Middle East -- and let's start taking some polls of Catholic voters' interests and concerns.

5) As for the Middle East and Israel -- it now becomes clear that there is no mileage whatsoever in a hard-line pro-Israel posture by RN. As noted, if RN's Jewish vote goes from 4 per cent to 20 per cent, he picks up fewer than 400,000 votes. It's a waste of time and effort.

6) RN should reconsider, if he has already decided, whether we ought not definitely to take the Conservative Party endorsement, and let Javits and his friends squeal their heads off.

7) It would be seven times as valuable for RN to show up at a visibly Catholic event as it would be a Jewish event.

8) It might be in RN's interest to begin to say what intelligent men are already saying -- that when it comes to the Middle East or anywhere else -- that an American statesman's first duty is to place America first, and not any other country, no matter how strong our times or our commitments.

(I am not arguing for RN to come off anti-Jew and score points that way at all. I just say that quite frankly, slobbering over the Israeli lobby is not going to get us anything, and so we ought to stand tall on the issue. It would appear the same is true of the Negroes.)

9) This offers new thoughts on the Vice Presidential thing -- which Buchanan did not mention in his memo on Reagan.

10) Ethnic groups which tend to be Catholic should be given first priority consideration in media, and time and RN statements and considerations. Among minority groups religion becomes now a factor in our considerations.

11) Positive efforts should be made to have RN and family and kids in specifically Catholic settings -- such settings should take priority over Negro and Jewish settings.

FINAL NOTE: To RN/ From Buchanan

We have come up here in the last two weeks with the Wallace in-depth analysis which no one has to date refuted; and here is a Catholic analysis which would seem to me to be self-evident to any of our people who are supposed to be analyzing the polls. But our poll people, to my knowledge, have never even mentioned either -- and our media people have not yet acted on the first -- the Wallace threat.

If this kind of analysis -- of both Wallace and the Catholic thing -- as opposed to the Negro- Jewish approach has not been brought to RN's attention by his poll analysts -- then perhaps they are reading our polls through rose-colored liberal glasses -- and they ought to be replaced.

My suggestion is that some of us in research be given access to the polls that we are taking -- so that we can do some of our own analysis; that Alan Greenspan be instructed to analyze the results of our polls as well as the "media" people; that further, strategy people be asked either to refute the analysis we have come up with -- or

start guiding the campaign and the advertising by them.

What I am contending in these recent memos and what I have yet to see refuted is that all this endless talk we have been getting about RN losing unless he gets the Negro and Jewish vote is a pile of crap. We have let ourselves be sold a bill of goods. The Eastern liberal Establishment which goes down the line for the Democrats has made the Republican Party dance to its own tune; it has told us that we cannot win without Negroes and Jews -- and it continues to feed us this nonsense every day.

The power of the Negro and the Jew to damage RN in this election lies in this: The Negro loud-mouths are given access to the public communications media by a guilt-ridden establishment -- and the Jews control that communications media.

We don't want to antagonize or alienate these people -- they can damage us. But they're not our voters; and if we go after them, we'll go down to defeat chasing a receding rainbow. The Irish, Italian, Polish Catholics of the big cities -- these are our electoral majority -- they, and the white Protestants of the South and Midwest and rural America. That way lies victory.

11

RN -- By dropping to 4 per cent of the Jewish vote and 7 per cent of the black vote -- we have been given a tremendous flexibility; man, we can't get any lower -- and so RN is now free of trying to placate these people, of trying to acquiesce their views -- and he can tell it like it is to the whole damn country. Let's face it. We are right now at 35 per cent of the vote nationally -- six points under Barry Goldwater. The way I see it we are just about at bedrock -- the guys we have will be hard to lose in any event; they are damn near all Republicans; it is time for RN to start swinging and telling it precisely like it is.

Buchanan

17 June 1968

MEMORANDUM TO BUCHANAN

SUBJ: Wallace

I am attaching a clipping from the Washington Star which notes that Negro voting in Chicago was down 50% last week for the Primary. I think this may be significant, and it would be wise to pay particular attention to the New York Primary to see if there is a similar drop.

Negroes may be losing faith in the electoral process, or they may simply not feel any compelling need to vote. In either case, a serious decline in Negro voting would be to our advantage. We should follow it closely and gather all the information we can about it.

I am also attaching a clipping with regard to Wallace's "terms" for a settlement. It is interesting that most of his positions are not too far away from our own, with the exception of kicking the Commies out of the Defense plants. I think it would be wise if we were to do some polling to ascertain what it is that Wallace says that prompt people to support him. Also we should ask open-ended questions to find out what is bothering people, ask them who they think would do something about the problems they indicate bother them, and ask them whether they believe RN could solve the problems. In other words, we need to find out what is on people's minds and see if they identify the Boss with them. We may find that we have the correct positions but they simply are not getting through to the people.

Question for the day: Is there really a dime's worth of difference between the major parties? At least does it appear that there is to the average voter?

*Haldeman -
good idea*

Citizens

Bob Haldeman

MEMORANDUM

TO: PJB

FROM: DC

I think that Huston's critique of May 1 hits the nail on the head. This, of course, must be kept in confidence so that the hard-working people involved will not have their noses knocked out of joint. I would suggest, however, that you follow-up by talking to John Mitchell and see if he could follow-up with Charlie Rhyne to try to shape the thing up. Also in this respect, I think Bob Haldeman should see a copy of this memorandum for follow-up purposes.

It occurs to me that this may be the niche for Huston. He has sent us a lot of good material on issues and I hope will continue to do so to the extent that his time permits. But I have a feeling that he could well be an organizational genius. Perhaps we can work him into the citizens organization as a trouble-shooter since this operates out of Washington. This cannot be done, however, unless Mitchell, Rhyne and Haldeman make it clear to Evans, Skidmore and Day that Huston has a role to play and should be paid attention to. I would like for you to follow-up on this project.

I emphasize again Huston's memorandum should be shown only to Mitchell, Haldeman and Rhyne.

5/5/68

MITCHELL

HALDEMAN

Notes on PJH from DC

We cannot put Hillings under Flanigan -- he has to be separate and dealing directly with you two.

Calling back -- holding hands -- counter attack.

Hillings
File

file

John Mitchell -- talk to him -- tell him to call me as soon as you can.

Buchanan -- wrote a letter that was to go out ~~this afternoon~~ to everyone

-- did they get anyone to sign it?

Mitchell has this letter gone out? Mitchell/ Ellsworth -- this whole response on the Hill to Nelson Rockefeller and to Hatfield -- what has been done?

When is it going to be done?

This is supposed to be done automatically.

Nothing has appeared -- our people have got to get going on this.^{v9}

I have to have a report on it right away.

file

Rockefeller particularly hates to be called a "Spoiler" --
(Burns told RN this) -- therefore we should get some of the people
to make statements including this in their statement.

Maybe we could get a mailing across the country -- Rocky the Spoiler
is at it again -- get someone who is not in our organization but who is
for us.

He did it in 1960/ 1964 and now again in 1968 (might even mention the
Romney situation).

He is the spoiler -- particularly point ~~out~~ up the fact he/would not enter
the primaries because he did not want to be ~~decisive~~ ~~in~~ divisive
Now - instead of attacking the many vulnerable spots in the Johnson-
Humphrey Administration he attacks Nixon/ he attacks Hatfield --
Republicans -- let's come off this -- let's be a team player for a change.

This should be worked up and mailed heavily to the New York people
so it will get back to him.

DC:rmw
6/21/68

~~set up mtg
w/ Hillings~~
File

6/11/68

BOB HALDEMAN

Pat Hillings called -- said RN had suggested that you two talk about rally things -- changes, etc.

Also Pat has some ideas of tightening up the organization, etc. and I think when he comes back from this weekend meeting in Chicago that possibly the three of us should get together.

RMWoods

Fl-6

Call Lewis

June 17, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: Haldeman

FROM: DC

L - need budget

Will get one to us

Hold File

Would you follow through with Hobart Lewis on his recommendation that we get out some kind of a magazine for the convention and a book after the convention. This project has been discussed with a number of others but Lewis has some very good ideas on it which we went over on our trip to Nassau. I think that Safire and Leonard might be the best ones to follow through on the magazine project. In the event we go forward on the book project, Ray Price should be put to work on it.

just in idea stage

Frauh, Next to Buchanan

246-0750
4 877 1317

overule Price if he objects.
do it

The main thing here is not to allow the project to fall on its face for lack of attention or because of the "how not to do it" attitude of some staff members.

Safire & Leonard - have outline
need articles written
don't have anyone to write

Memo Safire to Leonard

Get to Leonard - Need Budget.
Budget must come through Safire.

Outline of Mag.
like news week special.

June 19, 1968

Correct File Copy.
Please let Mr.
Haldeman know status.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Bob Haldeman
FROM: DC

L.

I would like to know as soon as possible what the media plans are for running the 1/2 hour telethon in Pennsylvania and Ohio. I would like to get that decision made and when it is going to be done. My view being that a check on that one -- that one properly advertised may give an idea whether we should run it in other states.

June 8, 1968

*Sear
McIntosh
Klein
A. Woods*

MEMORANDUM

TO: Bob Haldeman

FROM: DC

You must be sure that all of our people -- both here in New York and Washington -- understand that there are to be no (absolutely no) backgrounders at this time. I do not want to hear of any of our people talking off or on the record to any writers with their ideas of what our strategy, plans, ideas, etc. are for the period ahead. I want you to make sure that everyone knows this - including, Ellsworth, Whelan, Herb Klein, Sears, etc. -- all of our people the press might be asking for some line on what we plan to do -- what kind of appearances -- etc. NOTHING is to be given out in this period.

Maybe you and John Mitchell should call all of the top people together and make this point.



NIXON FOR PRESIDENT COMMITTEE, P. O. BOX 1968, TIMES SQUARE STATION, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10036
PHONE (212) 661-6400

Robert Ellsworth, National Director

January 5, 1968

AIR MAIL

Mr. H. R. Haldeman
c/o J. Walter Thompson Company
6505 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90048

Dear Bob:

I have the following instruction:

"Bob Haldeman is to be given charge of the Convention and all arrangements. Timmons and anyone else who wants to work on this will be under Haldeman. (John Ehrlichman of Seattle, Washington, has volunteered to be of assistance in this matter as well.)"

I have visited with Bill Timmons about this, and we will be in touch with you in the next few days on what has been done and how the land lies, etc.

Warmest and best.

Sincerely,

Robert Ellsworth
National Director

RE:jl

cc: Bill Timmons

May 22, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: Bob Haldeman
FROM: RN
Re; Addition to Check List

While others have the responsibility --
please add to your check list -- New Jersey and Illinois write-ins.
Check on progress.

January 25, 1968

REMINDER TO: DWIGHT CHAPIN

FROM: DC

Pass on to Haldeman my idea that I want some effort to be made to get the Chicago Tribune delivered to each delegate's and alternate's room as well as to each newspaperman at the Convention. The New York Times and Miami Herald will be there and we need one paper which will give another point of view.

#

Mrs Ethel Kennedy —

The ~~same~~ news from

Californ

Bob

Will you call
Huston on this?

Memorandum to RN

From Buchanan

May 8, 1968

Before the simulmatics idea is finally canned, if it is to be, would RN take a rapid reading of this thing from TCH. Huston says the cost of the thing will be less than the cost of the Youth Budget between now and convention.

Buchanan

go ahead (if 40g or less)
but get a new cost
figure - ships - 476 -
(of no use to RN)

This is on balance just an organized effort to get info that any decent campaign organization should have at its finger tip. But since we won't get it - lets buy it.

6 May 1968

MEMORANDUM TO BOB HALDENAN

SUBJ: The Simultron Project

In our initial memorandum explaining the simulation process, we listed six broad areas of information which can be made available:

- (1) a state-by-state ranking by degree of "favorableness" to Nixon, Kennedy, Humphrey, etc.
- (2) a weighted ranking of these states by favorableness and electoral vote, showing the most favorable and most valuable states for each candidate.
- (3) a ranking of the favorableness of the people who have been mentioned as possible running-mates with Nixon.
- (4) "voter-types" (ex., white, urban, Catholic, male, Republican, Easterner, upper socio-economic class) listed in order of preference for Nixon, Kennedy, etc.
- (5) the most important issues in each state.
- (6) the most important issues to each "voter-type".

Essentially, the above information represents only a rough product whose value is derived from its specific application to concrete campaign objectives, programs, and problems. The options available are almost limitless once the raw data has been programmed and is available on the computer. The following examples of application of this information are intended only to suggest some of the areas where we believe this program could be of great value. As the campaign progresses and as we begin to work with the data, new opportunities as well as new requirements will doubtless arise to be exploited. Since we intend to limit our hypotheses and allow the data to speak for itself, we believe that information which we did not anticipate will become available to guide us further in an effort to provide the utmost assistance in relating public opinion data to the practical aspects of the campaign. However, there are many applications which we can program for immediate use. Some of these are listed below.

I. STATE DATA.

1. Determining a winning electoral combination. The most immediate product of simulation will be a ranking of states based upon their favorableness and their importance electorally to RN. This will be a relative ranking (rather than an absolute percentage distribution), but

will tell us with a high degree of accuracy which states represent the best opportunity for a winning electoral combination. We can tell which states deserve the most attention based on their relative electoral importance and which should receive the least attention because of the likelihood they will inevitably go Democratic. Also, we will be able to determine which states are marginal and thus require particular attention.

2. Information for state leaders. As will be pointed out in further detail below, we will be able to analyze each state in terms of voter-types and issues. This information will be of great help to us in many ways, but one peripheral consideration is the possibility of making some of this state information available to state leaders to assist them in working not only for RN's election, but for a clean sweep for the GOP. This helps us guarantee a maximum effort for RN with the correct groups on the correct issues, but it also helps us build morale among state leaders by providing them invaluable information which would not otherwise be available to ~~them~~^{them} except at great expense. We could also do this for Congressional candidates. If in each state candidates down the line on the ticket are hitting on the same issues (issues selected by RN), it is bound to assist the national ticket and get us more exposure than otherwise might be available.

II. ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES.

1. Scheduling. Simulation data can provide assistance in determining the amount of attention which the candidate should devote to each state. In a presidential campaign, the candidate's time is the most precious commodity. We can determine the relative importance of states and postulate the attention which should be paid to each state. We intend to analyze the relative voter appeal of each of the recognized Republican presidential possibilities, e.g., Rockefeller, Percy, Reagan, etc., so that we could do the same thing for these people. On the basis of this information, we will know in which states they are particularly strong, with which voter-types, and on which issues. From this information, we can advise on the use of these people in support of the national ticket. If one of these should be the Vice Presidential candidate, this information would be particularly useful, but no doubt RN will want to use all the prominent Republican leaders in his campaign, and simulation will tell us where to use them to best advantage.

2. Campaign Spending. Simulation can also help determine the allocation of financial resources. This is an obvious deduction, but only if it is understood that resources of every type are to be principally allocated on the basis of the viable electoral combination which arises from our determination that certain states and certain activities are to receive priority because of their importance and potentiality.

III. VOTER-TYPES.

1. Holding a New Coalition. Presidential elections are not won on the basis of strict popular appeal. Electoral combinations are decisive, but the Democrats recognized with FDR that electoral votes are secured through the careful formulation of a winning coalition of interest groups, i.e., voter-types. Simulation will enable us to identify those voter-types within each state which are for RN or inclined toward him. It will enable us to determine which groups we have and which groups we need to get. Because we will also be analyzing the strength of each potential Democratic nominee, we will also be able to identify those groups which are traditionally Democrat but which may be dissatisfied with the particular nominee. In view of the fact that the Democrats may split this year, it is particularly important that we be able to readily define those groups which are disenchanted with the ultimate nominee. This we will be able to do regardless of whom the Democrats nominate in Chicago.

2. Citizens Operation. The Citizens for Nixon operation in Washington is organizing a series of special interest committees, e.g., Senior Citizens for Nixon, Doctors for Nixon, etc. Simulation will enable us to determine by states where these committees can be most effective because simulation data will parallel their own interest orientation. This information will not only make it possible to zero in on groups in those states which are electorally most important, but will make it possible to identify specifically which groups are most important and where and on what issues these special interest groups should be approached. Our data would also enable the Citizens operation to operate on a cost effective basis since we would be able to advise against contemplated projects which our analysis of each group by state indicated would not be productive.

3. Voter Registration. Certainly a major effort will be undertaken to register new voters in those states which we regard as crucial. Simulation, augmented by demographic information to determine population shifts and trends in voting, will enable us to pin-point those areas where intensive registration efforts would be most productive. We can determine specific voter-types within geographical areas which represent the most lucrative targets for a registration effort as well as point out specific communities which should receive priority attention.

IV. ISSUES.

1. Determining key issues. Simulation will enable us to determine key issues by state and by voter-type. This will enable us to tailor our appeals to specific groups which will make up the new coalition necessary for victory. More specifically, we can:

a. Advise RN and others campaigning on his behalf which issues are of paramount concern in each state and relate these issues to specific voter-types. As a corollary, we can advise which issues to avoid in particular areas so as to eliminate the possibility of unnecessarily generating disagreement in an area where it could easily be avoided.

b. Advise various campaign committees both at the national and state level on the type of appeal to include in printed campaign literature. This would be particularly helpful to the Citizens operation since we could provide specific information on issues of greatest concern to those groups which they are attempting to service. This assistance could also be rendered to state committees who would thus be able to concentrate on those issues of greatest concern within their own states.

c. Advise the advertising people on the type of copy to be used in particular states and in the media directed at particular voting groups. By working closely with media representatives, we could provide information on voter attitudes and issue-orientation for voters within recognized media-markets. This assumes, of course, that some advertising will be localized. However, even on national advertising, the type of issue information we could make available would doubtless be of assistance.

2. Public Opinion Data Book. We could prepare for use by key staff personnel a notebook containing public opinion data developed not only from our simulation operation, but also from demographic and voter trend studies as well as other public opinion research. This notebook would be broken down into various categories, e.g., a) demographic information, b) issue information (by states and voter types), c) states (voting trends, demographic information, voter-types, issue orientation), d) voter trends (by states and voter-types on various issues), and e) group attitudes (on issues by states). As you can see, much of this information would be cross-indexed to make it easier to use. When preparing a speech, planning an itinerary, preparing advertising copy, or drafting a piece of campaign literature, this information would be readily available. We could put this information into such a format as to make it readily available to the working staff. Of course, this would not be a substitute for the more detailed analysis which would be made available to RN for planning purposes, but would simply be an additional effort in order to gain the maximum use of the information which we produced.

V. PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS.

1. Analysis of polls taken outside the organization. Our in-house personnel could study polls taken by people unrelated to the Nixon organization and evaluate it for the benefit of top staff planners.

This would include various public opinion polls appearing in the media. We could relate this data to our own to determine both the reliability of our own work and the political significance of the polls being published.

2. Analysis of local polls. Many polls of varying reliability will be appearing in the local press, e.g., the Gary Tribune's poll of Indiana's 1st Congressional District. We could collect this information and evaluate it, thus enabling us to compare it with our simulation data to further refine our analysis of state voter-type attitudes within states. Much of this type of information might not otherwise come to the attention of the campaign staff, but might nevertheless be of some value.

3. Periodic Report on Polling Implications. We could prepare a periodic analysis of published polls to be circulated among the campaign staff and others directly interested in the campaign. This activity would principally be of psychological value since we could point out encouraging signs and discredit obviously political efforts designed to make RN look bad in the polls, e.g., Harris. An example of this is the recent student poll conducted by Time magazine. We would point out that the margin of error in such a major effort is such that it is likely that RN has more campus support than Bobby, particularly in view of the fact that only the most politically-motivated students would take the time to go to the polling places and vote. The margin of difference in the two totals is so slight that we should realistically consider RN to have at least tied with Bobby for second rather than having placed third as Time would have us believe. We would support this contention by pointing out that other student surveys have shown greater Republican affiliation on the campus than does the Time study, and that many students who are "hung up" on the Vietnam question will swing around as the issue clears now that Johnson is out of the race. This sort of analysis (rough as it is here) might be valuable to our campaign workers who will be called upon to explain the meaning of polls occurring in the daily press.

4. In-House Polling. It is obvious that the most efficient arrangement would be for us to handle whatever in-house polling is necessary. From our simulation data, we can determine which states require polls in order to provide us with sufficient data. We can also determine the types of information we need based upon whatever deficiencies turn up in our simulation of a particular state or based upon issues which suddenly show up which we believe need to be examined further. However, if it should be decided to have current polling done by someone else, we should at least be provided with the raw data once the poll is completed and we should be consulted prior to the preparation of the interview questions. One of our first tasks should this project be authorized should be to evaluate the raw data from polls already conducted on behalf of RN.

VI. CONCLUSIONS.

We believe that the above represent some of the major areas where simulation can be of particular assistance. As mentioned at the beginning, we intend to let the data speak for itself, so we fully expect to find information which will suggest new avenues for both exploration and application. One of the main advantages of the simulation process is that it will enable us to identify problem areas which will require further investigation in special polls and further analysis of demographic information, voter trend studies, and issue surveys. To attempt to postulate these problem areas at the outset would be to defeat our purpose and ignore the process, but one of our major tasks will be to be on the lookout for them so that we can anticipate their impact before we are confronted with them on a political level.

We believe that the proper utilization of the data which simulation can give could easily result in the savings of more money than the simulation operation will cost. This is particularly true if financial resources are allocated among stages and voter-types on the basis of our determination of where they will do the most good. Thus, simulation can help campaign planners and financiers reduce the likelihood of money being spent in areas and for projects which, in the final analysis, will not materially assist RN in November.

We recognize that in many instances listed above wherein we suggest the use of data derived from simulation, it would be possible to arrive at approximately the same information by other means. For example, an electoral combination of states could be put together merely by sound judgment. It might or might not be as accurate as what we could determine through simulation. Also, it would be possible strictly from demographic information and voter trend studies to determine in which states you should concentrate your voter registration efforts. You could also determine the issue orientation of voter-types by states by non-simulation techniques but only through the extensive use of state polls -- at a cost of approximately \$300,000 if you were to do the job thoroughly.

We believe the advantage of simulation, particularly at this time, is the opportunity it provides for coordinated effort. There is not a single example listed above of information which we believe would of itself justify the expense of a simulation program. However, we believe the total program is certainly worth the expense. An important question which you might wish to ask yourself is this: Are you likely without the simulation program to get the same degree of information with the same degree of accuracy as rapidly and at less cost with the same degree of coordination and close attention? If the answer is yes, then doubtless simulation offers you little. If a candid appraisal is likely to force you to conclude that you would not, we believe simulation

is definitely necessary.

Two examples immediately come to mind to point out the type of service an in-house simulation effort could provide. First, there are at least 20 states which have state-wide polls available. Some, of course, are more reliable than others. We could analyze these state polls and determine how reliable they are. Those which we found to be valid for our use would enable us to avoid the expense of conducting our own polls in those states. Query: Without such an in-house capability would the Nixon operation take advantage of this opportunity? Second, the Republican House and Senate Campaign Committees are planning to survey 50 Congressional districts and 8 states during the campaign. If RN is the nominee, we could most likely gain access to this information and again eliminate the necessity for some original polling at our expense. Query: If there were not within the campaign organization a specific team working with this type of information, would this opportunity be seized?

It also should be pointed out that these types of information would be of value only if they augmented a simulation project, since otherwise it would be virtually impossible to relate them to data which not only verified their accuracy, but which provided the additional detailed information necessary to provide you with meaningful conclusions.

We believe that it is possible to provide valuable information for planning purposes in sufficient time to be of use and to do so at a reasonable cost. We believe that simulation is the most efficient means to provide this information and to guarantee the coordinated effort most likely to assure that raw data is translated into practical campaign assistance.

It is not our desire to over-sell the advantages of simulation. In fact, we believe we have tended to attribute less value to the process than we actually believe it has. We tend to think that more information will be available and more uses for it will present themselves than we have suggested to you. Simulation is not magic, nor is it pure science. It is, however, one important step along the road that leads from an educated guess to a calculated probability. It is valuable as a planning tool and as an aid in the formulation of decisions and the allocation of resources. This we feel is enough to justify its use, and should you decide to go ahead with the project, we will provide you with the most precise data possible upon which to make the crucial decisions necessary in the months ahead.

file

July 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: Pat Buchanan
FROM: DC

The next time the research group meets, let's try to develop some line with regard to the government workers which will be appealing to them.

They are a decisive block in Maryland and Virginia and, of course, there are more government workers in California than there are in Washington, D. C.

Our anti-big-government line may scare these people and I think we need a good program for them to counter-balance this. Here is a place where the Critical Issues Group might give us some assistance.

file

July 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: Pat Buchanan

FROM: DC

Would you give an assignment to Huston and Gavin to prepare for RN the fifty best quotes from Woodrow Wilson and from Churchill - having in mind the fact that I am interested only in quotes that might be relevant today. Let each of them work independently on this project.

Also on that same subject, Jim Howard makes the point that we need to use more parables in our speeches. I have often raised this same question myself. Would you ask Gavin, Huston and Hume to come up with any further suggestions. Also, if there are any others on the staff who have any flair in this direction - get them to work on it too.

It is not helpful for me to receive a mass of material in this respect (I can buy books of quotations). I want each individual to put himself in my place and try to come up with parables and/or quotes that can be used in some of my speeches today.

(H) 18

MEMO TO RN
FROM BUCHANAN
September 13 1968

File

According to Sears, the Agnew staff was essentially deigned for a gubernatorial office--and is adequate only for that. Not intended for a national campaign--but it will function adequately in its current role. Apparently, their press office which we beefed up, is working out better than any other department. Basic need is for a hardhitting speech writer.

Crane was dropped because he is a foreign policy guy who is not a phrase-maker and who is constantly conseling Agnew to make weight foreign policy pronouncements----which Agnew has no business making in the first place. ~~XXXXXX~~ Pendergast is essentially a researcher, not writer and as Sears states, both Pendergast and Crane "ought to park their ass somewhere" and do their jobs. They are not needed flying around in the airplane. Steve Hess comes on Monday. Agnew and Sears looking forward to this, both think Hess has right idea and fills the basic need.

(However, Sears says he is getting heat from New York that Kent Crane "has" to be put back on the plane.) Sears also has the Safire stuff and the stuff we worked up for Ellsworth. They will start cracking HHHH on this just as soon as the Soft on Communism stuff is behind them.)

BUCHANAN

KL

[Handwritten signature]

MEMO TO RN

From Buchanan

I talked with Austin of Time tonight. He wanted to know if RN's position had shifted on the Fortas thing. I said not a centimeter since Fortas was named. He said that Herb Klein had led either him or someone to believe that RN's statement about opposing all filibusters was something of a movement toward the appointment. I don't know what Herb has been told to say, but if I were RN, I would sit right where we are. We have already gotten the benefit of our position---and paid the price. Why take a new position on this thing?

Buchanan

*File Buchanan
Personal*

MEMO TO RN

From Buchanan

April 17, 1968

RESEARCH

*RN agrees
will follow up*

I have given some thought to our research situation and it seems to me that our answer lies somewhere along these lines. First, let us recognize that we have a very small staff, that we cannot expect it to do first tier research in depth where some great breakthrough. What we can expect is that they will be equipped to brief us on anything we want. We can expect that they will act as harvesters of the available material.

HOW TO USE RESEARCH.

Given our situation, with this small staff, we must concentrate upon relevant research, which is quite precisely what RN wants and what RN himself can use. That has got to be our first priority. And the only one who can determine that is RN himself. Thus Buchanan recommends that either Buchanan or Chapin or someone designated get from RN on a regular basis just what RN wants research to do for him.

Right now, research is not getting the necessary guidance, and the necessary guidance can only come from RN. If RN asks for a great deal, then research can expand according to RN's needs, or we can set RN's demands in front of him and have him list priorities.

This sounds elementary, but the problem in research is that they are flying blind; they are too small to turn out everything one associates with a national campaign, positions papers from A to Z, etc. etc.

Their first purpose is to service the candidate, and only the candidate can know precisely what he wants done.

Now, for the second purpose.

When no demands are being made, research should yet be moving, contiuning to gather and winnow material, and working in anticipation of future needs. For this also, however, Research needs guidance from RN as to just what areas to concentrate in.

(let me put it this way. The Research Effort we have today is nothing more than an expansion of the one-man operation we ran with in 1966, The research I did was a) specifically what RN requested for his speech material and b) the regular reading and gaterhing and filtering through. I realize the Big Show requires a hell of a lot more---but the needs of the candidate still come first and only the candidate can know them ~~exactly~~ exactly, and he is the one who can best project what he will need)

RECOMMEND: That RN on a regular basis tell ~~Chapin~~ Chapin or Buchan-an or whomever he designates to be the pipeline just what he wants from the Research people and when---and I will have Shelly keep a check list on the road.

Secondly, that RN tell research, or rather tell the pipeline to research, what priorities he wants set on long-range projects in what areas he wants them done.

Third, that the Research people be taken out of the Issue Mail Area if at all possible

Fourth, that the Research People submit to RN on a regular basis a brief progr^ess report of what they are working on and where they are going, so that RN can cut off this or that project and tell them to move in this or that direction.

Let me add here a number of important points. We delude ourselves I think if we are expected the Research group we have, which is quality in my view and competent, to come up with position papers on a thousand different subjects. Basically what we have here is a small strong arm for the candidate to use as he sees fit.

If we do not keep in communication with it, if we do not provide guidance (which comes directly from RN's demands) then the research effort will be flying blind, and they will miss the mark time after time. I think, however that with constant instruction from the plane we can get valuable service out of them.

We must remember I think that the only research that amounts to a damn is what gets into the public print and what gets into the public print is going to come nine times out of ten out of RN.

I think it would be a mistake to have a massive operation going here independent of RN and working on great research papers which are never going to get us anything which RN is never going to say. The important thing is that seven paragraphs that is all that is going to be run.

This does not preclude the need for more people which exists. It does not preclude the need for more writers which exists. It just argues for effective use of what we have.

(Handwritten scribble)

*not feasible
too many turn downs*

MEMO TO RN

From Buchanan

You might tell these Texans to demand of their Congressmen
---before voting for them---that they support the popular winner
in the House of Representatives---if the thing should go there.
Make them take a stand etc.

I wonder if this ~~is~~ is something we could do nationally.
Get every Republican Congressional Candidate to make that pledge
and then demand that it be made of Democrats as well.

*good idea but it's
too late to implement*

(Large handwritten signature)

BUCHANAN

MEMO TO ~~RMX~~ Haldeman

From Buchanan

Two points.

One---RN says it is too late for this---but is it really. According to his scratched out note he was ready to try it. We might just implement it with a series of telegrams to every Congressional Candidate.

Two---Thimmesch has a bit of a problem. He is the RN expert. Has written some excellent stuff. Wants to do a piece on Nixon and Kennedy the last ~~two~~ two men of the War Generation. (That is JFK) and Nixon being the last etc. He says he will be the Nixon Columnist if RN gets into White House. To make along story short---he wants five minutes with RN

Buchanan

Bob Halderman

September 24, 1968.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Keogh/Price/Buchanan/Safire/Harlow/Gavin/Anderson/Moore
FROM: RN

Here are some general thoughts with regard to excerpts and statements for the next six weeks. I don't think we are yet quite hitting the mark as these comments will indicate.

As a general rule, an excerpt should be no more than 1 to 1-1/2 pages long. It should be meaty and quotable and should be material that I can easily work into a stump speech even if I am speaking outdoors without a podium.

A case in point is the statement for Sioux Falls. Something like this should never be put out as an excerpt for two reasons: (1) It is too long. (2) It is too localized. From now on anything on agriculture should generally just be dropped off as a statement for the local press and let our press give it whatever ride they want. The national press couldn't care less about what we say on Karl Mundt's pet REA project nor on our repeating our agriculture program. In fact, I think the less we speak nationally on agriculture in the next few weeks - the better. Just drop statements off where needed - Harlow knows what we can say -- they can just be cleared with Bryce -- I won't need to see them.

More often than not a statement dealing with a local subject and zeroing in on a local problem should be dropped off at most stops. This will ^{give} enormous local coverage and since it will not require me to include the material in my speech it imposes no burden on me. Just read the advance information sheets and if you see that some place cares about Indians - put out a little statement indicating that we care about Indians, etc. A case in point was the statement Pat Buchanan prepared reacting to the Yippees that broke up the Catholic mass in Milwaukee. As a matter of fact, that statement deserved even a national play. I hope it got out in time to get not only the local press but also to be circulated among our national press.

With regard to our excerpts - they should zero in primarily on the four major themes. If we scatter-gun too much we are not going to have an impact. That is why I repeat we must have at least two excerpts a week which hit some aspect of the law and order theme and one or two a week which hit some aspect of the spending theme and two or three which hit the foreign policy-respect for America theme.

Let me take the spending theme as a case in point. I think a follow up on what we said in Milwaukee would be to find the memorandum that I dictated a couple of weeks ago and if you can't find it - I think you will recall it. In it I said that a survey would show that we could safely make the statement that no member of the Senate had introduced bills calling for more money than Hubert Humphrey. I think we should nail him

as the most expensive member of the Senate while he was in the Senate and that he would be the most expensive President in history if he were to be elected. He will have a very difficult time denying this because he would have to say that one of his supporters had introduced more bills - or called for spending more money - than he did.

I think we should start hammering him hard and regularly on the spending theme, particularly in view of the fact that he has introduced so many bills and talks about introducing so many new programs. On this score, it is now time to cost-out Humphrey's programs for spending and then make the charge that already in this campaign - with six weeks left - he has advocated programs which would add _____ millions of dollars annually to the budget. This does not have to be done in too technical a fashion -- I don't want a Dunn and Bradstreet report on it.

On the law and order theme, I think we should start hammering on the fact that he defends the record of the Administration over the past four years. Demand that he name one instance in which he disagrees with the record of the Administration. Does he disagree with Clark in not using wire tapping -- in not going after organized crime -- in not enforcing the Narcotics Act. Demand replies. We must keep him on the defensive just as he is trying to put us on the defensive.

Another theme that can be developed is Hubert vs. Hubert. Pick out four or five major issues and use direct quotes where he has contradicted himself. These all don't have to be

big issues -- of course, Viet Nam offers the most inviting one. Get to work on this one immediately and give me a good excerpt on that one.

Some general guidelines:

Don't be cute or gimmicky -- just hit hard with crisp one-liners whenever they are appropriate.

I think we can make some mileage too out of everybody reading the press excerpts that Pat Buchanan sends in to me and then having our excerpt directly relate to one of those provided we are not simply answering Hubert.

It seems to me that most of our excerpts suffer from not being current and livelier. This could be corrected by simply spending a little more time reading the daily news summaries and zeroing in on some of those problems.

Another point that we want to develop is to demand Hubert disassociate himself from any of the Administration's policies with which he disagrees. Ask again and again for him to name in the field of foreign policy, in the field of domestic policy, in the field of law and order where - if at all - he disagrees with the Administration.

I think a good excerpt could be gotten out too on Hubert's not waging a national campaign. Why is he avoiding the South? Challenge him to go South.

Apart from these day to day excerpts, of course, we should drop in regular statements - about two a week from now on -- that are meaty, substantive - they will not have any impact on voters but they will impress the press -- the piece on the Presidency; merchant marine, etc., are ones in this

category.

It seems to me that we should have more of these statements in the bank than currently seems to be the case.

There is no reason why we should not get some rather safe statements on some of these issues, calling in effect for change so that we thereby counter the charge that we are not talking to the issues.

Sometime toward the middle of the week we should all get together and discuss this further but I would like for all of you to have ^adiscussion on this tonight in Seattle and see how we can improve on our program in this respect.

#

MEMO TO RN

From Buchanan

October 5, 1968



The attacks on RN and Agnew have accelerated in recent days---they have become incredibly irresponsible; RN has been accused of being part of an Administration that let people starve in West Virginia. And we continue along our merry way. With no one responding to this thing. I realize that Laird and X surrogate said this and that, and that we have a transcript to ~~prove~~ ^{prove} it said it---but it doesn't make a damn bit of difference if he replied or not---because it sure as hell is not turning up in the ~~News~~ ^{News} column.

~~As~~ ^{As} for Agnew, he is spending his time these days clearing up the record, or getting chopped up by the Press. He is getting this because he is ~~not~~ ^{not} making enough hard and tough news to make these bastards sit up and write it as the lead. Now, I don't know about Hess but from meeting him, I just doubt that he is the kind of nut-cutter RN needs right now.

I don't agree with Finch, ~~is~~ that the answer for Agnew is to get positive. Our job is not to make the New York Times happy. I think someone needs ~~to~~ ^{to} kick the living hell out of Humphrey and if goes personally after us---then let's go right after him. I think Agnew has got to be that guy. We are letting Hubert off the defensive---he is on the attack every day---this for the most vulnerable candidate and the most vulnerable administration in history.

Neither Mitchell nor Ellsworth gets the kind of play that O'Brien does. They have Muskie and O'Brien and WHumphrey kicking the hell out of RN and who do we have that is kicking them and getting a headline worth talking about?

Maybd the decision has been made for RN to ignore this stuff and perhaps that is right. But my own personal view is that we can't not only for political, but for simply the morale of our troops, let them get away with the type of irresponsibility they have been getting away with.

My suggestion is that Buchanan go with Agnew for a while, and try to write two attacks a day for him---and have RN call Agnew and tell him this is what he wants done. We don't have any other guns than Agnew--and I think the experience of the campaign shows this. To do the job that needs doing I would need some weight with Agnew, some way to get through his staff if there is resistance there----some press people, just two or so, ~~and~~ that would be all we need. The objective is to get Agnew in the headlines every day hammering these people----and let the editorial writers squeal.

BUCHANAN

RN
bkgrd

October 18, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: BUCHANAN

FROM: BELL

RE: Catholic Vote

file

School Statement

I recommend that we go with the attached statement of sympathetic consideration for the parochial schools -- in effect, a hand signal that they will get a better break from us -- for the following reasons:

1) It is right. At a time when massive new funds seem necessary to keep any school system afloat, a denial of relief to Catholic schools is little short of a death warrant to the second largest school system in this country. This would be a disservice to American education as well as to the Catholic taxpayer who has to pay more and more to get the same educational benefit for his children -- little or nothing.

2) If properly publicized, this can have a significant and possibly decisive effect on the Catholic vote, without antagonizing very many Protestants. While a public opinion poll might still show a plurality against aid to parochial schools, it is well known that most Catholics will change their vote on this issue, while most Protestants will not. The gun-control analogy is apt -- the anti-control minority is willing to shift votes, while the lukewarm majority

is not. The election of Kennedy largely defused this as a big issue among Protestants -- remember, ten years ago intelligent people were asking whether a Catholic President might have to take orders from the Pope -- and the textbook provision of the school-aid bill, together with the Supreme Court decision which upheld it, have at least partially removed the "constitutional" issue.

3) Those Protestants who would tend to react negatively are for the most part in states (e.g. Kansas and Oklahoma) where RN is safely ahead. Moreover, the Bible Belt-Fundamentalist types who would react most negatively are the least likely to hear of RN's statement.

4) The states where this statement is likely to have a net favorable impact tend to include the large industrial states regarded as marginal. The statement, properly publicized, could help substantially in Michigan, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Connecticut. These 1960 Kennedy states, close this year, have a total of 75 electoral votes.

5) The statement could move Massachusetts from the Humphrey to the Marginal column.

6) In New York -- which, I admit, is the big problem because it is the only state with a heavy Jewish vote -- I believe the gains among Catholics would outweigh the losses among Jews. At the outset, it should be remembered that about

one-third of the Jewish community -- the Orthodox Jews heavily concentrated in Brooklyn -- have long been in favor of religious schools, and RN's stand would not only not hurt, but ought to be publicized in these areas. These also tend to be the "law and order" Jews among whom Humphrey has suffered the greatest RN inroads to date.

7) Because of a number of events, Jewish faith in the public school system, and in the rigidly secularist approach to church-state relations, has been eroded. In a long Commentary article last year, Milton Himmelfarb chided his fellow Jewish intellectuals for practicing secularist anti-Catholicism in the name of constitutionalism.

Furthermore, the present New York school crisis has caused many of the non-Orthodox Jews to re-evaluate their support of the public schools, and their opposition to private religious-affiliated schools. My information is that even some Reform congregations are considering starting schools to avoid the current chaos. From the point of view of potential New York Jewish backlash, the present is the most propitious opportunity in quite a while to chance it.

8) This is a direct thrust at Humphrey's most important strength. Gallup (38-36-20) and Harris (43-33-15) agree in giving Humphrey the edge among Catholics. If Humphrey cannot maintain or increase his present lead among

Catholics, he cannot carry Michigan, Pennsylvania, New York, or Connecticut.

9) This diverts some attention from the debate issue and tends to defuse the "Nixon won't speak out" issue.

10) It puts Humphrey profoundly on the defensive. What can he say? He can't attack the statement as irresponsible, since all it really does is call for a new look. He can't come out against parochial schools, or he is dead among Catholics. And yet if he does not, he will alienate the liberal ideologues he has been trying to woo with a softer Vietnam line. He would probably wind up either me-tooing (which interrupts his self-righteous posturing as the "issues candidate") or making a serious political mistake.

11) The injection of an important new domestic issue into the campaign diverts attention to some extent from Vietnam. Given the present peace offensive, the less the campaign is preoccupied with Vietnam, the less the Democrats will tend to be helped.

The genesis of this draft is as follows: it was drafted by Thomas Patrick Melady, passed on for approval by Chotiner, seen and/or edited by Anderson, Bell, Buchanan, Gavin and Price.

Chotiner's feeling is that this should be secretly

prepared, and dropped at the parish level the Sunday before election.

I disagree, and think it should be dropped as soon as possible for the following reasons.

1) The New York school strike -- and difficulties in other school systems across the country -- defuse to some extent the state-school partisans. Some of these disruptions may be settled by November 3.

2) Dropping at the parish level on November 3 allows HHH to attack RN via the "sneakiness" issue, a la the securities statement.

3) Few voters change their minds in the last two or three days of the election. Most will have decided by then.

4) Humphrey might get to this one first. If so, any political advantage RN would reap as the pioneer on this issue would be gone, and it is we who would be awkwardly on the defensive.

#

LB

MEMO TO RN

From Buchanan

October 18, 1968

Day to Day battle casualties is not a good figure. A big battle one day might send them up and the next day there might be next to none. I am having Agnes telecopy the weekly casualties since January, which would include Tet and the Bombing Pause, and Post Bombing Pause.

Also, daily figures are unavailable ~~_____~~ unless we want to try to get them out of the Pentagon with a direct call in.

Buchanan

What I want
is not the post figures
But if there is a
-bomb pause or cease fire
I want some current figures
on new casualties - to
show the war is not over.

Confidential file

MEMO TO RN

From Buchanan

October 22, 1968

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12356, Section 1.1
By RJP NARS, Date 4/6/87

In these last ten days I would argue strongly for RN presenting the image of both a winner and a President. I would recommend a easing off in the number of the cheer lines, an easing back of the shouted lines at rallies. I would recommend an increase in the depth and substance of the speech--something like Cincinnati, which I did not see but which I heard was extremely effective.

Also, we ought not again I think to have the next President talking about how many rapes occurred in the last five minutes. I think that continued use of the broad figures, said not in a shrill but in a serious fashion are fully adequate.

In hitting Humphrey, Muskie and Clark, RN ought I think to do this more as a winner and a President, as we did in new Hampshire with Governor Romney. We needèd him, made several jokes about him, but were never bitter, because we knew we would need his support. RN might treat Humphrey in the same manner. We can still stick it in him, about Obedience School, etc. but do it in such a way as to leave no impression he has stung us, no impression we are angry or bitter, but rather jab him a few times as though he were a bumbling and ineffective boxer who had been unable to lay a glove on us.

Further recommendation is that RN showed a relaxed and confident modd----which could not be better exemplifeid than a trip through the plane or somethingk like that to needle some of the press people. The little things do more than anything else to show that RN feels confident and thinks things are going well.

As for the stump speeches yesterday, I think they are when RN talks at the audience, or discusses some things with rather than sort of shouting the cheer lines to them. ~~XXXXXX~~ Price points out, the cool as opposed to the "hot" comes over Also, our campaign is judged not by what is seen of it in person by how cool the press judges it to be.

Thus, the presidential impressions. The aloof but friendly for Hubert the well-meaning clown, the more serious moments, the for support, ~~and~~ a cutting back on anything that smacks of ~~bragg~~ braggadocia, and the call for people to join in a common cause. rule out things like a vote for me is a vote for peace, and and for Humphrey is a vote for failure. The over-simplistic things we can do without.

Again, a final note. The thing to maintain these last few days I think it "our cool" and our "flexibility." ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ We can get on the offensive without being offensive.

I don't know if RN feels comfortable with it, but if he uses of these many occasions just to get up before the crowd and start about the kind of country he wanted to build, the kind of nation to see, and we are going to need Democrats; we know there are difficult times ahead. Sort of Wilsonian. If it doesn't come off, we haven't lost anything but a single rally.

One last thought----I think that we ought to be now campaigning like the President of the United States campaigning for election. the madding crowd, above Hubert and George.

##\$

ADD AT END

On the cheer lines and on the criticism suggest that RN talk them or speak them into the microphone, and let the microphone do the amplification, rather than shouting them into the mike. Often times, ~~ixxxx~~ RN can say the same thing----but if shouted it sounds like a more bitter attack than if simply said, with the kind of ~~xxxxxxx~~ disdain for HHH that ~~xxx~~ he merits and that we should ~~xxxxxxx~~ practice

..

File

~~14~~
H. H. H.
w/ H.

October 18, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: DC

FROM: Buchanan and Ziegler

Our early warning system is picking up signs of real trouble in these last 18 days, trouble that can be avoided, as it can be foreseen easily.

We talked with Mike Wallace the other day. He says a consensus is developing in the press corps that RN is inaccessible, that his campaign is super efficient but bland, that we are programmed perfectly, but that we are sort of avoiding controversy and coasting to victory. The press, bored with the rally speech and paying little attention to radio speeches which have been committee-prepared, and are sinking without a trace, is now looking for new angles -- and finding them. They are going out and they are going to find it and it is going to be damaging to us -- seriously damaging unless we counteract it. We have treated these guys with the best of care -- but we have fed the stomach and starved the soul -- as someone once said.

So, our thinking is this. If our controlled and expected and programmed appearances have lost their news value -- as they have -- then we must find some controlled and "unexpected" appearances to get our news -- and we can do that job.

It is time for a return to the Spirit of New Hampshire, which was one of RN openness and even occasional camaraderie with the press, which was one of the unexpected and the surprising. We can still do it, even with 125 reporters along as opposed to 25.

Possible suggestions:

The unexpected and the unscheduled appearance, at a school anywhere that surprises the press and makes them act as reporters and write it.

The unscheduled RN drop by in the plane to talk to some reporter and too for RN to start ranging off -- on his own -- into some subject that is of intense interest like the New Majority that RN intends to build or the Successor to the Roosevelt Coalition, how RN hopes to pull together these elements of the old Democratic establishment and put them together with the GOP for a coalition to govern for a decade.

The point in both cases is that the press is rightly tired and bored with rewriting our releases. RN can make them into reporters again at the same time that he gives his own advance thought and care and preparation to his materials and then goes back in the plane, or finds some surprise occasion, to deliver it "extemporaneously."

RN has already demonstrated with Johnny Apple that it can be done. He was reportedly moaning and groaning until his conversation with RN -- after which he was genuinely elated, which report came from Wallace -- after we had had our conversation.

If RN walks in and controls a situation -- then it is not a press conference -- and RN can talk about any particular subject that interests him and that is newsworthy.

My point here is that it requires nothing on our parts, but to start using our imagination a bit -- and to cease running this show like a Prussian Fire Drill. Unless we get a little of the unexpected and new, and hence newsworthy, in this thing toward the last two weeks -- then we are going to find these guys out searching for new and different leads, like "Is Nixon Aloof," "Where is this Campaign's Achilles Heel?"

The old adage about an idle mind being the devil's workshop is especially true of the press corp, where the devil is always close at hand. So, what I suggest and Ron suggests, is a simple return to the philosophy of the primaries -- controlling the news by providing new and different and exciting and newsworthy events which force these guys to cover them -- in order to cover themselves with their competition.

The point we make is that radio speeches and rallies are old hat. They are not going to be reported any more unless they are dramatic and unless we use our collective imagination to find some new and different and newsworthy thing to force them to cover -- they are going to write their own stories and, as JFK used to say, "we don't want that."

*Finch
pulled this.
L*

*LE
LE*

RN

*Draft re: Court appointments
per your request.*

DRAFT

(Buchanan)
October 23, 1968

THE NEW COURT

*to RM
Submit - next
week - after
check with
Allsworth
Finch*

From recent events it appears that vacancies shall open on the Supreme Court during the term of the next President of the United States. As I am a candidate for the office, the people have a right to know the kind of men I might name to the High Court.

They would be strict constructionists. They would see their duty as interpreting the law, rather than making law. They would see themselves as caretakers of the Constitution and servants of the people, not super-legislators with a free hand to impose their political and social viewpoints upon the American system and the American people.

Americans are a deeply divided and embittered people today. It is vitally important that when future far-reaching social changes are made in their society, those changes not be handed down by five men who are appointed for life, who answer to no one, and from whose judgements the people have almost no appeal. In future years when such social legislation comes, it must and should come from elected

representatives who are responsible to and answerable to the people of the United States.

Future Justices should be men who reject the philosophy of social permissiveness. They should recognize that social justice embraces not only a scrupulous respect for the rights of the accused, but a constant concern for the security of the law-abiding. They should be men who will weigh the rights and freedoms of the individual against the rights and freedoms of the many, and find a better balance.

~~They should not be drawn from Ivory Towers. They should be men of the people, who will consider in their judgements -- not only the brilliance of an abstract argument, but the precise impact of each decision on the lives and fortunes of millions of unnamed and unknown Americans, who will have to live with those judgements.~~

The Constitution of the United States should be their guide -- as it was written and not as they would have written it.

They should be aware of the peril to our system from the unchecked rise in crime; they should be versed in criminal law; they should bring to the Court knowledge,

wisdom, experience, and common sense.

These are the requirements I would consider in considering any appointments to the High Bench. As for my opponent, whenever the subject of the Court or its decisions comes up, he acts as though he were in Church. Here is another difference between us.

I have great respect for the Supreme Court; I respect the men on it; but they are not infallible and the judgements of the Court do not come down from Mount Sinai; they often come down in five-four decisions. In my view, in recent years the four in the minority have sometimes been right and the five in the majority have occasionally been wrong. And as these decisions have dramatic impact upon political and social life in the United States, I intend to discuss them.

As for Mr. Humphrey, his silence on the subject must lead us to conclude that either he does not care about the Court decisions, or he does not question their wisdom, or he does not think they are a legitimate subject of discussion in a presidential election -- or he does not understand them.

Whatever the motive behind his vow of silence, the difference between us is clear -- and the people can decide.

#

DRAFT --
(Buchanan -- 10/23/68)

Ellsworth Editing -- 10/26/68

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Americans are a deeply divided and embittered people today. It is vitally important that when future far-reaching social changes are made in their society, those changes not be handed down by five men who are appointed for life, who answer to no one, and from whose judgments the people have almost no appeal. In future years when such social changes come, they should come from elected

representatives who are responsive and responsible to the people of the United States.

Future Justices should recognize that social justice embraces not only a scrupulous respect for the rights of the accused, but a constant concern for the security of the law-abiding. They should be men who will weigh the rights and freedoms of the individual against the rights and freedoms of the many, and find a better balance.

They should be aware of the peril to our system from the startling rise in crime; they should be versed in criminal law; they should bring to the Court knowledge, wisdom, experience, and common sense.

These are the requirements I would consider in any appointments to the High Bench.

I have great respect for the Supreme Court; I respect the men on it; but they are not infallible. The judgments of the Court often come down in five-to-four split decisions. In my view, in recent years the four in the minority have sometimes been right and the five in the majority have occasionally been wrong. And as these decisions have dramatic impact upon political and social life in the United States, I have freely discussed them in the campaign.

As for Mr. Humphrey, his silence on the subject must lead us to conclude that either he does not care about the Court decisions, or he does not question their wisdom, or he does not think they are a legitimate subject of discussion in a Presidential election -- or he does not understand them.

Whatever the motive behind his vow of silence, the difference between us is clear -- and the people can decide.

#

*in the Court of Appeals
for your reports*

DRAFT

(Buchanan)
October 23, 1968

ELLSWORTH
EDITING

10-26-68

THE NEW COURT

*to M.M.
Submit - next
week - after
check with
Allison
Frank*

will ~~From recent events~~ ^I It appears that vacancies shall open on the Supreme Court during the term of the next President of the United States. As I am a candidate for the office, the people have a right to know the kind of men I might name to the High Court.

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representatives who are ^{and} ~~responsible~~ ^{responsive} to ~~and answerable~~ to the people of the United States.

Future Justices should ~~be men who reject the~~ philosophy of social permissiveness. They should recognize that social justice embraces not only a scrupulous respect for the rights of the accused, but a constant concern for the security of the law-abiding. They should be men who will weigh the rights and freedoms of the individual against the rights and freedoms of the many, and find a better balance.

They should ~~not be drawn from Ivory Towers.~~ They should be men of the people, who will consider in their judgements -- not only the brilliance of an abstract argument, but the precise impact of each decision on the lives and fortunes of millions of unnamed and unknown Americans, who will have to live with those judgements.

The Constitution of the United States should be their guide -- as it was written and not as they would have written it.

They should be aware of the peril to our system from the ~~unchecked~~ ^{startling} rise in crime; they should be versed in criminal law; they should bring to the Court knowledge,

N
NIXON FOR PRESIDENT COMMITTEE,
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS,
1726 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 783-4201

*L - Call Timmons
& tell him
too*

Memo to: Bob Haldeman

Copies to: Peter Flanigan
John Ehrlichman

Date: July 1, 1968

Subject: Chicago Tribune

*Phoned
JOE*

This will serve as a reminder that you were going to talk to RN about the cost of buying and distributing free copies of the Chicago Tribune during the Republican National Convention.

Apparently, Mr. Maxwell said we had to purchase copies through a Miami Beach newsstand. The Dade County News Dealers Association can order copies for us at 11¢ each. Figuring 3,000 copies each day, it will cost us \$330 or \$1,980 for six days.

agree

Frankly, I don't think it is worth it.....but please let me know soonest because of the lead time required in planing an order like this.

Best,

Bill Timmons



*Catt
Levitt.*

file *Haldeman* *Call*
Lewis
re budget
problem
TOPA

MEMO TO: HOBART LEWIS, FRANK LEONARD FROM BILL SAFIRE
RE: RECAP OF JUNE 26 MEETING ON ONE*SHOT MAGAZINE PROJECT

WORKING TITLE: NIXON '68
FORMAT: 80-PAGE 9x12 magazine, similar to a National Observer "Newsbook"
COLOR: Front and back covers, plus eight pages inside.
BUDGET: To be drawn up by Lewis, assuming 100,000 copies, to be ready for distribution just before convention.
SALES PRICE: \$1.25. Some free distribution; some sold by Nixon clubs; some newsstand sales.


FORMAT:

1. Color cover shot of Nixon campaigning in crowd of people; back cover color photo of Nixon with family.
2. 600-750 word introduction by General Eisenhower. Lewis to make contact through Ben Hibbs and Bob Shultz, Hibbs to draft. (1 page)
3. "I Believe in the American Dream" essay by RN. Impressionistic in tone, illustrated by photos of American scenes and people, some with Nixon in them, designed to show scope of interest and support. ~~xxxxxz~~ 1500 words, (4 pages). Price or Safire to write.
3. Nixon's life in pictures, showing all phases of career, as a child, Navy, early candidate, up to and including each of "six crises". (8 pages) . Leonard to assemble and caption.
4. "America and the World" essay by Nixon, 1500 words on need to reassert leadership, what has happened to our alliances, our proper role as world power. ~~xx~~ Price, Buchanan or Whalan to write; illustrated by pix of RN with world leaders past and present, Leonard to assemble.

- 4 (con'td) Also Leonard to get from Rose Woods a complete list of grips since 60, to send to Lewis for cartographer to work into map. Altogether 8 pages.
5. The Nixon Humor: selections of examples of wit, illustrated by a laughing picture. Safire and Leonard to send suggestions to Lewis, who already has Alfalfa speech; Leonard to get more from Buchanan. 2 pages.
6. The Quotable Nixon: selections of best lines over the years, broken into categories, with some small pix. Lewis already has Safire selection; additional material from Leonard who gets from Research. 6 pages
7. Family Portrait: a spread on the Nixon family, early shots to present, including David Eisenhower shot with General (4 pages) Shots working on campaign, also Ed Nixon.
8. The Pat Nixon story, interview updated by Eleanor Harris, Lewis to arrange interview, with pix selected by Leonard (4 pages). Stress shots with daughters.
9. "The Great Comeback", from 1962 to ~~present~~ beginning of 68, showing how RN aided the rebirth of the Republican party, power in helping elect Republicans to Congress in 1966. Safire to write; 6 pages.
10. Campaign trail 68: picture story of the primaries, with box scores of results, including family campaigning shots, diverse supporter shots, 10 pages selected by Leonard.
11. "What they are saying about Nixon": selection of editorial comment on Nixon the man and the positions taken so far; Leonard to select.
12. Picture spread, and heavy selections from text, of Oregon telethon. Good color photos available; this is also the spot for coverage of current stands on issues. 8 pages.

13. The Watershed Speech: vision by RN of future of America,
harking back to opening article in magazine and giving it unity.
Safire has written, 6 pages.

cc: Haldeman, *W. H. R.*



1 May 1968

MEMORANDUM TO BUCHANAN

SUBJ: Planning for Post-Miami Operations

I am concerned about the lack of co-ordinated planning for field operations in the immediate post-Miami period. From my discussion with Tom Evans and from what I have observed of the formative organization of the Citizens operation, I fear that a major effort is about to be launched without the benefit of clear objectives or detailed operational plans. The line and block charts look impressive, but detailed plans and objectives are lacking.

Citizens operations very rarely are cost effective. Without the benefit of close co-ordination with other aspects of the campaign and without the aid of experienced organizers and administrators, they often function on the shotgun principle: establish as many different "citizens groups" as possible and hope something beneficial happens.

A Citizens organization, like a youth section, represents an integral part of the campaign myth. It is recognized that you have to have one, but no one is quite certain exactly what it is supposed to do. Too little attention is paid to determining at the outset specific campaign objectives to be accomplished.

Although it may be presumptuous of me, I believe the following observations are in order: (1) Tom Evans, while being a competent guy, has not had any experience as a program administrator on a national scale. This is a serious disadvantage only when pride refuses to admit it and hedge against its consequences by seeking the assistance of experienced people; (2) Jim Skidmore has not impressed those in Washington who have watched his activities over the past year as the logical choice to direct field operations; he is prone to attach too much attention to image and comfort, too little to concrete results; (3) Jim Day is a prize catch: he is experienced and competent, although most of his previous work has been in-house administration and convention arrangements. In short, I think we are lacking personnel who have had previous experience as program administrators, people who understand the hard, unglamorous, persistent efforts required to translate a line and block chart into a viable, productive, and efficient program effort.

In light of these comments and observations which are intended to be as analytical as possible without regard to personalities, I would suggest the following:

1. RN should require a detailed program prospectus outlining in specific terms exactly what the Citizens operation intends to accomplish and specifically how they intend to do it. Emphasis should be attached to specific programs, personnel to administer each program, and cost. All these factors should be related to specific campaign objectives. This operation is going to cost one hell of a lot of money. Left to itself there is no guarantee that the money will be well spent. Considering that money is a limited resource, if I were RN I would want to be damn certain that it is being allocated in a cost effective manner.

2. A procedure for continuing review and evaluation of the Citizens operation should be established. This should consist of more than periodic budget reviews. Frequent and extensive evaluation should be made of the impact and progress of projected program activities.

3. Within the framework of the Citizens operation, but in close co-ordination with the New York campaign staff, a special Task Force should be established to concentrate on up to 10 states which are regarded as electorally crucial to our success in November. These states can be selected on the basis of a hunch or if we implement the simulation exercise on the basis of empirical data. However chosen, they should receive special attention separate from general programming undertaken by the Citizens operation.

The first task of the special Task Force should be to prepare for a major registration drive immediately following the Convention. Studies should be immediately launched of the latest demographic information to determine population shifts, trends in voting, etc. which would aid us to pin-point those areas where intensive registration efforts would be most productive for a Republican candidate. After this information is determined (this would be available from our simulation studies or could be arrived at independently), detailed operational plans for putting troops in the field to register voters should be worked out.

The Task Force should also begin immediately to identify those groups of voters within the key states who represent the source of greatest support for RN (this too would be available from simulation or could roughly be sketched out from demographic and voter trend studies). Once this information was derived, specific programs in each state could be tailored by the Citizens operation, e.g., Senior Citizens effort in Florida, etc. The obvious advantage is that you can zero in on important voting blocs in crucial states instead of dissipating your resources on a broad national basis, e.g., mailing to Senior Citizens on a national basis when simulation or other analysis reflects that as a group they are inclined toward the Democratic candidate.

These are only two specific program ideas which I believe could be implemented to materially assist the campaign looking past Miami. They may not seem particularly novel, but they may have been overlooked simply because our planners are thinking generally and nationally rather than thinking in terms of specific, attainable program objectives.

My key point is simply this: a flurry of activity generated by the infusion of large amounts of money does not necessarily mean that progress is being made. I know that RN has many things on his mind, but I believe at the early stages when programs are being formulated, it might be wise if he took at least some direct interest to guarantee that those who will make a difference between victory and defeat are doing the best possible job on his behalf. I know that he thinks I tend to be negative or too critical. However, I do not have any cross to bear or any grudge to carry. All I am interested in is seeing that the best possible job is done so that he will win in November. To the extent that my critical evaluation of program ideas and project operations will help in this regard, I

feel compelled to make them. To the extent that they are irritating or a nuisance, I am sorry. However, in the final analysis, a detached evaluation of what is going on in the midst of a necessarily hectic campaign operation may, on at least one occasion, be of value, and for that reason I continue to bring these matters to your attention.

file

June 28, 1968

To: PJB for RN
From: RJW
Re: Professors for Nixon

OB
Holeman
up with
a preliminary
discussion

Roger Clark of the United Citizens operation has asked for a nominee to undertake organizing and administering Professors for Nixon. After consultation with Allen and Anderson, I have decided that this tough assignment demands high priority and the special qualities of Dr. Olds.

In the implacably hostile academic world, RN needs as his advocate a man filled with missionary zeal, a man at ease in the environment and enjoying wide contacts and professional prestige. I can think of no one more deserving of this assignment, which would require 2-3 days a week in and around Washington and far-ranging travel over the country, than the good dean.

The request for his services should come directly from RN, it should fan the flame of zeal, and it should move our man out into the field as soon as possible.

Don't call it this -
seems better.

Done - 7/2

Olds is mtg with
Tanner Alexander
10:00 Fri.

PATRICK J. BUCHANAN 11-15-67

Bob:

Here are sketched out a number of ideas worked out over the weekend. While there are still many holes in this thesis, you can get from this the drift of it---and the import in terms of our own use of television. Can you give us your thoughts on this thing.

Aide to RICHARD NIXON
20 Broad Street, New York City PatBuchanan

September 26, 1968

TO: Buchanan

FROM: Allan

Re: RN Projected visit to Mexico

Former Ambassador Robert Hill advises against RN trip to Mexico on basis of his conversations in last two days with contacts in Mexico City. Reasons:

1. It is anticipated that there will be further serious disorders.
2. There is a chance that if RN visits Mexico City there could be extensive Communist-led demonstrations against RN. Coming 20 days before election, it could damage RN image as statesman.

9/24
done
B.B.
handle

MEMORANDUM TO BOB HALDEMAN

From Buchanan

Can you get this processed for us?

Buchanan

The \$1,000 fee is
in cash - from
Mitchell -

The expenses shld
follow the normal
process

September 18, 1968

file

MEMORANDUM

TO: John Ehrlichman
FROM: Larry Higby
RE: RN's questions on counterattack.

I had a conversation with Murray Chotiner this afternoon in which we covered the following points:

(1) We released a story today by Mr. John Gilhooley, Chairman of our New York state organization that attacked HHH on the following:

- (a) His embracing of Maddox earlier this year.
- (b) The fact that he had no qualms in accepting Southern support for his nomination. We included the exact figures as to the number of Southern delegate votes he received and specifically stated that had he not received those votes he would not have been nominated.

(2) We released an attack today by John Mitchell in which he asked HHH to state on which issues he disagrees with Johnson and to name specifically which Cabinet members he would retain from the present Administration if he were elected.

(3) We also released a story today attacking HHH's position on young people. In substance it states that HHH is a "me too" candidate. He is copying RN statement re: "Student Coalition" of a week ago.

(4) Concerning RN's questions on counterattacking HHH for his being insensitive to the Czechs on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, an attack will go out on this tomorrow.

(5) In response to the Buchanan memo re: the Jeff Hart memo: as stated above we have already made the point on Lester Maddox. Concerning points B and C of that memo, Chotiner feels that by referring to Wallace and the Humphrey-Muskie-Wallace ticket we are only showing weaknesses and building Wallace. He feels we don't want to build Wallace to the point of a threat even if he is a threat.

Murray is also aware of the fact that we need earlier and more positive counterattacks as stated in RN notes, rather than "knee jerk" reactions.

I will check with Murray Chotiner tomorrow to make sure we have followed up on the other points mentioned by RN.

MEMO TO RN

From Buchanan

September 17, 1968

Jeff Hart has a memo to RN which I will summarize briefly. He feels HHH is lost on the great issues, thus must move on the "symbolic" issues like Fortas and NPT.

He says HHH sure to stress the role of Thurmond, that RN ought

1) Deny and "deal" briefly and flatly.

2) Point out loudly that HHH not well situated to pursue the argument because HHH has

done a) himself publicly embraced Lester Maddox as a good Democrat and b) In the South his lieutenants are actively cooperating with the Wallace campaign to hurt the Republicans and 3) we might allude to the Humphrey-Muskie-Wallace ticket in South Carolina, as seen by E-N in south Carolina.

BUCHANAN

E.C.A. (3)

C - you must control this.

old boy
is slaying
bully
Wallace

Don't want to build
Wallace to pt of
threat.

the book
Whig in Hall
doesn't the
counter attack
9 to 10 p.m. including a group
do this. our whole staff has a
knee jerk reaction
for H.H. to answer &
initiate attack - We can't by force to do a better job in this.

NIXON CAMPAIGN

Campaign Committee
450 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022
(212) 661-6400

~~AA?~~
M

Patrick J. Hillings
Special Assistant to Campaign Manager

September 18, 1968

TO: Robert Haldeman
John Mitchell
Pete Flanigan
Herb Klein
Murray Chotiner
Pat Buchanan

Len Garment
Fred LaRue

FROM: Pat Hillings

In monitoring the media, it is obvious that the TV and radio networks now consider Wallace as serious a contender as RN and HHH. Without attempting to actually measure time allotted to him on newscasts, etc., it appears he is being given as much coverage as the standard bearers of the two major parties.

This means politically that he has the biggest forum any third party candidate has ever had in our country's history and if he utilizes this properly to get his message through, he will hurt our side.

This situation, if it continues, will require a revision of strategy on our part. It will mean we can no longer continue to ignore Wallace and we may have to begin openly attacking and exposing him. We may have to instruct our surrogate candidates, for example, on how they should handle this in speeches and press conferences,

10 September 68, P.M.

To: Buchanan
From: Allen

Last week Glenn Olds went to Harvard, where he met with a group studying the problems of transition to a new Administration. The group consists of Phil Areeta, Chairman, Franklin A. Lindsay, and Ernest May. This group has already produced an initial memo on transition, which apparently found its way to Olds. Henry Kissinger also sits with this group.

Today I talked with Kissinger, who said: "Listen, I am telling you as a friend, my colleagues here were appalled" as a consequence of the meeting with Olds, and "he made a complete ass of himself." Apparently Olds went armed with his famous "chart" in three colors, which purports to describe the functions of an Administration. The chart has to be seen to be believed; a copy is attached.

That this man, whose outlook and ideology belongs clearly to the left--to wit, his one-time suggestion of Felix Green as an Advisor on Vietnam, his contacts with Andrew Cordier, his proposal of McNamara and Ralph Bunche as advisors, his request of a Polish Marxist Professor to identify people who "know" Eastern Europe and its problems, and ^{the} subsequent recommendation ^{by OMS} of the man identified by the Polish professor--that this man should be given a free rein to careen around the country and to present himself as RN's key man in "issue and policy and manpower development" is a flt-out catastrophe. He is a danger to RN, and to RN's supporters who have labored long and hard on RN's behalf.

This issue can no longer be muted. As I explained to you before, the man is likable and obviously competent in certain prescribed areas, and my contention with him revolves not around a personality dispute between academicians with substantial egos-- but it is a crucial matter of orientation, of feeling, of issues and ideas and the people to implement them.

Believe me, I am getting out of this in-fighting once and for all, and will concentrate my efforts exclusively in the realm of production. I want no more part of this; it has gone on long enough. And, quite apart from my own feelings in the matter, there is the objective issue of this man, Glenn Olds, whom I regard as unsuited for the position which he occupies in the operation or competent to discharge the broad mandate which he has arrogated to himself. My concern is for our candidacy, for the victory, and for the chance to govern by RN.

It is indeed hard to conceal a sense of outrage in this matter---for RN and what he stands for, and for myself.

16

MEMO TO BOB HALDEMAN

From Patrick J. Buchanan

September 5, 1968

Three things you ought to at least be aware of.

Dick Allen in research feels that Ellsworth is going around him in talking with people like Henry Kissinger which Allen sees as his province and area of concern.

Ellsworth thinks that, rather Scramton told him that he felt that our foreign policy group should be headed^{not} up by Bob Hill. And that Ellsworth feels it might be more balanced. Come to think of it---why don't you let me see if I can handle this one.

Anderson and the Researchers in New York are concerned and angry that Mitchell and Garment have apparently given Olds a go-ahead to set up task forces for the take-over in Washington. To a man they think Olds wholly lacks the ~~intellect~~ competence to judge individuals in their field of speciality--Allen is especially insistent that Olds doesn't know his ass from first base about foreign policy, that he hobnobs with left-wing asses, whom we seek to remove from government not restore. I would not underestimate the concern ~~over~~ over this development---and I would vote to have Olds kept out of this stuff myself.-----Buchanan

MEMO TO BOB HALDEMAN

From Buchanan

This stuff sent to us by members of the Ad Agency we have employed. They think it is good---it seems like the kind of gutsy stuff RN wanted to me---but everything they put out of this kind is vetoed apparently. I call this to your attention as we were together in RN's presence when RN said he wanted spots---without himself in it. This is the type of stuff which Rocky used so effectively.

Buchanan

There are two dozen like this---and apparently nothing goes through.-----Buchanan

From Rose

In mentioning able young men -- it would be good to try to include Ed Nixon -- and if he has any young men working w th him this would help out morale wise because it is not much fun to be the ones sitting back there answering the mail - sending out messages, etc. when all that looks exciting is happening on the road -- or over at 445 where Mitchell et al are located.

Also if we still have a Washington Headquarters it would be good to mention them in a memo even if nothing else were ever done.

Also Pat Hitt's women -- I think we will find in the long run they will be of much more value than the Citizens groups.

Another person you might want to write up would be Bud Wilkinson's son (but I guess that is Citizens so that is covered).

Also don't forget the schedulers -- too many times lists of people who are important and vital are given out and John Whitaker is left out -- and believe me he does a great job.

(And he has some young men with him now too.)

Also Advance Men -- although we don't have to have ;a special story on them it could be pointed out what fine young men they are -- many of them do much more than say the new fellows who have just joined as the fellows working for Mitchell and Flanigan -- they are ~~xxx~~ apparently wonderful fellows -- but we do have to watch leaving some of the kids out all the time.

Fuller *LB*

MEMO TO BOB HALDEMAN
FROM Buchanan

What O'Brien is up to with all his talk is the old strategy used on Godlwater. Frighten the hell out of people. Now, that strategy cannot possibly be as effective against RN as it was against BG---but it can have some impact in a number of close states. Buchanan suggests that RN devote a major speech to the old in America---what we are going to do for them; what we are going to ask of them in the New America---that RN further begin to get a line or two in his basic speech which we can get across the country to ~~fx~~ offset this O'Brien talk of an end to social progress and a repeal of social progress in this country if RN wins.

4
Suggest
G & Keogh.

Seriously, I would appreciate it if you would take this up with DC---or do what is necessary on this. SEcondly, we should hit this in radio and tv ads to offset the impact of what O'Brien is saying. Those old folks are one hell of a lot of votes.) Finally, it is rumored that the Information Office uses a Cadillac limousine to deliver releases. ~~XXXXXX~~ While this is a subject of some humor----it would mean an adverse press story if it were true.

KL.
↓
Not So.

Buchanan

MEMO TO RN

From Buchanan

September 19, 1968

I noticed yesterday where Cohen of HEW and Wirtz of Labor, the President's Cabinet were out on the hustings trying to help Hubert. We haven't seen Orville Freeman or Ramsey Clark out there yet---but I'd be willing to suspend the Hatch Act to get them out on the stump (Buchanan unsure if it is the Hatch Act that applies here.)

Buchanan

B

*we have no jobs or tips
can take eight
but have no room on plane or
housing but will try
to work out
if essential*

File

*Cons file.
JDE in giving
me list tonight.*

*B
A*

MEMO TO BOB HALDEMAN

From Buchanan

July 15, 1968

*have to double Anderson, Huston,
Whelan*

*all will have to double up + some may be
in remote hotels*

Here are the ones we think must go sometime to that Convention
1 Alan Greenspan, 2 Dick Allen, 3 Agnes Waldron (she may not go but
it should be offered) 4 Jeff Bell, 5 Annelise Anderson, 6 Darrell Trent,
and Bill Gavin. 7 Also Ken Khachigian and Mel Humphrey. 8

The others whom it would be worthwhile to take down there in
our view--and who should go also are

Diane Lebakkas, Mike Guhin, Jim Gidwitz, Mary Froning, Marie
Hiel, Patsy ~~Sturdy~~ Sturdy, Jesse Horack, and Lucy Colagiovanni.

As for the last herewe are not as strong as the others---however
it would seem that there are a number of odd jobs being handed out
down there---and these people ought to be ~~able~~ able to help out with
them.

Buchanan

file
letter
sent.

MEMO TO BOB HALDEMAN

From Buchanan

O.K. Armstrong, the former Missouri Cong. Asked me to tell RN that he was the one that got the Stark Endorsement. Buchcan's suggestions is that a letter go out for RN's signature, thanking ~~XXXX~~ O.K. for his contribution to the cause in Missouri. RN might just get a one-line memo on this--since I told Armstrong I would convey it.

Buchanan

Letter ?
yes _____
no _____ L following

O. K. ARMSTRONG

Editorial Staff
THE READER'S DIGEST
Pleasantville, New York

The Highlands
Republic, Missouri 65738
Area Code 417 / 732-2602

*Relay to RM
O. R. Ambrose*

Aberdeen Farms
Eolia, Missouri 63344

STATEMENT OF LLOYD C. STARK, ENDORSING NIXON

I am Lloyd C. Stark, a former Democratic Governor of Missouri. I am a Jeffersonian Democrat, and my family have been Jeffersonian Democrats since my great-grandfather Stark immigrated from Kentucky to Missouri 152 years ago.

I am a graduate of the Naval Academy at Annapolis and served eight years in the Navy. From 1917 I served in the U. S. Army all through World War I. I served as the chairman of the Missouri Highway Campaign to build Missouri's highway system, then served as Governor of my native state of Missouri from 1937 to 1941.

As a Jeffersonian Democrat, I am alarmed to find more and more power of government centralized in Washington, more and more controls placed upon the people, higher and higher taxes until their burden is almost unbearable; a steadily growing federal bureaucracy that is the very opposite of Thomas Jefferson's ideal that, and I quote him:

"The best government is that which does for the people only what they cannot do for themselves."

And worst of all, I find our nation bogged down in a war which has cost us more than 27,000 lives and hundreds of billions of dollars in resources.

As a Jeffersonian Democrat, I am convinced that we must have a change, if our country, as we know and love it, is to survive. I believe that Richard M. Nixon, when elected President of the United States, will bring about such a change. I believe that he will make every effort to stop inflation, cut out the socialist schemes, do everything possible to balance the budget and preserve a sound dollar; and end this tragic war in Viet Nam at the earliest possible moment.

As a Jeffersonian Democrat, I urge my fellow Americans to vote for Dick Nixon for President on November 5th.

File

MEMO TO HALDEMAN

From Buchanan

October 15, 1968

Henry Tasca is the U.S. ambassador to Morocco. Guy RN regards highly. He will be in States on Nov. 4 Staying at in-laws:

MRS MARIA TENAGLIA
7208 Sellers Avenue
Bywood, Upper Darby
Pennsylvania
FL-2-4310

This message comew to RN from "Ofie" who is a friend of RN, PN and Tasca----and just contributed to campaign through Clay.

You might mention this to RN---since RN has a high regard for his abilities in foreign policy.

BUCHANAN

File

MEMO TO BOB HALDEMAN
FROM BUCHANAN
September 25, 1968

The Time boys are really hot on this Agnew thing. They seem to think it is something of a disaster the way he is conducting his campaign, the foot-in-mouth disease, they think he has contracted.

What I am wondering is if perhaps we may be giving too little attention to this problem. It has not bothered me a great deal, but the variety of different "clarifications" he has issued is bound to be making some impact with the general public.

Agnew ought to be on the offensive, and I would think that all these negative stories are the direct result of uncontrolled ~~xxxxxxxx~~ situations, press conferences and the like, interviews. What he could use I think is a first rate---writer to hammer the Administration and Humphrey twice a day and not be giving all these reporters other stories to write---He need not be as responsible as we are, thus his attacks can be made through news out of the Agnew camp each day rather than having it be some clarification. I wonder if they don't need some more and better staff people ~~xxx~~ over there working for this guy. Seriously, there must be some first-raters on the Hill who could do an effective job for him---with the two a day attacks. The apparent feeling of the Time guys that Agnew is a genuine disaster makes me think that this may have become a middling problem for us. For what its worth.

File

MEMO TO BOB HALDEMAN

From Buchanan

Read this first and see if you think RN needs to see it.

It is a good memo.

Buchanan

Memo to Buchanan

Sept. 23

From: Bell

Re: Harris Poll

The trend evident in the Harris Poll published today scares me half to death.

The poll, based on interviews in mid-September, gives RN a 39-31-22 lead over Humphrey and Wallace. The Gallup Poll, taken in early September, showed 43-31-19. Note that in both polls the "conservative" (Nixon-Wallace) majority is virtually identical (62-31 Gallup, 61-31 Harris); but that the later poll shows Wallace with a larger share of the conservative vote.

Since Harris is interviewing the same sample voters he polled in July, he is able to give an idea of how the Rockefeller-over-Humphrey and McCarthy-over-Nixon voters are going. Not surprisingly, RN has the bulk of the Rockefeller voters and Humphrey has an even larger bulk of the McCarthyites. My suspicion is that this is mostly a function of party allegiance and will not change substantially for the rest of the campaign.

The frightening thing is the wide acceptance George Wallace is winning as a serious candidate for the Presidency. The Harris survey indicates that nearly one in four of all decided voters are for Wallace. He even has one in ten of the July McCarthy voters. By any measure, he is the strongest protest-party candidate in history and is far closer to winning the Presidency than was the Republican nominee at this time four years ago.

Furthermore, the pat formulation that Wallace "hurts the Republicans in the South, and the Democrats in the North" no longer stands up. With Wallace out of the race,

note

according to Harris, RN's lead over Humphrey nearly doubles (39-31 to 50-36).
Wallace voters say RN is their second choice by better than 2-to-1. The idea
that Wallace is hurting RN not only in the South tends to be confirmed by the
Oliver Quayle poll's showing narrow Humphrey leads in Michigan (38-36-15) and
Missouri (38-33-22)--two states in which the Wallace showing is especially strong.
The electoral-vote projection of the Harris vote indicates Wallace victories in
most of the South, and Humphrey victories in the more marginal Northern and Border
states most affected by the Wallace tide. This would probably result in a "hung"
election as of now.

The misconception we should avoid falling into is the idea (widely heard) that
the Northern Wallace voters have some kind of phobia against pulling a Republican
lever, and would simply return to Humphrey if they decided against Wallace.
This is certainly not true of the huge bloc of Wallace independents--and I don't
think it's true of the union-oriented Wallace Democrats. There is no doubt that
in states like Michigan, Eisenhower won a huge bulk of this milieu in 1952 and
1956. They were dissatisfied with the Democratic candidate, and didn't hesitate
to break. In 1966--running against the impeccable unionist Soapy Williams--
the author of the Landrum-Griffin Law got 56% of the vote, cutting heavily into
unionist precincts. Can there be any doubt that a lot of the Griffin Democrats
are for George Wallace today?

There is no doubt that the Northern Wallace voters are mad, and that most of them
will vote for RN if they are convinced that he represents a significant change.
This is doubly true in view of Humphrey's new liberal line. There is also no
doubt that until we are able to check and reverse the Wallace inroads in the North,
we will not be assured of an electoral majority.

*Confid
file*

MEMO TO BOB HALDEMAN

From Buchanan

Attached a report for your perusal on the Citizens thing
and on the aide to Agnew.

Buchanan

August 27, 1968

Pat,

Attached is what I have been able, without obvious prying, to find out about Charlie Bressler.

Gov. Agnew has made some other appointments -

Jim Miller - competent & Able

Louise Gore - Republican Chairman for the Nixon-Agnew. Good solid Nixon supporter going back to 1960.

Don Kendall - Executive Director under Louise Gore. AA to Ray Bliss. Solid Rockefeller man. Do not expect much from him. Wife is Bobbi Kendall - Chairman of Montgomery County Republican Central Committee. Do not expect much from her or the Central Committee. Ex--they had a tent at the Montgomery County Fair last week. Tent was loaded with Gude & Mathias material (both endorsed Rockefeller) and virtually no Nixon material except what my U.C.N. tent gave them. We handed out several thousand pieces of Nixon material a day and they gave out Gude & Mathias material (especially interesting considering her husband's position).

I was advised by many people (including precinct chairmen and a couple of Central Committeemen that if Nixon was nominated, not to expect the Montgomery County Central Committee to do an awful lot for Nixon. This appears to be coming true. Their primary interest appears to be in Gude & Mathias.

Charles Bressler--

Has been sued at least 3 or 4 times Ex--building contrary to existing zoning etc.

School board bought ground from him which was undesirable for schools (implied that it was the only way Bressler could unload the property)

Petition was brought to Agnew (when he was elected Gov.) by Prince Georges residents to prevent him from appointing Bressler to a liason post between the state and federal government.

Has reputation for having powerful political friends and word most often used about him was "slick".

Impression, gained by a lawyer I talked to from briefs, was that some of the suits had validity but were not filed in time. He won his cases but believe one or two are still under appeal.

* Complete file on Bressler can be obtained from the Publisher

of the Greenbelt News, a paper printed in Greenbelt, Md.

* Most prevalent reaction to his appointment - humor.

CONFIDENTIAL

October 13, 1968

TO: HALDEMAN, MITCHELL

FROM: BUCHANAN

File

The Agnew staff is wholly inadequate for a national campaign or for an effective Vice President of the United States. It is close to a total loss with George White perhaps the only salvageable member. They lack any grasp of national issues; they lack any knowledge of what a vice presidential candidate should be doing. If they did know, most of them would not be up to the mark -- in particular the "press secretary," Herb Thompson.

The de-celeration, in shifting from the Nixon tour to the Agnew tour is so dramatic as to send one flying through the windshield. There are two typewriters on the plane -- and they only get in the way of the stewardesses rushing whiskey to the journalists. No work is done on the plane -- I did not observe much being done at the stops. One night when we stayed up until about midnight to get the New York Times summary, we came close to provoking a mutiny among the secretaries.

Again, these people are loyal and dedicated to their Governor; but they don't belong in the National league.

The Governor himself is a personable fellow, who comes across quite well at rallies, who handles hecklers

excellently, who makes a first-rate appearance on television, and who programs as well as any candidate I have seen. Given 300 to 500 words, he weaves them right into his speech -- and he delivers his material in a soft-spoken manner that I find at least quite effective. On local television he is first rate. He is a decided asset to the campaign.

His weaknesses include his candor, his lack of information on national issues, and his lack of sophistication in areas of sensitivity, his unawareness of how an effective national candidate should work his staff to the greatest benefit.

His operation is an effective low-keyed thing on the Governor's part -- but it is simply not the professional juggernaut we run on the RN plane -- with deadlines met and with copy constantly pouring out. When I arrived there last week, Steve Hess was basically turning out some pedestrian co-ordinating committee-type stuff, on call from the candidate. In confidence, White told me that the Governor is not comfortable with Hess' material and prefers some of the nut-cutting stuff he received later in the week.

Agnew himself is deeply loyal to RN, deeply appreciative that RN did not call and chew him out when he punted a few, willing to do about anything RN asks, on cue.

BUCHANAN'S RECOMMENDATIONS

1) RN should make irregular calls to Agnew to keep his confidence up -- and to let him know he has RN's full backing

and that RN understands that the press is out to give him a screwing.

2) Since Agnew is going to be made increasingly the target of the HHH operation -- with Agnew being portrayed as something of a boob, who is RN's first mistake, and who would be a dangerous man a heartbeat away -- Agnew ought to be getting out some substantive in-depth stuff that de facto repudiates that argument. (I don't say Agnew should get off the offensive, but he should be dropping some thoughtful pieces which make the national press sit up and take notice and give the lie of the allegations about him.

3) The TV people might give some thought to having Agnew put, full face, on national TV spots. He himself and his appearance are the best arguments we have against the kind of attack that is going to be mounted.

4) Keep in the back of our minds the possibility of an Agnew Nationwide TV appearance, for some of the same purposes as the RN Fund speech -- apologizing pro vita sua -- if the attacks on Agnew get rough which I think they well might.

5) Do not try to revamp their operation now with three weeks to go. Agnew would see it as a vote of no confidence. It would shake them up, and him up -- and we should go down to the wire with the team in the same shape it is in now.

6) My own thinking is that Buchanan can be helpful

to Agnew by giving him something of a briefing each morning, by writing materials for him, by acting as liaison with the RN plane who can feed stuff through me to the Governor. I get along well with the staff over there; I represent no threat to any of them; they want help; George White recognizes that they need help. And since this is the front where the attack is going to come, it needs a bit of beefing up -- without sending them someone or some group which would lead them to believe we didn't think they could cut it themselves.

7) Agnew is feeling badly about the attacks on him as the weak link in the chain -- and RN personally ought to attend to this problem and keep his confidence. up.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING E.O. 12356, Section 1.1 By RTP NARS, Date 4/8/87

file

MEMORANDUM

TO: RN (via Haldeman)
FROM: Buchanan

DATE: Nov. 13, 1968

Some of these thoughts I have already relayed to Bryce, but I wanted to get them directly to RN before getting out of town. These reflect some of my views on the White House staff; and RN can discount them given Buchanan's prejudices and predispositions.

1) If RN is going to build a New Majority, we have to get cracking on building and expanding the party in the border states and the South, as well as the Midwest and West. The party has to be united and working together in all these states for us to win -- 1968 demonstrated the tremendous resiliency and strength of the Democrats. My own suggestion would be to put Sears in as a White House Assistant with responsibility to the President for reporting on the condition of the party in every state; he should, as well have some measure of authority for settling disputes and scrounging for new Congressional candidates and for liaison with the Hill and the RNC. Sears is loyal to RN, enormously competent, well liked by press and politicians and without peer in terms of knowledge of the various States situations.

2) Press Secretary. Directly and indirectly, several members of the press corps friendly to RN have indicated that it would be a grave error for Ziegler to be named press spokesman.

He won't be.

*I agree -
under
Ehrlich
H*

First, he is an "advertising man" which turns them off at once; secondly, he is without knowledge on issues and politics and third, he has no seasoning.

3) RN needs close by him some advisor with "soul" for lack of a better term. By that I mean someone who understands and will counsel RN to utilize the vast powers inherent in the majesty of the office and the respect in which it is held. FDR and the Kennedys recognized that you do not speak to the poor in statements and speeches alone, that you speak in symbols and gestures as well. A dramatic and gracious RN visit to a Negro community, done with dignity and decorum can help more to win the blacks back to the national fold than any of Humphrey's "programs." The same is true of the young. RN, I believe, should have close to him someone who recognizes and knows how RN can use the tremendous powers, the third and fourth dimensions of communication offered to him by the office he now holds. I don't know who is the man, but RN needs some people of both passion and compassion close by. *Moore + Finch + Garment*

4) RN needs to widen his circle of advisors, in my view. The point is not that any particular individual should be there, but that ^{more} points of view should be represented. The Congressional Establishment, the Liberal Establishment nationally, the Jewish intellectuals, the conservatives; labor, the Wall Street Crowd, and the business community, the stock market: RN should know how all of these various elements are going to react to various

moves. And to do that RN has got to have a base of advisors who know something about each of these, who march to the different drums of differing groups of Americans.

There were in my own view, a few mistakes made in the general election that might have been avoided if the ideas had been run by a few more people.

Nowhere is this need for reliable backboards more urgent than in the final selection of Cabinet members. I know the requirements of secrecy and time, but I think that these selections should be checked out as exhaustively as possible for both competence and political impact of their appointment. We are going to have to live with these people; they can make or break us, and if we err on any side, for God's sake, let it be on the side of too much checking and too many opinions sought.

5) In selecting the new men around him in the White House, RN must concentrate not only on people who know how to administer things, but on some men who have a clear idea of what they want the Nixon Administration to accomplish. We need some men near RN with fire in their bellies who want to change things, to accomplish set goals, not just to hold power.

6) RN in moving as President should not be a "conservative" in his actions; he should not be induced into any sense of caution or hesitence by the fact of our tiny plurality. That is a

myth we can disregard, if we will fill the Cabinet with Big Men. If RN will act with decisiveness and daring, then we will build the majority as President that we did not win as candidate.

7) The greatest asset we have as President is that trust, that bond between President and people which LBJ squandered away by lack of candor and lack of openness. This bond of trust can survive and even prosper in failure, if we maintain it. Remember JFK was never held higher in public esteem than when he took public responsibility for the disaster at the Bay of Pigs.

8) In setting up his White House staff RN ought not let himself be straight-jacketed by any past model; and I for one would like to see on the staff there perhaps some maverick intellectual like a Milton Friedman responsible for spinning off ideas about how RN is going to accomplish this goal of decentralization.

MEMO TO BOB HALDEMAN

From Buchanan

December 19, 1968

Attached is the memo I drafted on the basis of the discussions yesterday on the Make-up of the Presidential Staff, and its operation. What you described may very well have been what RN's wants, and perhaps it is best. But before the thing finally congeals that way, I would trust that RN would give a quick reading to the new book, *The President's Men*. To me, the structure seems to be geometric and workable on paper, but in reality I don't think it's going to fly. Anyhow, I wanted to give you the benefit of all of the concerns that arise with me, and some of these I would imagine are shared by others.

Buchanan

December 20, 1968

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

E.O. 12065, Section 6-702

By Emprise NRS, Date 1-30-80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMO TO:

Bob Haldeman

FROM:

Buchanan

I have given considerable thought over the last day to the organizational structure of the staff, as you outlined, and, unless you left a portion of it out, I don't think it will work to the benefit of the President.

First. You, as I understand, are to sit astride all incoming paper, to read it and to pass final judgement on it. This will tend to be a rather inhibiting factor if we wanted to criticize to the President some element of your own operation, which is really an all-embrasive as of now. Suppose the press operation is breaking down, and the press is grumbling about it; suppose special assistants are being flooded with calls about the ineptitude of the appointments operation; suppose there are complaints about "nobody getting to see the President" and the complaints are reaching a point where it is damaging the Administration; suppose someone wants to demand a restructure of the staff. Some of these things the President should judge for himself on the basis on "privileged" input. I am not denigrating your objectivity. In my experience you have always passed things on, where I have felt they "ought" to go in. But the presence itself of a single screen or censor of sorts induces a self-imposed

censorship on the writer. Everybody writing memos is going to tailor them to take into consideration the fact that "your Administrative Boss is watching you."

I don't think this a wise arrangement and a bit further on I will mention a few organizational reforms which I think will eliminate what could be a continuing problem--in the quality of the paper the President receives.

Secondly, you have in effect told staff that any "end runs," especially to the President, would mean "it's been nice knowing you in the White House."

It seems to me unrealistic frankly to attempt to block all end runs. They are a part of human nature they represent the oldest play in American politics; on many, many occasions they have resulted in short-circuiting a foolish decision or recommending a brilliant idea.

Even JFK recognized that Bundy and Schlesinger and O'Brien and Sorenson could not be expected to go, hat-in-hand, to Kenny O'Donnell, outside the door, everytime they wanted to see the President. So Kennedy deliberately collaborated in their use of Mrs. Lincoln's entrance into the Oval Room, and some grievous staff problems were prevented.

What Kennedy did was to "institutionalize" the end run. As RN is not the type who likes to "chat" with staffers, etc., and

our staff is more effective with the written than the spoken word, I would suggest the creation of a Dissenters Pipeline to the President, a secure pouch in which the staff could get to the President "for his eyes only" real concerns on their mind, whether within or without the White House. The fact that it existed would be an ongoing boost to staff morale; it would not even have to be used regularly. And should it become clogged or heavy with traffic, the President should himself instruct X staffer to tend to his knitting, etc. If you talk with Bryce you will find that Eisenhower had a different arrangement yet with the same motive. To provide automatically 15 minutes with the President to any staffer who requested it, but the staff had damn site have something significant to say.

Third. The injunction that anything regarding urban affairs or anything regarding national security be cleared first with Moynihan or Kissinger in effect makes them czars of information in these areas, and it provides simply too much power in their hands without a check but maybe I didn't get this correctly.

I agree with the need to coordinate the material before the President, to get all proposals, and their pros and cons before him at the same time. But if you leave all coordination in the hands of either of them in these enormously broad areas, then in effect they can make the decision for the President by the manner of presentation. It is a simple thing to accomplish.

I don't argue that they will. I only argue that the President should have his own built-in checks on his own top people, that the President should have dissent and vigorous disagreement built into the White House Staff Structure, and it does not appear to be there under the current arrangement.

Of vital importance, it seems to me, the President himself has got to have an independent flow of information so that he can ask informed questions, cogent questions of his top advisers; he has got to have background so that he can throw out another alternative in addition to the two that Kissinger may have presented. In addition, the President should have a brief-case full of his own "ideas" to bounce off the top advisers.

The way the thing is established, RN's only foreign policy ideas will already been screened by Kissinger, upon whom there remains no check.

Fourth. The Press Office. The Zielger approach to clear every talk with him, or let him know we had it, differs from Marvin Watson's approach of monitoring calls only in that it contains a "public disclosure" clause, with the onus on the staff member.

Now, on all matters on which one talks for public record, I concur wholeheartedly. But with the press since I have been with RN almost, 99 per cent of what I tell them is not for attribution. I think I have always been able to make a good case

for the President-elect, and for what he tries to accomplish in my own words, matching wits with these people--and we have only been burnt a few times in three years. In those three years, I have been able to soften and improve a hell of a lot of stories, to get good columns written, to get good reports turned out in the public media about our whole operation.

Now, if I am going to have to file everyone I talk with to Zielger, it is quite apparent that when a bad story or column comes out, and it is found Buchanan talked with the individual, Buchanan will henceforth be watched. It may have been that I screwed up, but it may have been that I improved the column, or prevented a worse one.

The point is that the President, to his own advantage, has to repose a measure of trust in the people around him and loyal to him, not just in their personal loyalty, but in their capacity to deal with these people. I know that Price and Buchanan and Garment and many others have press people with whom they talk to and work with, contacts that are private and which we use in behalf of the cause. If we have to name these people everytime they come in, again, that will not be censorship, but everyone is going to say, what the hell, why risk it. If TIME writes a bad article and I've talked with Fentress or Austin, then I'll catch hell and it's not worth it, so I won't talk with them or when I do,

I'll give them a lot of crap. You will be inducing that kind of attitude.

I think this was one of the mistakes of Eisenhower. It is the daily press, the Historians of the Present, who are responsible for the fact that he is not rated as a great President. Only the historians can save Ike now--and whether we like these *press* people or not, they are like Communists, we have to talk with them and deal with them and trade with them, or we are not going to be able to really put PN across.

I would hold up as the example the whole primary season where a number of us were open with these people, took risks and chances, but, damn'it, it paid off. We won't win unless we get in the game and risk some ships.

Fifth: The emphasis of the meeting seemed to be almost totally how to keep things and people away from the President. Perhaps that is just an impression, but if PN is going to change things, if he is going to turn the government in new direction, if he is going to innovate policies, as well as simply to react correctly to events, then he has got to have a steady flow of fresh, unalderated and even occasionally bizarre ideas. He has got to take some risks and chances, and we seem to be structuring ~~this~~ collateral paper-shuffling to minimize the risk and chance. We have to remember I thin k that we lack what Ike and JFK and FDR had which is that personal following and charisma

and trappings of royalty which led the public to ignore or sympathize with failures. We are going to provide our own excitement and drama and our Cabinet and top it off is a Cabinet of highly competent technicians, with Moynihan the only innovator and Kissinger's forte is in penetrating analysis from what I have seen; not in drama or imagination.

Sixth: This seems to be a corporate or para-military, pyramidal structure, which does not lend itself to the office of the Presidency. From my own experience the President is more like a publication or newspaper. "Going over his head to the Publisher" is a way of life there, and it is in that kind of "creative chaos" that you get the kind of dash and color and imagination and boldness and daring that I am afraid we are going to need-- and which doesn't seem to be programmed.

Seventh; Let me suggest that RN adopt, on top of the existing pyramid for his own benefit, a circular structure where he, like FDR, draws directly and regularly on the people ~~on~~ his staff for ideas and criticism of what is going on, and for what should go on.

This is something no one can impose upon him, but it is needed. RN has about him some twenty or more people in whom he has some confidence I think and whom he should constantly cross check things. The potential McCarthy appointment would have

a diaster in a matter of weeks I believe, with that arrogant messiah up at the UN spouting his own policy and philosophy and anyone of half a dozen of RN's advisers, it would seem to me, would have shot that thing down before it got above the treeline. I don't know how that got so far--perhaps the press is wrong-- but it indicates to me decisions are not being put through enough tests.

If RN is not going to have something like this within his staff, how is he going to get the bad news which he has to have, on a regular basis to know where something needs changing. Also, again, RN should know regularly I think what the press is thinking and writing and saying. The Fourth Estate may be the American Institution most in need of reform, but we have to deal it, because in the short run, and very possible in the long run, ~~and we~~ they are going to be grading our papers. TV is now final solution--both Romney and the Vice President-elect can testify.

Eighth: Staff members I think have to have a channel of communication with the President for another reason. To them it is the lifeblood, frankly, which enables them to represent the President's interest, to look out for those interests, to draw information from press and the Departments. If it is known that ~~some~~ of RN's aides cannot get his ear at any time, their usefulness to the President is destroyed and though the President may have a staff of forty for operational purposes it will amount to only

those few who are known to have his confidence and communicate with him.


Similar arguments obtain with regard to salary and title of the President's aides, a matter which is properly the subject of another memo.

In the last analysis Robert, Structure is Policy; that is why the N. Vietnamese are battling in Paris over the structure of that conference; that is why the structure of this White House staffing can't come off some block chart, because the lines of communication on that chart are going to determine the direction of the Nixon Years.

2ND DRAFT (SEPT 16TH 1969)

REORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

————— general supervisory channels
 - - - - - administrative channels



The President's Advisory Council on Exec Organization is working on this structure and will present its plan o/A Sept. 20. (The BOB would become a part of this office)

Essentially as now organized.

Memo to H.R. Haldeman

From Buchanan

December 22, 1968

During our conversation about the "diatribe" I discussed briefly the idea of having the Kissinger or Moynihan who takes all the pros and cons to the President being required to file with the "dissenter" a copy of how the Minority view of the dissenter is presented.

The purpose of course is to guarantee to those making the inputs that their views are being fully presented, that the President is getting the "other side of the coin" ably presented.

It is an idea which you may not agree with---but it gets at a goal which I am sure you concur in---namely--that we must guarantee that RN is made privy to the best arguments on every side of an issue.

Buchanan

The reason I am sending this along is that it was not in the memo that I sent---and it is a thought which you want to consider or modify in setting the structure up.

Buchanan

D
Procedure

January 4, 1969

MEMORANDUM

TO: Bob Haldeman

FROM: RN

In order to avoid or mitigate the development of cliques on the White House staff I think you should not only have a regular brief meeting of the staff each morning, or perhaps twice a week, but in addition, that you should try to meet each of the assistants on a regular basis once a week; and that you also should meet with the whole research group once a week. I have already suggested to Ehrlichman a meeting with the PR group on a weekly or bi-weekly basis. That group would include Buchanan, Price and Safire, together with Ehrlichman and Garment. It might be wise too to include Ellsworth in this group and, of course, Klein on a regular basis. Ziegler should sit in for information purposes.

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But apart from that, top White House staffers need to have a regular contact with you so that you may anticipate their needs and keep them from reaching me, if possible. This means that McCracken, Kissinger, Wilkinson, perhaps Moynihan, should have regular meetings with you.

I think that you ought to make it a practice to call the Cabinet officers, except for the top four (Rogers, Laird, Kennedy and Mitchell), on a somewhat regular basis just to see if they have any problems that you can take care of without them coming up to me.

MEMO TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT/H.R.HALDEMAN

From Buchanan

RE--PRESIDENT'S NEWS SUMMARY

January 5, 1968

My understanding is that the President-elect wants from Buchanan on a regular basis a "news analysis" or "general appraisal" of how the press is treating the Administration. In particular, following press conferences or television appearances, the President would want from Buchanan broad reaction from around the country.

To accomplish this, I will set up in Washington, in my own office, shelves containing the ten top periodicals in terms of political influence, and eight or so of the nation's best newspapers, representatives of the national spectrum.

From a scanning of the press, and reading of periodicals, we ought to be able to file an independent regular report on the impression the Administration is leaving.

In addition, on an irregular, perhaps weekly basis, the President would get a briefing on what the columnists are thinking and writing about---especially with regard to the Nixon Administration.

TELEVISION REPORT---On a regular basis, three persons should ~~xxxx~~ monitor the evening news shows on the networks and the 11 o'clock D.C. news shows---the latter because they are viewed by national press, national network correspondents and national Administration.

The three monitors should work for Herb Klein.

They should file daily reports with Klein, Ziegler and Buchanan. Klein, because he is authorized independly to take up gross outrages with the network chiefs; Ziegler, because he is on hand to take them up wit the White House correspondents, if they be the offending party--and Buchanan to report to the President, should any television commentary be consistently prejudiced---either for or agin.

I don't think RN is really interested in a daily report here. Normally, they are worthless, and Buchanan can decide when and if to summarize them and send them along.

Another reason they should be under Klein is simply that to have them work for Buchanan is to provide him with three people in a staff that will have but two half-hour segments of work each day.

NEW SUMMARY---Any news summary coming from staff to President must---first---be discounted for what RN is reading in the press, for what RN is getting from Intelligence, and for what RN is going to be getting from the agencies in daily briefings. The news summary may be redundant.

Anyhow, since it consists of one individual marking the papers, and about four typists working full blast for a couple of hours; it is again a function that rightly belongs in communications; this is a routing job involving a number of secretaries; it seems to be rightly the province of the communications division of the government.

They can co-ordinate it with the materials the departments are putting out as well.

However, if this arrangement is otherwise than what the President has in mind--please let me know. If it is acceptable as an arrangement, let me know and I will start working with Herb on setting it up in D.C.----and we can make do up here until then.