

Iraq War:

Prelude Documents

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Iraq War Prelude Documents

A collection of documents highlighting the development of the American and British government's case for going to war against Iraq. Most documents are from the year 2002. They include documents from the Executive Office of the President United States State Department, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the British Prime Minister's Office.

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Source material from Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Secret Service, National Security Council, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Justice, National Archive Records and Administration, and Presidential Libraries.

<http://www.paperlessarchives.com>

DOCUMENT: United Nations Security Council, "Note by the Secretary-General," S/1997/779, [extract].

DATE: October 8, 1997

SOURCE: International Atomic Energy Agency

CONTENT: An International Atomic Energy Agency report declares Iraq to be free of nuclear weapons, stating that its nuclear facilities were destroyed by U.S. bombing during the Persian Gulf War and that "There are no indications that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of weapon-usable nuclear material of any practical significance."



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/779
8 October 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the Security Council the attached letter dated 6 October 1997, which he has received from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

"... I am pleased on this occasion to reaffirm once again the obligations of the Republic of Iraq without limitation or condition under the NPT and full compliance with the agreement signed with the IAEA on the safeguards regime."

Summary

39. The IAEA continues with implementation of its OMV plan and has embarked upon a programme to update the technology used in its monitoring activities. This has already resulted in the implementation of sub-surface sensing techniques and the further development of routine aerial and land-based radiometric surveys. Work in other areas of technology is being actively pursued with the help of member States.

40. In the course of discussions, the Iraqi counterpart has provided a response to IAEA questions but, from the IAEA perspective, the questions were often construed as narrowly as possible and responses addressed only inaccuracies or omissions that the IAEA had specifically identified in the text. This minimalist approach has resulted in the expenditure of considerable additional time and effort, for all concerned, to produce improvements to FFCD-F. More detailed consideration of the matters reported in paragraphs 11 to 31 above are included in part two of this report and summarised in paragraphs 73 to 83.

41. In response to IAEA requests, the Iraqi counterpart has invested considerable effort in the provision of equipment and personnel resources to support IAEA search and excavation activities to locate and verify the status of materials and equipment declared by Iraq to have been destroyed, either as a result of the Gulf War bombardment or by Iraq's unilateral actions. Also, with the co-operation of the Iraqi counterpart, further progress has been made, in the content and accuracy of Iraq's six-monthly declarations under the OMV. In particular, the July 1997 declarations include supplementary information, requested by the IAEA, on current activities at certain sites involved in the production of materials, equipment and components, as well as sites involved in design and in research and development work. The IAEA is evaluating the most recent declarations and will identify requirements for further improvements.

42. The 1 May 1997 letter from Iraq's Minister of Foreign Affairs resulting from his discussion with the Director General is understood by the IAEA to reflect not only Iraq's unconditional reaffirmation of its obligations under the NPT, but its acceptance of its obligations, as interpreted by the IAEA, under Iraq's Safeguards Agreement with the Agency.

43. The IAEA's ongoing monitoring and verification activities carried out since April 1997 have not revealed indications of the existence in Iraq of prohibited materials or activities. As regards prohibited equipment, the Iraqi counterpart has handed over to the IAEA a number of pieces of weaponisation-related equipment which it had located in response to repeated requests by the IAEA. This equipment is being removed from Iraq.

44. In carrying out its activities in Iraq, the IAEA has benefited from the assistance and co-operation of the United Nations Special Commission and, in particular, from the generous support of certain IAEA member States which have

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States. The results of the IAEA's investigation have over many years yielded a technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme.

77. Although certain documentary evidence is missing and some gaps in knowledge remain, the following can be stated with regard to Iraq's clandestine programme:

- There are no indications to suggest that Iraq was successful in its attempt to produce nuclear weapons. Iraq's explanation of its progress towards the finalisation of a workable design for its nuclear weapons is considered to be consistent with the resources and time scale indicated by the available programme documentation. However, no documentation or other evidence is available to show the actual status of the weapon design when the programme was interrupted.
- Iraq was at, or close to, the threshold of success in such areas as the production of HEU through the EMIS process, the production and pilot cascading of single-cylinder sub-critical gas centrifuge machines, and the fabrication of the explosive package for a nuclear weapon.
- There are no indications to suggest that Iraq had produced more than a few grams of weapon-usable nuclear material (HEU or separated plutonium) through its indigenous processes, all of which has been removed from Iraq.
- There are no indications that Iraq otherwise acquired weapon-usable nuclear material.
- All of the safeguarded research reactor fuel, including the HEU fuel that Iraq had planned to divert to its "crash programme", was verified and fully accounted for by the IAEA and removed from Iraq.
- There are no indications that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of weapon-usable nuclear material of any practical significance.

78. Iraq's description of its development of the single-cylinder sub-critical gas centrifuge is considered to be consistent with the resources and time scale indicated by the available documentation and the status of the related facilities. Although little documentation is available, it is clear that Iraq had intentions to exploit the information in its possession regarding multi-cylinder, super-critical centrifuge machines. It will be necessary to gain access to Iraq's foreign source of information in order to have the opportunity to verify Iraq's explanation that only limited exploratory design-work had been undertaken.

79. There are no indications of significant discrepancies between the technically coherent picture which has evolved of Iraq's past programme and the information contained in Iraq's FFCD-F issued on 7 September 1996, as supplemented by the written revisions and additions provided by Iraq since that time. However, taking into account the possibility, albeit remote, of undetected duplicate facilities or the existence of anomalous activities or facilities outside this technically coherent picture, no absolute assurances can be given with regard to the completeness of Iraq's FFCD. Some uncertainty is

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DOCUMENT: U.S. Executive Office of the President, Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement by the President"

DATE: October 31, 1998

CONTENT: In a statement accompanying his signing of the Iraq Liberation Act making the overthrow of Iraq's government U.S. policy, President Bill Clinton indicates that the U.S. is giving Iraqi opposition groups \$8 million dollars to assist them in unifying, cooperating, and articulating their message.

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RELEASED IN FULL

SIB

October 31, 1998

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary For Immediate Release October 31, 1998

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Today I am signing into law H.R. 4655; the "Iraq Liberation Act of 1998." This Act makes clear that it is the sense of the Congress that the United States should support those elements of the Iraqi opposition that advocate a very different future for Iraq than the bitter reality of internal repression and external aggression that the current regime in Baghdad now offers.

Let me be clear on what the U.S. objectives are:

The United States wants Iraq to rejoin the family of nations as a freedom-loving and law-abiding member. This is in our interest and that of our allies within the region.

The United States favors an Iraq that offers its people freedom at home. I categorically reject arguments that this is unattainable due to Iraq's history or its ethnic or sectarian make-up. Iraqis deserve and desire freedom like everyone else.

The United States looks forward to a democratically supported regime that would permit us to enter into a dialogue leading to the reintegration of Iraq into normal international life.

My Administration has pursued, and will continue to pursue, these objectives through active application of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. The evidence is overwhelming that such changes will not happen under the current Iraq leadership.

In the meantime, while the United States continues to look to the Security Council's efforts to keep the current regime's behavior in check, we look forward to new leadership in Iraq that has the support of the Iraqi people. The United States is providing support to opposition groups from all sectors of the Iraqi community that could lead to a popularly supported government.

On October 21, 1998, I signed into law the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, which made \$8 million available for assistance to the Iraqi democratic opposition. This assistance is intended to help the democratic opposition unify, work together more effectively, and articulate the aspirations of the Iraqi people for a pluralistic, participatory political system that will include all of Iraq's diverse ethnic and religious groups. As required by the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for FY 1998

http://www.inc.org.uk/311098_Statement%20By%20President%20Clinton.htm

12/28/98

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER
DATE/CASE ID: 19 JAN 2005 200401527

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(Public Law 105-174), the Department of State submitted a report to the Congress on plans to establish a program to support the democratic opposition. My Administration, as required by that statute, has also begun to implement a program to compile information regarding allegations of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes by Iraq's current leaders as a step towards bringing to justice those directly responsible for such acts.

The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 provides additional, discretionary authorities under which my Administration can act to further the objectives I outlined above. There are, of course, other important elements of U.S. policy. These include the maintenance of UN Security Council support efforts to eliminate Iraq's prohibited weapons and missile programs and economic sanctions that continue to deny the regime the means to reconstitute those threats to international peace and security. United States support for the Iraqi opposition will be carried out consistent with those policy objectives as well. Similarly, U.S. support must be attuned to what the opposition can effectively make use of as it develops over time. With those observations, I sign H.R. 4655 into law.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

THE WHITE HOUSE, October 31, 1998

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in Iraq, and has persisted in a pattern of deception and concealment regarding the history of its weapons of mass destruction programs.

(10) On August 5, 1998, Iraq ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM, and subsequently threatened to end long-term monitoring activities by the International Atomic Energy Agency and UNSCOM.

(11) On August 14, 1998, President Clinton signed Public Law 105-235, which declared that "the Government of Iraq is in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations" and urged the President "to take appropriate action, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations."

(12) On May 1, 1998, President Clinton signed Public Law 105-174, which made \$5,000,000 available for assistance to the Iraqi democratic opposition for such activities as organization, training, communication and dissemination of information, developing and implementing agreements among opposition groups, compiling information to support the indictment of Iraqi officials for war crimes, and for related purposes.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAQ.

It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.

SEC. 4. ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT A TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN IRAQ.

(a) **AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE.**—The President may provide to the Iraqi democratic opposition organizations designated in accordance with section 5 the following assistance:

(1) **BROADCASTING ASSISTANCE.**—(A) Grant assistance to such organizations for radio and television broadcasting by such organizations to Iraq.

(B) There is authorized to be appropriated to the United States Information Agency \$2,000,000 for fiscal year 1999 to carry out this paragraph.

(2) **MILITARY ASSISTANCE.**—(A) The President is authorized to direct the drawdown of defense articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense, defense services of the Department of Defense, and military education and training for such organizations.

(B) The aggregate value (as defined in section 614(m) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) of assistance provided under this paragraph may not exceed \$97,000,000.

(b) **HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.**—The Congress urges the President to use existing authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to provide humanitarian assistance to individuals living in areas of Iraq controlled by organizations designated in accordance with section 5, with emphasis on addressing the needs of individuals who have fled to such areas from areas under the control of the Saddam Hussein regime.

(c) **RESTRICTION ON ASSISTANCE.**—No assistance under this section shall be provided to any group within an organization designated in accordance with section 5 which group is, at the time

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H. R. 4655—9

the assistance is to be provided, engaged in military cooperation with the Saddam Hussein regime.

(d) **NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.**—The President shall notify the congressional committees specified in section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 at least 15 days in advance of each obligation of assistance under this section in accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications under section 634A.

(e) **REIMBURSEMENT RELATING TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE.**

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Defense articles, defense services, and military education and training provided under subsection (a)(2) shall be made available without reimbursement to the Department of Defense except to the extent that funds are appropriated pursuant to paragraph (2).

(2) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There are authorized to be appropriated to the President for each of the fiscal years 1998 and 1999 such sums as may be necessary to reimburse the applicable appropriation, fund, or account for the value (as defined in section 644(m) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) of defense articles, defense services, or military education and training provided under subsection (a)(2).

(f) **AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.**—(1) Amounts authorized to be appropriated under this section are authorized to remain available until expended.

(2) Amounts authorized to be appropriated under this section are in addition to amounts otherwise available for the purposes described in this section.

(g) **AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE.**—Activities under this section (including activities of the nature described in subsection (b)) may be undertaken notwithstanding any other provision of law.

SEC. 6. DESIGNATION OF IRAQI DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION ORGANIZATION.

(a) **INITIAL DESIGNATION.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall designate one or more Iraqi democratic opposition organizations that the President determines satisfy the criteria set forth in subsection (c) as eligible to receive assistance under section 4.

(b) **DESIGNATION OF ADDITIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.**—At any time subsequent to the initial designation pursuant to subsection (a), the President may designate one or more additional Iraqi democratic opposition organizations that the President determines satisfy the criteria set forth in subsection (c) as eligible to receive assistance under section 4.

(c) **CRITERIA FOR DESIGNATION.**—In designating an organization pursuant to this section, the President shall consider only organizations that—

(1) include a broad spectrum of Iraqi individuals, groups, or both, opposed to the Saddam Hussein regime; and

(2) are committed to democratic values, to respect for human rights, to peaceful relations with Iraq's neighbors, to maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity, and to fostering cooperation among democratic opponents of the Saddam Hussein regime.

(d) **NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.**—At least 15 days in advance of designating an Iraqi democratic opposition organization pursuant

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to this section, the President shall notify the congressional committees specified in section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 of his proposed designation in accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications under section 634A.

SEC. 6. WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL FOR IRAQ.

Consistent with section 301 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-138), House Concurrent Resolution 187, 105th Congress (approved by the House of Representatives on November 13, 1997), and Senate Concurrent Resolution 78, 105th Congress (approved by the Senate on March 13, 1998), the Congress urges the President to call upon the United Nations to establish an international criminal tribunal for the purpose of indicting, prosecuting, and imprisoning Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi officials who are responsible for crimes against humanity, genocide, and other criminal violations of international law.

SEC. 7. ASSISTANCE FOR IRAQ UPON REPLACEMENT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN REGIME.

It is the sense of the Congress that once the Saddam Hussein regime is removed from power in Iraq, the United States should support Iraq's transition to democracy by providing immediate and substantial humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, by providing democracy transition assistance to Iraqi parties and movements with democratic goals, and by convening Iraq's foreign creditors to develop a multilateral response to Iraq's foreign debt incurred by Saddam Hussein's regime.

SEC. 8. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or otherwise speak to the use of United States Armed Forces (except as provided in section 4(a)(2)) in carrying out this Act.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

*Vice President of the United States and
President of the Senate.*

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DOCUMENT: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Information Memo from Edward S. Walker, Jr. to Colin Powell, "Origins of the Iraq Regime Change Policy"

DATE: January 23, 2001

SOURCE: State Department FOIA

CONTENT: A memo Informs the secretary of state that the origin of the U.S.'s Iraq regime change policy is the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, and provides several quotes from Bill Clinton supporting concepts included in the act.

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01 JAN 24 P3:37

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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(SI)



01 JAN 23 11:00

January 23, 2001

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/S

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

TO: The Secretary
FROM: NEA - Edward S Walker, Jr.
SUBJECT: Origins of the Iraq Regime Change Policy

Handwritten notes:
NEA
24/1
See note
have 1/24/01

You asked about the origin of our regime change policy in Iraq. It is the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (attached). It states that the sense of the Congress is that:

It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.



The statement by the President on the occasion of the signing of the Act was highly nuanced in its support for regime change. However, subsequent statements by the President and other senior officials clarified the policy and made it more concrete.

- Over the long-term the best way to address that threat is through a government in Baghdad -- a new government -- that is committed to represent and respect its people, not repress them; that is committed to peace in the region...Let me say again, what we want and what we will work for is a government in Iraq that represents and respects its people, not represses them, and one committed to live in peace with its neighbors.
- Statement by the President, 11/15/98
- The hard fact is that so long as Saddam remains in power, he threatens the well-being of his people, the peace of his region and the security of the world. The best way to end that threat once and for all is with a new Iraqi government -- a government ready to live in peace with its neighbors...

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government that respects the rights of its people. Bringing about a change in Baghdad will take time and effort. We will strengthen our engagement with the full range of Iraqi opposition forces and work with them effectively and prudently. - *President's Address to the Nation, 12/16/98*

- Now, over the long-term the best way to end the threat that Saddam poses to his own people in the region is for Iraq to have a different government. We will intensify our engagement with the Iraqi opposition groups, prudently and effectively. We will work with Radio Free Iraq, to help news and information flow freely to the country. And we will stand ready to help a new leadership in Baghdad that abides by its international commitments and respects the rights of its own people. - *Remarks of the President on Iraq, 12/19/98*

The regime change policy evolved further, to emphasize the fact that we expect the Iraqi people themselves to be the source of regime change.

- On January 21, Secretary of State Albright announced the appointment of Frank Ricciardone as Special Representative for Transition in Iraq (sic)...He outlined U.S. intentions to help Iraq resume its rightful place in the region -- a goal the United States believes can only be achieved under new Iraqi leadership. He emphasized U.S. desire to work with Iraqis -- who alone can make this happen -- inside Iraq and outside Iraq, as well as with Iraq's neighbors who share the same objectives. - *President's Report to the Congress on Iraqi Non-Compliance with UNSC Resolutions, 3/3/99*

Is he still on THE JOB?

Is he still on the job?

- In the final analysis, change has to come from the Iraqi people themselves. - *Testimony of Undersecretary of State Pickering before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 3/17/99*

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - Iraq Liberation Act of 1998
- Tab 2 - ILA Signing Statement of October 31, 1998

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neanga/kingrj/memos/s info mmo - regime change 010123

drafted: nea/nga:rjking 7-9448

cleared: nea/akeiswetter
nea/nga:pdibble ok
nea/scti:fjricciardone ok

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DOCUMENT: U.S. Department of State Memo from Robert J. Einhorn and James A. Larocco to Colin Powell, "Update on Efforts to Prevent Iraqi Procurement of Aluminum Tubes"

DATE: June 29, 2001.

SOURCE: State Department FOIA

CONTENT: Indicates early high-level interest in aluminum tubes purchased by Iraq before even a preliminary determination has been made as to whether they are intended for nuclear weapons use, a sample is to be shown to the president the next day. Also shows immediate U.S. government interest in "publicizing the interdiction to our advantage," and "Getting the right story out." Conversely, United Nations arms inspectors from UNMOVIC and the IAEA plan to "analyze samples before drawing conclusions."

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~~B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(C), 1.4(D)~~

200113962

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

S1



01 JUN 29 2001

JUN 29 2001

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/S

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: APPEALS REVIEW PANEL
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 29 JUN 2021
APPEAL ACTION: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEASED
REASON(S): B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(C), 1.4(D)
DATE/CASE ID: 15 APR 2008 200403934

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
DECL: 6/29/11

TO: The Secretary

FROM: NP - Robert J. Einhorn ^{RE}
NEA - James A. Larocco, Acting ²

SUBJECT: Update on Efforts to Prevent Iraqi Procurement of Aluminum Tubes

Subsequent to your meeting [redacted] on June 29, we have taken several steps to promote UN and Jordanian action on the aluminum tube shipment. B1

Energizing UNMOVIC and IAEA. We urged UNMOVIC and IAEA to approach Jordan and request permission to inspect the tubes. Due to logistics and bureaucratic hurdles (e.g., need to get IAEA Director General's approval), the visit is unlikely before July 3, though we will press for the earliest possible date.

Internal Analysis. [redacted] has now made sample tubes available to other USG agencies for further review of likely end-use (nuclear or conventional). A sample will be shown to the President on June 30. We expect to have a better determination of likely end-use early next week. B1

Avoiding Problems with China. The Chinese have played a positive role in this interdiction, [redacted] acting responsibly when told [redacted] that a Chinese entity was making the sale. If and when the interdiction becomes public, we want the Chinese to receive credit rather than blame. We are clearing points [redacted] for public use that would acknowledge China's positive role. We [redacted] will also give the Chinese a private heads-up that the interdiction could become public. B1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: HARRY R MELONE
DATE/CASE ID: 26 OCT 2006 200403934

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified by NP A/S Robert J. Einhorn
Reasons: E.O. 12985 & 1.5 (b) and (d)

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-2-

Publicizing the Shipment. With UNMOVIC and the IAEA unlikely to inspect before July 3 and with their desire to analyze samples before drawing conclusions, we see little prospect for publicizing the interdiction to our advantage before the OFF rollover. Although the July 3 deadline is imminent, it is not necessary for the shipment to become public before then. Getting the right story out in say a week or so will be more important than rushing it out in a day or two. We will work with UNMOVIC and IAEA to try to ensure that their report to the Security Council (or whatever device they use) will help us in our efforts to revise UN controls on Iraq.



UNMOVIC/IAEA

"received information" about the cargo, approached the Jordanians, and received their permission to inspect.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

-3-

Drafted: NEA/ARN: AnneBodine (x71147)
NP/RA: S. Burk (x79670)

Cleared: NEA/ARN: R. Erdman (ok)
NEA/NGA: R. Beecroft (ok)
IO/UNP: G. Olson (ok)
INR/SPM: B. Frisa/S. Dodge (ok)
D: R. Gilchrist (ok)
P: T. Lenderking (ok)
T: T. Godby (ok)
S/P: R. Danin (ok)
EAP/CM: C. Hegadorn (ok)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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DOCUMENT: U.S. Department of State Memo from Vann Van Diepen, James A. Larocco, and James A. Kelly to Colin Powell, "Update on Efforts to Prevent Iraqi Procurement of Aluminum Tubes"

DATE: July 2, 2001.

SOURCE: State Department FOIA

CONTENT: Indicates that the U.S. has concluded that aluminum tubes purchased by Iraq are prohibited items and that it considers it important that the International Atomic Energy Agency find the same. The IAEA Action Team on Iraq will consult with the IAEA director general on whether the team should report the results of its analysis to the U.N.'s sanctions committee "even if it concludes that the tubes do not meet specifications for nuclear end use." The CIA has already notified Congress of the interdiction, evidently without informing the State Department, although the CIA's initial briefing included a discussion of diplomatic efforts on the issue.

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~~DENIED IN FULL~~
~~B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)~~

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

01 JUL - 2 2001

JUL - 2 2001

CLP

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REVIEW AUTHORITY: APPEALS REVIEW PANEL

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

APPEAL ACTION: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEASED

DECL: 7/2/11

REASON(S): B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)

DATE/CASE ID: 11 FEB 2008 200403934

TO: The Secretary

FROM: NP - Vann Van Diepen, Acting

NEA - James A. Larocco, Acting

EAP - James A. Kelly

SUBJECT: Update on Efforts to Prevent Iraqi Procurement of Aluminum Tubes

IAEA to Inspect Tubes. IAEA Action Team experts will arrive in Jordan on July 3. They plan to take samples of the tubes to determine whether they violate UN sanctions on weapons/dual-use items. (While our information indicates that the tubes are, indeed, prohibited weapons items, it will be important for the IAEA to verify this independently.) Definitive analysis of the samples cannot be done on site and could take several days.

Briefing the Chinese. We have received clearance from [redacted] on points acknowledging China's responsiveness in this case that can be used publicly, if necessary. We also have clearance on points to use privately with the PRC to give them a heads up that the interdiction could become public. We also will urge China to exercise strict controls over its exports to Iraq. We will coordinate the timing of that approach with [redacted]

B1

B1

Publicizing the Shipment. Action Team officials believe that the IAEA should report its findings to the UN Sanctions Committee, even if it concludes that the tubes do not meet specifications for a nuclear end use. We agree that this is the right course of action. The Action Team will need IAEA Director General El Baradei's approval, however, to submit such a report. The Mission in Vienna is following this closely and will inform us immediately if there is a need for Washington to weigh in with the DG.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: HARRY R MELONE
DATE/CASE ID: 26 OCT 2006 200403934

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
Classified by Acting NP A/S Vann Van Diepen
Reasons: E.O. 12985 & 1.5 (C) and (d)

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~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

CIA Briefing to Congress. The DO called this afternoon to inform us that the Agency's Congressional Affairs Office had verbally notified the Hill about this issue on Friday, June 29. We are not aware that anyone in the Department or Embassy Amman was informed in advance. We understand the briefing went beyond the intelligence to include a review of our diplomatic efforts. We have asked for a copy of the briefing notes that CIA has prepared to send to the Hill as a follow-up to the verbal briefing.



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~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

Drafted: NP/RA - Susan Burk, x79670
Cleared: NP/RA - P. Evans (ok)
NP/CPA - J. Kessler (ok)
NEA/ARN - A. Bodine (ok)
NEA/NGA: R. Beecroft (ok)
IO/UNP: H. Ensher (ok)
INR/SPM: S. Dodge (ok)
D: R. Gilchrist (ok)
P: T. Lenderking (ok)
T: T. Godby (ok)
S/P: R. Danin (ok)
EAP/CM - C. Hegadorn (ok)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

DOCUMENT: U.S. Defense Department Memo from Donald Rumsfeld to Condoleezza Rice, "Iraq"

Date: July 27, 2001.

SOURCE: State Department FOIA

CONTENT: Rumsfeld recommends a Principals Committee meeting and then a National Security Council meeting on Iraq, because sanctions are failing and Iraq's air defenses seem to be improving. He lists policy options, and says, "Within a few years the U.S. will undoubtedly have to confront a Saddam armed with nuclear weapons" (he also says that Iran will "almost certainly" have nuclear weapons by 2006) and that "If Saddam's regime were ousted, we would have a much-improved position in the region and elsewhere."

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~~CLOSE HOLD~~
Working Paper

July 27, 2001
4:47 PM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Colin Powell

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Iraq

I recommend we have a Principals Committee meeting on Iraq, to be followed by a National Security Council meeting.

Background

We have discussed Iraq on a number of occasions. The discussions have been inconclusive. Several things have evolved in the intervening period:

- Sanctions are being limited in a way that cannot weaken Saddam Hussein. He undid the UN inspections in the 1990s and is working now to further undo the sanctions and the no-fly zones. He appears to believe he is getting stronger. His general behavior and relationships with his neighbors suggest he is riding higher than a year ago.
- The routes into and out of Iraq seem to be increasing. One has to assume the volume and mix of materials he desires are increasing.
- We have had a series of coalition air incidents, which, thus far, have not resulted in the shooting down of a coalition plane, but this is an increasingly likely danger. The recent firings demonstrate two things:
 - a greater degree of Iraqi aggressiveness; and, even more important,
 - what appears to be significantly improved Iraqi air defense capability, coupled with a reduction in U.S. ability to know what they are doing—partly because of their improved fiber optic linkages.

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Proposal

We have a number of options with respect to the northern and southern no-fly zones. They include:

- Continue current U.S. course, with the distinct possibility that a coalition plane will be shot down and the crew either killed or captured in the period immediately ahead. If some important U.S. interest is being accomplished by the flights, it is well worth the risk. If not, it isn't.
- Undertake a fairly significant U.S. strike against Iraq's fiber optic links, radars, SAM sites and perhaps some asymmetrical strategic assets that would impose a more-than-tit-for-tat cost on Saddam for his endangerment of our pilots. A number of the currently proposed targets are near Baghdad. Hitting them would result in a great deal of attention on CNN, accusations that Iraqi civilians were killed and strong—potentially explosive—public expressions of consternation from our moderate Arab friends in the region, even more so than was the case during the last major strike in February.
- Finally, the U.S. could either discontinue or significantly reduce the number of flights in the northern and southern zones. However, if we seek to limit the risk to coalition aircraft by cutting back on the number and/or locations of patrols, Iraqi air defenses will continue to improve, which will further add to the risk and create increased pressure to limit the patrols still further or to stop them altogether.

The Broader Context

While it is important, indeed necessary, that we confront the no-fly zone issues, the NFZs are only a piece of a set of broader Iraqi policy issues. It is the broader subject of Iraq that merits the attention of the Administration.

There are people in the Administration who can come up with a variety of more nuanced options. However, for the sake of beginning the discussion, here are some possibilities:

- The U.S. can roll up its tents and end the no-fly zones before someone is killed or captured. We can try to figure out a way to keep an eye on Saddam Hussein's aggressiveness against his neighbors from a distance.

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We can publicly acknowledge that sanctions don't work over extended periods and stop the pretense of having a policy that is keeping Saddam "in the box," when we know he has crawled a good distance out of the box and is currently doing the things that will ultimately be harmful to his neighbors in the region and to U.S. interests—namely developing WMD and the means to deliver them and increasing his strength at home and in the region month-by-month. Within a few years the U.S. will undoubtedly have to confront a Saddam armed with nuclear weapons.

- A second option would be to go to our moderate Arab friends, have a reappraisal and see whether they are willing to engage in a more robust policy. We would have to assert strong leadership and convince them that we will see the project through and not leave them later to face a provoked, but still incumbent, Saddam. The risks of a serious regime-change policy must be weighed against the certainty of the danger of an increasingly bold and nuclear-armed Saddam in the near future.
- A third possibility perhaps is to take a crack at initiating contact with Saddam Hussein. He has his own interests. It may be that, for whatever reason, at his stage in life he might prefer to not have the hostility of the United States and the West and might be willing to make some accommodation. Opening a dialogue with Saddam would be an astonishing departure for the USG, although I did it for President Reagan the mid-1980s. It would win praise from certain quarters, but might cause friends, especially those in the region, to question our strength, steadiness and judgment. And the likelihood of Saddam making and respecting an acceptable accommodation of our interests over a long period may be small.
- There ought to be a way for the U.S. to not be at loggerheads with both of the two most powerful nations in the Gulf—Iran and Iraq—when the two of them do not like each other, are firing at each other and have groups in their respective countries that are hostile to the other side. The particularly unfortunate circumstances of Iraq being governed by Saddam and Iran being governed by the clerics have suspended the standard rule that "my enemy's enemy is my friend." If Saddam's regime were ousted, we would have a much-improved position in the region and elsewhere.

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Working Paper

Closing Thoughts

Two problems coming down the road are the following:

- Iran will almost certainly have a nuclear weapon sometime within the next five years, and that will change the balance in the region notably.
- Somebody, whether Iran, Iraq, or Usama Bin Laden, could take out the royal family in one or more of the Gulf states and change the regime and the balance, perhaps inviting Iranian or Iraqi troops in to protect them.

Clearly, the Arab-Israeli situation makes it more difficult to take strong action, but it is at least questionable to assume that our ability to act will improve by waiting. It is possible that Saddam's options will increase with time, while ours could decrease. We certainly need to consider the effects of the Arab-Israeli situation on U.S. Iraq policy. We also need to consider the reverse effects. A major success with Iraq would enhance U.S. credibility and influence throughout the region.

Why don't we get some smart people to take this memo, rip it apart and refashion it into an appropriate paper for discussion at an early Principals Committee meeting?

DHR/dh
072601-1C

Declassified by
USDP Declass Team
10 May 2007
IAW EO 12958

Working Paper
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DOCUMENT: U.S. Department of Defense Notes from Donald Rumsfeld, [Iraq War Planning], Annotated.

DATE: November 27, 2001

SOURCE: Department of Defense FOIA

CONTENT: Notes used by Rumsfeld to brief Central Command chief Tommy Franks during a visit to Tampa to discuss a new plan for war with Iraq.

fig 1 of 3

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November 27, 2001

- Focus on WMD.
- Slices (building momentum for regime change): *might not have to go all the way*

b(1) 1.4(a), 1.4(c)

- WMD sites.
- Seize or destroy offensive missile sites (factories, deployed systems).
- Seize or destroy Republican Guards.

b(1) 1.4(a), 1.4(c)

Do in advance?

- Oil fields in south.
- Oil fields in north.
- Seize western desert:
 - Secure Jordanian border,
 - Prevent SCUD missile launches (against Israel).
- Deploy ground forces in western desert or south of Baghdad:
 - Threaten Baghdad.

** what order to create likelihood of collapse?*

- Force Republican Guards to move and present targets.
- Cut off Baghdad:
 - Prevent movement of WMD materials.
 - Pressure on regime.

- Protect Provisional Government, north or south.
- Regime change.

→ what do forces do coming out of Afghanistan?

- How start?
 - Saddam moves against Kurds in north?
 - US discovers Saddam connection to Sept. 11 attack or to anthrax attacks?
 - Dispute over WMD inspections?
 - Start now thinking about inspection demands.

- Surprise, speed, shock and risk.

*- Power communications, etc
People hate him -- why want to take him out.*

- Do *not* reduce footprint now.
- Be ready to strike from a standing start.

Enhance current footprint.

Start military action before moving into place all the force Republican Guards that would be required in the worst case. Larger forces flow in behind.

- Decapitation of government.

- Do early.
- Cut off communications too - including television and radio.

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- Abort any executive order to b(1) 1.4(a)

- Consider radical ideas

b(1) 1.4(a), 1.4(c)

b(1) 1.4(a), 1.4(c)

- Protect options for unilateral action.

- No-Saudi option.
- No-Turkey option.
- US may get cooperation only from 2 or 3 of GCC countries.

- Coalition – who do we want in?

- Declaratory policy:

- Inspections.
- What if Saddam uses CW or BW or fires missiles at neighbors?
- Warnings to regime.
- Warnings to individuals in Iraq's WMD programs.
- Amnesty for defecting forces?

- Provisional government.

- War crimes indictments against Saddam and top lieutenants.
- Recognize once pieces are liberated from north and south (no separate Kurdish state).
- UN seat.
- Release frozen Iraqi assets to the Provisional Government.
- Give control over oil sale proceeds from liberated fields.

- Unlike in Afghanistan, important to have ideas in advance about who would rule afterwards.

- Doing the planning.

b(1) 1.4(a)

- Confidentiality.
- How many people do you need?
- Can talk to service chiefs and get you people, who will be detailed to you.

Where do the work? Here or DC?

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- They can work in DC or in Tampa.
- Rough concept, not complete execution-level planning.
- Deadline.

- Command structure issues.
 - Centcom and Eucom.
- Influence Campaign --- when begin?

- Next steps

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DOCUMENT: U.S. Department of Defense Memo from Robert Andrews to Douglas Feith, "Pre-emptive Operations," Annotated; Attachment Not Included.

DATE: December 17, 2001

SOURCE: Department of Defense FOIA

CONTENT: The Defense Department's Special Operations chief advises Douglas Feith to read a conservative Catholic theologian's upcoming op-ed asserting a "moral justification for a pre-emptive strike against Iraq" that "demonstrates how pre-emptive action against Iraq fits into the just-war tradition." (The declassified memorandum as released does not include the "attached op-ed" mentioned.)

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DRT
Feb 05

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2500

INFO MEMO

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SPECIAL OPERATIONS/
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY)

FROM: Robert Andrews, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict) *Robert A.*

SUBJECT: Pre-emptive Operations ~~(S)~~

~~(S)~~ I recommend that you read the attached op-ed.

- A prominent Catholic theologian outlines the moral justification for a pre-emptive strike against Iraq.
- The op-ed will appear in several dozen newspapers after Christmas.

~~(S)~~ The author, George Weigel, author of the authoritative biography of Pope John Paul II, is the former president of the Ethics and Public Policy Center. Mr. Weigel:

- introduces the concept of "regime factor,"
- illustrates the concept using the Iraq situation, and
- demonstrates how pre-emptive action against Iraq fits into the just-war tradition.

→ RA 12/15/01
George is a brilliant guy and a gentleman.
Thanks for sending this along.
D.J.F.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED BY OSD POLICY DRT
JUNE 29, 2007
07-F-1332

~~Derived from Multiple Sources~~
~~Declassify 17 October 2011~~

Prepared by Robert Andrews [redacted]

DOCUMENT: "The Just Case for the War," by George Weigel

DATE: March 31, 2003

SOURCE: Ethics and Public Policy Center

CONTENT: An article written by the author mentioned in the December 17, 2001 memo from Robert Andrews

This information was found online at:
http://www.eppc.org/news/newsID.1577/news_detail.asp

The Just War Case for the War

By George Weigel

Posted: Monday, March 31, 2003

ARTICLE

America (New York, NY)

Publication Date: March 31, 2003

It didn't happen in France, when the question recently was what to do about chaos in Cote d'Ivoire. It didn't happen in the European Union in the 1990s, when the questions were genocide in Rwanda and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. But it did happen in the United States: for well over a year now, both in government and in the public arena, the question of what to do about Saddam Hussein and his Iraqi regime's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has been debated in terms explicitly drawn from the just war tradition.

Many American religious leaders and religious intellectuals have found the Bush Administration's just war case for the war wanting. I have a different view; I believe that a compelling case can be made for using proportionate and discriminate armed force to disarm Iraq. Because the recent debate has focused on four key "war-decision" (*ad bellum*) issues, let me address these here, recognizing that the debate over the war's actual conduct *in bello* will continue during and after the campaign - and that the prior *ad bellum* issues will be revisited if the critics' case against the administration proves to have been based on false readings of the tradition and the contingencies.

A last preliminary note. The just war tradition does not "begin," theologically, with a "presumption against war." Rather, classic just war thinking begins with moral *obligations*: the obligation of rightly-constituted public authorities to defend the security of those for whom they have assumed responsibility, and the obligation to defend the peace of order in world affairs. That is one reason why Aquinas put his discussion of just war within the *Summa's* treatise on charity: public authorities are morally obliged to defend the good of *concordia* - the peace of order - against the threat of chaos. That is why Paul Ramsey described just war thinking as a specification of the second great commandment of love of neighbor - even as he insisted that the same commandment put limits on what can be done in defense of security, order, and peace. In the classic just war tradition, armed force is not intrinsically suspect from a moral point of view. It depends on who is using it, why, for what ends, and how. All of this bears directly on the case at hand.

Just Cause. In classic just war thinking, "just cause" meant response to an aggression underway, recovery of something wrongfully taken, or punishment for evil. Contemporary just war thinking tends to limit the meaning of "just cause" to "response to an aggression underway" (although calls for "humanitarian intervention" to prevent or halt genocides may resurrect the classic idea of "punishment for evil"). So the question is, when do we know that "aggression" is "underway"?

This is neither 1776 nor 1812; an "aggression underway" is not a matter of waiting for the redcoats to crest the hill at dawn. Modern weapons technologies, the character of a regime, and the hard lessons of 9/11 must be factored into today's moral analysis of "just cause" and into our ideas of "imminent danger." Which brings us to Iraq.

When a regime driven by an aggressive fascist ideology has flouted international law for decades, invaded two of its neighbors, and used weapons of mass destruction against its foreign and domestic enemies; when that regime routinely uses grotesque forms of torture to maintain its power, diverts money from

feeding children to enlarging its military, and rigorously controls all political activity so that effective internal resistance to the dictator is impossible; when *that* kind of a regime expands its stores of chemical and biological weapons and works feverishly to obtain nuclear weapons (defying international legal requirements for its disarmament), tries to gain advanced ballistic missile capability (again in defiance of U.N. demands), and has longstanding links to terrorist organizations (to whom it could transfer weapons of mass destruction) - when all of *that* has gone on, is going on, and shows no signs of abating, then it seems plausible to me to assert that aggression is underway, from a just war point of view.

A historical analogy may help. Given the character of the Nazi regime and its extra-legal rearmament, would it not have been plausible to assert that aggression was underway when Germany militarily re-occupied the Rhineland in 1936, in defiance of the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations? The withdrawal of UNSCOM weapon inspectors from Iraq in 1998 was this generation's 1936. Another 1938, a new Munich, is morally intolerable: the world cannot be faced with a nuclear-armed Saddam Hussein and an Iraqi regime that had successfully defied all international legal and political attempts to disarm it.

Just cause is satisfied by recognizing that the present Iraqi regime, armed as it is and as it seeks to be, *is an "aggression underway."* The U.N. recognized that in 1991 when it demanded Iraq's disarmament. To disarm Iraq now, by using proportionate and discriminate armed force if necessary, is to support the minimum conditions of world order and to defend the ideal of a law-governed international community. Thus military intervention to disarm Iraq is not "pre-emptive war," nor is it "preventive war," nor is it aggression. The war has been underway for twelve years.

Competent authority. This classic "war-decision" criterion reflects the tradition's basic distinction between *bellum* and *duellum*. *Duellum*, dueling, is armed force used for private ends by private individuals. *Bellum*, war, is armed force used for public ends by public authorities who have a moral obligation to defend security and order. "Competent authority" once helped moral analysts distinguish between legitimate princes and marauding brigands. For the past several hundred years, "competent authority" has resided in the nation-state. Over the past year, a new claim has entered the debate: that only the United Nations (which in effect means the Security Council, which in effect means the five veto-holding members of the Security Council) possesses "competent authority" to authorize the use of armed force.

This claim actually outstrips anything the U.N. claims for itself. The Charter explicitly recognizes an inalienable right of national self-defense; if you are attacked, you do not need the permission of veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council like France, China, or Russia before you can defend yourself. A further, interesting question is raised by the claim that only the Security Council possesses the moral authority to authorize the use of force: how is *moral* authority (as distinguished from political throw-weight) derived from the acquiescence of states like China, Russia, and France, whose foreign policies are conducted on entirely amoral (i.e., Realpolitik) grounds? Here is something for the masters of casuistry to think about.

In the case of Iraq, the debate these past two months came down to one question: how many more "final" Security Council resolutions were required to satisfy the war-decision criterion of competent authority? When Resolution 1441 was meticulously negotiated last November, everyone understood that the "serious consequences" to follow Iraq's material breach of the demand for its disarmament *and its active cooperation in that disarmament* meant intervention through armed force to enforce disarmament. Is it obtuse to suggest that the unanimous acceptance of 1441, by a Security Council which obviously understood what "serious consequences" meant, satisfies the criterion of "competent authority" - and precisely on the grounds advocated by those who argue for the superior competence of the U.N.? No. Absent another "final" Security Council resolution, would the use of armed force to compel Iraqi disarmament mean that brute force had displaced the rule of law in world affairs? No. It would mean that a coalition of states had decided, on just war grounds, that they had a moral obligation to take measures that the U.N., as presently configured, found it impossible to take - even though those measures advance the U.N.'s goals.

Willing ends without concurrently willing the means necessary to achieve them is not morally serious. Functional pacifism cannot help us traverse the hard, stony path from today's world - in which homicidal

ideologies are married to unimaginably lethal weapons - to the world envisioned by John XXIII's *Pacem in Terris*: a law-governed international political community.

Finally, the criterion of "competent authority" involves the "location" of moral judgment in matters of war and peace. The *Catechism* is quite explicit: "the evaluation of these [just war] conditions for moral legitimacy belongs to the prudential judgment of those who have responsibility for the common good" [2309]. Responsible public authorities make the call. Religious leaders and religious intellectuals must teach the relevant moral principles, insist that they inform public and governmental debate, and bring their best prudential judgments to bear in those debates. But the call is made by others.

Proportionality. The most intellectually respectable arguments against military intervention in Iraq have involved weighing desirable outcomes (Saddam's disarmament) against undesirable possibilities: the "Arab street" in chaos, further deterioration in the prospects for peace in the Holy Land, terrorists emboldened, a new and dangerous rift in Christian-Muslim relations. These are very serious concerns. Yet scholars and analysts with entirely respectable track-records have argued that these things will *not* happen. The "Arab street" did not rise up as predicted in 1991; the first Gulf War actually advanced the cause of Middle East peace by leading to the Madrid peace conference; terrorists struck the United States most viciously when Osama bin Laden had convinced himself that Americans were feckless. As for the future of relations between the West and the Arab Islamic world, the brilliant Fouad Ajami, a Lebanese Shi'ite, has argued that, for all its dangers, the disarming of Iraq, ridding the Iraqi people of a vicious dictatorship, and helping to build a new, democratic Iraq could have a galvanizing effect throughout the Middle East by breaking the patterns of corruption and repression we now mistakenly call "stability," and by challenging what Ajami calls the culture of "bellicose self-pity" in the Arab Islamic world.

This is, as always in the just war tradition, a judgment call. Reasonable people could differ on it. What should not have been in dispute is that the gravest damage would be done to the cause of world order and international law if Saddam Hussein were permitted to defy demands for his regime's disarmament. That fact must weigh heavily in any calculus of proportionality.

Last resort. "Last resort" is also a matter of prudential judgment, not algebraic certitude. I judge that "last resort" was reached in the first months of 2003 for at least three reasons:

First, the experience of the late 1990s demonstrated that containment cannot work in Iraq, given the weaknesses of the U.N. system and the cravenness of those Security Council members who dismantled UNSCOM for commercial advantage. A prudent statesman could not assume that effective containment could be re-built. Moreover, a robust containment regime would have to include economic sanctions; the primary victims of those sanctions, thanks to Saddam's manipulations and internal control, would be Iraq's ill, elderly, and children. This would have been a morally superior policy option?

Second, the post-Resolution 1441 inspections process seemed almost certainly incapable of succeeding in its task: to compel the disarmament of Iraq. It could not succeed because the regime cooperation necessary to rid Iraq completely of WMD was manifestly not forthcoming - and never would be.

Third, "last resort" was reached because deterrence was not an option after containment's failure. When Saddam Hussein got control of nuclear weapons - and prudent statecraft understood that, absent disarmament and regime change, the question was *when*, not *if* - the only forces that would be deterred would be the U.N. and the U.S. The Iraqi people would then be condemned to more torture, repression, starvation, and disease. Our capacity to protect the Kurds and Shi'ites would be lost. Moreover, no prudent statesman could bet on the long-term likelihood of deterring a man who, at many crucial junctures in the past, had made the wrong decision, with vast suffering as a result.

I took no pleasure in reaching this conclusion. People of decency and good will kept saying, "But surely there must be another way?" The hard fact of the matter, though, is that the other ways had all been tried and had all failed. It was true that we had been brought to this point both by Saddam's relentless pursuit of power and by failed western policies in the past. But the failures of the past could not be excuses for further failures of wit and nerve now. Last resort was upon us in early 2003. A binary choice had been posed:

appeasement, or military intervention to enforce disarmament. And the appeasement of Saddam Hussein's murderous regime was, in my judgment, both morally loathsome and a profound threat to peace.

From War to Peace. The just war case for the war against the Iraqi regime must conclude with a viable concept of the peace that can be achieved after Saddam Hussein, his government, and the Ba'athist regime are deposed and Iraq's disarmament of WMD is achieved. As President Bush and his senior counselors made clear, armed intervention in Iraq would not be a matter of "butcher and bolt" (as Britain used to describe some of its 19th century Third World adventures). Disarmament and regime change must, and will, be followed by a concerted effort to rebuild Iraq - to empower its educated and hard-working people to regain control of their own lives, and to facilitate the emergence of a modern, post-Ba'athist Iraq that is good for Iraqis, good for the region, and good for the world. In that way, the use of proportionate and discriminate armed force against the Saddam Hussein regime - not against the Iraqi people but against the regime that has brutalized and enslaved them for decades - can contribute to building the peace of order, justice, and freedom in a long-suffering country. And in doing so, it can set an example for the entire Middle East.

As the Holy Father has said, war is always a "defeat for humanity," a defeat for the forces of reason. Permitting Saddam Hussein to realize his ambitions to hegemony in the most volatile region of the world would also be a defeat for humanity and its quest for the peace of order that is composed of freedom and justice. The "defeat for humanity" that the last resort of armed intervention to enforce Iraq disarmament will represent can be redeemed by the emergence of a new, free, and stable Iraq - a living refutation of the debilitating notion that Arabs and Muslims are incapable of self-government and unsafe for the world. Thus "last resort" can, and I pray will, create an opening to new and welcome possibilities for the pursuit of peace, security, and freedom.

DOCUMENT: U.S. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research Intelligence Assessment, "Europe: Key Views on Iraqi Threat and Next Steps"

DATE: December 18, 2001

SOURCE: State Department FOIA

DOCUMENT: This intelligence assessment indicates that war against Iraq "absent incontrovertible evidence of links to the September 11 attacks" would be highly problematic for France and Germany and that only British Prime Minister Tony Blair, "at substantial political cost," would support a U.S. attack.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: APPEALS REVIEW PANEL
APPEAL ACTION: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEASED
REASON(S): B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN//SI~~ DATE/CASE ID: 16 SEP 2008 200302360

INR 

US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Intelligence Assessment
12/18/2001

~~DENIED IN FULL~~
~~B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)~~

(U) Europe: Key Views on Iraqi Threat and Next Steps

~~(C/NF)~~ France, Germany, and the United Kingdom all want the return of UN inspectors to Iraq and the establishment of a long-term monitoring program to contain the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat. But military action against Iraq, absent incontrovertible evidence of links to the September 11 attacks, would create problems for Paris and Berlin. Only British Prime Minister Blair, at substantial political cost, would publicly support a US decision to bomb Iraq. All three countries see a direct link to the spiral of violence in the Middle East and believe strong American pressure on both sides in the peace process is essential.

(U) Assessment of Iraq's WMD threat

~~(C/NF)~~ There is no argument with the US proposition that Iraqi WMD capabilities pose a significant threat. Washington has shared intelligence on this issue, and there is general agreement as to the extent of Iraq's capabilities and potential in the nuclear area. There appears to be a fairly good understanding of the threat represented by Iraq's ballistic missile and chemical weapons capabilities,

B1

(U) Views on inspections/monitoring

~~(C/NF)~~ London, Paris, and Berlin believe inspectors should be allowed to return to Iraq. The Allies seek to keep up the pressure on Baghdad for the resumption of inspections. All parties have tried to ensure the Iraqis get the message that their options are limited and time is running out—Baghdad must comply with UN Security Council resolutions and accept UN inspectors or face potential US military action.

(U) Reactions to bombing Iraq

~~(C/NF)~~ The French have indicated that bombing Iraq is a red-line issue for them in the war on terrorism. They are worried that Washington will decide to inform coalition partners only when it is about to undertake hostile action. The French have made clear that their willingness to support military strikes beyond Afghanistan would require three elements: a Security Council resolution, incontrovertible evidence of links between the September 11 attacks and the new target, and a consensus that diplomatic

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and other methods (such as financial controls, police or judicial efforts, surveillance, and covert methods) are insufficient to eliminate terrorist cells.

~~(CONF)~~ German Chancellor Schroeder and Foreign Minister Fischer repeatedly have voiced objections to expanding the counterterrorism war to Iraq in the absence of compelling evidence implicating Saddam in sponsorship of al-Qaida or other terrorist groups or activities. A US decision to bomb Iraq would confront the Schroeder government with a dilemma. It doubtless would criticize Washington pointedly but would not want to be in the forefront of governments opposing such action. Even the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) probably would criticize the United States in such an eventuality. Schroeder and Fischer have stressed the polarizing effect that the bombing of Iraq would have on "moderate" Arab states. Berlin worries that the defection of Egypt, Jordan, and others from the coalition and concomitant ill will toward the United States would jeopardize the US role as peacemaker in the Middle East.

~~(CONF)~~ The UK's Blair would publicly support a US decision to bomb Iraq but would face considerable criticism [redacted] about the wisdom of widening the war. The price of this support would be high for him at home and in Europe. He would be exposed to further sharp criticism from the left wing of his own party. Moreover, there is serious concern in the security services and in mainstream opinion about opening a second front at home: it could bring a radicalization of British Muslims, the great majority of whom opposed the September 11 attacks but are increasingly restive about what they see as an anti-Islamic campaign.

B1

(U) Middle East peace process

~~(CONF)~~ There is an insistent refrain that the United States should do more about the deteriorating situation in the Middle East. All three capitals have tried to be helpful in the peace process, believe there is no substitute for an active US role in the region, and emphasize the necessity of avoiding any action that would risk turning the war against terrorism into a war against Islam. Leaders in each of the countries have spoken out and traveled widely in making this point. [redacted]

(U) For additional analysis related to the Middle East, see

INR Brief on (title S) "Israel/Turkey..." 11/18/2001 - (TS//SI//USA/AUS/CAN/GBR/NZL/EYES ONLY//X1).

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Reason for Classification: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 20111213
Derived from: multiple sources

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DOCUMENT: Department of State, “Jordan: Talking Points for Vice-President’s Expanded Meeting with King Abdullah”

DATE: February 23, 2002

SOURCE: State Department FOIA release

CONTENT: Vice President Cheney was to discuss a variety of topics with the Jordanian king during this early 2002 visit, including actions on counterterrorism and the Middle East peace process in addition to Iraq.

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
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JORDAN: TALKING POINTS FOR VICE PRESIDENT'S EXPANDED MEETING
WITH KING ABDULLAH

Counterterrorism:


- We appreciate Jordan's superb cooperation on counterterrorism issues. Jordan's contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom set an example and are a tribute to your courageous leadership.
- While our initial focus has been on Usama Bin Laden and his network, our longer-term intention remains to go after all terrorist groups with a global reach.
- We recognize this is an extremely complicated issue with many different dimensions and no quick solutions. Our approach will be comprehensive, careful and methodical.




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Middle East Peace Process:

- We intend to remain engaged and will send Zinni back when such a mission can be effective.



- We understand the negative consequences for Jordan of continuing violence between Israel and the Palestinians. Our interests are also at stake.




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UNited STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE Classified by: NEA A/S Bill Burns
REVIEW AUTHORITY: SHARON E. AHMED, E.O. 12958, UNCLASSIFIED and (d)
DATE/CASE ID: 27 JUL 2007 200602303

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


Iraq:

- Saddam Hussein is a threat to U.S. and regional interests, as well as to the Iraqi people. We are determined to address that threat and are seriously considering various options.
- We have been working to make multilateral controls effective; have insisted Iraq must accept the unconditional return of UN weapons inspectors.
- If multilateral approach ineffective, we will have to look to other ways to protect our interests.
- We will keep in mind Jordan's concerns and vulnerability, and will remain in close touch as the situation unfolds in the coming months.

Economic Assistance/Debt Relief:

- Working on increased economic and military assistance for FY 2002, importance of working with IMF and advocacy with G-7 creditors on debt rescheduling. Encourage continued economic reforms.
- Proud of ETA and committed to expanding bilateral economic relationship.



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Drafted:NEA/ARN: Susan.Ziadeh 71022

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JORDAN: VICE PRESIDENT'S EXPANDED MEETING
WITH KING ABDULLAH

I. Key Objectives

- **Counterterrorism:** Express appreciation for Jordan's strong support for the counterterrorism effort and review our thinking on next steps in Afghanistan and beyond.
- **MEPP:** Emphasize our intention to remain engaged in Middle East peace efforts and outline our view on how best to move forward.
- **Iraq:** Assure the King that as we weigh our options regarding Iraq, we will be sensitive to Jordan's concerns.
- **Assistance:** Indicate support for increased economic and military assistance for Jordan, including prospects for a 2002 supplemental.
- **Economic Reforms:** Applaud continued efforts by the King on economic reforms [redacted]
- Encourage continued close cooperation to ensure effective Free Trade Agreement (FTA) implementation.

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II. Background

In the context of current Middle East troubles, Jordan's role as a key Arab moderate and steadfast ally in our campaign against international terrorism is more important than ever.

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[redacted] The King is leaving shortly after your meeting for the Monterrey Financing for Development Conference, where he hopes to meet with the President and compare notes on regional issues prior to the March 27-28 Arab League Summit in Beirut.

[redacted] your visit [redacted] is [redacted] an opportunity for us to demonstrate our continued strong support for Jordan, the King, and the moderate policies he is pursuing.

Support for the War on Terrorism

Jordan's commitment to participate in U.S.-led coalition efforts in Afghanistan, the first Arab country to do so, has been consistent and strong.

[redacted]

Middle East Peace Negotiations


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
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
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
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
U.S. Assistance to Jordan



Although no final decision has been made, the State Department supports increasing assistance for Jordan as part of a FY 2002 supplemental.



The U.S. has been supportive of Jordan's efforts to reschedule its debt



An increase in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is also being considered as part of the supplemental process, and if made

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
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available would be used for increased border security and counterterrorism. The Administration has also requested an increase to \$198 million in FY 2003, up from the current \$75 million in FY 2002.

U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA)

The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA) went into effect on December 17, 2001. It has generated a great deal of excitement within the business community in Jordan and there is an active private sector-led initiative to execute a strategy to implement the FTA. While it is too soon to quantify the impact on the Jordanian economy, there is already anecdotal evidence that the agreement is stimulating bilateral trade. USAID has begun programs to enhance the commercial competitiveness of Jordanian exporters to help them take advantage of the FTA.



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DOCUMENT: Department of State, "Jordan: Talking Points for Restricted Meeting with King Abdullah"

DATE: February 24, 2002

SOURCE: State Department FOIA release

CONTENT: Unlike in his wider meeting, at Cheney's private meeting with King Abdullah the Iraq issue led the agenda, and with the point that "Saddam Hussein is a threat to U.S. and regional interests," following up with the declaration that "we are determined to address that threat." King Abdullah was to be given assurances that the United States would "keep in mind Jordan's concerns and vulnerability."

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
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JORDAN: TALKING POINTS FOR RESTRICTED MEETING WITH
KING ABDULLAH


Iraq:

- Saddam Hussein is a threat to U.S. and regional interests, as well as to the Iraqi people. We are determined to address that threat and are seriously considering various options.
- We have been working to make multilateral controls effective; have insisted Iraq accept unconditional return of UN weapons inspectors.
- If multilateral approach ineffective, we will have to look to other ways to protect our interests.



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- We will keep in mind Jordan's concerns and vulnerability, and will remain in close touch as the situation unfolds in the coming months.



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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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E.O. 12958, Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)

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Drafted: NEA/ARN: Susan Ziadeh 71022

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P:Tlenderking ok

D:BGilchrist ok

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DOCUMENT: United Kingdom, Cabinet Office, Overseas and Defense Secretariat, "Iraq: Options Paper"

DATE: March 8, 2002

SOURCE: Downing Street Documents (Confirmed by the Chilcot Committee)

CONTENT: The paper notes, "The US administration has lost faith in containment and is now considering regime change." The paper reads, "A legal justification for invasion would be needed" and that "none currently exists." The Cabinet Office analysts recommended a "staged approach" to establish international support, which would anyway be consonant with the requirement for a six-month interval to prepare for military action.

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IRAQ: OPTIONS PAPER

SUMMARY

Since 1991, our objective has been to re-integrate a law-abiding Iraq which does not possess WMD or threaten its neighbours, into the international community. Implicitly, this cannot occur with Saddam Hussein in power. As at least worst option, we have supported a policy of containment which has been partially successful. However:

- * Despite sanctions, Iraq continues to develop WMD, although our intelligence is poor. Saddam has used WMD in the past and could do so again if his regime were threatened, though there is no greater threat now than in recent years that Saddam will use WMD; and
- * Saddam's brutal regime remains in power¹ and destabilises the Arab and wider Islamic world.

We have two options. We could toughen the existing containment policy. This would increase the pressure on Saddam. It would not reintegrate Iraq into the international community.

The US administration has lost faith in containment and is now considering regime change. The end states could either be a Sunni strongman or a representative government.

Three options for achieving regime change are:

- * covert support to opposition groups to mount an uprising/coup;
- * air support for opposition groups to mount an uprising/coup; and
- * a full-scale ground campaign.

These are not mutually exclusive. Options 1 and/or 2 would be natural precursors to Option 3. The greater investment of Western forces, the greater our control over Iraq's future, but the greater the cost and the longer we would need to stay. The only certain means to remove Saddam and his elite is to invade and impose a new government¹ but this could involve nation building over many years. Even a representative government could seek to acquire WMD and build-up its conventional forces, so long as Iran and Israel retain their WMD and conventional armories and there was no acceptable solution to Palestinian grievances.

A legal justification for invasion would be needed. Subject to Law Officers advice, none currently exists. This makes moving quickly to invade legally very difficult. We should therefore consider a staged approach, establishing international support,¹ building up pressure on Saddam, and developing military plans. There is a lead time of about 6 months to a ground offensive.

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CURRENT OBJECTIVES OF UK POLICY

1 Within our objectives of preserving peace and stability in the Gulf and ensuring energy security, our current objectives towards Iraq are:
* the reintegration of a law-abiding Iraq¹ which does not possess WMD or threaten its neighbours, into the international community. Implicitly, this cannot occur with Saddam in power; and
* hence, as the least worst option, we have supported containment of Iraq, by constraining Saddam's ability to re^uarm or build up WMD and to threaten his neighbours.

2 Subsidiary objectives are:

- * Preserving the territorial integrity of Iraq;
- * improving the humanitarian situation of the Iraqi people;
- * protecting the Kurds in Northern Iraq;
- * sustaining UK/US co-operation, including, if necessary, by moderating US policy; and
- * maintaining the credibility and authority of the Security Council.

HAS CONTAINMENT WORKED?

3 Since 1991, the policy of containment has been partially successful:
* Sanctions have effectively frozen Iraq's nuclear programme;
* Iraq has been prevented from rebuilding its conventional arsenal to pre^uGulf War levels;
* ballistic missile programmes have been severely restricted;
* Biological weapons (BW) and Chemical Weapons (CW) programmes have been hindered;
* No Fly Zones established over northern and southern Iraq have given some protection to the Kurds and the Shia. Although subject to continuing political pressure, the Kurds remain autonomous; and
* Saddam has not succeeded in seriously threatening his neighbours.

4 However:

* Iraq continues to develop weapons of mass destruction, although our intelligence is poor. Iraq has up to 20 650km-range missiles left over from the Gulf War. These are capable of hitting Israel and the Gulf states. Design work for other ballistic missiles over the UN limit of 150km continues. Iraq continues with its BW and CW programmes and, if it has not already done so¹ could produce significant quantities of BW agents within days and CW agent within weeks of a decision to do so. We believe it could deliver CBW by a variety of means, including in ballistic missile warheads. There are also some indications of a continuing nuclear programme. Saddam has used WMD in the past and could do so again if his regime were threatened.

2

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* Saddam leads a brutal regime, which impoverishes his people. While in power Saddam is a rallying point for anti-Western sentiment in the Arab and wider Islamic world, and as such a cause of instability; and
* despite UN controls over Iraq's oil revenue under Oil for Food, there is considerable oil and other smuggling.

5 In this context, and against the background of our desire to re-integrate a law-abiding Iraq into the international community, we examine the two following policy options:

* a toughening of the existing containment policy, facilitated by 11 September; and
* regime change by military means: a new departure which would require the construction of a coalition and a legal justification.

TOUGHENING CONTAINMENT

6 This would consist of the following elements:

* full implementation of all relevant UNSCRs, particularly 687 (1991) and 1284 (1999). We should ensure that the Goods Review List (GRL) is introduced in May and that Russia holds to its promise not to block. The signs are positive but continuing pressure is needed. (The GRL focuses sanctions exclusively on preventing shipments of WMD-related and other arms, while allowing other business without scrutiny. As such, it will greatly facilitate legitimate Iraqi commerce under Oil for Food.);
* encourage the US not to block discussions to clarify the modalities of Resolution 1284 once Russian agreement to the GRL has been secured. We should take a hard-line on each area for clarification - the purpose of clarification is not to lower the bar on Iraqi compliance; but
* P5 and Security Council unity would facilitate a specific demand that Iraq re-admit the UN inspectors. Our aim would be to tell Saddam to admit inspectors or face the risk of military action.
* push for tougher action (especially by the US) against states breaking sanctions. This should not discriminate between allies (Turkey), friends (UAE) and others (especially Syria). It would put real pressure on Saddam either to submit to meaningful inspections or to lash out;
* maintain our present military posture, including in the NFZs, and be prepared to respond robustly to any Iraqi adventurism; and
* continue to make clear (without overtly espousing regime change) our view that Iraq would be better off without Saddam. We could trail the rosy future for Iraq without him in a 'Contract with the Iraqi People', although to be at all credible, this would need some detailed work.

7 What could it achieve:

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- * There will be greater pressure on Saddam. The GRL will make sanctions more attractive to at least some of their detractors. Improving implementation of sanctions would reduce the regime's illicit revenues; and
- * the return of UN weapons inspectors would allow greater scrutiny of Iraqi WMD programmes and of Iraqi forces in general. If they found significant evidence of WMD, were expelled or, in face of an ultimatum, not re-admitted in the first place,¹¹ then this could provide legal justification for large-scale military action (see below).

8 But:

- * Some of the difficulties with the existing policy still apply;
- * those states in breach of sanctions will want compensation if they are to change tack;
- * Saddam is only likely to permit the return of inspectors if he believes the threat of large scale US military action is imminent and that such concessions would prevent the US from acting decisively. Playing for time,¹² he would then embark on a renewed policy of non co^operation; and
- * although containment has held for the past decade, Iraq has progressively increased its international engagement. Even if the GRL makes sanctions more sustainable¹³ the sanctions regime could collapse in the long-term.

9 Tougher containment would not re¹⁴integrate Iraq into the international community as it offers little prospect of removing Saddam. He will continue with his WMD programmes, destabilising the Arab and Islamic world¹⁵ and impoverishing his people. But there is no greater threat now that he will use WMD than there has been in recent years, so continuing containment is an option.

US VIEWS

10 The US has lost confidence in containment. Some in government want Saddam removed. The success of Operation Enduring Freedom, distrust of UN sanctions and inspection regimes, and unfinished business from 1991 are all factors. Washington believes the legal basis for an attack on Iraq already exists. Nor will it necessarily be governed by wider political factors. The US may be willing to work with a much smaller coalition than we think desirable.

REGIME CHANGE

11 In considering the options for regime change below¹⁶, we need to first consider what sort of Iraq we want? There are two possibilities:

- * A Sunni military strongman. He would be likely to maintain Iraqi territorial integrity. Assistance with reconstruction and political rehabilitation could be traded for assurances on abandoning WMD

programmes and respecting human rights, particularly of ethnic minorities. The US and other militaries could withdraw quickly. However, there would then be a strong risk of the Iraqi system reverting to type. Military coup could succeed until an autocratic, Sunni dictator emerged who protected Sunni interests. With time he could acquire WMD; or * a representative¹¹ broadly democratic government. This would be Sunni-led but¹¹ within a federal structure¹¹ the Kurds would be guaranteed autonomy and the Shia fair access to government. Such a regime would be less likely to develop WMD and threaten its neighbours. However, to survive¹¹ it would require the US and others to commit to nation building for many years. This would entail a substantial international security force and help with reconstruction.

OTHER FACTORS TO CONSIDER: INTERNAL

12 Saddam has a strong grip on power¹¹ maintained through fear and patronage. The security and intelligence apparatus, including the Republican and Special Republican Guard, who protect the regime so effectively are predominantly drawn from the Arab Sunni minority (20-25 per cent of the population); many from Tikrit like Saddam. They fear non-Sunni rule¹¹ which would bring retribution and the end of their privileges. The regime's success in defeating the 1991 uprising stemmed from senior Sunni officers looking into the abyss of Shia rule and preserving their interests by backing Saddam. In the current circumstances, a military revolt or coup is a remote possibility.

13 Unaided, the Iraqi opposition is incapable of overthrowing the regime. The external opposition is weak, divided and lacks domestic credibility. The predominant group is the Iraqi National Congress (INC), an umbrella organisation led by Ahmad Chalabi, a Shia and convicted fraudster, popular on Capitol Hill. The other major group, the Iraqi National Accord (INA)¹¹ espouses moderate Arab socialism and is led by another Shia, Ayad Allawi. Neither group has a military capability and both are badly penetrated by Iraqi intelligence. In 1996, a CIA attempt to stir opposition groups ended in wholesale executions. Most Iraqis see the INC/INA as Western stooges.

14 The internal opposition is small and fractured on ethnic and sectarian grounds. There is no effective Sunni Arab opposition. There are 3-4m Kurds¹¹ in northern Iraq. Most live in the Kurdish Autonomous Zone¹¹ established in 1991. The Kurds deploy at least 40,000 lightly armed militia but are divided between two main parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). These groups have an interest in preserving the status quo¹¹ and are more interested in seeking advantage over the other than allying against Saddam. Divide and rule is easy; in 1996 the KDP

assisted the Iraqi Army's expulsion of the FUK and Iraqi opposition groups from Irbil.

15 The Kurds do not co-operate with the Shia Arabs who form 60 per cent of the population. The main Shia opposition group is the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SGIRI), with 3-5,000 fighters, but it is tainted by Iranian support. Most Shia would like to have a greater say in Iraqi government, but not necessarily control: they do not want secession, Islamic autonomy or Iranian influence.

REGIONAL

16 Iraq's neighbours have a direct interest in the country's affairs. Iran and Turkey, in particular, are wary of US influence and oppose some opposition groups. Turkey,¹ conscious of its own restive Kurdish minority, will do anything to prevent the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, including intervention. Iran, also with a Kurdish minority,¹ would also oppose a Kurdish state and is keen to protect the rights of its co-religionists in the south. (see FCO paper on P5, European and regional views of possible military action against Iraq;¹ attached.)

17 We have looked at three options for achieving regime change (we dismissed assassination of Saddam Hussein as an option because it would be illegal):

OPTION 1: COVERT SUPPORT TO OPPOSITION GROUPS

18 The aim would be to bring down the regime by internal revolt, aided by the defection or at least acquiescence of large sections of the Army. A group of Sunni generals probably from within the Republican Guard, might depose Saddam if they decided the alternative was defeat. This option could be pursued by providing covert intelligence, large¹ scale financial and Special Forces support to opposition groups. The Kurds would be persuaded to unite and attack into northern Iraq, tying down some Iraqi forces. Simultaneously, in a greater threat to the regime,¹ the Shia would rise up in the southern cities, and in Baghdad.

19 This option also has a very low prospect of success on its own. The external opposition is not strong enough to overthrow Saddam and would be rejected by most Iraqis as a replacement government. The Kurds could only mount a very limited offensive in the north. Mass uprisings in the south would be unlikely. The US failure to support the 1991 uprising remains vivid. The Republican Guard would move against any opposition and any wavering regular Army units. There would also be a high risk of US/coalition forces being captured. The remaining elements of opposition could be eliminated, buttressing

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Saddam and his reputation as Arab folk hero. On the other hand, this option has never been pursued in a concerted, single-minded way before and should not be dismissed, at least as a possible precursor to Options 2 and 3.

OPTION 2: AN AIR CAMPAIGN PROVIDING OVERT SUPPORT TO OPPOSITION GROUPS LEADING TO A COUP OR UPRISING

20 The aim would be to assist an internal revolt by providing strategic and tactical air support for opposition groups to move against the regime. Such support would disable Saddam's military and security apparatus. Suspected WMD facilities would also be targeted. Substantial numbers of aircraft and munitions would need to be built up in theatre over a period of months. Any campaign would take several weeks at least¹¹ probably several months. Pressure on the regime could be increased by massing ground and naval forces and threatening a land invasion.

21 This option has no guarantee of success. The build up of pressure might persuade other Sunnis to overthrow Saddam and his family, but there is no guarantee that another Sunni autocrat would be better. Comparisons with Afghanistan are misleading. Saddam's military and security apparatus is considerably more potent and cohesive. We are not aware of any Karzai figure able to command respect inside and outside Iraq. Arab states would only back the plan if they were sure Saddam would be deposed. At least the cooperation of Kuwait would be needed for the necessary military build-up. The Arab street would oppose an air attack against Iraq, but visibility of a popular uprising could calm Arab public opinion.

OPTION 3: A GROUND CAMPAIGN

22 The aim would be to launch a full-scale ground offensive to destroy Saddam's military machine and remove him from power. A pro-Western regime would be installed which would destroy Iraq's WMD capability; make peace with Iraq's neighbours and give rights to all Iraqis, including ethnic minorities. As in the Gulf War¹¹ this would need to be preceded by a major air-offensive to soften up defences.

23 US contingency planning prior to 11 September indicated that such a ground campaign would require 200-400,000 troops. The numbers would be roughly half those of 1991 because Iraqi forces are now considerably weaker. Any invasion force would need to pose a credible threat to Baghdad in order to persuade members of the Sunni military elite that their survival was better served by deserting to the coalition than staying loyal to Saddam. Sufficient air assets would need three months and ground forces at least four-five months to assemble¹¹ so on logistical grounds a ground campaign is not feasible until autumn 2002. The optimal times to start action are early spring

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24 From a purely military perspective it would be very difficult to launch an invasion from Kuwait alone. Carrier-based aircraft would not be enough because of the need for land-based air-to-air refuelling. To be confident of success, bases either in Jordan or in Saudi Arabia would be required. However, a wider and durable international coalition would be advantageous for both military and political reasons. Securing moderate Arab support would be greatly assisted by the promise of a quick and decisive campaign, and credible action by the US to address the MEPP.

25 The risks include US and others military casualties. Any coalition would need much tending over the difficult months of preparation for an actual invasion. Iran, fearing further US encirclement and that it will be invaded next¹¹ will be prickly but is likely to remain neutral. With his regime in danger, Saddam could use WMD, either before or during an invasion. Saddam could also target Israel as he did during the Gulf War. Restraining Israel will be difficult. It could try to pre-empt a WMD attack and has certainly made clear that it would retaliate. Direct Israeli military involvement in Iraq would greatly complicate coalition management and risk spreading conflict more widely.

26 None of the above options is mutually exclusive. Options 1 and/or 2 would be natural precursors to Option 3. All options have lead times. If an invasion is contemplated this autumn, then a decision will need to be taken in principle six months in advance. The greater investment of Western forces, the greater our control over Iraq's future¹¹ but the greater the cost and the longer we would need to stay. Option 3 comes closest to guaranteeing regime change. At this stage we need to wait to see which option or combination of options may be favoured by the US government.

27 But it should be noted that even a representative government could seek to acquire WMD and build-up its conventional forces, so long as Iran and Israel retain their WMD and conventional armouries.

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

28 A full opinion should be sought from the Law Officers if the above options are developed further. But in summary¹¹ CONTAINMENT generally involves the implementation of existing UNSCRs and has a firm legal foundation. Of itself, REGIME CHANGE has no basis in international law. A separate note by FCO Legal Advisors setting out the general legal background and the obligations in the relevant UN Resolutions is attached.

29 In the judgement of the JIC there is no recent evidence of Iraq complicity with international terrorism. There is therefore no justification for action against Iraq based on action in self-defence (Article 51) to combat imminent threats of terrorism as in Afghanistan. However, Article 51 would come into play if Iraq were about to attack a neighbour.

30 Currently, offensive military action against Iraq can only be justified if Iraq is held to be in breach of the Gulf War ceasefire resolution, 687. 687 imposed obligations on Iraq with regard to the elimination of WMD and monitoring these obligations. But 687 never terminated the authority to use force mandated in UNSCR 678 (1990). Thus a violation of 687 can revive the authorisation to use force in 678.

31 As the ceasefire was proclaimed by the Security Council in 687, it is for the Council to decide whether a breach of obligations has occurred. There is a precedent. UNSCR 1205 (1998), passed after the expulsion of the UN inspectors, stated that in doing so Iraq had acted in flagrant violation of its obligations under 687. In our view, this revived the authority for the use of force under 678 and underpinned Operation Desert Fox. In contrast to general legal opinion, the US asserts the right of individual Member States to determine whether Iraq has breached 687, regardless of whether the Council has reached this assessment.

32 For the P5 and the majority of the Council to take the view that Iraq was in breach of 687:

- * they would need to be convinced that Iraq was in breach of its obligations regarding WMD, and ballistic missiles. Such proof would need to be incontrovertible and of large-scale activity. Current intelligence is insufficiently robust to meet this criterion. Even with overriding proof China, France and Russia, in particular, would need considerable lobbying to approve or acquiesce in a new resolution authorising military action against Iraq. Concessions in other policy areas might be needed. However, many Western states, at least, would not wish to oppose the US on such a major issue; or
- * if P5 unity could be obtained, Iraq refused to readmit UN inspectors after a clear ultimatum by the UN Security Council; or
- * the UN inspectors were re-admitted to Iraq and found sufficient evidence of WMD activity or were again expelled trying to do so.

CONCLUSION

33 In sum, despite the considerable difficulties, the use of overriding force in a ground campaign is the only option that we can be confident will remove Saddam and bring Iraq back into the international community.

- 34 To launch such a campaign would require a staged approach:
- * winding up the pressure: increasing the pressure on Saddam through tougher containment. Stricter implementation of sanctions and a military build-up will frighten his regime. A refusal to admit UN inspectors, or their admission and subsequent likely frustration, which resulted in an appropriate finding by the Security Council" could provide the justification for military action. Saddam would try to prevent this, although he has miscalculated before;
 - * careful planning: detailed military planning on the various invasion and basing options, and when appropriate force deployment;
 - * coalition building: diplomatic work to establish an international coalition to provide the broadest political and military support to a ground campaign. This will need to focus on China, France and particularly Russia who have the ability to block action in the UN Security Council and on the other Europeans. Special attention will need to be paid to moderate Arab states and to Iran;
 - * incentives: as an incentive guarantees will need to be made with regard to Iraqi territorial integrity. Plans should be worked up in advance of the great benefits the international community could provide for a post-Saddam Iraq and its people. These should be published.
 - * tackling other regional issues: an effort to engage the US in a serious effort to re-energise the MEPP would greatly assist coalition building; and
 - * sensitising the public: a media campaign to warn of the dangers that Saddam poses and to prepare public opinion both in the UK and abroad.

35 The US should be encouraged to consult widely on its plans.

OVERSEAS AND DEFENCE SECRETARIAT
CABINET OFFICE
8 MARCH ")))"

DOCUMENT: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, memo from Tim Dowse, Head of Non-Proliferation Department, to Michael Williams, special adviser to Foreign Secretary Jack Straw.

DATE: March 13, 2002

SOURCE: U.K. FOIA disclosure

CONTENT: Dowse complains that his department was not told in advance of a briefing paper on Iraq that Foreign Secretary Straw had given to the Parliamentary Labour Party. He points out that the paper went against the government's established line by stating that Iraq's alleged nuclear weapons program was "unchecked," but adds that the early draft of the British government's dossier will have to be reviewed "to avoid exposing differences with your paper."

From: Tim Dowse, NPD
Date: Error! Reference source not found. cc: PS
PS/Mr Bradshaw
PS/PUS
Peter Ricketts
Stephen Wright
William Ehrman
Alan Goulty
Heads: News Dept, MED

To: Error! Reference source not found., Special Adviser

SUBJECT: Error! Reference source not found.

1. I am sorry that NPD had no forewarning of the briefing paper which you circulated to PLP members last night. It differs in one important respect from our usual line on Iraqi nuclear weapons.

2. Press reports today have seized on your papers's statement that "If Iraq's weapons programmes *remain unchecked*, Iraq could...develop a crude nuclear device in about five years" (my italics). Our longstanding public line is that would only be possible "if controls [ie UN sanctions] are lifted" – in other words, we believe that at present that the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme is not 'unchecked' (CBW programmes are another matter). This was the line that News Department offered in response to questions from the Guardian to the Secretary of State yesterday.

3. The difference is small, but significant. Our standard line is supported by repeated JIC assessments, and helps to underline the importance of retaining sanctions against Iraq. It is also included in the draft public dossier on 'WMD programmes of concern' which the Cabinet Office are producing at No10's request. We clearly will now have to review that text, to avoid exposing differences with your paper.

4. The underlines the importance of very close co-ordination at a time when so much public briefing material is in preparation on WMD – and Iraqi – issues.

Tim Dowse

Tim Dowse
Head, Non-Proliferation Department

DOCUMENT: United Kingdom Government, Prime Minister's Office, Memorandum, David Manning-Tony Blair

DATE: March 14, 2002

SOURCE: Downing Street Documents

CONTENT: A senior adviser to Prime Minister Blair reports on a dinner conversation on "Tuesday" (March 12) with Condoleezza Rice along with discussions with the "NSC team" the following day.

SECRET - STRICTLY PERSONAL

FROM: DAVID MANNING

DATE: 14 MARCH 2002

CC: JONATHAN POWELL

PRIME MINISTER

YOUR TRIP TO THE US

I had dinner with Condi on Tuesday; and talks and lunch with her and an NSC team on Wednesday (to which Christopher Meyer also came). These were good exchanges, and particularly frank when we were one-on-one at dinner. I attach the records in case you want to glance.

IRAQ

We spent a long time at dinner on IRAQ. It is clear that Bush is grateful for your support and has registered that you are getting flak. I said that you would not budge in your support for regime change but you had to manage a press, a Parliament and a public opinion that was very different than anything in the States. And you would not budge either in your insistence that, if we pursued regime change, it must be very carefully done and produce the right result. Failure was not an option.

Condi's enthusiasm for regime change is undimmed. But there were some signs, since we last spoke, of greater awareness of the practical difficulties and political risks. (See the attached piece by Seymour Hersh which Christopher Meyer says gives a pretty accurate picture of the uncertain state of the debate in Washington.)

From what she said, Bush has yet to find the answers to the big questions:

- how to persuade international opinion that military action against Iraq is necessary and justified;
- what value to put on the exiled Iraqi opposition;
- how to coordinate a US/allied military campaign with internal opposition (assuming there is any);
- what happens on the morning after?

Bush will want to pick your brains. He will also want to hear whether he can expect coalition support. I told Condi that we realised that the Administration could go it alone if it chose. But if it wanted company,¹¹ it would have to take account of the concerns of its potential coalition partners. In particular:

- the Un dimension. The issue of the weapons inspectors must be handled in a way that would persuade European and wider opinion that the US was conscious of the international framework, and the insistence of many countries on the need for a legal base. Renewed refusal by Saddam to accept unfettered inspections would be a powerful argument;

- the paramount importance of tackling Israel/Palestine. Unless we did, we could find ourselves bombing Iraq and losing the Gulf.

YOUR VISIT TO THE RANCH

No doubt we need to keep a sense of perspective. But my talks with Condi convinced me that Bush wants to hear your views on Iraq before taking decisions. He also wants your support. He is still smarting from the comments by other European leaders on his Iraq policy.

This gives you real influence: on the public relations strategy; on the UN and weapons inspections; and on US planning for any military campaign. This could be critically important. I think there is a real risk that the Administration underestimates the difficulties. They may agree that failure isn't an option, but this does not mean that they will avoid it.

Will the Sunni majority really respond to an uprising led by Kurds and Shias? Will Americans really put in enough ground troops to do the job if the Kurdish/Shi'ite stratagem fails? Even if they do will they be willing to take the sort of casualties that the Republican Guard may inflict on them if it turns out to be an urban war, and Iraqi troops don't conveniently collapse in a heap as Richard Perle and others confidently predict? They need to answer these and other tough questions, in a more convincing way than they have so far before concluding that they can do the business.

The talks at the ranch will also give you the chance to push Bush on the Middle East. The Iraq factor means that there may never be a better opportunity to get this Administration to give sustained attention to reviving the MEPP.

DAVID MANNING

DOCUMENT: United Kingdom, Washington Embassy, Memorandum, Christopher Meyer-David Manning, "Iraq and Afghanistan, Conversation with Wolfowitz"

DATE: March 18, 2002

SOURCE: Downing Street Documents

CONTENT: Ambassador Meyer reports on a lunch the previous day with Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, saying that he had stuck closely to the script Manning had used a few days earlier: "We backed regime change but the plan had to be clever and failure was not an option." Meyer emphasized war would be a "tough sell" for the Blair government, which was considering putting out a white paper to make the case against Saddam.

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British Embassy Washington

From the Ambassador
Christopher Meyer KCMG

18 March 2002

Sir David Manning KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: CONVERSATION WITH WOLFOWITZ

1 Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, came to Sunday lunch on 17 March.

2 On Iraq I opened by sticking very closely to the script that you used with Condi Rice last week. We backed regime change, but the plan had to be clever and failure was not an option. It would be a tough sell for us domestically, and probably tougher elsewhere in Europe. The US could go it alone if it wanted to. But if it wanted to act with partners, there had to be a strategy for building support for military action against Saddam. I then went through the need to wrongfoot Saddam on the inspectors and the UN SCRs and the critical importance of the MEPP as an integral part of the anti-Saddam strategy. If all this could be accomplished skilfully, we were fairly confident that a number of countries would come on board.

3 I said that the UK was giving serious thought to publishing a paper that would make the case against Saddam. If the UK were to join with the US in any operation against Saddam, we would have to be able to take a critical mass of parliamentary and public opinion with us. It was extraordinary how people had forgotten how bad he was.

4 Wolfowitz said that he fully agreed. He took a slightly different position from others in the Administration, who were focussed on Saddam's capacity to develop weapons of mass destruction. The WMD danger was of course crucial to the public case against Saddam, particularly the potential linkage to terrorism. But Wolfowitz thought it indispensable to spell out in detail Saddam's barbarism. This was well documented from what he had done during the occupation of Kuwait, the incursion into Kurdish territory, the assault on the Marsh Arabs, and to his own people. A lot of work had been done on this towards the end of the first Bush administration. Wolfowitz thought that this would go a long way to destroying any notion of moral equivalence between Iraq and Israel. I said that I had been forcefully struck, when addressing university audiences in the US, how ready students were to gloss over Saddam's crimes and to blame the US and the UK for the suffering of the Iraqi people.

5 Wolfowitz said that it was absurd to deny the link between terrorism and Saddam. There might be doubt about the alleged meeting in Prague between Mohammed Atta, the lead hijacker on 9/11, and Iraqi intelligence (did we, he asked, know anything more about this meeting?). But there were other substantiated cases of Saddam giving comfort to terrorists, including someone involved in the first attack on the World Trade Center (the latest New Yorker apparently has a story about links between Saddam and Al Qaeda operating in Kurdistan).

6 I asked for Wolfowitz's take on the struggle inside the Administration between the pro- and anti- INC lobbies (well documented in Sy Hersh's recent New Yorker piece, which I gave you). He said that he found himself between the two sides (but as the conversation developed, it became clear that Wolfowitz was far more pro-INC than not). He said that he was strongly opposed to what some were advocating: a coalition including all outside factions except the INC (INA, KDP, PUK, SCIRI). This would not work. Hostility towards the INC was in reality hostility towards Chalabi. It was true that Chalabi was not the easiest person to work with. Bate had a good record in bringing high-grade defectors out of Iraq. The CIA stubbornly refused to recognize this. They unreasonably denigrated the INC because of their fixation with Chalabi. When I mentioned that the INC was penetrated by Iraqi intelligence, Wolfowitz commented that this was probably the case with all the opposition groups: it was something we would have to live with. As to the Kurds, it was true that they were living well (another point to be made in any public dossier on Saddam) and that they feared provoking an incursion by Baghdad. But there were good people among the Kurds, including in particular Salih (?) of the PUK. Wolfowitz brushed over my reference to the absence of Sunni in the INC: there was a big difference between Iraqi and Iranian Shia. The former just wanted to be rid of Saddam.

7. Wolfowitz was pretty dismissive of the desirability of a military coup and of the defector generals in the wings. The latter had blood on their hands. The important thing was to try to have Saddam replaced by something like a functioning democracy. Though imperfect, the Kurdish model was not bad. How to achieve this, I asked? Only through a coalition of all the parties was the answer (we did not get into military planning).

DOCUMENT: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, letter from Peter Ricketts, Political Director, to Foreign Secretary Jack Straw

DATE: March 22, 2002

SOURCE: The Downing Street Documents.

CONTENT: This is a response to Straw's request for input into a letter that he would send to Prime Minister Blair, giving advice on how to handle the forthcoming Crawford summit.

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PR.121

FROM: P F RICKETTS
POLITICAL DIRECTOR

DATE: 22 MARCH 2002

CC: PUS

SECRETARY OF STATE

IRAQ: ADVICE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

1 You invited thoughts for your personal note to the Prime Minister covering the official advice (we have put up a draft minute separately). Here are mine.

2 By sharing Bush's broad objective¹ the Prime Minister can help shape how it is defined, and the approach to achieving it. In the process, he can bring home to Bush some of the realities which will be less evident from Washington. He can help Bush make good decisions by telling him things his own machine probably isn't.

3 By broad support for the objective brings two real problems which need discussing.

4 First, the THREAT. The truth is that what has changed is not the pace of Saddam Hussein's WMD programmes, but our tolerance of them post-11 September. This is not something we need to be defensive about, but attempts to claim otherwise publicly will increase scepticism about our case. I am relieved that you decided to postpone publication of the unclassified document. My meeting yesterday showed that there is more work to do to ensue that the figures are accurate and consistent with those of the US. But even the best survey of Iraq's WMD programmes will not show much advance in recent years ont he nuclear, missile or CW/BW fronts: the programmes are extremely worrying but have not, as far as we know,¹ been stepped up.

5 US scrambling to establish a link between Iraq and Al Aaida is so far frankly unconvincing. To get public and Parliamentary support for military operations, we have to be convincing that:

- the threat is so serious/imminent that it is worth sending our troops to die for;

- it is qualitatively different from the threat posed by other proliferators who are closer to achieving nuclear capability (including Iran).

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We can make the case on qualitative difference (only Iraq has attacked a neighbour¹¹ used CW and fired missiles against Israel). The overall strategy needs to include re-doubled efforts to tackle other proliferators, including Iran, in other ways (the UK/French ideas on greater IAEA activity are helpful here). But we are still left with a problem of bringing public opinion to accept the imminence of a threat from Iraq. This is something the Prime Minister and President need to have a frank discussion about.

6 The second problem is the END STATE. Military operations need clear and compelling military objectives. For Kosovo¹¹ it was: Serbs out, Kosovars back¹¹ peace-keepers in. For Afghanistan, destroying the Taliban and Al Qaida military capability. For Iraq, "regime change" does not stack up. It sounds like a grudge between Bush and Saddam. Much better, as you have suggested, to make the objective ending the threat to the international community from Iraqi WMD before Saddam uses it or gives it to terrorists. This is at once easier to justify in terms of international law¹¹ but also more demanding. Regime change which produced another Sunni General still in charge of an active Iraqi WMD programme would be a bad outcome (not least because it would be almost impossible to maintain UN sanctions on a new leader who came in promising a fresh start). As with the fight against UBL, Bush would do well to de'personalise the objective¹¹ focus on elimination of WMD, and show that he is serious about UN Inspectors as the first choice means of achieving that (it is win/win for him: either Saddam against all the odds allows Inspectors to operate freely¹¹ in which case we can further hobble his WMD programmes, or he blocks/hinders, and we are on stronger ground for switching to other methods).

7 Defining the end state in this way, and working through the UN, will of course also help maintain a degree of support among the Europeans, and therefore fits with another major message which the Prime Minister will want to get across: the importance of positioning Iraq as a problem for the international community as a whole¹¹ not just for the US.

PETER RICKETS

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DOCUMENT: Department of State, Briefing Memorandum, William Burns-Colin Powell, "Principals' Committee Meeting on the Vice-President's Trip"

DATE: March 25, 2002

SOURCE: State Department FOIA release

CONTENT: This Principals' meeting called by Vice President Cheney had one of its purposes was "previewing the next steps toward Iraq."

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520



BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
S/ES

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March 25, 2002


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SCANNED

APR 18 2002

TO: The Secretary
FROM: NEA - Bill Burns *WB*
SUBJECT: Principals' Committee Meeting on the Vice President's trip; Tuesday, 2:00-3:00 P.M., March 26, 2002, White House Situation Room

Key Objectives for Your Participation in the PC:



B1

Background

The Vice President has convened a Principals' Committee meeting to review his recent visit to the UK, Turkey, and the Middle East. The Vice President visited the United Kingdom, Egypt, Jordan, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Yemen, Israel, and Turkey March 10-20. Key objectives for his trip included:

- Encouraging closer counterterrorism cooperation, while expressing appreciation for support to date;
- Reassuring key leaders about the value we place on bilateral relations, plus seeking to open strategic dialogues on the future of these relationships;
- Previewing next steps toward Iraq;

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE SELLIN
DATE/CASE ID: 11 JUN 2007 200602100

Classified by NEA A/S Bill Burns
E.O. 12958 Reason 1.5 (b) and (d)

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- Underscoring that the U.S. remains fully engaged in efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and
- Emphasizing the importance of reform.

B1


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We have not received an agenda for the meetings.
Participation is restricted to principals only.

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Drafted: NEA/ARP: Atul Keshap, 7-6572

Cleared: NEA: DSatterfield *AKV*
NEA/ARP: GGray ok
NEA/IPA: DHale ok
NEA/NGA: RBeecroft ok
EUR/SE: TZuniga-Brown ok
NEA/ENA: CHenzel ok
EUR/UBI: RKing ok
NEA/ARN: RErdman ok
PM: MKlunder info
S/CT: ACasper ok
D: RSchrivier ok
P: DGatto ok
S/P: JAlterman ok
S/P: RDanin ok

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DOCUMENT: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Circular Cable Diptel 73, 101727Z

DATE: April 10, 2002

SOURCE: British Iraq Inquiry (Chilcot Committee) release

CONTENT: This cable was for the general guidance of British diplomatic missions

Extracts from FCO Diptel 73 of 101727Z, April 2002

Paragraphs 2-5 and 7 onwards have been redacted on the grounds that they reported on issues other than Iraq.

SUBJECT: THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BUSH, 5-7 APRIL

INTRODUCTION

1. The Prime Minister and Mrs Blair visited the Bush ranch in Crawford, Texas on 5-7 April. Much of the discussion was tete-a-tete between the Prime Minister and the President. In FCO telno 215 to Abidjan, the PUS commended the Prime Minister's subsequent speech on 7 April at the George Bush Senior Presidential Library and invited you to draw on it.

IRAQ

6. The Prime Minister came away convinced that President Bush would act in a calm, measured and sensible but firm way. There was no question of precipitate action. But they agreed that Iraq's WMD programmes were a major threat to the international community, particularly when coupled with Saddam's proven track record on using these weapons. Letting that programme continue unhindered was not an option. The Prime Minister and President Bush agreed that action in the UN was the priority. It was essential to get the weapons inspectors deployed to begin to assess the extent of the Iraqi WMD programmes. The Prime Minister had been tough in his demands that Saddam must let the inspectors back in "any one any time any place that the international community demands"

DOCUMENT: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Assessment, “Western Europe: Publics Support Action Against Iraq,”

DATE: April 10, 2002

SOURCE: Department of State FOIA release

CONTENT: State Department intelligence cites opinion polls recording substantial support in Western Europe for military action against Iraq. Public opinion was strongest for action to eliminate the ability to produce weapons of mass destruction, and more mixed on action “forcibly to remove terrorists and shut down training camps.”

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US Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Intelligence Assessment
04/10/2002

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
(U) Western Europe: Publics Support Action Against Iraq

(C) European publics are far ahead of their governments in support for possible military action in Iraq, as long as it is taken multilaterally. Arguments that draw attention to human rights in addition to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will be the most persuasive with Allied publics.

(C) INR surveys conducted before the current Israeli crackdown in the West Bank and Gaza show half or more among key Allied publics supporting military action against Iraq. Backing for action to eliminate Iraq's WMD capabilities reaches majority levels in the United Kingdom, France, and Spain (Table 1). This argument has slightly more influence than using force to "remove terrorists" and eliminate their training camps.


(U) Table 1: Views on Own Country Taking Part in Military Action Against Iraq (percent)					
	UK	France	Germany	Italy	Spain
Forcibly to remove terrorists and shut down training camps					
Support	73	62	48	47	57
Oppose	23	34	50	48	36
To eliminate Iraq's ability to produce weapons of mass destruction					
Support	72	70	53	55	61
Oppose	24	28	44	40	33

B1



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Figure 1: European Attitudes Toward Iraq



04-02 STATE (Office of Research)

(U) Underlying support for military action, European publics are widely negative toward Iraq (Figure 1). Even more than concerns over WMD, European publics take issue with Iraq on terrorism and human rights (Table 2).

(U) Table 2: Reasons for Unfavorable Views
(percent of those "somewhat" or "very" unfavorable toward Iraq)

	UK	France	Germany	Italy	Spain
It is an oppressive regime where human rights are not respected	54	59	58	63	65
It sponsors terrorism	23	25	25	23	20
It possesses weapons of mass destruction	19	11	12	8	10
It is a Muslim state	1*	3	2	3	2

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Other	3	1	2	1	1
Don't know/no answer	2	2	1	2	2
<i>* volunteered answer in the UK</i>					

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Reason for Classification: 1.5 (c)(d)
Declassify on: 20120410
Derived from: multiple sources

[INR Home Page](#) | [Briefs](#) | [Intel Assessments](#) | [Viewpoints](#) | [Products by date](#) | [Products by country](#)

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SEQCOR:130722

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FOISG: Byrne, Malcolm

INR reports on Iraq since September 11, 2001

DOCUMENT: DOD/OUSSDP Memorandum, "Read Ahead for Secretary Rumsfeld RC Meeting, Tuesday April 16, 2002: 'Necessity for Full Range of Training for Iraqi Opposition'

DATE: April 12, 2002

SOURCE: Department of Defense FOIA

CONTENT: A cover note from Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter W. Rodman makes clear that by April 2002 the Pentagon has already completed action on a "decision package" of materials regarding "providing a full range of military training to the Iraqi opposition," to include combat training, and is taking that choice forward to the NSC Principals' Committee. The Department of Defense argues that previous limitations on support to the level of "non-lethal" aid are not based upon legal restrictions, and that combat training "is a necessary first step in implementing the President's guidance." Such training will build trust with the Iraqi exiles, "reduces the possibility of fratricide" in a collaborative military operation, and would increase its effectiveness.

[REDACTED]

April 12, 2002

**READ AHEAD FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD
PC MEETING TUESDAY, 16 APRIL 2002
NECESSITY FOR FULL RANGE OF TRAINING FOR IRAQI OPPOSITION**

**From: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
(Peter W. Rodman, 695-4351)**

- The authors of the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA) say their intent was to provide the full range of military training to the Iraqi opposition.
- The ILA as written does not prohibit using Drawdown Authority for the full range of military training. The current policy to provide only "non-lethal" assistance was a policy decision of the last administration (based on the UN arms embargo on the Saddam regime).
- The Office of the DOD General Counsel advises that the full range of military training assistance to the opposition can be provided consistent with UN Resolutions.
- Providing the full range of military training to the opposition is a necessary first step in implementing the President's guidance to DOD as laid out in [REDACTED] (e.g., "capitalize in our planning on particular lessons learned from our recent support for Afghan opposition forces").
- One of the lessons from working with the Afghan opposition is that early coordination of effort between SOF forces and opposition forces:
 - Builds trust between U.S. and opposition forces.
 - Reduces the possibility of fratricide and collateral damage.
 - Increases the effectiveness of operations.

Attachment:

DOD Decision Package on Removal of Restrictions on ILA Drawdown Authority

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DOCUMENT: CENTCOM, General Tommy Franks, "AOR Trip: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UK, 19-26 April 2002"

DATE: April 29, 2002

SOURCE: Department of Defense FOIA

CONTENT: General Franks recounts conversations with officials in the region as well as key military contacts in the United Kingdom.

*GEN Tommy R. Franks, USA
Commander in Chief
U S Central Command*



AOR Trip

*Egypt, Saudi Arabia Kuwait, and the UK
19 26 April 2002*

April 29, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: CINCCENT AOR Trip 19 to 26 April 2002

(U) CINCCENT conducted an AOR trip to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. A component Commander's meeting was held in Kuwait. The AOR trip was followed by a visit to London, England.

2. Summary of meetings:

- Egypt: 19-22 April – Cairo, Egypt. Following a country team meeting with Ambassador Welch and MG Wilson (OMC Cairo), the CINC called on LTGEN Wahiba, Chief of Staff, Egyptian Armed Forces, Field Marshall Tantawi, Minister of Defense, and President Mubarrak.
- Saudi Arabia: 22/23 April – Riyadh, Prince Sultan Air Base, Jeddah. The CINC met with AMB Jordan and the Country Team in Riyadh. Visited with Troops in PSAB and met with Prince Sultan, Minister of Defense and Aviation, and GEN Muhayya, Chief of Staff, Royal Saudi Defense Forces.
- Kuwait: 24/25 April, Kuwait City, Camp Doha. Following an office call on the US Ambassador and country team briefing, the CINC attended the Hotwash exercise review for Exercise LUCKY SENTINEL and conducted an office call on LTG Ali Mohamed Al-Mumin, Chief of Staff, Kuwait Armed Forces. A Component Commander meeting and troop visit with CJTF Consequence Management followed.
- United Kingdom: The CINC met with Mr. Geoffrey Hoon, Secretary of State for Defence and received a series of briefings from ADM Boyce, Chief of Defence Staff.

3. Specific notes regarding the visit to Egypt.

A. The CINC met with Ambassador Welch and the Country Team. Key issues of concern:

- (1) Amb. Welch noted that the visits by Sec. Powell and VP Cheney had not achieved much emphasis in the region and that the statement by President Bush that "Sharon is a man of peace" had been received very negatively. Additionally, the timeline for pullout noted by Sec. Powell had been viewed as misleading – the common view is that there would be no pullout of Israeli forces from Palestinian areas. President

1.4 (d)

Declassified by:
Vern M. Findley, II, Maj Gen, USAF
CCJ5, Plans Policy and Strategy
Declassified on: 27 Sep 2007

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- (2) The CINC discussed the recent demarche' to Egypt regarding Maritime Interception Operations (MIO). The Ambassador thought the Egyptians would not agree to complete freedom to let U.S. pursue vessels in Egyptian waters but thought that some sort of cooperative method could be worked out.

1.4(c)

- (4) During a private breakfast meeting with MG Wilson, OMC Cairo, he suggested that a new focus be placed on security cooperation. CINC agreed and noted that components need to visit Cairo and meet with counterparts. Additionally, MG Wilson noted that Field Marshall Tantawi would like to come to the US to visit Washington, DC and Tampa.

Action: CENTCOM Components Commanders visit Egypt in the near term and meet with counterparts to discuss security cooperation. CCJ5 provide BG level focus on coordination with OMC Cairo to update and push programs.

Action: CINC to discuss with SECDEF invitation for visit by FM Tantawi to US.

- B. CINC called on LTGEN Wahiba, Chief of Staff. Topics included progress on Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, training of the Afghan National Army (ANA), performance of Egyptian LNO in Tampa, US relationship with Egypt and how media is affecting the view in Egypt, Bright Star 03, and the Middle East crisis. CINC offered an invitation for LTGEN Wahiba to come to the US and visit Washington, DC, and Tampa.
Action: Coordinate visit by LTGEN Wahiba to US following FM Tantawi visit.
- C. CINC called on Field Marshall Tantawi. Topics included: Middle East crisis, importance of US Egyptian Military to Military relationship, visit by Egyptian general officers to Washington in the near future, and Bright Star 2003.
Action: CINC to discuss invitation with SECDEF for FM Tantawi to visit the US (DC & Tampa) in the future (completed 5/2). Chief of Staff to coordinate visit to Tampa in conjunction with visit to Washington, DC.
- D. Following the meeting with FM Tantawi, the CINC conducted an interview with a local Cairo Newspaper and a local TV station.
- E. CINC called on President Mubarrak – the meeting was friendly and constructive. Topics discussed included Operation Enduring Freedom, Middle East crisis, media impacts on the region, Multinational Force and Observers' role in maintaining peace, Bright Star 2003 and terrorism. President Mubarrak noted that the US needed to do something to give the Palestinian people and the Arab world some hope.
Action: CINC agreed to discuss MFO and present President Mubarrak's views to the SECDEF. (Completed 4/23)

4. Specific comments from visit to Saudi Arabia.

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A. Country Team Briefing and meeting with Ambassador Jordan (no CINC action resulted).

(1)

1.4(a) (b)

(2) Other comments from the Country Team: the Saudis have commissioned several groups to study what kind of military they want in the future. 1.4(b)

1.4(b)

ie

B. Call on General Muhayya, Chief of Royal Saudi Defense Forces. The topics included: US/Saudi exercise program resumption,

1.4(b) potential risk to US pilots in Operation Southern Watch (OSW), CINC request for KSA to allow OEF coalition representatives into the CAOC, CINC offer for the Saudis to send a coalition representative to the CENTCOM HQ in Tampa, and the next Joint Planning Conference (JPC).

Action: CCJ5 – Follow up with USMTM on the offer for a KSA representative at CENTCOM HQ for OEF.

Action: CCJ5 – Follow up with USMTM on the request for OEF Coalition Representatives in the CAOC.

C. Call on Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and Aviation, Prince Sultan. Topics included joint KSA and US military exercise program resumption, the next JPC, potential for visit to KSA by US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, building a backup CAOC in Qatar, and the US/KSA relationship. No action resulted from the meeting.

5. Specific comments from Kuwait.

A. CINC conducted a brief country review with Ambassador Jones. No action resulted from this review.

B. Exercise LUCKY SENTINEL hot-wash and after action review (AAR). The CINC attended the AAR at the Kuwait Defense Force Exercise facility. No CINC action resulted from the AAR.

C. Office Call on LTGEN Ali Mohammed Al-Mumin, Chief of Staff of the Kuwait Defense Force. Topics included Kuwaiti participation in Exercise LUCKY SENTINEL, the present Iraq situation, 1.4(a)

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1.4(a) recent operations in Afghanistan, and the
CINC's invitation for LTG Ali to visit the US in the future.

Action: CCJ5 -

1.4(a)

1.4(a)

D. The CINC attended a CENTCOM Component Commander's meeting with CENTCOM Component Commanders. Topics included selected compartmented programs, the Afghanistan National Army and Operation Enduring Freedom. Each Component Commander provided a short discussion on particular issues of concern. CINC action provided separately.

5 Visit to the United Kingdom.

A. The CINC met with Mr. Jeffrey Hoon, the UK Secretary of State for Defense at his request. The meeting took place at Brize Norton, RAF Base.

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(5) Mr. Hoon asked about US plans for Iraq.

1.4(a)(c)

1.4(a)(c)

B. The CINC met with ADM Sir Michael Boyce, Chief of Defence Staff, in a private meeting and then received briefings from the Defence Staff leadership. The briefings included: 1.4(a) a UK military operational brief, and discussions on regional issues.

1)

1.4(a)

(2) The UK Defense Staff leadership met and provided the CINC a series of briefs. Following comments and actions are provided:

A general discussion on the areas to the west of Afghanistan.

1.4(a)

1.4(a)

- DEPCDR PJHQ provided an operations brief.

1.4(a)

1.4(a)

Action:

1.4(a)

1.4(a)

Action:

1.4(a)

1.4(a)

- The J3 from the Defence Staff provided a regional security brief. The CINC was asked about the relationship between CJTF – Afghanistan and the ISAF. 1.4(a)

1.4(a)

should continue the "supported" and "supporting" relationship with ISAF through the CJTF similar to the way presently done with the CFLCC. The CJTF would work directly for the CINC.

DSJ3 noted they have put together a small cell of two- and three-star flag officers thinking strategically about Iraq. Some of the questions they are discussing include: what courses of action are available to handle the regime, what are regime power centers, how to exploit the no fly zones, what could be done with the Iraq army? The CINC noted that OSW and ONW are now not efficacious in that the IADS in Iraq have been reconstituted. A general discussion on approaches to the OSW/ONW problem was conducted.

1.4(a)

1.4(a)

DSJ3 noted that the UK does not see a long-term permanent presence in Afghanistan -

1.4(a)

1.4(a)

As the

Afghan National Army grows in capability, it is expected that the US presence can be reduced.

1.4(a)

1.4(a)

1.4(a)

This is a level that should allow the AIA to manage internal and border security problems.

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United States Central Command
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

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(U) ~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 002213

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

FOR POLAD AMB MARTIN CHESHES FROM PM COUNSELOR MARTIN ADAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2012

TAGS: AMGT

SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL: CINCCENT MEETINGS IN SAUDI
ARABIA

REF RIYADH 2028

CLASSIFIED BY: PM COUNSELOR MPADAMS. REASONS 1.5 A/B/D.

1. (U) AMBASSADOR: HERE FOR YOUR APPROVAL IS THE PROPOSED
TEXT OF OUR CABLE REGARDING GEN. FRANKS, CONVERSATIONS WITH
SAUDI CHIEF OF STAFF GEN. MUHAYYA AND MINDEF PRINCE SULTAN.

(U) 2. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY: ON APRIL 23 CINCCENT MET SAUDI CHIEF OF STAFF
GEN. SALEH MUHAYYA AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND AVIATION
PRINCE SULTAN. MUHAYYA ASKED WHETHER THE USG QUESTIONED
SAUDI FULFILLMENT OF ITS COMMITMENTS RELATED TO SECURITY

1.4(b)

GEN. FRANKS, REQUESTS TO PERMIT LIAISON OFFICERS FROM
COALITION PARTNERS INTO THE SAG,S COMBINED AIR OPERATION
CENTER (CAOC), AND TO STATION A SAUDI OBSERVER AT CENTCOM
HEADQUARTERS WOULD ALSO NEED TO BE ADDRESSED AT THE POLITICAL
LEVEL.

(U) 3. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY CONTD: PRINCE SULTAN CALLED THE AFGHANISTAN
OPERATION A GREAT SUCCESS AND AGREED THAT ESTABLISHMENT
OF STABILITY THERE WILL REQUIRE YEARS OF EFFORT AND
CONSIDERABLE EXPENSE. HE WELCOMED A POSSIBLE VISIT BY SECDEF
AND OTHER U.S. OFFICIALS AND REITERATED HIS INVITATION TO
CJCS GEN. MYERS TO COME TO THE KINGDOM AFTER THE CROWN
PRINCE,S RETURN IN ORDER TO INAUGURATE THE JOINT PLANNING
COMMITTEE (JPC). SULTAN EXPRESSED INTEREST IN VISITING THE
CAOC NEXT MONTH AND PROPOSED THAT COS MUHAYYA SHOULD VISIT
THE U.S. END SUMMARY.

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- (U) 4. ~~(S)~~ COMMENT: ALTHOUGH NO DECISIONS WERE MADE, GENERAL FRANK,S RAISED ISSUES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN DISCUSSED AT SENIOR

1.4(b)

THROUGHOUT BOTH MEETINGS. WE NEED TO PURSUE OPENINGS FOR SENIOR-LEVEL DIALOGUE BOTH IN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN CHANNELS.
END COMMENT.

MEETING WITH MUHAYYA

- (U) 5. ~~(S)~~ COMMITMENTS AND U.S. PRESENCE IN THE KINGDOM: GEN. MUHAYYA OPENED BY STATING THAT, WHILE HE HAD NO ISSUES TO BRING UP HIMSELF, HE WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANY ITEMS

1.4(b)

- (U) 6. ~~(S)~~ GEN. FRANKS ASSURED GEN. 1.4(b)

1.4(b)

ALTHOUGH THE RELATIONSHIP HAD BEEN GOOD FOR FIFTY YEARS, IT WAS NOT PERFECT. SOME ISSUES BECAME IRRITANTS BECAUSE OF MISHANDLING AT THE WORKING LEVEL. MUHAYYA RESPONDED THAT HE FELT IT IMPORTANT TO RAISE IRRITATIONS WHEN THEY OCCURRED BECAUSE, AS A SINCERE FRIEND, THE KINGDOM WISHED TO PROVIDE &EFFECTIVE ADVICE.8 GEN. FRANKS AGREED THE RELATIONSHIP HAD ALWAYS FEATURED HONEST DISCUSSION OF ISSUES.

- (U) 7. ~~(S)~~ EXERCISES: GEN. FRANKS REMARKED THAT THE LOSS OF THE EXERCISE PROGRAM HAD BEEN AN &IRRITANT,8 AND IT IS IMPORTANT THAT EXERCISES WOULD NOW RESUME. GEN. MUHAYYA COUNTERED THAT SUSPENSION OF EXERCISES WAS NOT INTENDED AS A NEGATIVE SIGNAL, BUT REFLECTED THAT THE SITUATION AT THAT TIME DID NOT FAVOR CONTINUATION OF THE PROGRAM. THE INTENTION HAD ALWAYS BEEN TO RESUME THE PROGRAM. THE SAUDI COS EXPLAINED THAT COMPARED TO OTHER NATIONALITIES, HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAD THE MOST FAVORABLE IMPRESSION OF

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AMERICANS, BUT HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT CERTAIN POLITICAL ISSUES (READ THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT).

- (U) 8. ~~(S)~~ SOUTHERN WATCH OPERATIONS: GEN. FRANKS NOTED THAT, WHILE SOME REQUESTS MAY APPEAR TO BE INVASIVE OF SAUDI SOVEREIGNTY, SUCH WAS NEVER THE INTENTION. TO THE CONTRARY, WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE SAG WILL NOT IN ALL CASES PERMIT OPERATIONS TO GO FORWARD. 1.4(a)

- (U) ~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 RIYADH 002213

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

FOR POLAD AMB MARTIN CHESHES FROM PM COUNSELOR MARTIN ADAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2012

TAGS: AMGT

SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL: CINCCENT MEETINGS IN SAUDI ARABIA

1.4(a)

- (U) 9. ~~(S)~~ SAUDI AIR FORCE COMMANDER GEN. HENAIIDY REMARKED THAT THE U.S. HAD OTHER ASSETS BESIDES THOSE IN SAUDI ARABIA FOR ENFORCING THE NO-FLY ZONE. GEN. FRANKS COUNTERED THAT IT WAS OF COURSE POSSIBLE TO ENFORCE THE NO-FLY ZONE WITH OTHER ASSETS, BUT IT WAS NOT CONVENIENT TO DO SO. THAT SAID, WHEN EITHER SIDE PUSHES TOO HARD ON AN ISSUE, FRICTION RESULTS. FOR THAT REASON, HE ACCEPTED THE RESTRICTIONS THE SAG HAD LEVIED. 1.4(d)

1.4(d) GEN. MUHAYYA NOTED THAT CHANGES IN OPERATION OR ROUTING COULD BE REEVALUATED AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL. 1.4(d)

1.4(d)

- (U) 10. ~~(S)~~ LIAISON OFFICERS: RESPONDING TO GEN. HENAIIDY, S RE MARK THAT COOPERATION AT THE CAOC APPEARS TO BE GOING WELL, CINCCENT ASKED FOR PERMISSION TO BRING PLANNERS FROM OTHER STATES IN THE COALITION TO WORK IN THAT FACILITY. HE NOTED

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THAT 31 NATIONS ARE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN THE WAR AGAINST TERROR

1.4(a)

1.4(a) GEN. MUHAYYA RESPONDED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD TURNED DOWN SEVERAL REQUESTS FROM THESE STATES. PERMISSION FOR THE PRESENCE OF COALITION FORCES IN THE KINGDOM WAS LIMITED TO ENFORCEMENT OF SOUTHERN WATCH. USE OF THE CAOC FOR OTHER PURPOSES BY NATIONS NOT ALREADY REPRESENTED THERE WOULD REQUIRE APPROVAL AT POLICY LEVELS.

- (U) 11. ~~(S)~~ GEN. FRANKS COUNTERED THAT SAUDI ARABIA DOES NOT GET SUFFICIENT CREDIT FOR ITS ASSISTANCE TO OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) AND THE WAR AGAINST TERROR. INASMUCH AS THE SAG WAS ALREADY A MEMBER OF THE OEF COALITION, IT SHOULD CONSIDER PERMITTING USE OF ITS CAOC FOR COALITION ACTIVITIES

1.4(a)

- (U) 12. ~~(S)~~ GEN. FRANKS POINTED OUT THAT IRAQ HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH OEF, WHEREAS AFGHANISTAN, YEMEN AND SOMALIA WERE ALL OF CONCERN TO THE COALITION. HE THEN SUGGESTED THAT THE SAG SEND A LIAISON OFFICER TO CENTCOM. SUCH AN OFFICER WOULD RECEIVE DAILY BRIEFINGS ON COALITION ACTIVITIES AND COULD FUNCTION AS A CONDUIT FOR INFORMATION BETWEEN CENTCOM AND THE SAUDI MILITARY. MOREOVER, SAUDI PRESENCE AT CENTCOM COULD BE AS HIGH OR LOW PROFILE AS THE SAG WISHED. GEN. MUHAYYA SUGGESTED THAT THIS ALSO WAS A MATTER FOR POLITICAL AUTHORITIES. (CINCENT ALSO PROVIDED A WRITTEN INVITATION ON THIS ISSUE TO BE FORWARDED TO PRINCE SULTAN.)

- (U) 13. ~~(S)~~ JPC/MILITARY VS. POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS: GEN. MUHAYYA DEMURRED AT CINCENT, S REMARK THAT HE HOPED FOR POLICY DISCUSSIONS AS PART OF THE JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE. THE MILITARY ARE NOT SUPPOSED TO DISCUSS THINGS OF A POLITICAL NATURE. THESE WERE & NOT OUR BUSINESS, 8 AND EMBARRASSMENT COULD RESULT.

1.4(d)

1.4(d)

POLITICAL ISSUES AND NEEDED DISCUSSION AT THE POLICY LEVEL. CHARGE D, AFFAIRES SECONDED GENERAL FRANKS, REMARKS, EXPLAINING THAT HIGH LEVEL USG CIVILIANS MADE THE MAJOR DECISIONS ABOUT NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY POLICY.

MEETING WITH PRINCE SULTAN

- (U) 14. ~~(S)~~ PRINCE SULTAN STATED THAT GEN. MUHAYYA HAD BRIEFED

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HIM FULLY ABOUT HIS MEETING WITH GENERAL FRANKS. THE MINDEF HOPED THAT BOTH SIDES COULD AGREE SOON TO RESTART MILITARY AND NAVAL EXERCISES, AND GEN. FRANKS ASSURED HIM THAT THEY WOULD. SULTAN PRAISED THE RESULT IN AFGHANISTAN AS A GREAT SUCCESS, BUT AGREED WITH CINCCENT THAT ESTABLISHING STABILITY WILL TAKE YEARS. SULTAN EMPHASIZED THE PRESSURE ON CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH TO ABANDON HIS VISIT TO THE U.S. HE WELCOMED A POSSIBLE VISIT BY SECDEF AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS AND REITERATED (REFTEL) HIS INVITATION TO CJCS GEN. MYERS TO COME TO THE KINGDOM AFTER THE CROWN PRINCE'S RETURN IN ORDER TO INAUGURATE THE JPC. SULTAN ALSO EXPRESSED INTEREST IN

(U) ~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 RIYADH 002213

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

FOR POLAD AMB MARTIN CHESHES FROM PM COUNSELOR MARTIN ADAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2012

TAGS: AMGT

SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL: CINCCENT MEETINGS IN SAUDI ARABIA

VISITING THE CAOC NEXT MONTH AND PROPOSED THAT COS MUHAYYA SHOULD VISIT THE U.S.

(U) 15. (+) COMMENT: GENERAL FRANKS HAS SET THE STAGE FOR FOLLOW-ON DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE US-SAUDI SECURITY PARTNERSHIP. AS GENERAL MUHAYYA REPEATEDLY NOTED, HE IS NOT THE INTERLOCUTOR FOR SUCH DISCUSSIONS. UNFORTUNATELY, PRINCE KHALID BIN SULTAN, ASSISTANT MINISTER OF DEFENSE, WAS NOT IN COUNTRY DURING GENERAL FRANKS' VISIT. HE IS THE ONLY SAUDI OFFICIAL BELOW PRINCE SULTAN WHO WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO DISCUSS ISSUES WITH A POLITICAL CONTENT. HE IS NOT A DECISION MAKER HIMSELF, BUT IS CONFIDENT ENOUGH TO ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE, TO REFLECT HIS FATHER'S VIEWS, AND TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR FUTURE SENIOR DISCUSSIONS WITH PRINCE SULTAN HIMSELF.
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FOISG: Strother, Roger


DOCUMENT: Covering note and draft U.K. white paper: “British Government briefing paper on Iraq - 03 June 2002”

DATE: June 3, 2002

SOURCE: U.K. FOIA disclosure

CONTENT: This is the earliest publicly available version of the document that became the U.K. “dossier” on “Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction” published in September 2002. It was described in a covering note as a “consolidated draft of Iraq papers as produced by CIC.” The draft refers obliquely to Iraq’s attempts to acquire: “specialised aluminium [British spelling] which is subject to international export controls because of its potential application in gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium.”

BRITISH GOVERNMENT BRIEFING PAPERS ON IRAQ



CAB/33/0005

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IRAQ

The Government has made clear its concern that Saddam Hussain previously developed and is still developing weapons of mass destruction and is ignoring UN Security Council Resolutions. We are also concerned at Saddam's continuing abuse of the human rights of the people of Iraq.

Saddam Hussain continues to claim that he has no chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, that the people of Iraq do not directly suffer under his leadership and he has not agreed to the return of UN weapons inspectors on UN terms. We are therefore taking this step of publishing this set of papers.

These papers show that Saddam Hussain has dangerous chemical and biological weapons and is still seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. These also shows the appalling human rights abuses the Iraqi people continue to suffer directly from Saddam Hussain.

Our concern is heightened by the knowledge that he may use these weapons – he has already used them against his own people and neighbours. This makes him unique among modern dictators. His threat is unique.

We are convinced that he will be prepared to use these weapons again against his neighbours and our friends and allies.

Doing nothing is not an option.


The world is urging Saddam Hussain to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) of which he is in breach, in line with UNSCR 1284 which demands that he agree to the return of UN weapons inspectors with full access to Iraq – **any time, any place, any where**.

No decision has been taken to launch military action. It is up to Saddam Hussain to show the world that he is serious about fulfilling Iraq's international and humanitarian obligations.

[Ministers to sign]

X X 2002

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



IRAQI WMD PROGRAMMES

NUCLEAR WEAPONS:

Iraq has a nuclear weapons programme, **in breach of its NPT and IAEA obligations and of UNSCR 687**, but will find it difficult to produce fissile material while sanctions remain in place

- Comprehensive programme prior to the Gulf War;
- Recalled scientists to work on a nuclear weapons programme,
- Covert efforts to procure nuclear related materials and technology

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS:

● Iraq has a capability to produce chemical and biological weapons **in breach of UNSCR 687**.

- The amount of chemical and biological material, including weapons and agents, left unaccounted for when the UNSCOM inspections terminated would provide a significant offensive capability;
- Produced and used proficiently a variety of chemical weapons in 1980s against Iran and its own citizens,
- Concealed large scale production of the nerve agent VX until discovered by UNSCOM,
- Produced and weaponised at least three BW agents but concealed this capability until forced to declare it in 1995,
- Failed to convince UNSCOM of the accuracy of its declarations.

BALLISTIC MISSILES:

● Retains more than a dozen prohibited Al Hussain missiles (650km) **in breach of UNSCR 687**, working on designs for longer-range missiles **in breach of UNSCR 687**;

- Infrastructure damaged in the Gulf War and Operation Desert Fox has now largely been reconstituted,
- Infrastructure for longer-range missiles is under construction,
- UNSCOM unable to account for all imported missiles, others could have been built using hidden retained components

CAB/33/0009

UN WEAPONS INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ

- UNSCR 687 fixed the terms of the cease-fire in the Gulf conflict following the illegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq under Saddam Hussain
- The history of UN weapons inspections in Iraq has been characterised by persistent Iraqi efforts to frustrate, deceive and intimidate inspectors
- One of the greatest threats to Allied forces during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 was Iraq's stockpile of chemical and biological weapons and long-range ballistic missiles
- UNSCOM and the IAEA were given the remit to designate any locations for inspection at any time, review any document and interview any scientist, technician or other individual and seize any prohibited items for destruction
- UNSCR 707 demanded that Iraq should allow inspection teams "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas" For over a decade **Iraq has consistently failed** to meet this standard
- Iraq has **admitted** having had a large, effective, system for hiding proscribed material including documentation, components, production equipment and, possibly, biological and chemical agents and weapons from the UN
- In July 1995, Iraq **acknowledged that biological agents had been produced** on an industrial scale at Al-Hakam
- Iraq acknowledged that it had pursued a biological programme that led to the deployment of actual weapons Iraq admitted producing in excess of **200 biological weapons** with a reserve stock of agent to fill considerably more
- Saddam has refused to admit UN-mandated weapons inspectors to Iraq since 1998
- The IAEA has pointed out that their annual inspection does "not serve as a substitute for the verification activities required by the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council "
- In April 1999, an independent UN panel of experts endorsed the Butler report and noted that "the longer inspection and monitoring activities remain suspended, the more difficult the comprehensive implementation of Security Council resolutions becomes, increasing the risk that **Iraq might reconstitute its proscribed weapons programmes** "

CAB/33/0010

IRAQI REGIME: CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

- Saddam Hussain seized control of Iraq in 1979. Five of his close friends were subsequently executed after they opposed his take-over
- In 1983, 8,000 male Kurds aged 13 and upwards were taken prisoner and later executed – for no reason, except that they were Kurds
- Amnesty International in 1985 told of 300 KURDISH CHILDREN who were arrested in Sulaimaniya – some were tortured and three were killed
- At least 100,000 Kurds were killed or disappeared during the Anfal campaign
- According to Human Rights Watch, a single CHEMICAL WEAPONS attack on the town of Halabja killed up to 5,000 civilians and injured some 10,000 more
- The Iraqi regime used chemical weapons – MUSTARD GAS and the nerve agents TABUN and SARIN – extensively from 1984, resulting in over 20,000 Iranian casualties
- Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Abuses committed by its forces included ROBBERY, RAPE of Kuwaitis and expatriates, and summary EXECUTIONS.
- More than 600 Kuwaitis taken by the Iraq regime ARE STILL MISSING and unaccounted for over TEN YEARS after the Gulf War
- More than 100 MUSLIM CLERICS have disappeared since 1991
- An estimated 2,500 PRISONERS WERE EXECUTED between 1997 and 1999 in a “prison cleansing” campaign
- In October 2000, dozens of women accused of prostitution were BEHEADED WITHOUT ANY JUDICIAL PROCESS, together with men accused of pimping. Some were accused for political reasons
- Men, women and CHILDREN continue to be ARRESTED, DETAINED, TORTURED AND MURDERED on suspicion of political or religious activities, or because they are related to members of the opposition

CAB/33 | 0011

IRAQI WMD PROGRAMMES

This document draws on information from a range of sources, including intelligence. Because of the need to protect the safety of sources, details underpinning intelligence judgements cannot be made public. But the Government is confident of the judgements set out in this paper.

Introduction

- Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons are collectively known as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Several countries have WMD programmes and missile systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical or biological warheads. They are working to develop more accurate and longer-range missiles that will allow them to threaten more than just their immediate neighbours.
- Most countries have promised not to acquire these weapons. They have signed relevant international agreements including the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and Toxins Weapons Conventions (BTWC).
- A few countries have either failed to sign these agreements or have decided to break them. The position of Iraq is a particular concern. Iraq is a signatory to the NPT, but since the late 1980s it has not abided by its obligations. Since the Gulf War Iraq has been bound by five UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) relating to its WMD programmes. It remains in breach of all of them. In 1980 and 1990 Saddam Hussain used his conventional forces to mount unprovoked attacks against his neighbours, Iran and Kuwait respectively. He has used chemical weapons both against Iran and against his own Kurdish people.
- The International Community has repeatedly sought to disrupt Iraq's efforts to acquire WMD. On each occasion Saddam has sought to rebuild his capabilities. His efforts are making progress. The Government monitors these efforts very closely. This paper sets out what the Government is able to say about them.

Background

Before the Gulf War, Saddam Hussain demonstrated his readiness to deploy extensively WMD in the form of chemical weapons both against his neighbours and his own population. Since the Gulf War, he has **failed to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions**, which his government accepted

While the successful enforcement of the sanctions regimes and the UN arms embargo have impeded Iraq's efforts to reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction, they have not halted them. Much of Iraq's missile infrastructure has been rebuilt; the nuclear weapons programme is being reconstituted, and Iraq continues to have the capability to produce chemical and biological weapons, and may already have done so.

Since the withdrawal of inspectors in 1998, monitoring of Iraq's attempts to restore a WMD capability has become more difficult

UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) relating to WMD

UNSCR 687, April 1991 created the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and required Iraq to accept, unconditionally, "the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision" of its chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150km, and their associated programmes, stocks, components, research and facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was charged with abolition of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. UNSCOM and the IAEA must report that their mission has been achieved before the Security Council can end sanctions. They have not yet done so.

UNSCR 707, August 1991, stated that Iraq must provide full, final and complete disclosure of all its WMD programmes and provide unconditional and unrestricted access to UN inspectors. Iraq must also cease all nuclear activities of any kind other than civil use of isotopes.

UNSCR 715, October 1991 approved plans prepared by UNSCOM and IAEA for the monitoring and verification arrangements to implement UNSCR 687.

UNSCR 1051, March 1996 stated that Iraq must declare the shipment of dual-use WMD goods.

UNSCR 1284, December 1999, established UNMOVIC (United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) as a successor to UNSCOM and calls on Iraq to give UNMOVIC inspectors "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transport"

Saddam's Weapons

Nuclear Weapons

Before the Gulf War, Iraqi plans for the development of a nuclear weapon were well advanced. Iraq was planning and constructing fissile material production facilities and work on a weapon design was underway. Their declared aim was to produce a weapon with a 20 kiloton yield, which would ultimately be delivered in a ballistic missile warhead.

We assessed in 1991 that Iraq was less than three years away from possessing a nuclear weapon.

After the Gulf War, Iraq's nuclear weapons infrastructure was dismantled by the IAEA. But we judge that Iraq is still working to achieve a nuclear weapons capability, in breach of its NPT and IAEA obligations and UN Security Council Resolution 687. Much of its former expertise has been retained.

Effect of a 20 kiloton nuclear device in a built up area

A detonation occurring over a city might flatten an area of approximately 3 square miles.

Within 1.6 miles of detonation, blast damage and radiation would cause 80% casualties, three-quarters of which would be fatal. Between 1.6 and 3.1 miles from the detonation, there would still be 10% casualties, 10% of which would be fatal injuries.

In the last year intelligence has indicated that specialists were recalled to work on a nuclear weapons programme in the autumn of 1998. But Iraq needs certain key equipment and materials for the production of the fissile material necessary before a nuclear bomb could be developed. We judge that the Iraqi programme is based on gas centrifuge uranium enrichment, which was the route Iraq was following for producing fissile material before the Gulf War.

Iraq is covertly attempting to acquire technology and materials with nuclear applications. This includes specialised aluminium, which is subject to international export controls because of its potential application in gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium. Although this material has applications in a range of other weapon systems.

So long as sanctions continue to hinder the import of such crucial goods, Iraq would find it difficult to produce a nuclear weapon. After the lifting of sanctions we assess that Iraq would need at least five years to produce a weapon.

Progress would be much quicker if Iraq was able to buy suitable fissile material.

Chemical And Biological Weapons

Iraq made frequent use of a variety of **chemical weapons** during the Iran-Iraq War. Iraq used significant quantities of mustard, tabun and sarin resulting in over 20,000 Iranian casualties. In 1988 Saddam also used mustard and nerve agents against the Kurds in northern Iraq. Estimates vary, but according to Human Rights Watch up to 5,000 people were killed. Iraq's military maintains the capability to use these weapons, with command, control and logistical arrangements in place.

Iraq admitted in 1991 to the production of blister agent (mustard) and nerve agents (tabun, sarin, and cyclosarin).

Effects of chemical agents

Mustard is a liquid agent that causes burns and blisters to exposed skin. It attacks and damages the eyes, mucous membranes, lungs, skin, and blood-forming organs. When inhaled, mustard damages the respiratory tract; when ingested, it causes vomiting and diarrhoea.

Tabun, sarin and VX are all nerve agents of which VX is the most toxic. They all damage the nervous system, producing muscular spasms and paralysis. As little as 10 milligrammes of VX on the skin can cause death.

A chemical weapon is the agent combined with a means of dispersing it.

After years of denial Iraq admitted to producing about 4 tons of VX nerve agent, but only after the defection of Saddam's son-in-law, Hussain Kamil in 1995. Iraq maintains that the chemical weapons programme was halted in January 1991 and all agents under its control were destroyed by the summer of 1991. However, there are inconsistencies in Iraqi documentation on destruction.

Analysis of figures provided by UN weapons inspectors indicate that they have been unable to account for:

- up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent, including 1.5 tonnes of VX nerve agent,
- up to 3000 tonnes of precursor chemicals including approximately 300 tonnes which, in the Iraqi CW programme, were unique to the production of VX;
- over 30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological agents

We cannot be sure whether these have been destroyed or remain at the disposal of the Iraqi government. But we judge that Iraq retains some production equipment and at least small amounts of chemical agent precursors.

Following four years of pressure from weapons inspectors and the information provided by Hussein Kamil, Iraq finally admitted to the existence of a **biological weapons** programme in 1995.

Iraq admitted to:

- producing anthrax spores, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin and to working on a number of other agents;
- weaponising some agents, which included the filling of warheads for its Al Hussain ballistic missiles,
- testing spraying devices for agents

Iraq has claimed that all its biological agents and weapons have been destroyed, although no convincing proof of this has been offered. UN inspectors could not account for large quantities of growth media procured for biological agent production, enough to produce over three times the amount of anthrax Iraq admits to having manufactured. Reports that Iraq has conducted research on smallpox and a number of toxins cannot be corroborated. Iraq is assessed to be self-sufficient in the technology required to produce biological weapons.

We assess that Iraq has a covert chemical and biological weapons programme, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687.

All the necessary expertise has been retained. Iraq appears to be refurbishing sites formally associated with its chemical and biological weapons programmes. This includes a facility near Habbaniyah, previously associated with the production of precursors. Iraq is assessed to have some chemical and biological agents available, either from pre-Gulf War stocks or more recent production.

We judge Iraq has the capability to produce the chemical agents:

- sulphur mustard, tabun, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX.

and the biological agents.

- anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin.

Iraq retains conventional delivery means for chemical and biological weapons such as free fall bombs and missile warheads. But given Iraq's admission of testing spray devices, we judge that the modification of the L-29 jet trainer could allow it to be used for the delivery of chemical and biological agents. The L-29 was subject to UNSCOM inspection for this reason.

Effects of biological agents

Anthrax

Anthrax is a disease caused by the bacterium *Bacillus anthracis*. Inhalation anthrax is the manifestation of the disease likely to be expected in biological warfare. The symptoms may vary. If the dose is large (8,000 to 10,000 spores) death is common. The incubation period for anthrax is 1 to 7 days, with most cases occurring within 2 days of exposure.

Botulinum toxin

Botulinum toxin is a neurotoxin produced by the bacterium *Clostridium botulinum* and is one of the most toxic substances known to man. The first symptoms of botulinum toxin poisoning may appear as early as 1 hour post exposure or as long as 8 days after exposure, with the incubation period between 12 and 22 hours. Paralysis leads to death by suffocation.

Aflatoxin

Aflatoxins are fungal toxins, which are potent carcinogens. Aflatoxin contaminated food products can cause liver inflammation and cancer.

Ricin

Ricin is derived from castor beans and can cause multiple organ failure within one or two days of inhalation. A lethal dose is estimated to be about 1 milligram.


A biological weapon is the agent combined with a means of dispersing it.

Saddam's Missiles

Ballistic Missiles

Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had a well-developed missile industry. Iraq fired over 500 SCUD-type missiles at Iran during the Iran-Iraq War and 93 SCUD type-missiles during the Gulf War. The latter were targeted at Coalition forces stationed in the Gulf region and Israel. Armed with conventional warheads they did limited damage. Iraq had chemical and biological warheads available but did not use them.

ABABIL-100



Most of the missiles fired in the Gulf War were an Iraqi produced stretched version of the SCUD missile, the Al Hussain, with an extended range of 650 km. Iraq was working on other longer-range stretched SCUD variants, such as the Al Abbas, which had a range of 900km. Iraq was also seeking to reverse engineer the SCUD engine with a view to producing new missiles, recent evidence indicates they may have succeeded at that time. In particular Iraq had plans for a new SCUD-derived missile with a range of 1200km. Iraq also conducted a partial flight test of a multi-stage satellite launch vehicle based on SCUD technology, known as the Al Abid.

SCUD missiles


The short-range mobile SCUD ballistic missile was developed by the Soviet Union in the 1950s, drawing from the technology of the German liquid-propellant V-2 which saw operational service towards the end of World War II.

For many years it was the mainstay of Soviet and Warsaw Pact tactical missile forces, and it was also widely exported. Recipients of Soviet-manufactured SCUDs included Iraq, North Korea, Iran, and Libya, although not all were sold directly by the Soviet Union.

Also during this period, Iraq was developing the BADR-2000, a 700-1000km range two-stage solid propellant missile (based on the Iraqi part of the 1980s CONDOR-2 programme run in co-operation with Argentina and Egypt). There were plans for 1200-1500km range solid propellant follow-on systems.

Since the Gulf War, Iraq has been openly developing two short-range missiles up to a range of 150km, which are permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 687. The Al-Samoud liquid propellant missile has been extensively tested, has appeared on public parade in Baghdad and is judged to be nearing deployment. In the absence of UN inspectors, Iraq has also worked on extending its range to at least 200km. Testing of the solid propellant Ababil-100 is also underway, with plans to extend its range to at least 200km.

AL HUSSEIN



Any extension of a missile's range to beyond 150km would be in breach of UN Security Resolution 687.

Compared to liquid propellant missiles, those powered by solid propellant offer greater ease of storage, handling and mobility. They are also quicker to take into and out of action and can stay at a high state of readiness for longer periods. We judge that Iraq has retained more than a dozen Al Hussain missiles, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687.

These missiles were either hidden from the UN as complete systems, or could have been re-assembled using illegally retained engines and other components. We judge that the engineering expertise available would allow these missiles to be effectively maintained. We assess that some of these missiles could be available for use.

Although not very accurate when used against *other countries*, they are still an effective system, which could be used with a conventional, chemical or biological warhead.

Reporting has recently confirmed that Iraq's priority is to develop longer-range missile systems, which we judge are likely to have ranges over 1000km, enabling it to threaten regional neighbours, Israel and some NATO members. These programmes employ hundreds of people. Imagery below has shown a new engine test stand being constructed (A), which is larger than the current one used for Al Samoud (B), and that formerly used for testing SCUD engines (C) which was dismantled under UNSCOM supervision.



We judge that this new stand will be capable of testing engines for missiles with ranges over 1000km, which are not permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 687.

Iraq is also working to obtain improved guidance technology to increase missile accuracy. The success of UN restrictions means the development of new longer-range missiles is likely to be a slow process.

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These restrictions impact particularly on the

- availability of foreign expertise,
- conduct of test flights to ranges above 150km;
- acquisition of guidance and control technology.

Saddam remains committed to developing longer-range missiles. We assess that, if sanctions remain in place, the earliest Iraq could achieve a limited missile capability of over 1000km is 2007, but it is more likely to be towards the end of the decade (Figure 4 shows the range of Iraq's various missiles)

To be confident that it has successfully developed a longer-range missile Iraq would need to conduct a flight-test. Current UN Security Council Resolutions do not permit tests of over 150km.

Iraq has managed to rebuild much of the missile production infrastructure destroyed in the Gulf War and in Operation Desert Fox in 1998. New missile-related infrastructure is currently under construction, including a plant for indigenously producing ammonium perchlorate, which is a key ingredient in the production of solid propellant rocket motors. This was obtained through an Indian chemical engineering firm with extensive links in Iraq.

Despite a UN embargo, Iraq has also made concerted efforts to acquire additional production technology, including machine tools and raw materials, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 1051.

The embargo has succeeded in blocking many of these attempts, but, despite the dual use nature of some of the items, we know some items have found their way to the Iraqi ballistic missile programme and will inevitably continue to do so.


Concealment

Strategies to conceal and protect key parts of Iraq's WMD and ballistic missile programmes from a military attack or a UN inspection have been developed. These include the

- use of transportable laboratories in their chemical and biological weapons programmes,
- use of covert facilities,
- dispersal of equipment when a threat is perceived.

In particular we know that the Iraqi leadership has recently ordered the dispersal of its most sensitive WMD equipment and material. This order is being carried out.

Iraq: Current and Planned/Potential Ballistic Missiles



CURRENT AND PLANNED/POTENTIAL BALLISTIC MISSILES

CONCLUSION

- Iraq retains some prohibited missile systems.
- Iraq is developing longer-range ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction throughout the Middle East and Gulf Region.
- Iraq is seeking a nuclear weapons capability.
- Iraq has a chemical weapons capability, and has used it. It also has a biological weapons capability.

HISTORY OF UN WEAPONS INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ

This paper draws on a number of different published and intelligence sources, including reports by UN personnel and non-Governmental organisations.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (UNSCR 687) of 3 April 1991 fixed the terms of the cease-fire in the Gulf conflict following the illegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq under Saddam Hussain and his defeat by an international coalition of forces in Operation Desert Storm.

UNSCR 687 also established the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM).

The purpose of this body was to oversee, in conjunction with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the dismantling of Iraq's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to maintain a monitoring programme to ensure that it was never rebuilt

Saddam Hussain



The history of UN weapons inspections in Iraq has been characterised by persistent Iraqi efforts to frustrate, deceive and intimidate inspectors. Despite the conduct of the Iraqi authorities towards them, both UNSCOM and the IAEA Action Team have valuable records of achievement in discovering and destroying biological and chemical weapons stocks, missiles and the infrastructure for Iraq's nuclear weapons programme

By the end of 1998 there nevertheless remained significant uncertainties about the disposition of Iraq's prohibited WMD programmes. A series of confrontations and the systematic refusal by Iraq to co-operate, left UNSCOM unable to perform its disarmament mandate and the inspectors withdrew on 13 December 1998.

The US and the UK had made clear that anything short of full co-operation would make military action unavoidable. Operation Desert Fox (16-19 December 1998) was designed to degrade Saddam's ability to regenerate and deploy biological and chemical weapons and prevent him from threatening his neighbours with these or other weapons.

Since December 1998, Iraq has refused absolutely to comply with its UN disarmament and monitoring obligations and allow access to weapons inspectors. We judge that Iraq has used the intervening 40-month period to rebuild significant aspects of its chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.

These actions not only present a direct challenge to the authority of the United Nations. They also breach Iraq's commitments under two key international arms control agreements

- the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention – which bans the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of biological weapons, and,
- the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – which prohibits Iraq from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons

This note clarifies the UN's inspection mandate in Iraq, records just some instances of Iraqi obstruction over the past decade and focuses on one of the most egregious examples of non-compliance with UN resolutions: Iraq's consistent denial of a biological weapons programme. The note ends with a summary of developments since the last inspection in December 1998, and the steps we think Iraq now needs to take if the international community is ever to have any assurance that Saddam Hussain's ambitions to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have finally been thwarted

UNSCR 687 and the Formation of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM)

One of the greatest threats to Allied forces during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 was Iraq's stockpile of chemical and biological weapons and long-range ballistic missiles. At the time, there were genuine concerns that Saddam Hussain would authorise the use of such weapons against Allied troops and his neighbours. In the mid-late 1980s Iraq had shown no compunction about using chemical weapons in its war with Iran and against the Kurdish people of Halabja. According to the non-governmental organisation (NGO), Human Rights Watch, the latter resulted in up to 5,000 deaths

But the true scale of Iraq's programme to acquire WMD and their means of delivery only became apparent with the establishment of a UN weapons inspection regime in the aftermath of Desert Storm. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 was adopted in April 1991. It obliged Iraq to provide declarations on all aspects of its WMD programmes within 15 days and accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless under international supervision of its chemical, biological and nuclear programmes, and all ballistic missiles with a range beyond 150km

UNSCR 687 mandated two inspection teams to handle Iraqi disarmament and establish long term monitoring regimes: the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) would tackle the chemical, biological and missile programmes, and the Action Team within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would be responsible for tracking down and dismantling Iraq's illicit nuclear weapons programme

UNSCOM and the IAEA were given the remit to designate any locations for inspection at any time, review any document and interview any scientist, technician or other individual and seize any prohibited items for destruction

Iraqi Non-Co-operation with UN Weapons Inspectors

The UN passed a further Resolution in 1991 that set out in clear and specific terms the standard of co-operation the international community expected of Iraq UNSCR 707 (August 1991) demanded that Iraq should allow inspection teams "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas". For over a decade Iraq has consistently failed to meet this standard

Prior to the first inspection, the Iraqi regime did its utmost to hide stocks of WMD. The former Chairman of UNSCOM, Richard Butler, reported to the UN Security Council that in 1991 a decision was taken by a high-level Government committee to provide inspectors with only a portion of its proscribed weapons, components, production capabilities and stocks. UNSCOM concluded that Iraqi policy was based on the following actions

- to provide only a portion of extant weapons stocks, releasing for destruction only those that were least modern,
- to retain the production capability and documentation necessary to revive programmes when possible,
- to conceal the full extent of its chemical weapons programme, including the VX nerve agent project;
- to conceal the number and type of chemical and biological warheads for proscribed long-range missiles,

- and to conceal the very existence of its massive biological weapons programme

At the same time, Iraq tried to maintain its nuclear weapons programme via a concerted campaign to deceive IAEA inspectors. In 1997 the Agency's Director General stated that the IAEA was "severely hampered by Iraq's persistence in a policy of concealment and understatement of the programme's scope."

Harassment of Inspectors by Iraq

Once inspectors had arrived in-country, it quickly became apparent that Iraq would resort to any measures (including physical threats and psychological intimidation of inspectors) to prevent UNSCOM and the IAEA from fulfilling their mandate. Examples of Iraqi obstruction are too numerous to list in full. But some of the more infamous examples include:

- firing warning shots in the air to prevent IAEA inspectors from intercepting nuclear related equipment (June 1991),
- keeping IAEA inspectors in a car park for 4 days and refusing to allow them to leave with incriminating documents on Iraq's nuclear weapons programme (September 1991),
- announcing that UN monitoring and verification plans were "unlawful" (October 1991),
- refusing UNSCOM inspectors access to the Ministry of Agriculture. Threats were made to inspectors who remained on watch outside the building. The inspection team had reliable evidence that the site contained archives related to proscribed activities,
- refusing to allow UNSCOM the use of its own aircraft to fly into Iraq (January 1993). In 1991-2 Iraq objected to UNSCOM using its own helicopters and choosing its own flight plans
- refusing to allow UNSCOM to install remote-controlled monitoring cameras at two key missile sites (June-July 1993),
- repeatedly denying access to inspection teams (1991- December 1998),
- interfering with UNSCOM's helicopter operations, threatening the safety of the aircraft and their crews (June 1997),
- demanding end of U2 overflights and the withdrawal of US UNSCOM staff (October 1997),
- destroying documentary evidence of WMD programmes (September 1997),
- and refusing access to inspection teams on the grounds that certain areas and even roads were deemed "Presidential Sites" (1997-98)


In response to these incidents, the President of the Security Council issued frequent statements calling on Iraq to comply with its disarmament and monitoring obligations

In December 1997 Richard Butler reported to the UN Security Council that Iraq had created a new category of sites – presidential and sovereign – from which it claimed that UNSCOM inspectors were henceforth barred

The terms of the cease-fire in 1991 foresaw no such limitation


Iraq consistently refused to allow inspections access to the eight Presidential sites until the invention of the UN Secretary General in February 1998, which enabled special access to UNSCOM/IAEA teams observed by diplomatic representatives. These sites are in fact massive compounds containing many buildings, some of which house security units that have in the past been associated with concealing Iraq's WMD programme.

A photograph of a presidential site or what have been called "palaces".



Buckingham palace has been super-imposed to demonstrate their comparative size.

Iraq - BW - Related Facilities as of Jan 1991



DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE STAFF

Army Mapping C7481/0107/J

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Iraqi Concealment Unit

Iraq acknowledged that a group of technical, security and intelligence staff was established in April 1991 to conceal vital aspects of its proscribed programmes including documentation, personnel, components, research and production equipment, biological and chemical agents and weapons. Shortly after the adoption of UNSCR 687 in April 1991, an Administrative Security Committee (ASC) was formed with responsibility for advising Saddam on the information which could be released to UNSCOM and the IAEA.

The Committee consisted of senior Military Industrial Commission (MIC) scientists from all of Iraq's WMD programmes. The Higher Security Committee (HSC) of the Presidential Office was in overall command of deception operations. The system was directed from the very highest political levels within the Presidential Office and involved, if not Saddam himself, his youngest son, Qusai.

The system for hiding proscribed material relied on high mobility and good command and control. It used lorries to move items at short notice and most hide sites appear to have been located close to good road links and telecommunications. The Baghdad area was particularly favoured. In addition to active measures to hide material from the UN, Iraq has attempted to monitor, delay and collect intelligence on UN operations to aid its overall deception plan.

Iraq's Biological Weapons Programme


Nowhere was Iraqi obstruction of UN inspectors more blatant than in the field of biological weapons. Iraq denied that it had pursued a biological weapons programme until July 1995. Between 1991 and 1995, Iraq refused to disclose any details of its past programme.

In the course of the first biological weapons inspection in August 1991, Iraq indicated that it had merely conducted a military biological research programme. At the site visited, Al-Salman, Iraq had removed equipment, documents and even entire buildings. Later in the year, during a visit to the Al-Hakam site, Iraq declared to UNSCOM inspectors that the facility was used as a factory to produce proteins derived from yeast to feed animals. Inspectors subsequently discovered that the plant was a central site for the production of anthrax spores and botulinum toxin for weapons. Iraqi officials had also systematically cleaned up the factory in order to deceive inspectors.

Another key site, the Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Institute at Daura which produced botulinum toxin and probably anthrax, was not divulged as part of the programme. Five years later, after intense pressure, Iraq acknowledged that tens of tonnes of bacteriological warfare agent had been produced there and at Al-Hakam.

Iraq's Nuclear
Weapon sites

Iraq - Nuclear - Related Facilities as of Jan 1991



Iraq consistently tried to obstruct UNSCOM's efforts to investigate the scale of its biological weapons programme. It created forged documents to account for bacterial

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growth media, imported in the late 1980s, specifically for the production of anthrax, botulinum toxin and probably plague. The documents were created to indicate that the material had been imported by the State Company for Drugs and Medical Appliances Marketing for use in hospitals and distribution to local authorities.

Iraq also censored documents and scientific papers provided to the first UN inspection team, removing all references to key individuals, weapons and industrial production of agents.

Iraq has yet to provide any documents concerning production of biological agent and subsequent weaponisation. Iraq claims to have destroyed, unilaterally and illegally, some biological weapons in 1991 and 1992 making accounting for these weapons impossible. In addition Iraq cleansed a key site at Al-Muthanna – its main research and development, production and weaponisation facility for chemical warfare agents – of all evidence of a biological programme in the toxicology department, the animal-house and weapons filling station.

The first biological inspection team tasked with establishing monitoring of compliance was denied access to Baghdad University Veterinary School in March 1993. In July 1995, Iraq acknowledged reluctantly that biological agents had been produced on an industrial scale at Al-Hakam. Following the defection in August 1995 of Hussain Kamel, Iraq released over 2 million documents relating to its WMD programme.

Iraq acknowledged that it had pursued a biological programme that led to the deployment of actual weapons. Iraq admitted producing in excess of 200 biological weapons with a reserve of agent to fill considerably more.

As documents recovered in August 1995 were assessed, it became apparent that the full disclosure required by the UN was far from complete. Successive inspection teams went to Iraq to try to gain greater understanding of the programme and to obtain credible supporting evidence. In July 1996 Iraq refused to discuss its past programme and doctrine forcing the team to withdraw in protest.

Monitoring teams were at the same time finding undisclosed equipment and materials associated with the past programme. In response, Iraq grudgingly provided successive disclosures of their programme which were judged by UNSCOM, and specially convened international panels, to be technically inadequate.

Iraq refused to elaborate further on the programme during inspections in 1997 and 1998, confining discussion to previous topics. In July 1998, Tariq Aziz personally intervened in the inspection process stating that the biological programme had been more secret and more closed than other WMD programmes. He also played down the significance of the programme. This is consistent with Iraq's policy of trivialising the

biological weapons programme as the personal adventure of a few misguided scientists

In late 1995, Iraq acknowledged weapons testing the biological agent ricin, but did not provide production information. Two years later – in early 1997 – UNSCOM discovered evidence that Iraq had produced ricin. Ricin is a highly dangerous toxin derived from castor bean pulp which can cause multiple organ failure and death within one or two days of inhalation

UNSCOM and IAEA Achievements

UNSCOM surveyed 1015 sites in Iraq, carrying out 272 separate inspections. Despite Iraqi obstruction and intimidation, UN inspectors uncovered details of chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes the scale of which surprised the world

One of the most sobering discoveries was that at the time of the Gulf War, Iraq had been within less than three years of acquiring a nuclear weapon. Other major UNSCOM/IAEA achievements included

- the destruction of 40,000 munitions for chemical weapons, 2,610 tonnes of chemical precursors and 411 tonnes of chemical warfare agent,
- the dismantling of Iraq's prime chemical weapons development and production complex at Al-Muthanna, and a range of key production equipment,
- the destruction of 48-SCUD type missiles, 11 mobile launchers and 56 static sites, 30 warheads filled with chemical or biological agents, and 20 conventional warheads,
- the destruction of the Al-Hakam biological weapons facility and a range of production equipment, seed stocks and growth media for biological weapons,
- and the removal and destruction of the infrastructure for the nuclear weapons programme, including the Al-Athir weaponisation/testing facility

Operation Desert Fox

The US and The UK had made clear, when calling off airstrikes in November 1998, that anything short of full co-operation would lead to immediate military action against Iraq

Richard Butler was requested to report to the UN Security Council in December 1998 and made clear that, following a series of direct confrontations, coupled with the systematic refusal by Iraq to co-operate, UNSCOM was no longer able to perform its disarmament mandate.

As a direct result, on December 13 the weapons inspectors withdrew and Operation Desert Fox was launched by the US and the UK three days later

During Operation Desert Fox (16-19 December 1998)

- Iraq's ability to deliver biological or chemical agents by ballistic missile was weakened.
- There were attacks against missile production and research facilities and the destruction of infrastructure associated with the concealment of material and documents associated with the biological, chemical, nuclear and long-range missile programmes;
- Key facilities associated with Saddam's Ballistic Missile programme were significantly degraded, setting this back between one and two years

The Situation Since 1998

Despite UNSCOM's efforts, a series of significant disarmament issues nevertheless remained to be resolved. In summarising the situation in a report to the Security Council in February 1999, the UNSCOM Chairman, Richard Butler, set out a damning account of Iraqi deceit. For example


- Butler declared that obstructive Iraqi activity had had "a significant impact upon the Commission's disarmament work,"
- contrary to the requirement that destruction be conducted under international supervision, "Iraq undertook extensive, unilateral and secret destruction of large quantities of proscribed weapons and items",
- and Iraq "also pursued a practice of concealment of proscribed items, including weapons, and a cover up of its activities in contravention of Council resolutions"

There have been no UN-mandated weapons inspections in Iraq since 1998. In an effort to enforce Iraqi compliance with its disarmament and monitoring obligations, the Security Council passed resolution 1284 in December 1999. This established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) as a successor organisation to UNSCOM. It also set out the steps Iraq needed to take to in return for the eventual suspension and lifting of sanctions.

A key measure of Iraqi compliance will be full co-operation with UN inspectors, including unconditional, immediate and unrestricted access to any and all sites

Iraq - Missile - Related Facilities

Iraq's
Missile sites



For the past three years, Iraq has allowed the IAEA to carry out an annual inspection of a stockpile of low-enriched uranium. This has led some countries and western commentators to conclude – erroneously – that Iraq is meeting its nuclear

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disarmament and monitoring obligations. As the IAEA has pointed out in recent weeks, this annual inspection does "not serve as a substitute for the verification activities required by the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council."

Since 1998, the UK believes that Iraq has pressed ahead with its WMD programmes. Dr. Hans Blix, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, and Dr. Mohammed El-Baradei, the Director General of the IAEA, have declared that in the absence of inspections it is impossible to verify Iraqi compliance with its UN disarmament and monitoring obligations.

In April 1999, an independent UN panel of experts endorsed the Butler report and noted that "the longer inspection and monitoring activities remain suspended, the more difficult the comprehensive implementation of Security Council resolutions becomes, increasing the risk that Iraq might reconstitute its proscribed weapons programmes."

In the interests of regional and global security, the international community cannot allow this stand off to continue indefinitely.

IRAQI REGIME: CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

Not only does Saddam Hussain's regime represent a threat to international security because of its continuing development of weapons of mass destruction, its aggression, violation of the laws of armed conflict and its record of systematic abuse of human rights is chilling.

This paper draws on a number of different published and intelligence sources, including reports by UN personnel and non-Governmental organisations



Saddam Hussain

Pre-Gulf War Record

Saddam's rise to power was marked by the brutality that now characterises his regime. Five of his close friends, members of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council, were executed for opposing his takeover of the Presidency in 1979. His uncle, General Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, who stepped down from the Presidency in Saddam's favour, was also killed. Saddam is also widely believed to have been behind the helicopter "accident" that killed his wife's brother, Adnan Khairallah, in June 1989.

Saddam quickly established all-pervasive control of Iraq. Right from the start, he committed numerous atrocities. Iraq's Shi'a Muslim and Kurdish communities in particular have suffered at his hands.

In April 1980, a leading Iraqi Shi'a cleric, Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, was executed. Many members of another leading clerical family, the Hakims, were arrested in May 1983 and executed. Another member of the same clerical family, Sayed Mahdi al-Hakim, was murdered in Khartoum in January 1988.

CAB/33/0037

Documents captured by the Kurds during the Gulf War and handed over to the non-governmental organisation Human Rights Watch indicated that Saddam's persecution of the Kurds amounts to a policy of genocide. 8,000 Kurds, males aged 13 and upwards, were taken prisoner in 1983 and later put to death.

Amnesty International in 1985 drew attention to reports of hundreds more dead and missing, including the disappearance of 300 Kurdish children arrested in Sulaimaniya, of whom some were tortured and three died in custody



In 1988, Iraqi government forces systematically razed Kurdish villages and killed civilians.



Amnesty International estimates that over 100,000 Kurds were killed or disappeared during the 1987-1988 campaign, known as the Anfal campaigns, to quell Kurdish insurgency and activities

The campaign included the use of chemical weapons. According to the non-governmental organisation Human Rights Watch, a single attack on the Kurdish town of Halabja killed up to 5,000 civilians and injured some 10,000 more

Chemical Massacre at Halabja, March 1988

The brutal massacre of the oppressed and innocent people of Halabja began before the sunrise of Friday, 17th of March 1988. The Iraqi regime committed one of its most tragic and horrible crimes against the civilian people on Friday, 17th of March. On that day, Halabja was bombarded more than twenty times by Iraqi regime's warplanes with chemical and cluster bomb.

That Friday afternoon, the magnitude of Iraqi crimes became evident. In the streets and alleys of Halabja, corpses piled up over one another. Children playing in front of their houses were killed instantly. The children did not even have time to run back home. Some children fell down at the threshold of the door of their houses.

Early in the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam shot a Minister who argued for peace during a Cabinet meeting. Saddam started the war because he disputed the Iran-Iraq border, despite having himself negotiated that border before he became President

The war claimed a million casualties. The Iraqi regime used chemical weapons – mustard gas and the nerve agents tabun and sarin – extensively from 1984, resulting in over 20,000 Iranian casualties

Ali Hasan al-Majid

“Chemical Ali”

As commander for the northern region, he bears direct command responsibility for the chemical weapons attack on the town of Halabja in northern Iraq which resulted in the death of up to 5,000 people


He also took a leading role in the brutal repression of the uprising that followed the Gulf War in 1991, which included mass executions, torture and widespread destruction.



The UN Security Council considered the report prepared by a team of three specialists appointed by the UN Secretary General in March 1986, following which the President made a statement condemning Iraqi use of chemical weapons. This marked the first time a country had been named for violating the 1925 Geneva Convention banning the use of chemical weapons

Non-Judicial Beheading and Torture

This document follows the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council’s appointment of Hasan al-Majid as the one in charge of all security, military and civil affairs in northern Iraq in March 1987. Immediately after his appointment, the Anfal campaign was launched. Indiscriminate deadly methods, ranging from chemical attacks against Kurdish civilians to destruction of Kurdish villages to beheading of Kurds, were used by the regime to follow through on its campaign.



One Arab Nation With an Eternal Message
The Ba’ath Arab Socialist Party
The Qutr of Iraq
Northern Organisation Bureau Command
Number 5083 (Secretariat Office)
Date 22 Aug 1987

-Confidential and Personal-

To First Corps Command
Subject Execution of Criminals
Comradely Salute,

[Re] your personal and confidential letter [No] 352 on 8 Aug 1987.

The valiant comrade, Ali Hasan al-Majid, Commander of the Northern Organisation Bureau, has commented as follows on your aforementioned letter

“We do not object to the decapitation of traitors. But it would have been preferable had you also sent them to Security for the purpose of interrogating them [Security personnel] could have found with them other significant information that could have been useful, prior to their execution.”

Kindly review Respectfully

[Signature]

Tahir Tawfiq

Secretary of Northern Affairs Committee

Iraq also started the "war of the cities", involving the indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets, with its attack on Ahwaz in March 1985. And it consistently mistreated POWs, including by brainwashing.

Farzad Bazoft

Farzad Bazoft was a young journalist working for the Observer when he was arrested by the Iraqi authorities in September 1989. The 31-year old Iranian exile, who was travelling on British travel documents, had visited Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi authorities on several occasions previously. He was researching a story on a large explosion at the rocket-testing complex at Qaqa, south of Baghdad when he was arrested. Detained with him was Mrs Daphne Parish, a British nurse who worked at one of Baghdad's major hospitals, who had driven him to the site. They were accused of spying for Britain and Israel. Mrs Parish was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, spent six months in solitary confinement before being moved to a women's prison, and was eventually released in 1990.

Bazoft was less fortunate. He was forced to make a confession (allegedly after being drugged) and sentenced to death by hanging after a cursory trial. Despite widespread international protest and condemnation, the Iraqi regime carried out the death sentence on 15 March 1990. In a callous snub, Mr Latif Nassif Jassem, the Iraqi Information Minister and confidant of President Saddam, said "Mrs Thatcher wanted him alive. We gave her the body", after Mr Bazoft's corpse was handed over to the British embassy in Baghdad.

Invasion of Kuwait

Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Abuses committed by its forces included robbery, rape of Kuwaitis and expatriates, and summary executions. Amnesty International documented many other abuses during the occupation of Kuwait.

Iraq denied access to the Red Cross, which has a mandate to provide protection and assistance to civilians affected by international armed conflict. The death penalty was extended to looting and hoarding of food.

As Iraq tried to implement a policy of Iraqisation of the occupied territory, Kuwaiti civilians were arrested for "crimes" such as wearing beards. People were dragged from their homes and held in improvised detention centres. In findings based on a large number of interviews, Amnesty listed 38 methods of torture used by the Iraqi occupiers, including beatings, breaking of limbs, extracting finger and toenails, inserting bottle necks into the rectum, and subjecting detainees to mock executions.

More than 600 Kuwaiti POWs and missing are still unaccounted for. We believe some were still alive in 1998. Iraq refuses to comply with its UN obligation to account for the missing. It has provided sufficient information to close only three files.



Aziz Salih Numan

Aziz Salih al-Nu'man

As Governor of Kuwait during the latter part of the occupation, November 1990 – February 1991, he bears responsibility for grave breaches of Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time Of War committed by Iraqi forces during that period, including murder, torture, rape and deportation

In an attempt to deter military action to expel it from Kuwait, the Iraqi regime took several hundred foreign nationals (including children) in Iraq and Kuwait hostage, and prevented thousands more from leaving. Worse still, hostages were held as human shields at a number of strategic military and civilian sites, many in inhumane conditions. These acts constituted a flagrant violation of international law – the Fourth Geneva Convention, to which Iraq is a party – as was confirmed in United Nations Security Council resolutions 670 and 674.

At the end of the Gulf War, the Iraqi army fleeing Kuwait set fire to over 1,160 Kuwaiti oil wells, with serious environmental consequences. And inside Iraq, an uprising by Iraqi Kurds and Shi'a Muslims was brutally suppressed, with the loss of tens of thousands of lives.

Continuing abuses

Since the Gulf War, the Iraqi regime's systematic repression of the Iraqi people has continued unabated.

Persecution of the Kurds

Persecution of Iraq's Kurds continues, although the protection provided by the northern No-Fly Zone has curbed the worst excesses. The Baghdad regime has continued a policy of Arabisation in northern Iraq to remove Kurdish claims to the oil-rich area around the city of Kirkuk. Kurds and other non-Arabs are forcibly relocated to the three northern Iraqi governorates – Dohuk, Arbil and Sulaimaniyah – which are under de facto Kurdish control.

The United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) Special Rapporteur for Iraq reports that 94,000 individuals have been expelled since 1991. Kurdish reports indicate that four million square metres of agricultural land owned by Kurds has been

confiscated and redistributed to Iraqi Arabs. Arabs from southern Iraq have been offered incentives to move into the Kirkuk area and, in disputes with their Kurdish neighbours, are always favoured by the authorities.

'B'

B (name withheld), a Kurdish businessman from Baghdad, married with children, was arrested in December 1996 outside his house by plainclothes security men. Initially his family did not know his whereabouts and went from one police station to another inquiring about him. Then through friends they found out that he was being held in the headquarters of the General Security Directorate in Baghdad. The family was not allowed to visit him.

Eleven months later in November 1997 the family was told by the authorities that he had been executed and that they should go and collect his body. His body bore evident signs of torture. His eyes were gouged out and the empty eye sockets were filled with paper. His right wrist and left leg were broken. The family was not given any reason for his arrest and subsequent execution. However, they suspected that he was executed because of his friendship with a retired army general who had links with the Iraqi opposition outside the country and who was arrested just before **B's** arrest and also executed.

In addition, ethnic Kurds and Turcomans have been prevented from buying property and those who own property and wish to sell have to do so to an Arab. Kurds have also been encouraged to change the ethnicity on their identity cards to Arab as part of this process.

Persecution of the Shi'a community, including murder of Shi'a religious leaders

More than 100 Shi'a clerics have disappeared since the 1991 uprising. Sayyed Muhammed Taghi al-Khore was killed in a staged car accident in July 1994. Following the assassination in 1998 of two leading Shi'a clerics, Grand Ayatollah Shaykh Mirza Ali al-Gharawi and Ayatollah Shaykh Murtadaal-Burujerdi, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights reported his fears that this formed part of a systematic attack on the independent leadership of Shi'a Muslims in Iraq.

Barzan al-Tikriti

Saddam's half brother. Personally responsible for the detention and/or murder of several thousand male members of the Barzani tribe in 1983. While head of Iraqi Intelligence (the Mukhabarat) 1979-1983, he was responsible for the repression of religious and ethnic minorities, including forced deportation, disappearances and murder.

Linked to the arrest of 90 members of the al-Hakim family and the murder of at least six of them.



In early 1999, during a peaceful demonstration in response to the Iraqi regime's murder of the most senior Shi'a cleric in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, security forces fired into the crowd of protestors, killing hundreds of civilians, including women and children. Security forces were also involved in efforts to break-up Shi'a Friday prayers in Baghdad and other cities. Large numbers of Shi'a were rounded up, imprisoned without trial and tortured. In May 2001, two more Shi'a clerics were executed in Baghdad for publicly accusing the regime of the Grand Ayatollah's murder

Al-Shaikh Yahya Muhsin Ja'far al-Zeini

Al-Shaikh Yahya Muhsin Ja'far al-Zeini, from Saddam City, is a 29-year-old former theology student in *al-Hawza al-'Ilmiya* in al-Najaf. On 2 July 1999 he was arrested in his parents' house following his arrival from al-Najaf. His father and two brothers had been detained as substitute prisoners until his arrest. Security men blindfolded him and took him to a Security Directorate building. Once there, he was taken to a room and his blindfold was removed. He told Amnesty International

"... I saw a friend of mine, al-Shaikh Nasser Taresh al-Sa'idi, naked. He was handcuffed and a piece of wood was placed between his elbows and his knees. The two ends of the wood were placed on two high chairs and al-Shaikh Nasser was being suspended like a chicken. This method of torture is known as *al-Khaygama* (a reference to a former security director known as al-Khaygani). An electric wire was attached to al-Shaikh Nasser's penis and another one attached to one of his toes. He was asked if he could identify me and he said "this is al-Shaikh Yahya". They took me to another room and then after about 10 minutes they stripped me of my clothes and a security officer said "the person you saw has confessed against you". He said to me "You followers of [Ayatollah] al-Sadr have carried out acts harmful to the security of the country and have been distributing anti-government statements coming from abroad". He asked if I have any contact with an Iraqi religious scholar based in Iran who has been signing these statements. I said "I do not have any contacts with him". I was then left suspended in the same manner as al-Shaikh al-Sa'idi. My face was looking upward. They attached an electric wire on my penis and the other end of the wire is attached to an electric motor. One security man was hitting my feet with a cable. Electric shocks were applied every few minutes and were increased. I must have been suspended for more than an hour. I lost consciousness. They took me to another room and made me walk even though my feet were swollen from beating. They repeated this method a few times."

In response to on-going attacks on government buildings and officials in southern Iraq during 1999, the Iraqi army and militia forces destroyed entire Shi'a villages in the south. This was a continuation of the regime's policy, pursued throughout the 1990s, of draining the marshes area of southern Iraq, so forcing the population to relocate to urban areas where it was unable to offer assistance to anti-regime elements and could be controlled more effectively by the regime's security forces.

Harassment of the Opposition

The UNCHR Special Rapporteur on Iraq has received numerous reports of harassment, intimidation and threats against the families of opposition members living abroad.

In mid February 1999 the brother of a senior London-based member of the Iraqi National Accord (INA) was arrested by Iraqi Intelligence (the Mukhabarat) in Basra and forced to phone his brother in the UK and explain his predicament. A


Mukhabarat officer subsequently spoke to the INA member and demanded that he cooperate with the Mukhabarat

In January 1999 the Mukhabarat phoned another INA official, who was told that his children and brother were under arrest and would face punishment if he did not cooperate with the Mukhabarat. The Mukhabarat demanded details of the home, car and routines of INA head Dr Ayed Allawi

A Professional Rapist

Government personnel card of Aziz Saleh Ahmed, identified as a "fighter in the popular army" whose "activity" is "violation of women's honour"

(i.e. a professional rapist)



The family of General Nahib al-Salehi, a political opponent living in Jordan, have been subjected to arrests, questioning and other forms of harassment. In June 2000, he received a videotape showing the rape of a female relative. Ten days later, he was contacted by the Iraqi Intelligence Service, who told him that they were holding another female relation and urged him to stop his activities.

Special Operations

"Special Operations" refers to regime-sanctioned sabotage, kidnapping and assassination missions. Since the early 1970s the Intelligence Services have planned and carried out assassinations of prominent Iraqi oppositionists and other political targets. Since 1991, these include:

- MUAYAD HASAN NAJJI AL-JANABI, a scientist formerly engaged in Iraq's nuclear programme, who was murdered in Jordan in late 1992.
- SHAYKH TALIB AL-SUHAYL, an Iraqi dissident, murdered in Lebanon in 1994.
- The attempted assassination of former US President GEORGE BUSH in Kuwait in early 1993.

Arbitrary killings

Executions are carried out without due process of law. Relatives are often prevented from burying the victims in accordance with Islamic practice, and have even been charged for the bullets used. An estimated 2,500 prisoners were executed between 1997 and 1999 in a "prison cleansing" campaign (not the first – in 1984, 4,000 political prisoners were executed at a single prison, the Abu Ghraib). In February 2000, 64 male prisoners were executed at Abu Ghraib, followed in March by a further 58, all of whom had previously been held in solitary confinement. In October 2001, 23 political prisoners, mainly Shi'a Muslims, were executed at Abu Ghraib.

Between 1993 and 1998 around 3,000 prisoners from the "Mahjar" prison (see below) were executed in an execution area called the "Hadiqa" (garden) near to the prison. The "Hadiqa" consisted of an open area and sand bank which was covered by a steel awning. Prisoners from the "Mahjar" were executed in the "Hadiqa" by machine gun. A Special Oversight Committee at the prison decided on the executions.

Udayy Saddam Hussain

Saddam's elder son. Has been frequently accused of serial rape and murder of young women.

Personally executed dissidents in Basra during the uprising which followed the Gulf War in March 1991.

As a member of the National Security Council, he bears command responsibility for all crimes committed with the authority or acquiescence of that body.



In October 2000, dozens of women accused of prostitution were beheaded without any judicial process, together with men accused of pimping. Some were accused for political reasons. Members of the Feda'iyye Saddam (the militia created in 1994 by Saddam's elder son, Udayy Hussain) used swords to execute victims in front of their homes.

'Ala 'Abd Al-Qadir Al-Majid

In mid 2001, 'Ala 'Abd Al-Qadir Al-Majid fled to Jordan from Iraq, citing disagreements with the regime over business matters. 'Ala was a cousin of Saddam Hussain, a former intelligence officer and, latterly, a businessman. He returned to Iraq after the Iraqi Ambassador in Jordan declared publicly that his life was not in danger. He was met at the border by Tahir Habbush, Head of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (the Mukhabarat), and taken to a farm owned by 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid. At the farm 'Ala was tied to a tree and executed by members of his immediate family who, following orders from Saddam, took it in turns to shoot him.

Saddam has a history of dealing with disloyalty by arranging for traitors, as Saddam sees them, to be killed by their family or tribal associates. This helps to prevent blood feuds between different family/tribal groups and to distance his involvement.

'Ala is just the latest of some 40 of Saddam's relatives, including women and children, that he has had killed. In February 1996, his sons-in-law Hussain Kamal and Saddam Kamal were executed. They had defected in 1995 and returned to Iraq from Jordan after the government had announced amnesties for them.

Arbitrary arrest, detention under inhumane conditions, inhumane punishments, and torture

Men, women and children continue to be arrested and detained on suspicion of political or religious activities, or simply because they are related to members of the opposition. Political prisoners are held in inhumane and degrading conditions throughout Iraq.

The "Mahjar" prison located on the Police Training College site in central Baghdad formerly housed the Police Dog Training Centre. The normal occupancy of the "Mahjar" is 600-700 people. Thirty of the cells are underground and thirty other cells used to be dog kennels. Prisoners are beaten twice a day and the women regularly raped by their guards. They receive no medical treatment, but some prisoners have survived up to a year in the "Mahjar". Two large oil storage tanks each with a capacity of 36,000 litres have been built close to the "Mahjar". The tanks are full of petrol and are connected by pipes to the prison buildings in the "Mahjar". The prison authorities have instructions to set light to the petrol and destroy the "Mahjar" in an emergency.

Torture and Mistreatment in Abu Ghraib Prison

Abdallah, a member of the Ba'ath Party whose loyalty became suspect has still-vivid personal memories from his four years of imprisonment at Abu Ghraib in the 1980s, where he was held naked the entire time and frequently tortured.

On the second day of his imprisonment, the men were forced to walk between two rows of five guards each, to receive their containers of food. While walking to get the food, they were beaten by the guards with plastic telephone cables. They had to return to their cells the same way, so that a walk to get breakfast resulted in twenty lashes. "It wasn't that bad going to get the food", Abdallah said, "but coming back the food was spilled when we were beaten." The same procedure was used when the men went to the bathroom.

On the third day, the torture began. "We were removed from our cells and beaten with plastic pipes. This surprised us, because we were asked no questions. Possibly it was being done to break our morale", Abdallah speculated. The torture escalated to sixteen sessions daily. The treatment was organised and systematic. Abdallah was held alone in a 3x2-meter room that opened onto a corridor. "We were allowed to go to the toilet three times a day, then they reduced the toilet to once a day for only one minute. I went for four years without a shower or a wash", Abdallah said. He also learned to cope with the deprivation and the hunger that accompanied his detention.

"I taught myself to drink a minimum amount of water because there was no place to urinate. They used wooden sticks to beat us and sometimes the sticks would break. I found a piece of a stick, covered with blood, and managed to bring it back to my room. I ate it for three days. A person who is hungry can eat anything. Pieces of our bodies started falling off from the beatings and our skin was so dry that it began to fall off. I ate pieces of my own body.

"No one, not Pushkin, not Mahfouz, can describe what happened to us. It is impossible to describe what living this day to day was like. I was totally naked the entire time. Half of the original group [of about thirty men] died. It was a slow type of continuous physical and psychological torture. Sometimes, it seemed that orders came to kill one of us, and he would be beaten to death."

The "Sijn Al-Tarbut" (the casket prison) is located on the third underground level of the new Directorate of General Security (DGS) building in Baghdad. The prisoners here are kept in rows of rectangular steel boxes, as found in mortuaries, until they either confess to their crimes or die. There are around 100-150 boxes which are

opened for half an hour a day to allow the prisoners some light and air. The prisoners receive only liquids



Qusayy Saddam Hussain

Saddam's younger son. As head of the Iraqi internal security agencies, he has permitted and encouraged the endemic use of torture, including rape and the threat of rape, in Iraq

The "Qurtiyya" (the can) prison is located in a DGS compound in the Talbiyyah area of the Saddam City district of Baghdad. This consists of 50-60 metal boxes the size of old tea chests in which detainees are locked under the same conditions as the "Sijn Al-Tarbut". Each box has a tap for water and a floor made of mesh to allow the detainees to defecate

A Tortured Family

A particularly nasty example of torture involved a family which was arrested in late 2000 and taken to two separate interrogation centres within Republican Guard facilities located along the road to Abu Ghraib. The husband was held in one centre whilst the wife and children were held at a women's facility. The husband and wife were interrogated under torture about the husband's sale of a vehicle which, the interrogators said, had been captured by Iraqi security forces during a raid on Iraqi oppositionists.

The interrogators said separately to both husband and wife that they would cease the torture if they signed confessions admitting to be collaborating with the oppositionists. They refused. The wife was stripped naked and cigarettes stubbed out on all parts of her body whenever she refused to implicate her husband. She was beaten and thrown around the interrogation room. Her children were forced to watch the torture. She was eventually released, having been told that her husband would continue being tortured until she returned to confess. She was arrested again two weeks later and the same pattern of torture was repeated, leaving her a psychological wreck.

During his interrogation, the husband's arms were tied behind his back and he was then suspended in the air using a hook hung from the ceiling. This caused intense pain as his shoulder muscles and ligaments were torn. After a period, the interrogators entered the room and the husband was unhooked and placed in a chair in the middle of the room. From close range, he was then shot at with a pistol whenever he refused to agree to sign his confession. Sometimes shots were fired which missed his body, at other times the pistol muzzle was placed against his fingers, toes or arms and fired so as to mutilate these areas.

Over the following two weeks further interrogations occurred at intervals, following periods of food and water deprivation. Eventually a bribe was paid to an Iraqi Intelligence officer by the husband's and wife's wider family and both the husband and wife were released. They subsequently escaped Iraq.

Prisoners are also subjected to brutal torture. Methods include knife cuts, sexual attacks, electric shocks, eye gouging, cigarette burns, pulling out of fingernails and mutilation of hands with electric drills. "Official" rape is also systematically used against Iraqi women.

In early 1998, the Iraqi regime obstructed a UN weapons inspection team which was trying to investigate claims that Iraq had conducted biological weapons experiments on prisoners during the mid-1990s

Saddam has issued a series of decrees establishing severe penalties (amputation, branding, cutting off of ears, or other forms of mutilation) for criminal offences. Anyone found guilty of slandering the President has their tongue removed. These punishments are practised mainly on political dissenters. Iraqi TV has broadcast pictures of these punishments as a warning to others.

Senior regime figures have been personally involved in these abuses. General 'Abd Hamud, the head of Saddam's private office, has played a direct role in supervising all of these prisons and their security. Both he and Saddam have signed death warrants for prisoners. The archive files holding these death warrants were kept hidden within the cafeteria area on the eighth floor of the main Ministry of Interior building in Baghdad.


Udayy Hussain maintained a private torture chamber, known as the "Ghurfa Hamra" (Red Room) in a building on the banks of the Tigris disguised as an electricity installation. In one infamous incident of mass torture, Udayy Hussain ordered the national football team to be caned on the soles of their feet after losing a World Cup qualifying match.



Saddam's chemical gifts to the Marsh Arabs



Iraq Current and Planned/Potential Ballistic Missiles



CAB/33/0049

DOCUMENT: CIA/National Intelligence Council draft white paper, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs"

DATE: July 2002

SOURCE: CIA FOIA

CONTENT: Draft of paper eventually published by the CIA in October 2002.

DRT
Feb 05



Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs

July 2002

Summary

Iraq—which has the expertise, facilities, and equipment to expand its WMD arsenal—is working to reconstitute prohibited WMD programs.

- Since December 1998, Baghdad has refused to allow UN inspectors into Iraq as required by UN Security Council resolutions; in the absence of such inspections, Iraq's ability to work on prohibited programs without risk of discovery undoubtedly has increased.
- Iraq has stockpiles of CW and BW agents and munitions, is rebuilding its dual-use production facilities, and is aggressively pursuing delivery platforms—including UAVs—for chemical and biological agents.
- Iraq retains a small force of prohibited Scud-variant missiles and launchers and is developing two short-range ballistic missile systems that could violate UN-imposed range restrictions. All of these Iraqi weapons could have warheads that deliver chemical or biological agents.
- Iraq still has much of the infrastructure needed to pursue its goal of building a nuclear weapon, but it is unlikely to produce indigenously enough weapons-grade material for a deliverable nuclear weapon until late in the decade. Baghdad could shorten the acquisition timeline significantly if it were able to procure fissile material abroad.
- Iraq has been able to import dual-use, WMD-related equipment and material through procurements both within and outside the UN sanctions regime. Baghdad diverts some of the \$10 billion worth of goods now entering Iraq every year for humanitarian needs to support the military and WMD programs.

Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs

In April 1991, the UN Security Council enacted Resolution 687 requiring Iraq to declare, destroy, or render harmless its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal and production infrastructure under UN or International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervision. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 also demanded that Iraq forgo the future development or acquisition of WMD.

Baghdad's determination to hold onto a sizeable remnant of its arsenal, agents, equipment, and expertise has led to years of dissembling and obstruction of UN inspections. Elite Iraqi security services orchestrated an extensive concealment and deception campaign to hide incriminating documents and material that precluded resolution of key issues in each WMD category: Iraq's missile, chemical warfare (CW), biological warfare (BW), and nuclear programs.

- Iraqi obstructions prompted the Security Council to pass several subsequent resolutions demanding that Baghdad comply with its obligations to cooperate with the inspection process and to provide United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and IAEA officials immediate and unrestricted access to any site they wished to inspect.
- While outwardly maintaining the facade of cooperation, Iraqi officials frequently denied access to facilities, personnel, and documents in an effort to conceal critical information about their WMD programs.

Successive Iraqi declarations on Baghdad's pre-Gulf war WMD programs gradually became more accurate between 1991 and 1998 but only because of sustained pressure from UN sanctions, coalition military force, and vigorous and robust inspections facilitated by information from cooperative countries. Nevertheless, **Iraq never has fully accounted for major gaps and inconsistencies in its declarations and has provided no credible proof that it has completely destroyed its weapons stockpiles and production infrastructure.**


- Despite the destruction of most of its prohibited ballistic missiles and some Gulf war-era chemical and biological munitions, Iraq probably still has a small force of Scud-variant missiles, chemical precursors, biological seed stock, and thousands of munitions suitable for chemical and biological agents.
- Iraq has managed to preserve and in some cases even enhance the infrastructure and expertise necessary for WMD production and has used that capability to maintain a stockpile and possibly to increase its size and sophistication.

Since December 1998, Baghdad has refused to allow United Nations inspectors into Iraq as required by the Security Council resolutions. Technical monitoring systems installed by the UN at known and suspected WMD and missile facilities in Iraq no longer operate.

UN Security Council Resolutions and Provisions for Inspections and Monitoring: Theory and Practice

Resolution Requirement	Reality
<p>Res. 687 (3 April 1991) Requires Iraq to declare, destroy, remove, or render harmless under UN or IAEA supervision and not to use, develop, construct, or acquire all chemical and biological weapons, all ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 150 km, and all nuclear weapons-usable material, including related material, equipment, and facilities. The resolution also formed the Special Commission and authorized the IAEA to carry out immediate on-site inspections of WMD-related facilities based on Iraq's declarations and UNSCOM's designation of any additional locations.</p>	<p>Baghdad refused to declare all parts of each WMD program, submitted several declarations as part of its aggressive efforts to deny and deceive inspectors, and ensured that certain elements of the program would remain concealed. The prohibition against developing delivery platforms with ranges greater than 150 km allowed Baghdad to research and develop shorter-range systems with applications for longer-range systems and did not affect Iraqi efforts to convert full-size aircraft into unmanned aerial vehicles as potential WMD delivery systems with ranges far beyond 150 km.</p>
<p>Res. 707 (15 August 1991) Requires Iraq to allow UN and IAEA inspectors immediate and unrestricted access to any site they wish to inspect. Demands Iraq provide full, final, and complete disclosure of all aspects of its WMD programs; cease immediately any attempt to conceal, move, or destroy WMD-related material or equipment; allow UNSCOM and IAEA teams to use fixed-wing and helicopter flights throughout Iraq; and respond fully, completely, and promptly to any Special Commission questions or requests.</p>	<p>Baghdad in 1996 negotiated with UNSCOM Executive Chairman Ekeus modalities that it used to delay inspections, to restrict to four the number of inspectors allowed into any site Baghdad declared as "sensitive," and to prohibit them altogether from sites regarded as sovereign. These modalities gave Iraq leverage over individual inspections. Iraq eventually allowed larger numbers of inspectors into such sites but only after lengthy negotiations at each site.</p>
<p>Res. 715 (11 October 1991) Requires Iraq to submit to UNSCOM and IAEA long-term monitoring of Iraqi WMD programs; and approved detailed plans called for in UNSCRs 687 and 707 for long-term monitoring.</p>	<p>Iraq generally accommodated UN monitors at declared sites but occasionally obstructed access and manipulated monitoring cameras. UNSCOM and IAEA monitoring of Iraq's WMD programs does not have a specified end date under current UN resolutions.</p>
<p>Res. 1051 (27 March 1996) Established the Iraqi export/import monitoring system, requiring UN members to provide IAEA and UNSCOM with information on materials exported to Iraq that may be applicable to WMD production, and requiring Iraq to report imports of all dual-use items.</p>	<p>Iraq is negotiating contracts for procuring—outside of UN controls—dual-use items with WMD applications. The UN lacks the staff needed to conduct thorough inspections of goods at Iraq's borders and to monitor imports inside Iraq.</p>
<p>Res. 1060 (12 June 1996) and Resolutions 1115, 1134, 1137, 1154, 1194, and 1205: Demand Iraq cooperate with UNSCOM and allow inspection teams immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to facilities for inspection and access to Iraqi officials for interviews. UNSCR 1137 condemns Baghdad's refusal to allow entry to Iraq to UNSCOM officials on the grounds of their nationality and its threats to the safety of UN reconnaissance aircraft.</p>	<p>Baghdad consistently sought to impede and limit UNSCOM's mission in Iraq by blocking access to numerous facilities throughout the inspection process, often sanitizing sites before the arrival of inspectors and routinely attempting to deny inspectors access to requested sites and individuals. At times, Baghdad would promise compliance to avoid consequences, only to renege later.</p>
<p>Res. 1154 (2 March 1998) Demands Iraq comply with UNSCOM and IAEA inspections and endorses the Secretary General's memorandum of understanding with Iraq, providing for "severest consequences" if Iraq fails to comply. Res. 1194 (9 September 1998) Condemns Iraq's decision to suspend cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA. Res. 1205 (5 November 1998) Condemns Iraq's decision to cease cooperation with UNSCOM.</p>	<p>UNSCOM could not exercise its mandate without Iraqi compliance. Baghdad refused to work with UNSCOM and instead negotiated with the Secretary General, whom it believed would be more sympathetic to Iraq's needs.</p>
<p>Res. 1284 (17 December 1999) Established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), replacing UNSCOM; and decides Iraq shall allow UNMOVIC teams immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all aspects of Iraq's WMD program.</p>	<p>Iraq repeatedly has rejected the return of UN arms inspectors and claims that it has satisfied all UN resolutions relevant to disarmament. Compared with UNSCOM, 1284 gives the UNMOVIC chairman less authority, gives the Security Council a greater role in defining key disarmament tasks, and requires that inspectors be full-time UN employees.</p>


- After four years of claiming that they had conducted only “small-scale, defensive” research, Iraqi officials finally admitted in 1995 to production and weaponization of biological agents. The Iraqis admitted this only after being faced with evidence of their procurement of a large volume of growth media and the defection of Husayn Kamil, former director of Iraq’s military industries.
- Iraq admitted producing thousands of liters of the BW agents anthrax,² botulinum toxin, (which paralyzes respiratory muscles and can be fatal within 24 to 36 hours) and aflatoxin, (a potent carcinogen that can attack the liver, killing years after ingestion) and preparing BW-filled Scud-variant missile warheads, aerial bombs, and aircraft spray tanks before the Gulf war, although it did not use them.



Two R-400A bombs in foreground (with black stripe) photographed by UNSCOM inspectors at Murasana Airfield near the Al Walid Airbase in late 1991 bear markings indicating they were to be filled with botulinum toxin. Other bombs appear to have markings consistent with binary chemical agent fill. This evidence contradicted Iraq’s declarations that it did not deploy BW munitions to operational airbases and that it destroyed all BW bombs in July 1991—declarations that were subsequently retracted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

² An infectious dose of anthrax is about 8,000 spores or less than one-millionth of a gram in a non-immunocompromised person. Inhalation anthrax historically has been 100 percent fatal within five to seven days, although in recent cases aggressive medical treatment has reduced the fatality rate.

Chemical-Filled Munitions Declared by Iraq



*Iraqi 250-gauge
chemical bomb.*




*Iraqi 500-gauge
chemical bombs.*




*Iraqi DB-2
chemical bomb.*




*Iraqi R-400
chemical bombs.*



*Iraqi 155-mm
chemical shell.*




*Iraqi Al Husayn
chemical
warheads.*



*122-mm rockets
filled with the
chemical nerve
agent sarin prior
to destruction.*


Iraq: CW-Related Production Facilities and Declared Sites of Deployed Alcohol-Filled or Chemical Agent-Filled Munitions During Desert Storm



DI Cartography Center/MPG 760101A (R00657) 6-02

Baghdad continues to rebuild and expand dual-use infrastructure that it could divert quickly to CW production. The best examples are the chlorine and phenol plants at the Fallujah II facility. Both chemicals have legitimate civilian uses but also are raw materials for the synthesis of precursor chemicals used to produce blister and nerve agents. Iraq has three other chlorine plants that have much higher capacity for civilian production; these plants and Iraqi imports are more than sufficient to meet Iraq's civilian needs for water treatment. Of the 15 million kg of chlorine imported under the UN Oil-for-Food program since 1997, Baghdad used only 10 million kg and has 5 million kg in stock, suggesting that some domestically produced chlorine has been diverted to proscribed activities.

- Fallujah II was one of Iraq's principal CW precursor production facilities before the Gulf war. In the last two years the Iraqis have upgraded the facility and brought in new chemical reactor vessels and shipping containers with a large amount of production equipment. They have expanded chlorine output far beyond pre-Gulf war production levels—capabilities that they could divert quickly to CW production. Iraq is seeking to purchase CW agent precursors and applicable production equipment and is trying to hide the activities of the Fallujah plant.



Nuclear Weapons Program

More than ten years of sanctions and the loss of much of Iraq's nuclear infrastructure under IAEA oversight have not diminished Saddam's interest in acquiring or developing nuclear weapons. Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development program before the Gulf war that focused on building an implosion-type weapon using highly enriched uranium. Baghdad was attempting a variety of uranium enrichment techniques, the most successful of which were the electromagnetic isotope separation and gas centrifuge programs. After its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq initiated a crash program to divert IAEA-safeguarded, highly enriched uranium from its Soviet and French-supplied reactors, but the onset of hostilities ended this effort. Iraqi declarations and the UNSCOM/IAEA inspection process revealed much of Iraq's nuclear weapons efforts, but Baghdad still has not provided complete information on all aspects of its nuclear weapons program.

- Iraq has withheld important details relevant to its nuclear program, including procurement logs, technical documents, experimental data, accounting of materials, and foreign assistance.
- Baghdad also continues to withhold other data about enrichment techniques, foreign procurement, weapons design, and the role of Iraqi security services in concealing its nuclear facilities and activities.

Iraq still has much of the infrastructure needed to pursue its goal of building a nuclear weapon. Iraq retains its cadre of nuclear scientists and technicians, its program documentation, and sufficient dual-use manufacturing capabilities to support a reconstituted nuclear weapons program. Iraqi media have reported numerous meetings between Saddam and nuclear scientists over the past two years, signaling his continued interest in reviving a nuclear program.

- Before its departure from Iraq, the IAEA made significant strides toward dismantling Iraq's nuclear-weapons program and unearthing the nature and scope of Iraq's past nuclear activities. In the absence of inspections, however, Iraq easily could have begun to reconstitute its nuclear program and to unravel the IAEA's hard-earned accomplishments.

Iraq's expanding international trade provides growing access to nuclear-related technology and materials and potential access to foreign nuclear expertise. An increase in dual-use procurement activity in recent years may be supporting a reconstituted nuclear-weapons program.

- The acquisition of sufficient fissile material is Iraq's principal hurdle in developing a nuclear weapon.
- **Iraq is unlikely to produce indigenously enough weapons-grade material for a deliverable nuclear weapon until mid-to-late in the decade. Baghdad could shorten the acquisition timeline significantly if it were able to procure fissile material abroad.**


Iraq: Nuclear-Related Facilities



DI Cartography Center/MPG 760102AI (PCC667) 8-02

Ballistic Missile Program

Compelling information reveals that Iraq is developing a ballistic missile capability that exceeds the 150-km range limitation established under UNSCR 687. Iraq had an active missile force before the Gulf war that included 819 Scud-B missiles (300-km range) purchased from the former Soviet Union and a program to extend the Scud's range and modify its warhead. Iraq admitted filling at least 75 of its Scud warheads with chemical or biological agents and deployed these weapons for use against coalition forces and regional opponents including Israel in 1991.




- Most of the approximately 90 Scud-type missiles Saddam fired at Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain during the Gulf war were al-Husayn variants that the Iraqis modified by lengthening the airframe and increasing fuel capacity, extending the range to 650 km.
- Baghdad was developing other longer-range missiles based on Scud technology, including the 900-km al-Abbas. Iraq was designing follow-on multi-stage and clustered medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) concepts—some similar to the Al Abid space-launch vehicle (SLV)—with intended ranges up to 3,000 km. Iraq also had a program to develop a two-stage missile called the Badr-2000 using solid-propellants with an estimated range of 750 to 1,000 km.
- Iraq never fully accounted for its existing missile programs. Discrepancies in Baghdad's declarations suggest that Iraq retains a small force of Scud-type missiles and an undetermined number of launchers and warheads. Further, Iraq never explained the disposition of advanced missile components, such as guidance and control systems, that it could not produce on its own and that would be critical to developmental programs.

Iraq continues to work on UN-authorized short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs)—those with a range no greater than 150 km—that help develop the expertise and infrastructure needed to produce longer-range missile systems. The al-Samoud liquid propellant SRBM is capable of flying beyond the allowed 150 km range. The al-Samoud and the solid-propellant Ababil-100, both of which may be nearing operational deployment, appeared on launchers in a military parade on 31 December 2000 in Baghdad. Other evidence strongly suggests Iraq is modifying missile testing and production facilities to produce even longer-range missiles:

- The Al-Rafah-North Liquid Propellant Engine RDT&E Facility is Iraq's principal site for the static testing of liquid propellant missile engines. Baghdad has been building a new test stand there that is larger than the test stand associated with al-Samoud engine testing and the defunct Scud engine test stand. The only plausible explanation for this test facility is that Iraq intends to test engines for longer-range missiles prohibited under UNSCR 687.
- The Al-Mutasim Solid Rocket Motor and Test Facility, previously associated with Iraq's Badr-2000 solid-propellant missile program, has been rebuilt and expanded in recent years. The al-Mutasim site supports solid-propellant motor assembly, rework, and testing for the UN-authorized Ababil-100, but the size of certain facilities there, particularly those newly constructed between the assembly rework and static test areas, suggests that Baghdad is preparing to develop systems that are prohibited by the UN.
- At the Al-Mamoun Solid Rocket Motor Production Plant and Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E) Facility, the Iraqis, since the December 1998 departure of inspectors, have rebuilt structures damaged in the Gulf War and dismantled by UNSCOM that were originally built to manufacture solid propellant motors for the Badr-2000 program. They also have built a new building and are reconstructing other buildings originally designed to fill large Badr-2000 motor casings with solid propellant.

- Also at al-Mamoun, the Iraqis have rebuilt two structures used to “mix” solid propellant for the Badr-2000 missile. The new buildings—about as large as the original ones—are ideally suited to house large, UN-prohibited mixers. In fact, the only logical explanation for the size and configuration of these mixing buildings is that Iraq intends to develop longer-range, prohibited missiles.

SA-2 (Al Samoud) Engine Test




Iraq: Ballistic-Missile-Related Facilities



DI Cartography Center/MPG 760103A1 (PO0867) 6-02

**IRAQ: Al Mamoun Solid-Propellant Production Plant, Reconstructed Production Building
March 2002**



Iraq has managed to rebuild and expand its missile development infrastructure under sanctions, suggesting that Baghdad maintains an active procurement network in support of its proscribed programs. Iraqi intermediaries have sought production technology, machine tools, and raw materials in violation of the arms embargo.


- The Iraqis have completed a new ammonium perchlorate production plant at Mamoun that supports Iraq's solid propellant missile program. Ammunition perchlorate is a common oxidizer used in solid propellant missile motors. Baghdad would not have been able to complete this facility without help from abroad.
- In August 1995, Iraq was caught trying to acquire sensitive, proscribed guidance systems (gyroscopes) for ballistic missiles, demonstrating that Baghdad has been pursuing missile

technology for some time. Iraqi officials admitted that they had received a similar shipment earlier that year.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Program and Other Aircraft

Iraq is continuing to develop other platforms capable of delivering chemical and biological agents. Immediately before the Gulf War, Baghdad attempted to convert a MiG-21 into an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to carry spray tanks capable of dispensing chemical or biological agents. UNSCOM assessed that the program to develop the spray system was successful, but the conversion of the MiG-21 was not. More recently, Baghdad has attempted to convert the L-29 jet trainer aircraft into a UAV that can be fitted with the CBW spray tanks, most likely a continuation of previous efforts with the MiG-21. Although much less sophisticated than ballistic missiles as a delivery platform, an aircraft, manned or unmanned, is the most efficient way to disseminate chemical and biological weapons over a large, distant area.

Iraqi L-29 UAV Test-Bed Aircraft at Samarra East Airbase



-
- Iraq already has produced modified drop-tanks that can disperse effectively biological or chemical agents. Before the Gulf war, the Iraqis successfully experimented with aircraft-mounted spray tanks capable of releasing up to 2,000 liters of an anthrax simulant over a target area. Iraq also has modified successfully commercial crop sprayers and tested them with an anthrax simulant delivered from helicopters.



Test of dissemination of BW agents from a modified drop tank carried by a Mirage F1. The drop tank was filled with 1000 liters of slurry Bacillus subtilis, a simulant for B. anthracis, and disseminated over Abu Obeydi Airbase in January 1991. The photo is from a videotape provided by Iraq to UNSCOM.

- Baghdad has a history of experimenting with a variety of unmanned platforms. Iraq's use of newer, more capable airframes would increase range and payload, while smaller platforms might be harder to detect and therefore more survivable. This capability represents a serious threat to Iraq's neighbors and to international military forces in the region.
- Iraq used tactical fighter aircraft and helicopters to deliver chemical agents, loaded in bombs and rockets, during the Iran-Iraq war. Baghdad probably is considering again using manned aircraft as delivery platforms depending on the operational scenario.

Procurement in Support of WMD Programs

Iraq has been able to import dual-use, WMD-relevant equipment and material through procurements both within and outside the UN sanctions regime. **Baghdad diverts some of the \$10 billion worth of goods now entering Iraq every year for humanitarian needs to support the military and WMD programs instead.**

- UN monitors at Iraq's borders do not inspect the cargo—worth hundreds of millions of dollars—that enters Iraq every year outside of the Oil-for-Food program; some of these goods clearly support Iraq's military and WMD programs. For example, Baghdad imports fiber-optic communication systems outside of UN auspices to support the Iraqi military.
- Iraq imports goods using planes, trains, trucks, and ships without any type of international inspections—in violation of UN Security Council resolutions.

Even within the UN-authorized Oil-for-Food program, Iraq does not hide the fact that it wants to purchase military and WMD-related goods. For example, **Baghdad diverted UN-approved trucks for military purposes and construction equipment to rehabilitate WMD-affiliated facilities, even though these items were approved only to help the civilian population.**

- On several occasions, Iraq has asked to purchase goods—such as neutron generators and servo valves—that the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) views as linchpins for Iraqi prohibited programs; alternative, non-dual-use items would serve the stated civilian purpose.
- The UN Iraq Sanctions Committee denied such sales under the former sanctions regime, and UNMOVIC and IAEA will continue to forward these items to the Sanctions Committee for consideration under the revised Goods Review List that began 30 May 2002.
- Iraq has been able to repair modern industrial machine tools that previously supported production of WMD or missile components and has imported additional tools that it may use to reconstitute Baghdad's unconventional weapons arsenal.

UNMOVIC began screening contracts pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1284 in December 1999 and since has identified more than 100 contracts containing dual-use items as defined in UNSCR 1051 that can be diverted into WMD programs. UNMOVIC also has

requested that suppliers provide technical information on hundreds of other goods because of potential dual-use concerns. In many cases, Iraq has requested technology that clearly exceeds requirements for the stated commercial end-use when it easily could substitute items that could not be used for WMD.


- On some UN contracts, Baghdad claimed that the requested goods are designed to rehabilitate facilities—such as the Al Qa'im phosphate plant and Fallujah—that in the past were used to support both industrial and WMD programs.

DOCUMENT: Central Command, “Compartmented Concept Update”

DATE: August 4, 2002

SOURCE: Defense Department FOIA release

CONTENT: This set of briefing slides presents the overall concept for what would be known to military planners as the “hybrid” war plan, in which war would be launched before forces had reached their full capability, and follow-on increments would supplement the initial attack. The briefing covered such issues as the phases of conflict, ending with a “Phase IV” occupation of Iraq, the time necessary to generate the forces and complete the buildup, and an overview of the military strategy used in the invasion.



Compartmented Concept

Update 4 Aug 2002

DECLASSIFIED BY: RADM R.T. Moeller
DECLASSIFY ON: 16 June 2005
ACTION OFFICER: Mr. M.D. Fitzgerald, Civ






"Generated Start" Plan

~~TOP SECRET / POLO STEP~~

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Operational Timeline



A = Air Operations Begin
G = Ground Operations Begin

~~TOP SECRET / POLO STEP~~



Military Options -- Contingency Responses...

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Response Option(s) 1-5	Small	Medium	Large
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In Place Forces • Existing Bases & Carrier battle group • Response is condition-based • 1 day duration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In Place Forces • Existing Bases, Carrier battle group • Response within 4 hours • 1-2 day duration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Forces from the continental US (CONUS) • Air Wing or a second Carrier battle group • Additional Beddown • Response within 96 hours • 5-7 day duration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CONUS Forces plus an Air Expeditionary Force and a third Carrier battle group • Increased Beddown • Response within 11 days • 14 day duration +...
<p>Effects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Destroy active threat systems - Targets linked to trigger - Hostile Act - Hostile Intent 	<p>Effects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Degrade enablers - Degrade selected capabilities - Initial targets linked to trigger 	<p>Effects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Defeat enablers - Destroy/ degrade selected capabilities - Begin to shape battlefield 	<p>Effects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Defeat enablers - Destroy/degrade multiple capabilities - Country-wide effect, all target sets - Continue to shape the battlefield
<p>~ 100 Aim Points ~ 80 Aircraft Sorties</p>	<p>~ 300 Aim Points ~ 90 Aircraft Sorties</p>	<p>~ 1800 Aim Points ~ 1000 Aircraft Sorties</p>	<p>~ 3000 Aim Points ~ 2100 Aircraft Sorties</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Southern and Northern Watch - One Carrier Battle Group 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Southern and Northern Watch - One Carrier Battle Group - Tactical Land Attack Missile (TLAM) Shooters 	<p>Adds: Global Power / Intel Surveillance and Recon Aircraft / additional Air Wing or Carrier Battle Group / TLAM shooters in Mediterranean</p>	<p>Adds: Global Power / Intel Surveillance and Recon Aircraft / an additional 1-2 Carrier Battle Group(s) / an Air Expeditionary Force</p>

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


"Running Start" Plan

~~TOP SECRET / POLO STEP~~

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Operational Timeline



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
A = Air Operations Begin G = Ground Operations Begin



"Modified" Plan Operational Timeline

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
A = Air Operations Begin G = Ground Operations Begin



Phase IV Actions

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- Support the establishment of a stable Iraqi government
 - Establish a secure environment and assist in recovery and reconstruction
 - Support the establishment of Iraqi Self-Defense forces
 - Ensure the territorial integrity of Iraq
 - Transition civil-military activities to international organizations / non-governmental organizations / Iraqi Government
- Ensure WMD capability destroyed
- Gather intelligence, detain terrorists and war criminals, free individuals unjustly detained
- Re-deploy forces


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Generated Start Initial Force Deployment Overview

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
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Running Start Initial Force Deployment Overview

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
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Running Start Initial Force Deployment Overview

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
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Modified Start Initial Force Deployment Overview

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Whiteman AFB, US
16 B2 (USAF)

Mediterranean

72 F18 (USN)
20 F14 (USN)
8 EA6B (USN)
8 E2 (USN)

48 GRL (USAF)

Souda Bay, CR (LBBG)

6 KC135E (USAF)
2 CH53 (USN)
2 C-130 (USN)

H5 (Prince Hasan), JO

2 MC130H (SOF)
4 MC130P (SOF)
6 MH47D (SOF)
3 MH60L (SOF)
4 HC130 (USAF)
6 HH60 (USAF)
4 RQ-1(1 MQ-1)(USAF)

Fairford AB, UK

12 B-52 (USAF)

Prince Sultan (PSAB)

8 KC135R (USAF)
3 E3 (USAF)
2 RC135WV (USAF)
5 EA6B (USN)
14 F16CJ (USAF)
12 F15C/D (USAF)
2 U2 (USAF)

VIC Camp Doha (OKAD)

775 HELOs (USA)

Al Jaber, KU (OKAJ)

60 F18C/D (USMC)
30 F16C+ (USAF)
30 A/OA-10 (USAF)
16 AV8B (USMC)
4 HC130 (USAF)
6 HH60G (USAF)

Camp Snoopy, QA (OTBD)

5 C-17 (USAF)
5 EC-130H (USAF)
24 C-130 (USAF)

Al Udeld, QA (OTBH)

12 F15C (USAF)
16 F16CJ (USAF)
18 F16CG (USAF)
36 F15E (USAF)

Thumrait, OM (OOTH)

12 B1 (USAF)
7 E3 (USAF)
4 RC135WV (USAF)
11 KC135R (USAF)
2 Cobra Ball (USAF)
5 E8C (USAF)

Al Dhafra, AE (OMAM)

6 U2 (USAF)
4 RQ4 (USAF)
5 KC10A (USAF)

Seeb, OM (OOMS)

3 C21 (USAF)
48 C130 (USAF)
24 KC135R (USAF)

Burgas, BU (LBBG)

6 KC10A (USAF)

Afyon, TU (LTAH)

18 KC135E (USAF)

Incirlik, TU (LTAG)

21 A/OA10 (USAF)
24 F15C (USAF)
24 F16CJ (USAF)
24 F15E (USAF)
5 EC-130H(CC) (USAF)
5 E8C (USAF)
6 KC135 (SOF)
4 RC135W/V (USAF)
10 EA6B (USN/USMC)
5 E3 (USAF)

Bahrain Int'l BA (OBBI)

6 C2COD (USN)
1 C20 (USN)
3 EP3 (USN)
2 UC12 (USN)
6 MH53 (USN)
4 PH53E (USN)
2 C130 (USN)
2 C9 (USN)
3 P3C (USN)

Abu Dhabi AE (OMAA)

24 KC135R (USAF)
9 KC10A (USAF)
28 C130 (USAF)

Masirah, OM (OOMA)

4 AC130U (USAF)
2 MC130P (USAF)
4 MH53M (SOF)
1 APEX GOLD (SOF)
4 P3C (USN)

"Running Start" C+45

DECLASSIFIED BY: RADM R.T. Moeller

DECLASSIFY ON: 16 June 2005

ACTION OFFICER: Mr. M.D. Fitzgerald, Civ

Diyabikr, TU (LTCC)

8 A/OA10 (USAF)
4 AC130H (SOF)
4 RQ-1 (USAF)
4 MC130H (SOF)
4 MC130P (SOF)
7 MH53 (SOF)
4 HC130 (USAF)
6 HH60 (USAF)

Shalkh Isa, BA (OBBS)

5 EA6B (USMC)
10 KC135R (USAF)
4 KC135 (SOF)
18 KC130 (USMC)

Arabian Gulf

96 F18 (USN)
42 F14 (USN)
12 EA6B (USN)
12 E2 (USN)

Diego Garcia (FJDG)

16 B-52 (USAF)
12 KC-10 (USAF)
3 P-3C (USN)

DOCUMENT: CIA, Intelligence Analysis, “The Postwar Occupations of Germany and Japan: Implications for Iraq,” NESAF 2002-20104

DATE: August 7, 2002.

SOURCE: CIA FOIA release

CONTENTS: The CIA here notes that “obtaining an international mandate and regional support will be key for any US occupation of Iraq,” a situation different from that following World War II when Washington had had “both a sweeping international mandate and long-lasting support of key regional countries.” The paper proceeded with a series of comparisons along different dimensions, warning that a long (seven-year) occupation from 1945 had “only laid the groundwork for success.” In general the paper warned of many issues that would actually become central to the Iraq occupation.



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

7 August 2002

The Postwar Occupations of Germany and Japan: Implications for Iraq ~~(C//NF)~~

NES/AP IA 2002-20104
APLA IA 2002-40715
OREA 2002-40155

The Postwar Occupations of Germany and Japan: Implications for Iraq ~~(C//NF)~~

Summary ~~(U)~~

For the postwar occupations of Germany and Japan, the United States had both a sweeping international mandate and long-lasting support of key regional countries.

- Obtaining an international mandate and regional support will be key for any US occupation of Iraq.
- Iraq's Arab neighbors view a strong Iraq as a bulwark against Iran and are likely to push for an early end to a US occupation and quick rearming of Iraq. ~~(C//NF)~~

In both Germany and Japan, the US occupation started with sweeping goals for political, social, and economic change that were rapidly scaled back in order to deal with the challenges of the Cold War. The need to impose stability required the use of local bureaucracies and institutions to implement occupation policies. The seven-year occupation only laid the groundwork for success—it took a generational change reinforced by the continuing presence of US troops to solidify the gains.

- The legacy of colonialism, tribal culture, and Islam are key factors in determining how Iraqi society would react to an occupation. ~~(C//NF)~~

In postwar Germany and Japan providing humanitarian relief was the most crucial problem. US generosity toward the general population and leniency toward leaders provided a legacy of gratitude.

- In Iraq, the ability of the occupation forces to control the security situation and provide humanitarian aid is key to earning the hearts and minds of average Iraqis and overcoming a decade of Saddam's anti-US propaganda.
- Iraq's wealth of natural resources and experience in reconstruction, rationing under the Oil-for-Food program, and the presence of UN agencies might provide a basis for the postwar period. ~~(C//NF)~~

In both Germany and Japan, the United States administered the occupation through limited occupation staffs working via local authorities and institutions, backed by the presence of hundreds of thousands of

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occupation troops. The rapid transfer of authority moderated resentment against the US occupation, but it still took years to turn weary acceptance to support for the United States. The shared partnership in defense against the Cold War threat of communism laid the framework for a lasting alliance.

- A rapid transfer of authority to local officials is possible in Iraq because the country's large bureaucracy probably would survive regime change. The downside is that this Sunni-centric bureaucracy is not inclined to respond to local religious and ethnic minorities' demands for greater control and inclusion. ~~(C//NF)~~

The United States began the occupations of Germany and Japan with the goal of finding, removing from public life, and punishing war criminals. The need to rely on local institutions and leaders moderated that goal. In the end, few Germans and Japanese were permanently barred from public life.

- In Iraq, most atrocities were committed by members of Arab Sunni tribes closely affiliated with the regime. These same tribes control the institutions to which an occupation would look to take charge in any rapid transfer of power.
- In Germany and Japan, crimes against humanity were targeted against foreign or marginalized groups; in Iraq the targets were the majority of the population. ~~(C//NF)~~

The retention of the Emperor provided a unifying symbol for Japan's relatively homogeneous population. In Germany, the Federal Republic prospered in spite of the lack of a clear national identity because of the external threat posed by the Soviet Union and the government's use of Marshall Plan funds to provide economic advantage to membership in the federal system.

- Iraq's lack of a national identity or homogeneous population renders Japan's model difficult to use.
- The German model offer better parallels for Iraq, but implementation would require a large, extended US military presence. ~~(C//NF)~~

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**The Postwar Occupations of
Germany and Japan:
Implications for Iraq (C//NF)**

**International Mandate and Regional Support Key
to Success ~~(U)~~**

The post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan between 1945 and 1952 had a *broad international mandate* because all the Allied powers had been direct victims of German and Japanese aggression. International support for the neutralization of the military threat from both countries continued at least through the start of the Cold War in 1948. Although China and the Soviet Union became hostile to the continued US presence in both countries—particularly after the start of the Korean war in 1950—US allies and other regional states opposed ending the occupations in both countries.

- London, Canberra, and all of Tokyo's East Asian neighbors harbored a deep distrust of Japan and opposed the 1952 peace treaty that ended the occupation on the grounds it returned sovereignty to Tokyo too quickly.
- The end of Germany's occupation in 1952 and subsequent remilitarization was greeted with deep suspicion by its neighbors and opposed by the Soviet Union. ~~(C//NF)~~

In both cases, opponents were reassured by the promise of a continuing United States military presence after the formal end to the occupation. In the case of Japan, the US signed separate security treaties with many of its former victims to counter their fears of potential, renewed Japanese militarism. One historian has said that the entire purpose of NATO for Europeans was to "keep the American in, the Russians out, and the Germans down." The

continued US presence in both countries to this day receives widespread regional support. ~~(C//NF)~~

Implications for Iraq ~~(C//NF)~~

- Receiving an international mandate and gaining regional support are key factors in planning for an occupation. Overcoming the skepticism of Iraq's neighbors regarding the military or security threat Saddam poses would facilitate gaining such support.
- Iraq's neighbors have viewed the country as a military bulwark against Iran; many of them continue to harbor deeper concern about Iranian long-term expansion than Iraqi aggression. Pressure for re-arming Iraq is likely to come sooner than was the case in Germany and Japan.
- The religious and cultural gap between occupying Western forces and the Iraqi population would be wider than was the case in Germany or even Japan. The legacy of colonialism is likely to spark broad regional resentment to an "infidel" force occupying an Islamic country. ~~(C//NF)~~

Not Unqualified Successes ~~(U)~~

In Germany and Japan, the occupations started with goals for sweeping political, social, and economic change that were rapidly rolled back in order to ensure that Japan and Germany would become stable and firm members of the anti-communist camp. This retreat from early lofty goals for social and political reformation reflected changing US policy goals due to the start of the Cold War and allowed many of the traditional elites and institutions to retain power and influence.

This assessment was prepared by the Offices of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Analysis; Asian Pacific and Latin American Analysis; and Russian and European Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Manager, NESAF, on

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- In Japan, occupation authorities reversed course from their early attempts to break up the *zaibatsu* industrial conglomerates; these groups became the postwar *keiretsu* networks that today continue to engage in monopolistic, anti-competitive practices.
- In Germany, the early goals of transforming the country, most fully expressed in the Morgenthau Plan to change Germany from an industrial to an agricultural nation, were quickly scrapped. ~~(C//NF)~~

In both countries, the seven-year long occupation merely laid the foundation for success. Solidifying the political gains required a generational change. As late as the early 1960s, there were still questions about the depth of Germany's commitment to democracy. Some observers of Japan today question the strength of Japanese democracy, and many of Tokyo's Asian neighbors still welcome the US military presence because of continuing fears about the danger of Japanese remilitarization.

- Allowing the Germans to craft institutions that matched their political and historical traditions facilitated Germany's successful democratization. The US helped integrate Germany firmly into Western European political and economic life, an integration that opened it up to influence from its democratic neighbors and from US culture. ~~(C//NF)~~

Implications for Iraq ~~(C//NF)~~

- A transformation of Iraq to a true democracy could require a US role lasting a generation.
- Any US commitment to sweeping changes in Iraqi society and politics could be effected by unanticipated developments, as the Cold War changed US goals in Germany and Japan.
- Allowing Iraqis to craft institutions that mirror their society and culture but guided by overall US goals would enhance the likelihood for a positive outcome. However, permitting Iraqis to craft their own institutions would be risky given Iraq's short,

turbulent history and the experience of life under the repressive Ba'ath Party.

- Pressure from disenfranchised religious and ethnic minorities for wider inclusion and reform of Iraq's institutions would encounter an entrenched Sunni Arab elite controlling the reins of economic, industrial, and military power.
- Key variables affecting how Iraqi society will react to the competing possibilities of reform versus restitution of sovereignty include the tribal culture, impact of exiles and returning refugees, the legacy of colonialism, Islam, and the religious schools.
- The regional context in the Middle East is one of authoritarian, not democratic, states. ~~(C//NF)~~

Humanitarian not Security Problems ~~(C//NF)~~

Planning for the postwar occupation of Germany and Japan started as soon as the United States entered the war. Much pre-occupation planning centered on the need for security, in actuality the greatest problems were the widespread devastation, starvation, and crime. ~~(C//NF)~~

Postwar occupation planning started almost as soon as the United States entered the war. By 1942, planning staffs for both Germany and Japan were working on a full range of tasks related to the occupation, including rebuilding the infrastructure, recreating an administrative and governmental structure, overseeing the economy, reforming the educational system, democratizing the populations, and apprehending and punishing war criminals. The largest initial concern was security due to fears that recalcitrant Nazis and Japanese militarists would attempt to continue the war. The defeated German and Japanese populations were relieved to see the end of the war, a fact that allowed the occupation forces to concentrate on relieving the humanitarian situation. ~~(C//NF)~~

The greatest problems facing the occupation forces in both countries were humanitarian crisis and criminal activity.

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- The disintegration of civil society and breakdown of the ration distribution system combined with millions of displaced or homeless people to present a daunting challenge to occupation planners.
- Many people turned to crime out of necessity or opportunity due to the disbanding of—or corruption in—the police forces. ~~(C//NF)~~

In Japan, US generosity toward the general population and the lack of retribution surprised a population conditioned by wartime propaganda to expect a harsh occupation. In Germany, US generosity during the occupation and especially during the Berlin Airlift helped to change public attitudes toward the US presence: an entire generation of German politicians talked about US Care packages distributed during the occupation and what they meant to them. ~~(C//NF)~~

Implications for Iraq ~~(C//NF)~~

- The ability of occupation forces to control the security situation will again be critical.
- The greatest initial challenges might be to address humanitarian relief, displaced persons, and criminal activity that would only be exacerbated by revenge killings on Ba'th Party and security officials.
- Leniency toward the Iraqi population should yield dividends over time.
- The Iraqi domestic experience in reconstruction, rationing, and managing the Oil-for-Food program since 1996, along with the presence of UN agencies, might provide a valuable framework for the postwar period.
- Iraq's wealth of natural resources, if properly used, would help smooth the political and economic transition under US occupation. ~~(C//NF)~~

Administration Through Local Authorities

~~(C//NF)~~

The United States administered both Germany and Japan indirectly, relying heavily on existing local authorities for most functions while retaining overall policy control. ~~(C//NF)~~

In Germany, the state of Bavaria had a Minister-President (state executive) in place in May 1945, the same month the German authorities signed the surrender. The occupation authorities permitted political activity to begin in 1945 with the licensing of political parties. The decision to allow the Social Democratic and Christian Democratic Parties to operate first set the stage for the postwar party system. The German civil service—with a reputation for loyalty, honesty, and impartiality—remained in place to serve first the occupation authorities then the new German government. ~~(C//NF)~~

In Japan, the occupation authorities abolished the Japanese military, the Home Ministry, and the Special Higher Police—also known as the “thought police”—but left the civilian bureaucracy that ran the war effort largely untouched. At its height, the occupation authority had a staff of only 3,200 American military and civilian personnel, forcing it to rely on Japanese officials to implement occupation directives. Small inspection teams monitored compliance at the local and prefectural levels—although with questionable effectiveness given the language barrier and their small numbers. ~~(C//NF)~~

In both countries, the authority of small-sized occupation staffs was reinforced by the presence of a garrison of hundreds of thousands of troops. The size of the occupation force tended to mitigate any attempt to challenge the occupation authority. ~~(C//NF)~~

Responsibility for administering the ration distribution system in each country was quickly turned over to local authorities, serving to deflect complaints about rationing away from the occupation authorities. In Japan this led to corruption where

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local officials would divert rations and supplies for sale on the black market. ~~(C//NF)~~

This rapid transfer of authority at the local and state/prefecture level, use of the existing civil service bureaucracy, and placing of responsibility for the rations distribution system in local hands worked to moderate initial German and Japanese resentment toward the US presence. It still took years for attitudes to change from weary resignation and resentment of the US toward acceptance—and there remains lingering antipathy to the US presence in both countries.

- It took the transfer of sovereignty, the Berlin Airlift, the pressures of the Cold War and the communist threat, and rapidly improving economic conditions to start the German and Japanese populations on the road to friendship and eventual alliance with the United States.
- A shared partnership in defense of Germany and Japan against an external security threat served as the foundation for the eventual close alliance between the US and Germany and Japan. ~~(C//NF)~~

Implications for Iraq ~~(C//NF)~~

- A large portion of Iraq's elaborate and pervasive bureaucracy is likely to survive any military action.
- A rapid transfer of power to local and governate level authorities in Iraq would facilitate moderation of Iraqi resentment at the US presence.
- Responsibility for setting and distributing the food ration should be delegated to local authorities as quickly as possible.
- The fact that equitable distribution of rations has not occurred under Saddam gives the United States a good opportunity to set a better record for ordinary Iraqis during an occupation, particularly in southern Iraq.

- Use of the existing structure and civil bureaucracy can facilitate this transfer of power, but also cause corruption.
- The existing Iraqi system has been in place since 1968; its strength is its organization, but its weakness is its secrecy.
- It will be difficult to strike a balance between bolstering a new central government and meeting the likely demands for greater local control by religious and ethnic minorities. ~~(C//NF)~~

Prosecution of War Criminals ~~(C//NF)~~

The United States began the occupation of Germany and Japan with the goal of finding and punishing war criminals but rapidly scaled back its goal due to the need to rely on local institutions and leaders. Denazification in Germany started with almost 13 million Germans being required to fill out questionnaires called *Fragebogen* outlining their participation in the NAZI rule. By early 1946 the process had been turned over to German-staffed committees to monitor and, under the pressures of the need to staff the local administrations, the process became an exercise in absolution. In Japan, the occupation authorities purged the military and security forces but never extended that to a wider audience. ~~(C//NF)~~

This change of policy resulted in most Germans and Japanese being rapidly rehabilitated. In Germany less than 20,000 people were permanently excluded from public life. In Japan, only about 200,000 were stripped of their political rights—and many of those had their right restored after the end of the occupation. The occupation authorities had previously purged almost half of the members of the first post-occupation Diet's Lower House. ~~(C//NF)~~

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Nobusuke Kishi, who headed the munitions ministry during World War Two and presided over Chinese forced labor in occupied Manchukuo during the 1930s, is perhaps the best example of the shallow effort to purge those responsible for Japanese aggression. He was arrested as a war criminal but then released—and later became prime minister and in 1960 signed the revised US-Japan security treaty with President Eisenhower. (C//NF)

The prosecution of war criminals did have some positive results in Germany. The Nuremberg Trials helped prompt Germans to confront Nazi abuses. In Japan, the rapid return of the political and economic leadership to public life contributed to Japan's persistent reluctance to come to terms with its war guilt. (C//NF)

The occupation authorities did impose controls on the political process. In Germany, US authorities rejected a provision for the socialization of property in the Hesse draft constitution. While Germans managed the process, the United States had a direct impact through by selecting members from the Christian Democratic or Social Democratic Parties or like-minded religious, social, or labor groupings to staff administrative positions. This reinforced the acceptable policies and set the tone of the political debate. In Japan, the occupation authorities took full control of writing a new constitution after Japanese officials produced a draft that offered few changes to Japan's prewar political structure. Another important element was the comprehensive censorship apparatus that employed about 6,000 people to monitor and translate print media, literature, films, and plays for US officials who would then judge whether the material was consistent with the objectives of the occupation. In both countries, an early attempt to rewrite school curriculum to purge it of nationalist sentiment was hampered by the lack of skilled occupation personnel conversant in the culture, language, and history of the countries. (C//NF)

Implications for Iraq (C//NF)

- A decision would be needed regarding how to purge Ba'ath Party members and officials complicit in

crimes against humanity from public life while retaining the skilled administrators, teachers, bureaucrats, and local public leaders necessary to administer Iraq.

- Indirect administration of any occupation working through local officials would help moderate potential Iraqi resentment and facilitate the US presence—but probably would leave in place people and institutions that supported the current regime.
- In Iraq, most atrocities were carried out by a limited segment of the society—the Arab Sunni tribes closely affiliated with the regime—a fact that would facilitate limiting investigations and prosecutions. But that same segment of society also staffs and controls the institutions to which an occupation would look to transfer power. Any robust investigation of crimes against humanity would chance alienating the same people needed to assume local control.
- In Germany and Japan, crimes against humanity were targeted at foreign or marginalized groups, whereas in Iraq the target is the majority of the Iraqi population. There would likely be a constituency in Iraq for an aggressive campaign to locate and punish individuals responsible.
- Rewriting the school curriculum to replace the current extolling of Saddam Husayn and the Ba'ath Party would be a requirement in any political transformation of Iraq. (C//NF)

Key Reforms That Reshaped Society (C//NF)

In Japan the occupation authorities instituted a radical land reform policy that reshaped the social and political structure. The occupation authorities in 1946 distributed four million acres of land to two million farmers—a process that created a middle class of small landowners that became the cornerstone of Japan's stable conservative politics. The Liberal Democratic Party, which has ruled Japan virtually uninterrupted since 1955, to this day relies heavily on

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support from rural areas to maintain its Diet majority.

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In Germany, international control of coal and steel production set the stage for the later creation of the European Coal and Steel Community. By its support of selected political parties and organizations through the allocation of jobs, the occupation authority fostered a political atmosphere favorable to US policies and eventual full democratization. ~~(C//NF)~~

Implications for Iraq ~~(C//NF)~~

- Land ownership is an historic lever of power in Iraq, along with Iraq's oil wealth, offering key opportunities which US occupation authorities might use to reshape Iraq.
- In Iraq, the oil sector and heavy industries are state owned and operated; there is widespread private ownership of land and light industry in a mixed socialist and capitalist system. ~~(C//NF)~~

Key Similarities and Differences ~~(U)~~

In Japan, retaining the Emperor as a symbol of Japanese unity, in spite of his possible guilt as a war criminal, was critical to maintaining the unity and morale of the Japanese people. The emperor became for many Japanese a symbol of the country's commitment to peace—although for Japan's neighbors he symbolized the ruling class' successful evasion of wartime responsibility. ~~(C//NF)~~

The success of the Federal Republic and the US occupation of Germany was due at least in part to confronting a set of issues that had undermined previous German regimes. Regional particularism, ethnic strife, and a lack of a clear identity had undermined the Weimar Republic and facilitated Hitler's rise to power. The postwar change to Germany's borders removed Prussia from West Germany and changed the religious balance from Protestant domination to a relatively even split between Protestants and Catholics. Occupation policies reinforced this process. The United States supported a strong federal system that allowed

regions to express their distinct identities without undermining central authority, and US authorities encouraged the Christian Democratic movement that brought together Catholics and Protestants in one party.

- The Federal Republic prospered despite the lack of a clear national identity due to the existence of a clear external threat and the federal government's success in providing economic advantages to the public by administering Marshall Fund moneys. ~~(C//NF)~~

Implications for Iraq ~~(C//NF)~~

- Iraq has no "unifying myth" such as the emperor nor is it ethnically or religiously unified. Iraqi exiles and oppositionists have been unable to articulate any political goals past getting rid of Saddam, posing challenges for any attempt to follow the Japanese model for an occupation.
- The German model of a strong, US backed federal structure offering regional and ethnic minorities advantage through participation in the central government and economic gain could provide a useful model for Iraq, but one which may well require a large, extended US military and occupation presence. ~~(C//NF)~~

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9/29/2009

FOISG: Prados, John

Postwar WWII German and Japan - Iran

DOCUMENT: DOD/OUSSDP Memorandum, Peter W. Rodman-Donald Rumsfeld, "Who Will Govern Iraq?"

DATE: August 15, 2002

SOURCE: Defense Department FOIA

CONTENT: Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman discusses a State Department proposal for a "Transitional Civil Authority" in Iraq after conquest is completed.

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- We will have nowhere near the total control in Iraq that we had in Germany and Japan.
- There is already a lively Iraqi opposition, which, despite its current disunity, will be essential for adding legitimacy to a U.S. military action.

(S) A more interesting analogy is with postwar France:

- FDR and Churchill planned an Allied Military Government for France, the same as for Germany. They did not take deGaulle seriously; only after millions turned out to greet him on his return after D-Day did they conclude that he represented Free France as he claimed.
- Had an occupation government been imposed on France, the Communists – who dominated the Resistance – would have taken over the countryside while the allies sat in Paris imagining that they were running the country. Meanwhile, the occupation government would have neutered the Gaullists.
- As it happened, deGaulle in power (1944-46) built up his own movement as a counterweight to the Communists and neutralized them.

The Iraq Case

(S) While Iraq has no deGaulle, the French experience seems to me more instructive than that of Germany and Japan:

- There are bad guys all over Iraq – radical Shia, Communists, Wahhabis, al-Qaeda – who will strive to fill the political vacuum.
- An occupation government will only delay the process of unifying the moderate forces.
- The best hope for filling the vacuum is to prepare Iraqis to do it.

(S) Thus, I see Afghanistan as the model to be emulated, even if the Iraqis are not yet ready for their Bonn process. We should accelerate the process of unifying the opposition – more or less the six organizations that were represented in Washington on 9-10 August – into a coherent political force:

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Douglas FEITH, War and Decision

J. 546-7

~~SECRET~~

- First, they should agree on a common program.
- Using our considerable leverage, we should then press them to form an umbrella group, with the aim of setting up a Provisional Government in the near term.
- The sooner they work out their mutual relations and allocate power among themselves, the better.
- The U.S. has enough leverage to reach firm understandings with this umbrella group or Provisional Government on issues that concern us (e.g., oil; WMD; relations with Turkey, Kuwait, Jordan; Kurdish autonomy).

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P. 548

DOCUMENT: U.S. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research Intelligence Assessment, “Problems and Prospects of ‘Justifying’ War with Iraq”

DATE: August 29, 2002.

SOURCE: State Department FOIA

CONTENT: Indicating that “Many, if not most” U.S. allies are skeptical of U.S. plans to attack Iraq, the INR uses the seven principles of so-called “just war” theory to summarize critiques of U.S. intentions.

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US Department of State
 Bureau of Intelligence and Research
 Intelligence Assessment
 08/29/2002

RELEASED IN FULL

(U) Problems and Prospects of "Justifying" War With Iraq

(C) Many, if not most, countries allied with or friendly toward the United States--especially in Europe--harbor grave doubts about the advisability of reported US plans for an all-out attack on Iraq. Though many of these reservations may be pragmatic, politically motivated, or even pusillanimous, to the publics of the countries concerned some are seen as matters of principle. The seven principles of traditional "just war" theory provide a framework for organizing critiques of presumed US plans for Iraq. Foreign critics tend to see the principles of "last resort," "justifiable cost," and "openness to peaceful resolution" as the most tenuous justification for an attack on Iraq.

(U) Principles of just war

(U//SBU) Traditional just war theory is based mainly on the work of Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, circa 1600. It is generally understood as comprising seven principles: just cause of conflict; competent authority to initiate conflict; last resort (peaceful means exhausted); justifiable cost; openness to peaceful resolution; prospect of success; and just means involving discrimination and proportionality. Many objections to and reservations about the perceived US advocacy of all-out war with Iraq, involving overthrow and replacement of the current regime, can be subsumed under one or more of these principles. Arguments of those criticizing putative US justifications are summarized below.

(U) Just cause

(U//SBU) *There must be a just reason for starting a war or initiating large-scale conflict between states.* Purely aggressive war has long been understood to be illegitimate. The scope, scale, intensity, and destructiveness of modern military action and technology are seen as effectively delegitimizing any justification for wars of aggrandizement. Only wars of defense currently are perceived as just. Preemptive wars of defense, however, require careful justification. In particular, the certainty and imminence of the alleged threat(s) require persuasive evidence.

(U//SBU) Most countries are convinced of--or at least will not openly discount--the dangers that would be posed by Iraqi possession of capabilities to produce and employ weapons of mass destruction (WMD--including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons). But many countries insist that persuasive, if not conclusive, evidence of current Iraqi capabilities and intentions is required to justify a contention that Iraqi WMD poses such a grave and imminent threat to international peace and security (read: to the United States) that a preemptive attack can be justified on defensive grounds.

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(U//SBU) Countries holding this view will want Washington to present such evidence.

(U) Competent authority

(U//SBU) *Only duly constituted civil authority--generally a legitimate government--can rightfully initiate war or large-scale conflict, owing to the scale and depth of responsibilities involved in causing destruction and suffering affecting a large segment of society.* There is no question that the government of a sovereign, democratic power such as the United States is a competent authority in this regard--especially if the United States follows its constitutionally mandated procedures for a formal declaration of war.

(U//SBU) But the existence of the UN Security Council and its Charter-mandated responsibilities for international peace and security, combined with the precedent of using UNSC resolutions to justify previous large-scale military operations against Iraq, creates a strong public presumption that the Security Council must authorize any future major hostilities with Iraq. If an additional UNSC resolution is not sought and obtained for such hostilities, many countries may never regard another war with Iraq as legitimate or justifiable.

(U) Last resort

(U//SBU) *A modern war is considered just only if it is a last resort after all peaceful means of resolution have been tried and have failed.* In the case of Iraq, assuming that the imminence of the WMD threat is the central justification for defensive preemption, every reasonable effort to employ UN inspectors to determine the state of Iraqi capabilities and eliminate them must first be exhausted. Much of the international community perceives the United States to be uninterested in any resumption of UN inspections.

(U) Justifiable cost

(U//SBU) *The damage, destruction, and suffering brought about by war must be shown to be worth the goals and objectives thought to be reasonably foreseeable--and achievable--as a result of going to war.* Protracted, large-scale urban warfare in Iraq, now seen as a likely prospect if major hostilities commence, would wreak enormous damage on civil infrastructure and inflict great suffering on Iraqi civilians. Other countries probably will demand a persuasive explanation of how this can be avoided or significantly mitigated before they will support military action. Committed, credible, long-term postwar reconstruction plans would have to be part of any persuasive presentation. Otherwise, the prospect of the complete destruction of Iraqi society would be seen as unjustified.

(U//SBU) The idea of justifiable cost also underlies pragmatic concerns in many countries about the terrorism, violent protest, and other forms of severe domestic instability that might ensue on their soil as a result of an all-out attack on Iraq.

(U) Openness to peaceful resolution

(U//SBU) *During the course of a conflict, participating countries should remain open to peaceful means of resolving it.* Categorical demands for the overthrow of the Iraqi regime are likely to be seen by other countries as an unjustifiable requirement for unconditional surrender. Many countries are disinclined to rule out completely yet another "deal" with Saddam Hussein, presumably under much

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tighter conditions and constraints than currently prevail, perhaps involving his effective removal from power but retention in a figurehead role. Absent US willingness to consider such an approach, other countries probably would demand some kind of formal indictment, by a duly constituted tribunal with appropriate international jurisdiction, for war crimes or crimes against humanity.

(U) Prospect of success

(U//SBU) *A reasonable chance of achieving a war's aims is required to justify the conflict.* Obviously the United States, whether alone or in coalition with other countries, has the capability to defeat Iraq to any degree that it chooses. But in view of perceived uncertainties about the cost and course of all-out conflict with Iraq, other countries want to know if the United States would commit to finish the job—for example, even in the face of large numbers of US casualties and even if the war dragged on for a long time.

(U//SBU) The aftermath of a war with Iraq would raise numerous pragmatic concerns relating to the prospect of success as a principle. There is widespread doubt that Washington has a viable plan to install and sustain a successor regime in Iraq. Worry also prevails that the entire region would become even more unstable and unfriendly to Western countries and other industrialized democracies. Countries in the region also are anxious about refugee inflows. Numerous other, less specific concerns about possible unintended consequences further exacerbate the doubts that dominate thinking almost everywhere abroad.

(U) Just means

(U//SBU) *A just war must be conducted by just means, especially in discriminating between combatants and noncombatants and limiting the destruction as much as possible while achieving legitimate military objectives.* US precision-guided munitions are now widely seen as fully providing the capability for discrimination and proportionality. But this perception can work against the United States when targeting errors, accidents, and baiting by disinformation lead to widely publicized civilian deaths. Saddam's well-documented use of Iraqi civilians as human shields will complicate actual operations, and other countries--especially potential coalition partners--will want to learn in detail about how the United States plans to cope with inevitable civilian hostage contingencies.

CONFIDENTIAL//20120823

Reason for Classification: 1.5 (c)(d)

Declassify on: 20120823

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DOCUMENT: Email exchange, Downing Street Chief of Staff Jonathan Powell-Communications Director Alastair Campbell

DATE: September 5, 2002, 2:41 p.m.

SOURCE: Released by the British Hutton Inquiry

CONTENT: The British prime minister's chief of staff and his communications director exchange emails on the results of the day's meeting.

Alison Blackshaw

From: Jonathan Powell
Sent: 05 September 2002 14:41
To: Alastair Campbell
Subject: RE

what is the timing on preparation of it and publication? Will TB have something he can read on the plane to the US?

-----Original Message-----

From: Sandra Powell **On Behalf Of** Alastair Campbell
Sent: 05 September 2002 14:38
To: Jonathan Powell
Subject: RE

I'll come back to you on the first

Re dossier, substantial rewrite, with JS and Julian M in charge, which JS will take to US next Friday, and be in shape Monday thereafter. Structure as per TB's discussion. Agreement that there has to be real intelligence material in their presentation as such.

-----Original Message-----

From: Jonathan Powell
Sent: 05 September 2002 13:50
To: Alastair Campbell
Subject:

~~How would we handle the dossier?~~
What did you decide on dossiers?

DOCUMENT: Foreign and Commonwealth Office draft U.K. dossier by John Williams, FCO Communications Director

DATE: Approximately September 9, 2002

SOURCE: U.K. FOIA disclosure

CONTENT: This is the first full draft of the dossier to be produced after Prime Minister Blair's announcement on September 3. This paper contains the initial version of what became the published dossier's executive summary, which includes a bullet-point list of claims implicitly attributed to the JIC. It covers an account of Saddam's regime and a section on his WMD "programmes." The bullet-point early in this paper in fact asserts that Iraq had actually "purchased" uranium.

considerable detail

This paper sets out in full the history of Iraq's efforts to equip itself with weapons of mass destruction. It details our knowledge of the weaponry unaccounted for [can we have a list, with a table of totals somewhere please? Perhaps in an annexe, so that the flow doesn't break up], in the absence of UN inspections. It lays out Saddam Hussein's record of murder and oppression. And it makes public for the first time our best publishable intelligence assessment of Iraq's weapons programme. Never before has a British government published so much intelligence material. This is a measure of the threat the international community faces. The public has a right to know the nature of the regime we are dealing with.

It is important to see the whole picture: the history of aggression and human rights abuse, as well as the most up-to-date information on weaponry. It is the aggressive intent and the casual indifference to human life which make Iraq a unique threat, as much as the weapons themselves.

It is nearly four years since the United Nations was last able to inspect Iraqi weapons facilities. Even when the inspectors were in Iraq, the regime did all it could to prevent them discovering the extent of its weaponry.

For example, Iraq claims to have 'lost' 550 shells filled with mustard gas. It argued that the chemical warfare agents in these weapons would have degraded long ago, so there was no need to account for them. However, a dozen shells were eventually found. Chemical tests, in April 1998, showed that the mustard was still of the highest quality and the shells were ready for combat use. [source: Unscm report, 1999] *WWI mustard gas shells still ready*

This single episode shows why the international community cannot afford to rely on Saddam Hussein's word, or neglect his capacity to make war. The weaponry which he has acquired, and

continues to seek, cannot be described as defensive. Its purpose is to terrorise, intimidate and de-stabilise.

The history of UN weapons inspections is a history of lies and evasions by Iraq, with the intention of concealing and maintaining as many offensive weapons as possible. Iraq has been alarmingly successful in doing so.

Because of Iraq's systematic dishonesty in the face of UN inspections, we have never had complete knowledge of the extent of its weaponry. We could establish a complete picture only if Saddam Hussein complied with the Security Council resolutions which call on Iraq to make available any location, any document, any scientist or technician to inspection at any time. That he refuses is the most damning evidence against him. If he has nothing to hide, he has nothing to fear from the UN.

Since 1998, the international community has been forced to rely on satellite imagery, and on intelligence, some of it gathered from those who have managed to escape the regime of torture, and execution without trial, behind which Saddam Hussein maintains his power and the weapons which underpin that power.

Our judgement, based on these and other intelligence sources (?), is that Iraq:

- is close to deploying its Al-Samoud liquid propellant missile, and has used the absence of weapons inspectors to work on extending its range;
- is testing the solid-propellant missile Ababil-100, and is making efforts to extend its range;
- has retained a dozen Al Hussein missiles, capable of carrying a chemical or biological warhead, either by hiding them from the UN as complete systems, or by re-assembling them;
- is developing as a priority longer-range missile systems capable of threatening NATO (Greece and Turkey?);
- has constructed a new engine test stand bigger than the one used for its current missile systems, and bigger than

*Penalty implications
when do we get
and?*

*Which one
is real to
Iraq's needs*

- the SCUD-testing stand dismantled under UN supervision; this will enable Iraq to test missiles with a range longer than permitted under Security Council resolution 687;
- is working to obtain improved guidance technology to increase missile accuracy;
 - is building a plant for producing ammonium perchlorate, an ingredient in rocket motor production;
 - is making concerted efforts to acquire weapons production technology, including machine tools, and the necessary raw materials, in contravention of UN sanctions;
 - has recruited specialists to work on its nuclear programme, whose declared aim was to produce a 20-kiloton weapon, capable of causing 80 per cent casualties within 1.6 miles of the detonation;
 - is covertly attempting to acquire technology and materials for use in nuclear weapons, including specialised aluminium with potential use in enriching uranium;
 - has acquired uranium, despite having no civil nuclear programme, and which therefore has no other use than in nuclear weapons;
 - retains chemical agent precursors, and production equipment for chemical weapons;
 - is self-sufficient in the technology required to produce biological weapons, and has retained the necessary expertise;
 - appears to be refurbishing sites formerly associated with its chemical and biological weapons programmes, including the Tareq facility;
 - has stocks of chemical and biological agents available, either retained from before the Gulf War, or from more recent production;
 - has the capability to produce the following chemical weapons agents: sulphur mustard, tabun, sarin, GF, VX;
 - and the following biological agents: anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflotoxin

[can we please have a side panel explaining in one sentence each what these things can do to people]

- retains conventional delivery means for chemical and biological weapons, for example free fall bombs and missile warheads;
- has ^{converted} modified the L-29 jet trainer ^{to make it} capable of delivering chemical and biological agents;
- has developed transportable laboratories and other means of enabling its chemical and biological programme to survive military action.

This is our assessment. It is based on a rigorous system in which ... [very brief explanation of how the JIC system produces intelligence for ministers]. The section on intelligence (page..) sets out the detail and, where possible, the sourcing. It shows how intelligence has steadily built an increasingly compelling picture of a regime which is not only seeking strenuously to circumvent the international community's efforts to keep exceptionally dangerous weapons out of uniquely aggressive hands; but has succeeded to a degree which makes it no longer possible to regard ~~the~~ UN sanctions as a safe means of containment.

On the basis of our best assessment, the British government is convinced that Iraq is actively assembling an arsenal of terror weapons with which to intimidate its neighbours and the wider international community. No country has a clearer record of being prepared to use such weaponry. No leader has shown himself to be so oblivious to ^{the} impact of such weaponry. Iraq is testing, procuring, constructing and recruiting the personnel, infrastructure, materials and technology necessary for a major capability in mass destruction. Saddam cannot be allowed to put himself in a position to use it. We do not need a crystal ball to see how he would use it. The record speaks grimly for itself.

THE NATURE OF THE REGIME

Saddam Hussein came to power by murder, has maintained power by torture, rape and execution, and used power to commit genocide.

He seized the Presidency of Iraq in 1979. Saddam's predecessor, his uncle Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, was killed [how? A bit more detail please] Five close friends who opposed him – members of the Revolutionary Command Council – were executed. [ditto].

As Saddam established control, leading clerics were arrested and killed: Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr in April 1980; many [how many? And why?] members of the Hakim family in May 1983. The range of Saddam's murders went beyond Iraq's borders. Sayed Mahdi al-Hakim was killed in Khartoum in 1988.

Murder is not the only means of dealing with dissenters outside Iraq. In June 2000, General Nahib al-Salehi, a political opponent living in Jordan, received a video showing a female relative being raped. Ten days later, he was contacted by Iraqi intelligence, who told him they were holding another woman in his family. They urged the general to stop his opposition activities.

Rape is a standard method of intimidation by the regime. The government personnel card produced here [picture] identifies its holder, Aziz Saleh Ahmed, as a 'fighter in the popular army' whose 'activity' is 'violation of women's honour': in other words, he is a professional rapist [any more on these people? This is the ghastly single image of oppression we must get into people's minds].

In a centralised tyranny, human rights abuse is not something which the leadership can claim no responsibility for. Saddam's younger son, Qusayy (?), is head of the internal security agencies. He has encouraged a policy of systematic torture and rape, and the threat of rape to coerce.

At the Mahjar prison in central Baghdad, which is part of the Police Training College (?), women prisoners are routinely raped by their guards. All prisoners are beaten twice a day.. They receive no medical treatment. The normal occupancy is between 600 and 700 prisoners in 30 cells underground and a further 30 cells which used to be dog kennels.

Saddam's prisons policy is tough. At the Sijn Al-Tarbut jail, three floors underground (?) at the Directorate of General Security building in Baghdad, prisoners are kept in rows of rectangular steel boxes, similar to the boxes in which bodies are stored in mortuaries. There are between 100 and 150 boxes. They are opened for half an hour a day, to allow the prisoner light and air. Prisoners have no food, only liquids. They remain in their boxes until they confess or die.

The Qurtiyya prison in the Talbiyyah area of the Saddam City district, Baghdad, consists of 50 to 60 metal boxes the size of tea chests in which prisoners are kept on the same confess-or-die basis. Each box has a floor made of mesh to allow detainees to defecate.

You do not have to be a criminal, or even a political opponent of the regime, to be held in an Iraqi jail. You can go to jail for being related to members of the opposition. Sometimes relatives are held as 'substitute prisoners' until the person wanted for arrest is found.

This happened to the father and two brothers of Al-Shaik Yahya Muhsin Ja'far al-Zeini, a theology student from Saddam City. When he was finally arrested, this is what happened (source: testimony to Amnesty International):

[use the quotes from the box]

Here is another personal testimony of Iraqi jail conditions:

[run the material in the Abu Ghraib box on page 50]

Two years ago, a husband and wife (names withheld) were arrested and taken for interrogation separately at Republican Guard facilities on the road to Abu Ghraib. [tell the story of 'a tortured family' on page 51]

In December 1996, a Kurdish businessman from Baghdad..[tell the story of B on page 46]

Executions are carried out with no judicial process. We know that in February 2000, 64 male prisoners were executed at Abu Ghraib, followed in March by a further 58. In October 2001, 23 political prisoners were executed there. The worst known case is the execution of 4,000 prisoners at Abu Ghraib in 1984.

Prisoners at the Mahjar jail have been executed by machine gun. Mahjar has an execution area called 'Hadiqa' (garden) where 3,000 prisoners were executed between 1993 and 1998.

Between 1997 and 1999, an estimated 2,500 prisoners were executed in what was called a 'prison cleansing' campaign: they were killed in order to reduce prison overcrowding (?).

No judicial process was evident when dozens of women accused of prostitution were beheaded in October 2000, along with men accused of pimping. Some, at least, were accused for political reasons.

Saddam favours barbaric punishments. He has issued a series of decrees authorising amputation, branding, cutting off prisoners' ears. Methods of torture used in Iraqi jails include using electric drills to mutilate hands, pulling out fingernails, knife cuts, sexual attacks and 'official rape'.

He believes in the punishment fitting the crime. The penalty for slandering the President is to have your tongue cut out. Iraqi television has broadcast this form of political punishment as a warning.

Saddam and the head of his private office, General 'Abd Hamud, have both signed death warrants. The archives holding these warrants are held in the cafeteria on the eighth floor of the main Ministry of the Interior building in Baghdad.

Saddam's sons take after their father. Uday once maintained a private torture chamber known as the Red Room in a building on the banks of the Tigris disguised as an electricity installation. It was Uday who ordered the Iraq football team to be caned on the soles of the feet for losing a World Cup match.

He created a militia in 1994 which has used swords to execute victims outside their own homes. He has personally executed dissidents, for instance in the uprising at Basra which followed the Gulf War.

But members of Saddam's family are far from being safe from persecution. A cousin of Saddam called Ala Abd Al-Qadir Al-Majid fled to Jordan...[tell the story on page 49] .

Such is the nature of the regime in whose hands we would leave a formidable array of weapons of mass destruction: a regime without the slightest respect for human life. There can be no doubt how those weapons would be used by a regime founded on murder and entirely lacking in moral scruple, with a record of waging war against internal minorities and external opponents.

SADDAM'S WARS

[can I have more background on Halabja – what happened and why? Just enough to tell the story in one long paragraph, for people who don't know about it]

Shortly before sunrise on Friday, 17th March 1988, the village of Halabja in...was bombarded by Iraqi warplanes. The raid was over in minutes (? This sort of detail, please). In that short time, Saddam Hussein had committed a crime that none of the 20th century's dictators committed. Neither Hitler nor Stalin attacked civilians with chemical weapons. The bombs that fell on Halabja that Friday morning were equipped with (what chemical?). (what does the chemical do to the body – how does it kill? Sorry to be grisly, but this will have real impact on real people, not journalists who take it all as read). Victims were killed instantly. Among the corpses, children were found dead where they had been playing outside their homes. In places, streets were piled with corpses. Five thousand villagers died. (why Halabja?)

Saddam remains the only man to have used chemical weapons to wage war on civilians: so far. It is not speculative to suggest he would do so again if he could: he has done it. And we know that he is now re-equipping himself with chemical weapons, while seeking to extend the range of the missiles that would carry them.

Amnesty International estimates that more than 100,000 Kurds were killed or disappeared during Saddam's 1987-88 campaign to crush Kurdish insurgency. Kurdish villages were systematically razed. This was a policy of genocide, comparable to the worst atrocities in modern history. A regime capable of genocide is not safe to be left in possession of the weapons with which to carry out racial mass murder.

Saddam Hussein has fought two wars of aggression; the Iran-Iraq war and the invasion of Kuwait. He shot a minister who argued for peace with Iran. A million died in that conflict. Twenty thousand Iranians were killed by chemical weapons: mustard gas and the nerve agents tabun and sarin: all of which Iraq still possesses. [perhaps we could have a paragraph or two on the history of this conflict please]

The invasion of Kuwait was the only (?) case since the founding of the United Nations of one of its members taking over another. We do not have to guess what Saddam would now do with his weapons if left unhindered by the international community – he has a record of external conquest. In 1990-1, he was deterred from going further, and turned back, only by military action. And since then he has been contained by sanctions: so far.

[insert here the passage on the Kuwait war, from the middle of 44 on, plus the passage on the persecution of the Kurds down to the middle of p 46. Then a sentence or two to explain what the 1991 uprising was – assume total non-knowledge in the reader – and then run that passage from the middle of 46 to the middle of 47. Then should come the passage Charles Gray is writing on the treatment of the marsh Arabs. Can you please

check that I'm right, and that he's doing that, as I have no raw material. Then conclude this section as follows]

....Such is the nature of the regime: guilty of religious persecution, of oppressing minorities, of genocide, of using chemical weapons on civilians, of waging two wars on neighbours. This is not a regime entitled to the benefit of any doubt, or fit to possess weapons of mass destruction.

IN DEFLANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

This is the regime which the United Nations has tried in vain to disarm, throughout a decade of deceit by Saddam Hussein. Despite Iraqi obstruction, the inspectors of the United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Authority managed to find and destroy much of Saddam's chemical and biological stockpiles, many missiles, and the infrastructure of his nuclear weapons programme. That was done in accordance with Security Council resolution 687, under which Iraq must agree to the 'destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision of':

- all ballistic missiles with a range over 150km;
- all repair and production facilities;
- all chemical and biological weapons, stocks of agents and related subsystems and components;
- all research and development, support and manufacturing facilities.

Iraq remains in breach of this, and eight other, resolutions. Even when the inspectors were in Iraq, the disclosure statements required by the resolutions were never complete, Iraq violated the resolutions by conducting secret, unsupervised destruction, and it persistently concealed and covered up as much as it could get away with. Saddam

thought it

eventually made inspections impossible: the inspectors were finding too much for his comfort.

The inspectors succeeded in discovering enough material to prove beyond doubt the scale of Saddam's military programme, but not enough to give confidence that that programme had been disabled. Iraq's repeated claim, including in the latest contacts with the UN in July (?), that it possesses no prohibited weapons or materials, is a demonstrable lie: on the basis of what was left unaccounted for when the inspectors left, even without the latest intelligence and satellite evidence. While lying to the UN, Iraq has been carrying out construction work at sites associated with its nuclear programme, according to satellite surveillance reported by the IAEA on 6 September (?). In the absence of inspectors on the ground, the international community cannot have any guarantee of safety.

Iraq has a long record of misleading the UN. In 1995, the inspectors uncovered a cache of documents which showed that Iraq had been giving them false information for four years. Iraq's word cannot be trusted.

From the beginning of inspections in 1991, Iraq's aim was to:

- conceal its VX nerve agent project
- conceal the very existence of its biological programme;
- conceal the number of warheads it possessed, capable of long-range delivery of chemical and biological weapons.

[source? Is this from a report? It's on p 2?]

In 1997, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Authority said his inspectors had been 'severely hampered by Iraq's persistence in a policy of concealment and understatement'. This is why the international community insists on 'immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access' for inspectors, as laid down in resolution 707. And it is why the British government has responded to

*As early as 1991, I was...
the inspectors...
the UN...
the IAEA...
the international community...
the British government...*

*to be... 1998...
Iraq's aim...
was to:*

recent Iraqi attempts to play games with the UN by repeating the need for unfettered access.

Iraq's long history of playing games – at times dangerous games - with the inspectors include:
[the material in the box on page 30, but not in a box, just as a list]

In December 1997, Iraq flouted the UN by creating a category of sites – ‘presidential and sovereign’ – from which it claimed a non-existent authority to bar the inspectors. It took the intervention of the UN Secretary General in February 1998 to persuade Iraq to allow inspectors to enter these presidential ‘palaces’: in fact, massive compounds long associated with Iraq's weapons programme [then run from page 33] These dots are not meant to be here. Please get rid.

The International Atomic Energy Authority has continued to assess Iraq's nuclear capacity and intentions. Its latest report (can I have the key points here please?)

[Here should come the section on money requested by the PM]

THE INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT

Delete everything until *** on page 21, which starts ‘In the last year...’ The background should all be done by the time we get to the intelligence, which should come straight into the latest information. Instead of little boxes summarising the resolutions, let's have them in full, as an annexe, plus the list of the 23 breaches out of 27.

IRAQI WMD PROGRAMMES

NUCLEAR WEAPONS:

Iraq has a nuclear weapons programme, in breach of its NPT and IAEA obligations and of UNSCR 687, but will find it difficult to produce fissile material while sanctions remain in place.

- Comprehensive programme prior to the Gulf War;
- Recalled scientists to work on a nuclear weapons programme;
- Covert efforts to procure nuclear related materials and technology.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS:

Iraq has a capability to produce chemical and biological weapons in breach of UNSCR 687.

- The amount of chemical and biological material, including weapons and agents, left unaccounted for when the UNSCOM inspections terminated would provide a significant offensive capability;
- Produced and used proficiently a variety of chemical weapons in 1980s against Iran and its own citizens;
- Concealed large scale production of the nerve agent VX until discovered by UNSCOM;
- Produced and weaponised at least three BW agents but concealed this capability until forced to declare it in 1995;
- Failed to convince UNSCOM of the accuracy of its declarations.

BALLISTIC MISSILES:

Retains more than a dozen prohibited Al Hussain missiles (650km) **in breach of UNSCR 687**;
Working on designs for longer-range missiles **in breach of UNSCR 687**;

- Infrastructure damaged in the Gulf War and Operation Desert Fox has now largely been reconstituted;
- Infrastructure for longer-range missiles is under construction;
- UNSCOM unable to account for all imported missiles; others could have been built using hidden retained components.

IRAQI WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMMES

Introduction

- Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons are collectively known as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Several countries have WMD programmes and missile systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical or biological warheads. They are working to develop more accurate and longer-range missiles that will allow them to threaten more than just their immediate neighbours.
- Most countries have promised not to acquire these weapons. They have signed relevant international agreements including the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and Toxins Weapons Conventions (BTWC).
- A few countries have either failed to sign these agreements or have decided to break them. The position of Iraq is a particular concern. Iraq is a signatory to the NPT, but since the late 1980s it has not abided by its obligations. Since the Gulf War Iraq has been bound by five UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) relating to its WMD programmes. It remains in breach of all of them. In 1980 and 1990 Saddam Hussain used his conventional forces to mount unprovoked attacks against his neighbours, Iran and Kuwait respectively. He has used chemical weapons both against Iran and against his own Kurdish people.
- The International Community has repeatedly sought to disrupt Iraq's efforts to acquire WMD. On each occasion Saddam has sought to rebuild his capabilities. His efforts are making progress. The Government monitors these efforts very closely. This paper sets out what the Government is able to say about them.

50X
 1/2 the diff
 does

Background

Before the Gulf War, Saddam Hussain demonstrated his readiness to deploy extensively WMD in the form of chemical weapons both against his neighbours and his own population. Since the Gulf War, he has **failed to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions**, which his government accepted.

While the successful enforcement of the sanctions regimes and the UN arms embargo have impeded Iraq's efforts to reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction, they have not halted them. Much of Iraq's missile infrastructure has been rebuilt; the nuclear weapons programme is being reconstituted; and Iraq continues to have the capability to produce chemical and biological weapons, and may already have done so.

Since the withdrawal of inspectors in 1998, monitoring of Iraqi attempts to restore a WMD capability has become more difficult.

UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) relating to WMD

UNSCR 687, April 1991 created the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and required Iraq to accept, unconditionally, "the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision" of its chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150km, and their associated programmes, stocks, components, research and facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was charged with abolition of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. UNSCOM and the IAEA must report that their mission has been achieved before the Security Council can end sanctions. They have not yet done so.

UNSCR 707, August 1991, stated that Iraq must provide full, final and complete disclosure of all its WMD programmes and provide unconditional and unrestricted access to UN inspectors. Iraq must also cease all nuclear activities of any kind other than civil use of isotopes.

UNSCR 715, October 1991 approved plans prepared by UNSCOM and IAEA for the monitoring and verification arrangements to implement UNSCR 687.

UNSCR 1051, March 1996 stated that Iraq must declare the shipment of dual-use WMD goods.

UNSCR 1284, December 1999, established UNMOVIC (United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) as a successor to UNSCOM and calls on Iraq to give UNMOVIC inspectors "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transport"

Saddam's Weapons

Nuclear Weapons

Before the Gulf War, Iraqi plans for the development of a nuclear weapon were well advanced. Iraq was planning and constructing fissile material production facilities and work on a weapon design was underway. Their declared aim was to produce a weapon with a 20 kiloton yield, which would ultimately be delivered in a ballistic missile warhead.

We assessed in 1991 that Iraq was less than three years away from possessing a nuclear weapon.

After the Gulf War, Iraq's nuclear weapons infrastructure was dismantled by the IAEA. But we judge that Iraq is still working to achieve a nuclear weapons capability, in breach of its NPT and IAEA obligations and UN Security Council Resolution 687. Much of its former expertise has been retained.

Effect of a 20 kiloton nuclear device in a built up area

A detonation occurring over a city might flatten an area of approximately 3 square miles.

Within 1.6 miles of detonation, blast damage and radiation would cause 80% casualties, three-quarters of which would be fatal. Between 1.6 and 3.1 miles from the detonation, there would still be 10% casualties, 10% of which would be fatal injuries.

START HERE, and get rid of all these horrible boxes and break outs. Let's have a clean text, telling the story. This lay-out makes me dizzy. I don't propose to rewrite this until I take delivery of the new version

In the last year intelligence has indicated that specialists were recalled to work on a nuclear weapons programme in the autumn of 1998. We judge that the Iraqi programme is based on gas centrifuge uranium enrichment, which was the route Iraq was following for producing fissile material before the Gulf War. . But Iraq needs certain key equipment and materials for the production of the fissile material necessary before a nuclear bomb could be developed

Iraq is covertly attempting to acquire technology and materials with nuclear applications. This includes specialised aluminium, which is subject to international export controls because of its potential application in gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium. Although this material has applications in a range of other weapon systems. There is also compelling evidence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa.

So long as sanctions continue to hinder the import of such crucial goods, Iraq would find it difficult to produce a nuclear weapon. After the lifting of sanctions we assess that Iraq would need at least five years to produce a weapon.

Progress would be much quicker if Iraq was able to buy suitable fissile material.

Chemical And Biological Weapons

Iraq made frequent use of a variety of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. Iraq used significant quantities of mustard, tabun and sarin resulting in over 20,000 Iranian casualties. In 1988 Saddam also used mustard and nerve agents against the Kurds in northern Iraq. Estimates vary, but according to Human Rights Watch up to 5,000 people were killed. Iraq's military maintains the capability to use these weapons, with command, control and logistical arrangements in place.

Iraq admitted in 1991 to the production of blister agent (mustard) and nerve agents (tabun, sarin, and cyclosarin).

Effects of chemical agents

Mustard is a liquid agent that causes burns and blisters to exposed skin. It attacks and damages the eye, mucous membranes, lungs, skin, and blood-forming organs. When inhaled, mustard damages the respiratory tract; when ingested, it causes vomiting and diarrhoea.

Tabun, sarin and VX are all nerve agents of which VX is the most toxic. They all damage the nervous system, producing muscular spasms and paralysis. As little as 10 milligrammes of VX on the skin can cause death.

A chemical weapon is the agent combined with a means of dispersing it.

After years of denial Iraq admitted to producing about 4 tons of VX nerve agent, but only after the defection of Saddam's son-in-law, Hussein Kamil in 1995. Iraq maintains that the chemical weapons programme was halted in January 1991 and all agents under its control were destroyed by the summer of 1991. However, there are inconsistencies in Iraqi documentation on destruction.

Analysis of figures provided by UN weapons inspectors indicate that they have been unable to account for:

- up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent, including 1.5 tonnes of VX nerve agent;
- up to 3000 tonnes of precursor chemicals including approximately 300 tonnes which, in the Iraqi CW programme, were unique to the production of VX;
- over 30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological agents.

We cannot be sure whether these have been destroyed or remain at the disposal of the Iraqi government. But we judge that Iraq retains some production equipment and at least small amounts of chemical agent precursors.

Following four years of pressure from weapons inspectors and the information provided by Hussein Kamil, Iraq finally admitted to the existence of a **biological weapons** programme in 1995.

Iraq admitted to:

- producing anthrax spores, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin and to working on a number of other agents;
- weaponising some agents, which included the filling of warheads for its Al Hussain ballistic missiles;
- testing spraying devices for agents.

Iraq has claimed that all its biological agents and weapons have been destroyed, although no convincing proof of this has been offered. UN inspectors could not account for large quantities of growth media procured for biological agent production, enough to produce over three times the amount of anthrax Iraq admits to having manufactured. Reports that Iraq has conducted research on smallpox and a number of toxins cannot be corroborated. Iraq is assessed to be self-sufficient in the technology required to produce biological weapons.

We assess that Iraq has a covert chemical and biological weapons programme, **in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687.**

All the necessary expertise has been retained. Iraq appears to be refurbishing sites formally associated with its chemical and biological weapons programmes. This includes facilities near Habbanjyah, previously associated with the production of CW precursors. One of the facilities, the Castor Oil Production Plant, could be used in the production of ricin BW agent. Other sites of concern include the Al-Dawrah Foot and

Mouth Disease Vaccine Facility, which was involved in BW Agent production before the Gulf War. Iraq is assessed to have some chemical and biological agents available, either from pre-Gulf War stocks or more recent production.

We judge Iraq has the capability to produce the chemical agents:

- sulphur mustard, tabun, sarin, cyclophosphamide, and VX.

We judge Iraq has the capability to produce the biological agents:

- anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin.

Iraq retains conventional delivery means for chemical and biological weapons such as free fall bombs and missile warheads. But given Iraq's admission of testing spray devices, we judge that the modification of the L-29 jet trainer could allow it to be used for the delivery of chemical and biological agents. The L-29 was subject to UNSCOM inspection for this reason.

Effects of biological agents

Anthrax

Anthrax is a disease caused by the bacterium *Bacillus anthracis*. Inhalation anthrax is the manifestation of the disease likely to be expected in biological warfare. The symptoms may vary. If the dose is large (8,000 to 10,000 spores) death is common. The incubation period for anthrax is 1 to 7 days, with most cases occurring within 2 days of exposure.

Botulinum toxin

Botulinum toxin is a neurotoxin produced by the bacterium *Clostridium botulinum* and is one of the most toxic substances known to man. The first symptoms of botulinum toxin A poisoning may appear as early as 1 hour post exposure or as long as 8 days after exposure, with the incubation period between 12 and 22 hours. Paralysis leads to death by suffocation.

Aflatoxin

Aflatoxins are fungal toxins, which are potent carcinogens. Aflatoxin contaminated food products can cause liver inflammation and cancer.

Ricin

Ricin is derived from castor beans and can cause multiple organ failure within one or two days of inhalation.

A biological weapon is the agent combined with a means of dispersing it.

Saddam's Missiles

Ballistic Missiles

Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had a well-developed missile industry. Iraq fired over 500 SCUD-type missiles at Iran during the Iran-Iraq War and 93 SCUD type-missiles during the Gulf War. The latter were targeted at Coalition forces stationed in the Gulf region and Israel. Armed with conventional warheads they did limited damage. Iraq had chemical and biological warheads available but did not use them.

ABABIL-100



Most of the missiles fired in the Gulf War were an Iraqi produced stretched version of the SCUD missile, the Al Hussain, with an extended range of 650 km. Iraq was working on other longer-range stretched SCUD variants, such as the Al Abbas, which had a range of 900km. Iraq was also seeking to reverse engineer the SCUD engine with a view to producing new missiles; recent evidence indicates they may have succeeded at that time. In particular Iraq had plans for a new SCUD-derived missile with a range of 1200km. Iraq also conducted a partial flight test of a multi-stage satellite launch vehicle based on SCUD technology, known as the Al Abid.

SCUD missiles


The short-range mobile SCUD ballistic missile was developed by the Soviet Union in the 1950s, drawing from the technology of the German liquid-propellant V-2 which saw operational service towards the end of World War II.

For many years it was the mainstay of Soviet and Warsaw Pact tactical missile forces, and it was also widely exported. Recipients of Soviet-manufactured SCUDs included Iraq, North Korea, Iran, and Libya, although not all were sold directly by the Soviet Union.

Also during this period, Iraq was developing the BADR-2000, a 700-1000km range two-stage solid propellant missile (based on the Iraqi part of the 1980s CONDOR-2 programme run in co-operation with Argentina and Egypt). There were plans for 1200-1500km range solid propellant follow-on systems.

Since the Gulf War, Iraq has been openly developing two short-range missiles up to a range of 150km, which are permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 687. The Al-Samoud liquid propellant missile has been extensively tested, has appeared on public parade in Baghdad and is judged to be nearing deployment. In the absence of UN inspectors, Iraq has also worked on extending its range to at least 200km. Testing of the solid propellant Ababil-100 is also underway, with plans to extend its range to at least 200km.

AL HUSSEIN



Any extension of a missile's range to beyond 150km would be in breach of UN Security Resolution 687.

Compared to liquid propellant missiles, those powered by solid propellant offer greater ease of storage, handling and mobility. They are also quicker to take into and out of action and can stay at a high state of readiness for longer periods. We judge that Iraq has retained more than a dozen Al Hussain missiles, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687.

These missiles were either hidden from the UN as complete systems, or could have been re-assembled using illegally retained engines and other components. We judge that the engineering expertise available would allow these missiles to be effectively maintained. We assess that some of these missiles could be available for use.

Although not very accurate when used against *other countries*, they are still an effective system, which could be used with a conventional, chemical or biological warhead.

Reporting has recently confirmed that Iraq's priority is to develop longer-range missile systems, which we judge are likely to have ranges over 1000km, enabling it to threaten regional neighbours, Israel and some NATO members. These programmes employ hundreds of people. Imagery below has shown a new engine test stand being constructed (A), which is larger than the current one used for Al Samoud (B), and that formerly used for testing SCUD engines (C) which was dismantled under UNSCOM supervision.



We judge that this new stand will be capable of testing engines for missiles with ranges over 1000km, which are not permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 687.

Iraq is also working to obtain improved guidance technology to increase missile accuracy. The success of UN restrictions means the development of new longer-range missiles is likely to be a slow process.

These restrictions impact particularly on the:

- availability of foreign expertise;
- conduct of test flights to ranges above 150km;
- acquisition of guidance and control technology.

Saddam remains committed to developing longer-range missiles. We assess that, if sanctions remain in place, the earliest Iraq could achieve a limited missile capability of over 1000km is 2007, but it is more likely to be towards the end of the decade (Figure 4 shows the range of Iraq's various missiles).

To be confident that it has successfully developed a longer-range missile Iraq would need to conduct a flight-test. Current UN Security Council Resolutions do not permit tests of over 150km.

Iraq has managed to rebuild much of the missile production infrastructure destroyed in the Gulf War and in Operation Desert Fox in 1998. New missile-related infrastructure is currently under construction, including a plant for indigenously producing ammonium perchlorate, which is a key ingredient in the production of solid propellant rocket motors. This was obtained through an Indian chemical engineering firm with extensive links in Iraq.

Despite a UN embargo, Iraq has also made concerted efforts to acquire additional production technology, including machine tools and raw materials, **in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 1051.**

The embargo has succeeded in blocking many of these attempts, but, despite the dual use nature of some of the items, we know some items have found their way to the Iraqi ballistic missile programme and will inevitably continue to do so.

Concealment

Strategies to conceal and protect key parts of Iraq's WMD and ballistic missile programmes from a military attack or a UN inspection have been developed. These include the:

- use of transportable laboratories in their chemical and biological weapons programmes;
- use of covert facilities;
- dispersal of equipment when a threat is perceived.

In particular we know that the Iraqi leadership has recently ordered the dispersal of its most sensitive WMD equipment and material. This order is being carried out.

Iraq: Current and Planned/Potential Ballistic Missiles**CONCLUSION**

- Iraq retains some prohibited missile systems.
- Iraq is developing longer-range ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction throughout the Middle East and Gulf Region.
- Iraq is seeking a nuclear weapons capability.
- Iraq has a chemical weapons capability, and has used it. It also has a biological weapons capability.

CONTENT: Memo from Alastair Campbell to John Scarlett

DATE: September 9, 2002

SOURCE: Released by the British Hutton Inquiry

CONTENT: This document shows Downing Street's request that the U.K. dossier should match US claims: "They intend to produce a series of dossiers, starting with one of Saddam's record of defiance of the U.N., to be published alongside President Bush's speech on Thursday. They will then roll out several reports in the coming weeks. I am confident we can make yours one that complements rather than conflicts with them."

From: Alastair Campbell
Date: 9 September 2002

JOHN SCARLETT

Cc: Jonathan Powell
David Manning
PMOS
Jim Poston
PS/Foreign Secretary
PS/Defence Secretary
PS/"C"
PS/DG of Security Servi
[REDACTED] (GCHC)
John Williams (FCO)
Peter Ricketts
Stephen Wright (FCO)
[REDACTED] (SIS)
[REDACTED] (SIS)
Martin Howard (MOD)
David Omand (CO)

At our discussion this morning, we agreed it would be helpful if I set out for colleagues the process by which the Iraq dossier will be produced.

The first point is that this must be, and be seen to be, the work of you and your team, and that its credibility depends fundamentally upon that.

The second is that you are working on a new dossier, according to the structure we agreed at the meeting last week, to meet the new circumstances which have developed over recent weeks and months. Therefore, the rush of comments on the old dossier are not necessary or totally relevant. People should wait for the new one, which will be more detailed and substantial.

The structure we agreed last week was roughly as follows:

- why the issue arose in the first place
- why the inspection process was necessary
- the history of concealment and deception
- the story of inspectors, leading to their departure
- the story of weapons unaccounted for, and what they could do
- a section on ballistic missile technology
- CW/BW
- nuclear
- the sanctions regime, and how the policy of containment has worked only up to a point
- illicit money
- the repressive nature of the regime
- why the history of the man and the regime (Iraq/Iran; chemical weapons on his own people; Kuwait; human

CAB/6/0002



rights) makes us worried he cannot be allowed further to develop these weapons.

Much of this is obviously historical, but the history is a vital part of the overall story. This is something the IISS Report deals with very well.

The media/political judgement will inevitably focus on "what's new?" and I was pleased to hear from you and your SIS colleagues that, contrary to media reports today, the intelligence community are taking such a helpful approach to this in going through all the material they have. It goes without saying that there should be nothing published that you and they are not 100% happy with.

It is of course inevitable that the media and political speculation surrounding the dossier will grow prior to publication. But it is important that nobody in government feeds it. Partial leaks, or running commentaries on an out of date document help nobody.

Our public line is that the dossier will set out the facts which make HMG judge Iraq/WMD to represent a real threat. It will be detailed and comprehensive. As to why we can't publish it now, it has to be cleared by all those who have helped to build the case. This involves important judgements, and we will take our time.

In the meantime, we should encourage the fullest possible coverage of the IISS Report, and other publicly available material. But we should not talk up the dossier. We should be making clear that even with the intelligence material, the picture can never be a complete one because the inspectors have been out for so long. We have to be disciplined in holding the line until publication.

We agreed that by the end of today, you should have most of the draft material together, with the Agencies providing the sections relevant to the middle part of our structure, and the FCO providing the more historical material.

You will want to go through this material before submitting a consolidated draft to No. 10 and others. You will also take this to the US on your visit at the end of the week.

In the meantime, I will chair a team that will go through the document from a presentational point of view, and make recommendations to you. This team, I suggest, will include John Williams (FCO) Paul Hamill (CIC) and Phil Bassett and David Bradshaw from here. Writing by committee does not work but we will make recommendations and suggestions, and you can decide what you want to incorporate. Once they are incorporated, we need to take a judgement as to whether a single person should be appointed to write the final version.



CAB/6/0003

INVESTOR IN PEOPLE

It would be helpful to me and my colleagues if I could have something to look at by the time we get back from the TUC tomorrow.

We also discussed the importance of translating the dossier into other languages. Perhaps the FCO could look at the feasibility and timescale questions involved on this, but the Al Qaida evidence document benefited greatly in its impact through the various translations and their use diplomatically and on websites, etc.

We also need to consider whether to do a shorter version more aimed at the general public than the media.

So our current thinking and planning points to sometime in the middle of next week as the earliest possible time to do this. Once we have an advanced draft, we can address the questions of exact timing, launch details, Prime Ministerial and other ministerial involvement. The Prime Minister has expressed an interest in seeing an advanced draft.

I also briefed you on our discussions with US officials at Camp David, recorded separately. They intend to produce a series of dossiers, starting with one of Saddam's record of defiance of the UN, to be published alongside President Bush's speech on Thursday. They will then roll out several reports in the coming weeks. I am confident we can make yours one that complements rather than conflicts with them.

**Dictated by ALASTAIR CAMPBELL and signed in his absence.
Director of Communications and Strategy**

CAB/6/0004



INVESTOR IN PEOPLE

DOCUMENT: Department of State, Memo, Beth Jones-Marc Grossman

DATE: September 8, 2002

SOURCE: State Department FOIA Release

CONTENT: This memorandum was sent to prepare Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman for his meeting with Scarlett set for 2:00 p.m. on September 12. It states: "John Scarlett is traveling to Washington to consult with the NSC and CIA about the U.K.'s dossier on Iraq, to be released in the coming weeks. The dossier apparently has been completely reworked since the USG last saw it and he should be sharing the new draft with his intelligence community contacts here."

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BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
S/ES

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

SECRET/NODIS DECAPTIONED
DECL: 09/08/12

TO: P - Under Secretary Grossman

FROM: EUR - Beth Jones

SUBJECT: Your meeting with John Scarlett, Chairman of the British Joint Intelligence Committee, Thursday, September 12, 2:00 p.m. (30 minutes)

John Scarlett is traveling to Washington to consult with the NSC and CIA about the UK's dossier on Iraq, to be released in the coming weeks. The dossier apparently has been completely reworked since the USG last saw it, and he should be sharing the new draft with his intelligence community contacts here. In addition to discussing the dossier, Scarlett may wish to discuss Al-Qaida activities in northern Iraq,

B1

Your objectives:

- Discuss the content of the Iraq dossier; and
- Ask for a copy of the draft dossier.

Attachments:

Tab 1 -- Checklist of Key Issues
Tab 2 -- Background Paper on Key Issues
Tab 3 -- Participants List

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Classified by EUR A/S Beth Jones

Reason: E.O. 12958 1.5 (B) and (D)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE SELLIN
DATE/CASE ID: 19 SEP 2008 200800643

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Archive no. 139059

UNCLASSIFIED

BRIEFING MEMO - P/Scarlett, September 12, 2002

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Scarlett 09-12-02.doc

Drafted: EUR/UBI:Rebecca Dunham

x7-6591 9/9/02

Cleared: EUR:RBradtke
EUR/UBI:PHernandez/AKaragiannis ok
P:BBrink ok
D:HDPittman ok
S/P:DVanCleve ok
NEA/NGA:JCarpenter(Iraq) ok
SA/RA:LRobinson (India/Pakistan) ok
SA/INS:TAndrews (India/Pakistan) ok

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
ULIB.

Background on Key Issues

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
Iraq Dossier

The British have completely re-written their dossier on the Iraqi threat, starting from scratch and tossing out the first draft they shared with the USG some time ago. John Scarlett heads the task of preparing the new paper. He is bringing a draft with him to discuss it with the CIA and NSC, and offered to discuss it with you as well.




B1

No precise release date has been set, but at his September 3 press conference, PM Blair promised the public would see the dossier "in the next few weeks," and, at least at the working level, HMG hopes to release it no later than several days prior to the Labour Party Conference, which begins on September 29.




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


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Under Secretary Grossman's Meeting with
John Scarlett, Chairman of the British Joint Intelligence
Committee

September 12, 2002, 2:00 p.m.

Tentative Participants List

U.S.

U/S Grossman

NEA DAS Ryan Crocker

EUR/UBI notetaker

UK

John Scarlett

Others TBD

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Document: Email Downing Street press officer Daniel Pruce- FCO press officer Mark Matthews (CAB 11/0021)

DATE: September 10, 2002, 12:25 PM

SOURCE: Released by the British Hutton Inquiry

CONTENT: This email reveals the existence and significance of the draft dossier written by press officer John Williams.

Alison Blackshaw

From: Daniel Pruce
Sent: 10 September 2002 12:25
To: 'Mark Matthews'
Cc: Matthew Rycroft, 'Paul Hamill', Godric Smith, Alastair Campbell
Subject: DOSSIER

Mark,

I promised some quick thoughts on John's draft of 9 September

On content

- in general I think we should personalise the dossier, placing the focus on Saddam as much as possible. So I would propose that we replace most, if not all, of the references to Iraq with references to Saddam,
- the personal witness statements are very powerful. Are there more we can use to illustrate Saddam's repression of his own people through murder, rape and torture?
- we make a number of statements about Saddam's intentions/attitudes. Can we insert a few quotes from speeches he has made which, even if they are not specific, demonstrate that he is a bad man with a general hostility towards his neighbours and the West?
- in the public's mind the key difference between this text and the IISS text will be the access to intelligence material. I like the idea of the history of JIC assessments. Might we also include a general statement on the nature of the intelligence services and their role. This could be drawn from material that is already in the public domain. It's inclusion might help underline the fact that the services have contributed to the report, often in ways which, for perfectly fair reasons, are imperceptible,

On presentation:

- the text now reads as a single continuous narrative. This is fine - but I think we should look at breaking it up into the sections set out in Alastair's note of yesterday,
- much of the evidence we have is largely circumstantial so we need to convey to our readers that the cumulation of these facts demonstrates an intent on Saddam's part - the more they can be led to this conclusion themselves rather than have to accept judgements from us, the better,

On mechanics

- I'd be grateful if you could discuss with the FCO Publications team production times and costs. I would envisage that most people would access this text over the web, but I would guess that 500 hard copies will be needed. We can look at design questions later - but I would envisage a fairly sober presentation with a very "official" flavour
- we also need to think, once we have John's further draft tomorrow, how we prepare the ground for the launch of the text to get expectations in the right place

Danny

DOCUMENT: Memo, John Scarlett-Alastair Campbell

DATE: September 10, 2002

SOURCE: Released by the British Hutton Inquiry

CONTENT: This memo covered the draft that John Scarlett circulated on September 10. It states that the document has been significantly recast, “with considerable help from John Williams and others in the Foreign Office.”

CONFIDENTIAL

Jp178

ALASTAIR CAMPBELL

cc Jonathan Powell
David Manning
David Omand
PS/Foreign Secretary
PS/Defence Secretary
Desmond Bowen
John Williams

THE IRAQ DOSSIER

1. As requested in your minute of 9 September, I attach a revised draft of the dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
2. This has been significantly recast, with considerable help from John Williams and others in the Foreign Office. It still needs further work and I cannot yet confirm that I am content with the overall tone of the paper and the balance between the main text and the annexes. This applies especially to the initial sections on the history of the regime which I will wish to amend substantially. But we have now reached the stage where it would be helpful to have your advice on presentation. I know that John Williams is also looking at the text, and may offer further views from New York.
3. The attached draft draws on all the available intelligence identified so far. I am most grateful for the cooperation of the SIS, GCHQ and the DIS in constructing the key section on Iraq's current capabilities. They will need to look carefully at the text as it now stands. In the meantime, we continue to check for any further intelligence for inclusion in the text.
4. Additionally, and as discussed with you and others, I am drafting a section on the history of JIC assessments of the Iraqi WMD threat since 1998. I am seeking the views of JIC colleagues and the advice of Cabinet Office Historical and Records Section. I will revert, hopefully with a draft text, as soon as possible.
5. Finally, in view of the obvious sensitivity of the draft and the fact that it is not finalised, I would ask that, not only do we hold the text very tight, but we continue to refrain from public reference to its contents.

JOHN SCARLETT

10 September 2002

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CAB/23/0002

DOCUMENT: Cabinet Office, draft U.K. dossier

DATE: September 10, 2002

SOURCE: Released by the British Hutton Inquiry

CONTENT: This document includes the initial appearance of the claim that Iraq could launch weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes.

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FOREWORD

- The threat posed to international peace and security by the spread of weapons of mass destruction cannot be ignored. Unless members of the international community face up to the challenge represented by this threat, they will place at risk the lives of their own citizens.
- Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime is a uniquely dangerous example of the general threat, both because of his record and his persistent flouting of international norms of behaviour.
- Saddam Hussein is the only modern leader to have used chemical weapons, against Iran in the war which he initiated in the 1980s, causing 20,000 casualties, and against Iraqi citizens at Halabja, resulting in several thousand deaths.
- He has shown his capacity for aggression, by invading Kuwait, terrorising its people and ransacking the country. [Many thousand] Kuwaiti civilians have never been accounted for and must be presumed to have been killed by forces loyal to Saddam.
- It was only because of firm action by the international community that Kuwait was freed. And it was only because of the international community's resolve, through the United Nations, that Saddam Hussein was forced to dismantle some of his weapons of mass destruction.
- In the 1990s UN Weapons Inspectors worked to implement UN Security Council Resolutions passed following the end of the Gulf conflict, which called for the elimination of Iraqi nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein worked throughout this period to thwart the efforts of the

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UN personnel. And even after the US and British Air Forces were deployed in 1998 in operations designed to degrade Iraq's capability to use chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, it was assessed that he retained sufficient materials and technical capacity to rebuild his arsenal.

- Since then the UN has tried repeatedly to achieve compliance with UN Resolutions and accept the return of weapons inspectors able to go anywhere at any time to track down and destroy his nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and supporting infrastructure.
- At every turn Saddam has played games with the UN, flouting its authority. He has consistently sought to divert attention from his failure to comply with the will of the international community. The only reasonable explanation for his prevarication is that he has something to hide, something he is unwilling to give up.
- Containment of Saddam's ambitions through sanctions was intended to ensure Iraqi disarmament, as demanded by the United Nations. This policy had significant success when UN inspectors were able to operate. And it continues to slow Saddam's efforts to build weapons of mass destruction. But without effective enforcement of UN resolutions, he will achieve his ambitions.
- We cannot wait forever for the right answer from Saddam, when all the time he is engaged in work on weapons which could threaten the whole Gulf region and the Eastern Mediterranean. The UK's own vital interests and security could be directly threatened. If we were to do so, particularly after 11 September, and our patience were to be rewarded with another devastating attack, we would rightly be castigated for our inaction.

- **The time has come for Saddam to comply with international law as set out most recently in [UNSCR...] and accept the deployment of UN Weapons Inspectors or face the consequences.**
- **This dossier sets out in detail our best assessment of the facts about Saddam Hussein's nuclear, biological and chemical weapons capabilities, his ballistic missile programmes, the history of UN weapons inspections in Iraq and Saddam's record of human rights abuses and aggression towards his neighbours. Taken individually each chapter is damning enough. As a whole they present a picture of a regime which is so opposed to international norms of behaviour that the threat it poses cannot be ignored.**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq has developed chemical and biological weapons, acquired missiles able to attack neighbouring countries with these weapons, and tried hard to develop a nuclear bomb. Iraq has admitted to all of these programmes to acquire weapons of mass destruction. And Saddam has used chemical weapons, both against Iran and against his own people.

2. This paper sets out the British Government's knowledge of these weapons programmes. It traces their history from the first use of chemical weapons against Iraq's own Kurdish population in 1987, through their further use against Iran and the details uncovered by UN inspectors after the Gulf War. Drawing on very sensitive intelligence, the paper also sets out our assessment of Iraq's current capabilities, and shows how the picture is continuing to develop as new information becomes available.

3. But the threat from Iraq does not depend solely on these capabilities. It arises also because of the violent and aggressive nature of Saddam's regime. His record of international repression and external aggression gives rise to unique concerns about the threat he poses. The paper briefly outlines his rise to power, the nature of his regime and his history of regional aggression. Vivid and horrifying accounts of Saddam's human rights abuses are also catalogued.

4. The importance of denying Saddam access to weapons of mass destruction was recognised by the United Nations in 1991. The paper sets out the key UN Security Council Resolutions, accepted by Iraq, which required the destruction of these weapons. It also summarises the history of the UN inspections regime. This includes both the extent of Saddam's capabilities uncovered by the inspectors and Iraq's history of dishonesty, deception, intimidation and concealment in its dealings with the UN

inspectors. It also describes the extent of Saddam's weapons programmes left unaccounted for at the end of the inspections process.

5. At the heart of the paper is an account, confirmed by secret intelligence as well as evidence from the UN inspections, of Iraq's current capabilities in the fields of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and of the ballistic missiles to deliver them. Our judgement, based on all the available sources is that Iraq:

- has stocks of chemical and biological agents and weapons available, both retained from before the Gulf War, and probably from more recent production;
- is self-sufficient in the technology and expertise required to produce chemical and biological weapons, specifically: sulphur mustard, tabun, sarin, GF, VX; and anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin;
- is refurbishing sites formerly associated with its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes;
- retains a range of delivery means for chemical and biological weapons;
- has modified the L-29 jet trainer to make it capable of delivering chemical and biological agents;
- has assembled specialists to work on its nuclear programme, which was aimed at producing a 20-kiloton weapon, capable of causing 80 per cent casualties within 1.6 miles of the detonation;
- is covertly attempting to acquire technology and materials for use in nuclear weapons, including specialised aluminium controlled because of its potential use in enriching uranium;
- has retained up to 20 Al Hussein missiles, capable of carrying chemical or biological warheads;
- is deploying its Al-Samoud liquid propellant missile, and has used the absence of weapons inspectors to work on extending its range;

- is testing the solid-propellant missile Ababil-100, and is making efforts to extend its range;
- has constructed a new engine test stand bigger than the one used for its current missile systems, to test missiles with a range longer than permitted under Security Council resolution 687 and capable of threatening the UK Sovereign Bases in Cyprus, NATO members (e.g. Greece or Turkey), Israel and all Iraq's Gulf neighbours;
- is working to obtain improved guidance technology to increase missile accuracy;

6. Recent intelligence adds to this picture. It indicates that Iraq:

- attaches great importance to the possession of weapons of mass destruction and that Saddam Hussein is committed to using them if necessary;
- envisages the use of weapons of mass destruction in its current military planning, and could deploy such weapons within 45 minutes of the order being given for their use;
- has begun dispersing its most sensitive weapons, equipment and material, because Saddam is determined not to lose the capabilities developed in the last four years;
- is preparing plans to conceal evidence of its weapons of mass destruction from any renewed inspection, including by dispersing incriminating documents;
- has acquired mobile laboratories for military use, corroborating earlier report about the mobile production of biological warfare agents;
- has purchased large quantities of uranium ore, despite having no civil nuclear programme that could require it.

7. The paper also briefly sets out how Iraq is able to finance its weapons programme. Drawing on illicit earnings generated outside UN control, Iraq generated income of some

\$3 billion in 2001. Further substantial earnings may have been generated through abuse of the UN oil for food programmes.

[8. Finally, this paper includes an account of the recent history of intelligence assessment on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Reflecting the great importance of the risk posed by Saddam, we summarise key judgements reached by the Joint Intelligence Committee and briefed to the Prime Minister each year since the withdrawal of UN inspectors in 1998. Together with the even more recent intelligence referred to in this paper, these assessments demonstrate the continuing and growing grounds for concern about the Iraqi programmes and help explain the government's view that the time has now come to see decisive action taken to tackle them.]

SECTION 1

SADDAM'S REGIME AND HIS RISE TO POWER

Origins and early years

1. Saddam Hussein was born in the district of Tikrit in 1937. In 1955 he moved to Baghdad, where he joined the Ba'ath Party. After a bungled attempt at a political assassination in 1959, Saddam escaped, first to Syria and then to Egypt. He was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment in absentia.

2. Saddam returned to Baghdad in 1963. When the Ba'ath Party fell from power, he went into hiding. Captured and imprisoned, he eventually escaped in 1967 with the co-operation of his guards, and became a bodyguard responsible for Ba'ath Party security. In this capacity, he set about establishing himself at the centre of power, rapidly increasing his influence with the Party. [Brief details about his progress in the 1970s]

3. Following the Ba'ath Party's return to power, Saddam took over the Presidency of Iraq in July 1979. Within days, five fellow members of Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council were arrested and accused of involvement in a coup attempt. They and 17 others were summarily sentenced to death and executed.

4. After the revolution that ousted the Shah in Iran, Saddam started a campaign against the Shia majority of Iraq, fearing that they might be encouraged by the new Islamic regime. A campaign of mass arrests and executions of Islamic activists led to the execution of the Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr and his sister in April 1980. In 1983, 80 members of another leading Shia family were arrested and six of them, all religious leaders, executed. A fuller account of Saddam's record on human rights is at Annex A.

5. Saddam attacked Iran in 1980, in an attempt to reverse earlier territorial concessions to the Shah. But the war went badly, and when the Iraqi army was driven back to the Iraqi frontier in 1982 he faced a serious crisis of confidence. The murmurers were purged, and Saddam's only potential rival conveniently died. In 1983 the army was cowed by the elimination of unsuccessful officers, and the Shia by the arrest of the family of their dead leader.

6. After the end of the conflict Saddam resumed his previous pursuit of primacy in the Gulf. When these efforts evoked international criticism, he challenged the presence of the US navy in the Gulf and threatened CW retaliation against the Israelis should they dare to attack Iraq. But his policies were expensive, and in a period of low oil prices left Iraq in severe financial difficulties.

7. By 1990, a number of factors, including his financial problems and resentment at Kuwait's oil production policies, prompted the invasion that led to the Gulf War (see section 2).

[The above section needs amendment]

Saddam's Iraq

8. Saddam now depends on a narrow inner circle of his relatives to convey his requirements to others, even members of the government. He has created a larger circle of trusted cronies from his home region of Tikrit at the centre of his Government.

9. Saddam keeps the various groupings in check by balancing the advantages he can offer and the fearful consequences of crossing him. His ruthlessness is demonstrated not only against those who have offended him, but also their families, friends or colleagues. For example a large number of officers from the Jabbur tribe were executed for the alleged disloyalty of a few of them. Saddam used the same system of

rewards, promises and punishment with the nations whose hostages he took during the war against Iran and the occupation of Kuwait.

10. To control the flow of rewards, inducements and penalties Saddam has to be the exclusive and individual source of all power in Iraq. To this end he has acted ruthlessly to ensure that there should be no other centres of power. The many security services report on the population and their colleagues upwards to him. Parties and tribes which might try to assert themselves, eg the Kurds and the communists have been crushed.

11 Army officers have been enmeshed in the government's web of informers. Suspicion that they have ambitions other than the service of the President leads to immediate execution. Even the war hero (and Saddam's erstwhile son in law) General Maher al Rashid was placed under house arrest, and his popular brother, General Taher al Rashid disposed of in a helicopter "accident".

12 It is routine for Saddam to pre-empt those who might conspire against him. He has said he knows who will conspire before they know it themselves. He constantly devises tests of his inner circle's reliability; and ostentatious enthusiasm for him or for his cause of the moment arouse his suspicions. He is perpetually aware that if he fails to deliver the benefits his supporters expect; or looks indecisive; or gives the impression of flagging, some of his supporters could be emboldened to dispose of him. So his need to retain their confidence, or to pre-empt them if they begin to doubt, constantly drives him to new adventures.

13. His experience has made Saddam a wily and sophisticated manipulator. He does not allow himself to be trammelled by friendships or loyalties, and these are always subject to his suspicions. And he never forgives those he believes have betrayed or opposed him; several have been assassinated abroad long after they have lost any significance at home.

14. Saddam sees himself as the personification of the new Iraq. His ubiquitous pictures portray him in a variety of guises – Saddam the peasant, Bedouin, townsman, Kurd, Shiite, family man and embattled warrior. As his personality cult has developed, he has come to think that he is creating an Iraq to dominate the Gulf. At the same time, he has become hypersensitive to criticism, regarding it not only as a personal slight, but also derogatory to his mission.

15. Behind everything is Saddam's own ambitious hunger for the power which he manipulates with such skill. Throughout his career he has sought power and control, and now he will do everything to preserve the domination over Iraq which he has achieved.

[The above section needs further amendment]

SECTION 2

SADDAM'S WARS

1. Saddam Hussein has fought two wars of aggression; the Iran-Iraq war and the invasion of Kuwait. He has also pursued a long-term programme of persecution against Iraqi Kurds.

War on Iran

2. The Iran-Iraq war broke out when Saddam decided to take advantage of the state of weakness, isolation and disorganisation that he perceived in post-revolutionary Iran. He wanted to assert Iraq's position as a leader of the Arab world and to recover frontier territory ceded to Iran a few years earlier. In September 1980 he publicly abrogated the border treaty reached with Iran in 1975 and launched attacks on Iranian targets a few days later. Saddam expected it to be a short, sharp campaign. But the Iranians fought back and the bloody conflict lasted for eight years.

3. There were a million casualties in the conflict with Iran. Twenty thousand Iranians were killed by chemical weapons: mustard gas and the nerve agents tabun and sarin: all of which Iraq still possesses.

Persecution of the Kurds

4. In the early years of the war against Iran, Saddam had encouraged rivalry between the KDP (Kurdish Democratic Party, who supported Iran) and the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan). But the PUK started to move towards the KDP and Iran in the mid 1980s and Saddam, under pressure elsewhere, felt the need to reassert control over the Kurdish areas. Saddam appointed his cousin, Ali Hassan al'Majid, as his deputy in the north and a campaign of attacks on Kurdish villages – the notorious Anfal campaign – began. Chemical weapons were used from April 1987 and the countryside was progressively devastated by Saddam's forces. The most horrific attack was on Halabja in 1988, although it was far from unique.

5. Amnesty International estimates that more than 100,000 Kurds were killed or disappeared during Saddam's 1987-88 campaign to crush Kurdish insurgency. Kurdish villages were systematically razed. This was a policy of genocide.

Invasion of Kuwait

6. The invasion of Kuwait was the only case in recent times of one member of the United Nations taking over another.

7. Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Abuses committed by its forces included robbery, rape of Kuwaitis and expatriates, and summary executions. Amnesty International documented many other abuses during the occupation of Kuwait.

8. Iraq denied access to the Red Cross, which has a mandate to provide protection and assistance to civilians affected by international armed conflict. The death penalty was extended to looting and hoarding of food.

9. As Iraq tried to implement a policy of Iraqisation of the occupied territory, Kuwaiti civilians were arrested for "crimes" such as wearing beards. People were dragged from their homes and held in improvised detention centres. In findings based on large number of interviews, Amnesty listed 38 methods of torture used by the Iraqi occupiers, including beatings, breaking of limbs, extracting finger and toenails, inserting bottle necks into the rectum, and subjecting detainees to mock executions.

10. More than 600 Kuwaiti POWs and missing are still unaccounted for. We believe some were still alive in 1998. Iraq refuses to comply with its UN obligation to account for the missing. It has provided sufficient information to close only three files.

11. In an attempt to deter military action to expel it from Kuwait, the Iraqi regime took several hundred foreign nationals (including children) in Iraq and Kuwait hostage, and prevented thousands more from leaving. Worse still, hostages were held as human shields at a number of strategic military and civilian sites, many in inhumane conditions. These acts constituted a flagrant violation of international law – the Fourth Geneva Convention, to which Iraq is a party – as was confirmed in United Nations Security Council resolutions 670 and 674.

12. At the end of the Gulf War, the Iraqi army fleeing Kuwait set fire to over 1,160 Kuwaiti oil wells, with serious environmental consequences. And inside Iraq, an uprising by Iraqi Kurds and Shi'a Muslims was brutally suppressed, with the loss of tens of thousands of lives.

Continuing abuses

13. Persecution of Iraq's Kurds continues, although the protection provided by the northern No-Fly Zone has curbed the worst excesses. The Baghdad regime has continued a policy of Arabisation in northern Iraq to remove Kurdish claims to the oil-rich area around the city of Kirkuk. Kurds and other non-Arabs are forcibly relocated to the three northern Iraqi governorates – Dohuk, Arbil and Sulaimaniyah – which are under de facto Kurdish control.

14. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) Special Rapporteur for Iraq reports that 94,000 individuals have been expelled since 1991. Kurdish reports indicate that four million square metres of agricultural land owned by Kurds has been confiscated and redistributed to Iraqi Arabs. Arabs from southern Iraq have been offered incentives to move into the Kirkuk area and, in disputes with their Kurdish neighbours, are always favoured by the authorities.

15. In the wake of Operation Desert Storm, riots broke out in Basra on 1 March 1991, which spread quickly to other cities in Shia - dominated southern Iraq. A similar uprising against Baghdad's rule occurred in the Kurdish north. The Iraqi regime responded ruthlessly, killing or imprisoning thousands and prompting a humanitarian crisis as over a million Kurds fled into the mountains and tried to escape Iraq.

SECTION 3

IRAQ'S WMD PROGRAMMES - THE THREAT IN 1991

1. By the beginning of the Gulf War in 1991 Iraq had developed a wide range of chemical and biological weapons and had equipped a significant number of missiles to deliver them. Iraq also had an ambitious programme for the development of nuclear weapons.


2. The threat from **chemical weapons** was already well known. Iraq had made frequent use of a variety of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. (Many of the casualties are still alive in Iranian hospitals suffering from the long-term effects of numerous types of cancer and lung diseases) In 1988 Saddam also used mustard and

The Attack on Halabja

Shortly before sunrise on Friday, 17th March 1988, the village of Halabja was bombarded by Iraqi warplanes. The raid was over in minutes (?). In that short time, Saddam Hussein had committed a crime that no other dictator in recent times has carried out. A Kurd described the effects of a chemical attack on another village:

"My brothers and my wife had blood and vomit running from their noses and their mouths. Their heads were tilted to one side. They were groaning I couldn't do much, just clean up the blood and vomit from their mouths and try in every way to make them breathe again. I did artificial respiration on them and then I gave them two injections each. I also rubbed creams on my wife and two brothers."

(From "Crimes Against Humanity," Iraqi National Congress.)



Among the corpses at Halabja, children were found dead where they had been playing outside their homes. In places, ~~CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL RELEASED~~ and villagers died.

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nerve agents against Iraqi Kurds at Halabja in northern Iraq (see photo). Estimates vary, but according to Human Rights Watch up to 5,000 people were killed

3. A month after the attack on Halabja, Iraqi troops used over 100 tons of sarin nerve agent against Iranian troops on the Al Fao peninsula. Over the next three months Iraqi troops used sarin and other nerve agents on Iranian troops causing extensive casualties.

4. In 1988 Saddam Hussein also ordered the use of nerve agents against Iraqi Kurds in northern Iraq. And in 1991 Iraq used the biological warfare agent aflatoxin against the Shia population of Karbala [casualties]

5. We now know that Iraq had the following range of agents available at this time:

- **Mustard** is a liquid agent that causes burns and blisters to exposed skin. When inhaled, mustard damages the respiratory tract; when ingested, it causes vomiting and diarrhoea. It attacks and damages the eyes, mucous membranes, lungs, skin, and blood-forming organs. It can kill in [] minutes.
- **Tabun, sarin and VX** are all nerve agents of which VX is the most toxic. They all damage the nervous system, producing muscular spasms and paralysis. As little as 10 milligrammes of VX on the skin can cause rapid death.
- **Anthrax** is a disease caused by the bacterium *Bacillus anthracis*. Inhalation anthrax is the manifestation of the disease likely to be expected in biological warfare. The symptoms may vary [which are?]. If the dose is large (8,000 to 10,000 spores) death is common. The incubation period for anthrax is 1 to 7 days, with most cases occurring within 2 days of exposure.

- **Botulinum toxin** is a neurotoxin produced by the bacterium *Clostridium botulinum* and is one of the most toxic substances known to man. The first symptoms of botulinum toxin A poisoning may appear as early as 1 hour post exposure or as long as 8 days after exposure, with the incubation period between 12 and 22 hours. Paralysis leads to death by suffocation.
- **Aflatoxins** are fungal toxins, which are potent carcinogens. Most symptoms take a long time to show. Food products contaminated by aflatoxin can cause liver inflammation and cancer. It can also affect pregnant women, leading to stillborn babies and children born with mutations.
- **Ricin** is derived from the castor bean and can cause multiple organ failure leading to death within one or two days of inhalation.

6. Iraq also had the ability to deliver chemical and biological agents through a wide variety of means from artillery shells to ballistic missiles.

7. Iraqi plans for the development of a **nuclear weapon** were well advanced before the Gulf War. Iraq was planning and constructing fissile material production facilities and work on a weapon design was underway. Its declared aim was to produce a weapon with a 20-kiloton yield. A detonation of a 20-kiloton nuclear warhead over a city might flatten an area of approximately 3 square miles. Within 1.6 miles of detonation, blast damage and radiation would cause 80% casualties, three-quarters of which would be fatal. Between 1.6 and 3.1 miles from the detonation, there would still be 10% casualties, 10% of which would be fatal injuries

8. Iraq's ultimate aim was to deliver nuclear devices in a **ballistic missile** warhead. Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had a well-developed missile industry. Iraq fired over 500 SCUD-type missiles at Iran during the Iran-Iraq War at both civilian and military targets, and 93 SCUD type-missiles during the Gulf War. The latter were targeted at

Israel and at Coalition forces stationed in the Gulf region. Armed with conventional warheads they did only limited damage. Iraq admitted to UNSCOM that it had 50 chemical and 25 biological warheads available for these missiles, but did not use them. Annex B gives a brief history of the Iraqi WMD programmes prior to 1991

Iraqi Declarations

9. From subsequent UN investigations, evidence from defectors and Iraqi admissions, we know that by the time of the Gulf War Iraq had produced:

- 19,000 litres of botulinum toxin, 8,500 litres of anthrax and 2,200 litres of aflatoxin, and to working on a number of other agents;
- 2,850 tonnes of mustard gas, 210 tonnes of tabun, 795 tonnes of sarin, 795 tonnes of cyclosarin; 3.9 tonnes of VX;
- 260 missile warheads including 75 "special" warheads for delivery of CBW;
- over 16,000 free-fall bombs for delivery of CBW;
- over 110,000 artillery rockets and shells for delivery of CBW;
- or purchased 819 missiles.

10. This was the substantial arsenal which the International Community set itself to dismantle once the war was over.

SECTION 4

THE RESPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

1. At the end of the Gulf War Iraq's conventional forces had been substantially reduced and weakened. But the International Community was determined that Saddam should be denied the ability to threaten the region and wider world through his possession of weapons of mass destruction.
2. The method chosen to achieve this aim was the establishment of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) to carry out intrusive inspections within Iraq, to ensure compliance with the requirements of the UN Security Council. The Security Council passed [unanimously?] a series of resolutions establishing the authority of UNSCOM to carry out its work in Iraq. [see box]

UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) relating to WMD

UNSCR 687, April 1991 created the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and required Iraq to accept, unconditionally, "the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision" of its chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150km, and their associated programmes, stocks, components, research and facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was charged with abolition of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. UNSCOM and the IAEA must report that their mission has been achieved before the Security Council can end sanctions. They have not yet done so.

UNSCR 707, August 1991, stated that Iraq must provide full, final and complete disclosure of all its WMD programmes and provide unconditional and unrestricted access to UN inspectors. Iraq must also cease all nuclear activities of any kind other than civil use of isotopes.

UNSCR 715, October 1991 approved plans prepared by UNSCOM and IAEA for the ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) arrangements to implement UNSCR 687. Iraq did not accede to this to November 1993. OMV was conducted from April 1995 to 15 December 1998, when the UN left Iraq.

UNSCR 1051, March 1996 stated that Iraq must declare the shipment of dual-use WMD goods.

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3. Iraq accepted the UNSCRs and agreed to co-operate with UNSCOM. In reality, as subsequently became clear, Iraq immediately mounted a major effort to conceal weaponry, related equipment and information from the inspectors and to deceive the UN about the extent of their programmes for mass destruction weaponry.

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SECTION 5

THE HISTORY OF UN WEAPONS INSPECTORS

1. The UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) was established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (UNSCR 687) of 3 April. Its purpose was to oversee, in conjunction with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the dismantling of Iraq's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and to maintain a monitoring programme to ensure that it was never rebuilt.
2. The subsequent history of the UN weapons inspections was characterised by persistent Iraqi efforts to frustrate, deceive and intimidate inspectors. Despite the conduct of the Iraqi authorities towards them, both UNSCOM and the IAEA Action Team have valuable records of achievement in discovering and destroying biological and chemical weapons stocks, missiles and the infrastructure for Iraq's nuclear weapons programme.
3. By the end of 1998 there nevertheless remained significant uncertainties about the state of Iraq's prohibited programmes. A series of confrontations and the systematic refusal by Iraq to co-operate left UNSCOM unable to perform its disarmament mandate and the inspectors were consequently withdrawn on 13 December 1998. The US and the UK had made clear that anything short of full co-operation would make military action unavoidable. Operation Desert Fox (16-19 December 1998) was designed to degrade Saddam's ability to regenerate and deploy biological and chemical weapons and prevent him from threatening his neighbours with these or other weapons.
4. Since Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, Iraq has refused to comply with its UN disarmament and monitoring obligations and allow access to weapons inspectors. We judge that Iraq has used the intervening period to rebuild significant

aspects of its chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. These actions not only present a direct challenge to the authority of the United Nations. They also breach Iraq's commitments under two key international arms control agreements:

- the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention – which bans the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of biological weapons;
- and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – which prohibits Iraq from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons

The Establishment of UNSCOM

5. One of the greatest threats to Allied forces during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 was Iraq's stockpile of chemical and biological weapons and long-range ballistic missiles. At the time, there were genuine concerns that Saddam Hussein would authorise the use of such weapons against Allied troops or Israeli civilians.

6. But the true scale of Iraq's programme to acquire WMD and their means of delivery only became apparent with the establishment of a UN weapons inspection regime in the aftermath of Desert Storm. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 obliged Iraq to provide declarations on all aspects of its WMD programmes within 15 days and accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless under international supervision of its chemical, biological and nuclear programmes, and all ballistic missiles with a range beyond 150 km. UNSCR 687 mandated two inspection teams to handle Iraqi disarmament and establish long term monitoring regimes: the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) would tackle the chemical, biological and missile programmes; and the Action Team within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would be responsible for tracking down and dismantling Iraq's illicit nuclear weapons programme. UNSCOM and the IAEA were given the remit to designate any locations for inspection at any time, review any document and interview any scientist, technician or other individual and seize any prohibited items for destruction.

Iraqi Non-Co-operation with UN Weapons Inspectors

7. The UN passed a further Resolution in 1991 that set out in clear and specific terms the standard of co-operation the international community expected of Iraq. UNSCR 707 (August 1991) demanded that Iraq should allow inspection teams "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas". For over a decade Iraq has consistently failed to meet this standard.

8. Prior to the first inspection, the Iraqi regime decided to do its utmost to hide its stocks of WMD. The former Chairman of UNSCOM, Richard Butler, reported to the UN Security Council that in 1991 a decision was taken by a high-level Government committee to provide inspectors with only a portion of its proscribed weapons, components, production capabilities and stocks. UNSCOM concluded that Iraqi policy was based on the following actions:

- to provide only a portion of extant weapons stocks, releasing for destruction only those that were least modern;
- to retain the production capability and documentation necessary to revive programmes when possible;
- to conceal the full extent of its chemical weapons programme, including the VX nerve agent project;
- to conceal the number and type of chemical and biological warheads for proscribed long-range missiles;
- and to conceal the very existence of its massive biological weapons programme.

9. At the same time, Iraq tried to maintain its nuclear weapons programme via a concerted campaign to deceive IAEA inspectors. In 1997 the Agency's Director General stated that the IAEA was "severely hampered by Iraq's persistence in a policy of concealment and understatement of the programme's scope."

10. Iraq's mistake was to underestimate the persistence and technical ability of the UN inspection teams and the will of the Security Council. Once inspectors had arrived in-country, it quickly became apparent that Iraq would resort to any measures (including physical threats and psychological intimidation of inspectors) to prevent UNSCOM and the IAEA from fulfilling their mandate. Examples of Iraqi obstruction are too numerous to list in full. But some of the more infamous examples include:

- firing warning shots in the air to prevent IAEA inspectors from intercepting nuclear related equipment (June 1991);
- keeping IAEA inspectors in a car park for 4 days and refusing to allow them to leave with incriminating documents on Iraq's nuclear weapons programme (September 1991). See Annex C for more details.

11. In response to such incidents, the President of the Security Council issued frequent statements calling on Iraq to comply with its disarmament and monitoring obligations

12. In December 1997 Richard Butler reported to the UN Security Council that Iraq had created a new category of sites – “Presidential” and “sovereign” – from which it claimed that UNSCOM inspectors would henceforth be barred. The terms of the ceasefire in 1991 foresaw no such limitation. However, Iraq consistently refused to allow UNSCOM inspectors access to any of these 8 Presidential sites. Many of these so-called “palaces” are in fact massive compounds which are an integral part of Iraqi counter-measures expressly designed to hide weapons material.

13. Despite UNSCOM's efforts, following the effective ejection of UN inspectors in December 1998, there remained a series of significant unresolved disarmament issues. In summarising the situation in a report to the Security Council, the UNSCOM Chairman, Richard Butler, set out a damning account of Iraqi deceit. For example:

- contrary to the requirement that destruction be conducted under international supervision, "Iraq undertook extensive, unilateral and secret destruction of large quantities of proscribed weapons and items";
- and Iraq "also pursued a practice of concealment of proscribed items, including weapons, and a cover up of its activities in contravention of Council resolutions."

Overall, Butler declared that obstructive Iraqi activity had had "a significant impact upon the Commission's disarmament work."

Operation Desert Fox

14. The US and the UK made clear, when suspending air strikes in November 1998, that anything short of full co-operation would lead to immediate military action against Iraq.

15. Richard Butler was requested to report to the UN Security Council in December 1998 and made clear that, following a series of direct confrontations, coupled with the systematic refusal by Iraq to co-operate, UNSCOM was no longer able to perform its disarmament mandate. As a direct result, on December 13 the weapons inspectors were withdrawn and Operation Desert Fox was launched by the US and the UK three days later.

16. During Operation Desert Fox (16-19 December 1998):

- Almost 80 per cent of the 100 targets identified were damaged or destroyed;
- There were attacks against missile production and research facilities and the destruction of infrastructure associated with the concealment of material and documents associated with the biological, chemical, nuclear and long-range missile programmes;
- The Iraqi Directorate of General Security, in particular, lost some of its most important buildings. We believe that these contained key equipment and documents;

- Key facilities associated with Saddam's Ballistic Missile programme were significantly degraded, setting this back between one and two years;
- Iraq's ability to deliver biological or chemical agents by ballistic missile was seriously weakened.

UNSCOM and IAEA Achievements

UNSCOM surveyed 1015 sites in Iraq, carrying out 272 separate inspections. Despite Iraqi obstruction and intimidation, UN inspectors uncovered details of chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes (see maps) the scale of which stunned the world. One of the most sobering discoveries was that at the time of the Gulf War, Iraq had been within 1-2 years of acquiring a nuclear weapon. Other major UNSCOM/IAEA achievements included:

- the destruction of 40,000 munitions for chemical weapons, 2,610 tonnes of chemical precursors and 411 tonnes of chemical warfare agent;
 - the dismantling of Iraq's prime chemical weapons development and production complex at Al-Muthanna, and a range of key production equipment;
 - the destruction of 48-SCUD type missiles, 11 mobile launchers and 56 sites, 30 warheads filled with chemical or biological agents, and 20 conventional warheads;
 - the destruction of the Al-Hakam biological weapons facility and a range of production equipment, seed stocks and growth media for biological weapons;
 - the discovery in 1991 of 15 kg of highly enriched uranium, forcing Iraq's acknowledgement of uranium enrichment programmes and attempts to preserve key components of its prohibited nuclear weapons programme; and
- the removal and destruction of the infrastructure for the nuclear weapons programme, including the Al-Athir weaponisation/testing facility

The Situation Since 1998

17. There have been no UN-mandated weapons inspections in Iraq since 1998. In an effort to enforce Iraqi compliance with its disarmament and monitoring obligations,

the Security Council passed resolution 1284 in December 1999. This established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) as a successor organisation to UNSCOM and calls on Iraq to give UNMOVIC inspectors "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transport.". It also set out the steps Iraq needed to take to in return for the eventual suspension and lifting of sanctions. A key measure of Iraqi compliance will be full co-operation with UN inspectors, including unconditional, immediate and unrestricted access to any and all sites. Given Iraq's track record of co-operation with UNSCOM and the IAEA between 1991-98, the prospects of Iraq meeting this standard are dim.

18. For the past three years, Iraq has allowed the IAEA to carry out an annual inspection of a stockpile of low-enriched uranium. This has led some countries and western commentators to conclude -- erroneously -- that Iraq is meeting its nuclear disarmament and monitoring obligations. As the IAEA has pointed out in recent weeks, this annual inspection does "not serve as a substitute for the verification activities required by the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council."

19. Dr. Hans Blix, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, and Dr. Mohammed El-Baradei, the Director General of the IAEA, have declared that in the absence of inspections it is impossible to verify Iraqi compliance with its UN disarmament and monitoring obligations. In April 1999, an independent UN panel of experts noted that "the longer inspection and monitoring activities remain suspended, the more difficult the comprehensive implementation of Security Council resolutions becomes, increasing the risk that Iraq might reconstitute its proscribed weapons programmes."

What Remains Unaccounted For?

20. The so-called "Butler Report" remains the single most authoritative document on the activities of UNSCOM inspectors in Iraq between 1991-98.

21. Based on the Butler Report and earlier UNSCOM reports, we assess that UN inspectors were unable to account for:

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- up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare (CW) agent, including 1.5 tonnes of VX nerve agent;
- up to 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals, including approximately 300 tonnes which, in the Iraqi CW programme, were unique to the production of VX;
- growth media procured for biological agent production (enough to produce over three times the 8,500 litres of anthrax spores Iraq admits to having manufactured);
- over 30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological agents; and
- up to 20 650 km-range Al Hussein ballistic missiles.

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SECTION 6

IRAQI CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMMES: THE CURRENT POSITION

1. Intelligence plays a central role in informing government policy towards Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes. The reports are often very sensitive. Much of the detail cannot be made public since great care has to be taken to protect our sources. But, taken with Saddam's record of using chemical weapons and the evidence from UN weapons inspections, the intelligence builds a compelling picture of Saddam's capabilities.

2. This section sets out what we now know of Saddam's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, drawing on all the available evidence. The **main conclusions** are that:

- Iraq has a useable chemical and biological weapons capability, in breach of UNSCR 687. And it is able to add to this capability despite sanctions;
- Iraq can deliver chemical and biological agents using an extensive range of artillery shells, free-fall bombs, sprayers and ballistic missiles;
- Iraq continues to work on developing nuclear weapons, in breach of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and in breach of UNSCR 687. Uranium to be used in the production of suitable fissile material has been purchased from Africa. But sanctions continue to hinder development of a nuclear weapon;
- Iraq possesses extended-range versions of the SCUD ballistic missile, capable of reaching Israel and Gulf States in breach of UNSCR 687. It is also developing longer range ballistic missiles to improve its capability to target neighbouring countries;
- Iraq's current military planning specifically envisages the use of chemical and biological weapons;

- Iraq's military forces maintain the capability to use chemical and biological weapons, with command, control and logistical arrangements in place;
- Iraq's WMD and ballistic missiles programmes are not short of funds, despite the parlous state of the Iraqi economy.

WHY ARE WE CONCERNED?

3. While the successful enforcement of the sanctions regimes and the UN arms embargo have impeded Iraq's efforts to reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction, they have not halted them. Much of Iraq's missile infrastructure has been rebuilt; the nuclear weapons programme is being reconstituted; and Iraq continues to have the capability to produce chemical and biological weapons, and has probably already done so. Since the withdrawal of inspectors in 1998, monitoring of Iraqi attempts to restore a WMD capability has become more difficult.

4. **Intelligence** from reliable and well-informed sources has become available in the last few weeks. This has confirmed that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons and the Iraqi leadership has been discussing a number of issues related to them. These include:

- **The important role of chemical and biological weapons in Iraq's military thinking:** Saddam attaches great importance to the possession of weapons of mass destruction which he regards as being the basis for Iraq's regional power. Respect for Iraq rests on its possession of chemical and biological weapons and the missiles capable of delivering them. Saddam is determined to retain this capability and recognises that Iraq's political weight would be diminished if Iraq's military power rested solely on its weakened conventional military forces.
- **Iraqi attempts to retain its existing banned weapons systems: Iraq is already taking steps to undermine the return of any UN weapons inspectors: We know from intelligence that Iraq has begun removing sensitive equipment and papers relating to its chemical and biological programmes and dispersing them beyond the gaze of inspectors, for example by hiding sensitive documents in the homes of his trusted officials. Saddam is determined not to lose the capabilities that he has been able to develop in the four years since inspectors left.**

- **Saddam's willingness to use chemical and biological weapons:** intelligence indicates that Saddam is prepared to use chemical and biological weapons. Saddam would not hesitate to use chemical and biological weapons against any internal uprising by the Shia population.

This intelligence confirms Saddam's readiness to use these weapons, even against his own people, and his disregard for the terrible consequences of using chemical and biological weapons.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Existing chemical warfare stocks

5. We do not know precisely how many **chemical** agent-filled munitions from before the Gulf War have been destroyed, degraded or remain at the disposal of the Iraqi government. Declarations to UNSCOM deliberately obscure the picture. But, whatever the fate of these stocks, we judge that Iraq has retained production equipment and at least small amounts of chemical agent and precursors. There is intelligence that Iraqi firms are currently trying to procure precursors for mustard, Tabun and VX. Unaccounted for at the time of UNSCOM withdrawal were:

- up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare (CW) agent, including 1.5 tonnes of VX nerve agent;
- up to 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals, including approximately 300 tonnes which, in the Iraqi CW programme, were unique to the production of VX.

6. Iraq repeatedly claims that if it had retained any chemical agents they would have deteriorated sufficiently to render them harmless. Iraq has admitted having the knowledge and capability to add stabilisers to nerve agent, which would prevent such decomposition. In 1997 UNSCOM examined some munitions which had been filled with mustard gas prior to 1991 and found that they remained very toxic and showed little sign of deterioration.

Chemical agent production capabilities

7. During the Gulf War a number of facilities which intelligence reporting indicated were directly or indirectly associated with Iraq's CW effort were attacked and damaged. Following


the ceasefire UNSCOM destroyed or rendered harmless facilities and equipment used in Iraq's CW programme. Other equipment was released for civilian use either in industry or academic institutes, where it was tagged and regularly inspected and monitored, or else placed under camera monitoring, to ensure that it was not being misused. This monitoring ceased when UNSCOM withdrew from Iraq in 1998. However, capabilities remain and, although the main chemical weapon production facility at al-Muthanna was completely destroyed by UNSCOM and has not been rebuilt, other plants formerly associated with the chemical warfare programme have been rebuilt. This includes the chlorine plant at Fallujah 2.

8. Other dual use facilities, which could be used to support the production of CW agent and precursors, have been rebuilt and re-equipped. New chemical facilities have been built, some with illegal foreign assistance, and are probably fully operational or ready for production. These include the al-Daura State Establishment for Heavy Equipment Engineering and the Ibn Sina Company at Tarmiya (imagery requested). Parts of the al-Qa'Qaa chemical complex damaged in the Gulf War have also been repaired and are operational. Of particular concern, elements of the phosgene production plant at Al Qa'Qaa which were severely damaged during the Gulf War, and dismantled under UNSCOM supervision, have since been rebuilt. While phosgene does have industrial uses it can be used by itself as a chemical agent or as a precursor for nerve agents.

The Problem of Dual Use Facilities

Almost all components and supplies used in chemical and biological agent production are dual-use. Any major petrochemical or biotech industry, as well as public health organisations, will have legitimate need for most materials and equipment required to manufacture chemical and biological weapons. Without UN weapons inspectors it is very difficult therefore to be sure about the true nature of many of Iraq's facilities.

For example, Iraq has built a large new chemical complex, Project Baiji, in the desert in north west Iraq at Ash Sharqat. This site is a former uranium enrichment facility, which was damaged during the Gulf War, and rendered harmless under supervision of the IAEA. Part of the site has been rebuilt, with work starting in 1992, as a chemical production complex. Intelligence indicates the site will be a carbon copy of, and under the control of, al-Qa'Qaa State Company, Iraq's foremost chemical establishment. Despite the site being far away from populated areas it is surrounded by a high wall with watch towers and guarded by armed guards. Intelligence reports indicate that it will produce nitric acid, which can be used in explosives, missile fuel, and in the purification of uranium.



9. Iraq also retained the expertise for chemical research, agent production and weaponisation. The bulk of the personnel previously involved in the programme remain in country. Indeed, intelligence indicates that Haidar Husain Taha, recently reported in the media as being the factory manager of the Fallujah 2 plant, is almost certainly the same individual who from 1984 until the end of the Gulf war worked at Iraq's CW programme at the Muthanna State Establishment researching mustard gas. While UNSCOM found a number of technical manuals (so called "cook books") for the production of chemical agents and critical precursors, Iraq's claim to have unilaterally destroyed the bulk of the documentation cannot be confirmed and is almost certainly untrue. Recent intelligence indicates that Iraq is still discussing methods of

concealing such documentation in order to ensure that it is not discovered by any future UN inspections.

Existing biological warfare stocks

10. Iraq has claimed that all its **biological agents and weapons** have been destroyed, although no convincing proof of any kind has been offered to support the claim. UN inspectors could not account for up to 20 tonnes of growth media (nutrients required for the specialised growth of agent) procured for biological agent production, enough to produce over three times the amount of anthrax Iraq admits to having manufactured. Reports that Iraq has conducted research on smallpox and a number of toxins cannot be corroborated.

Biological agent production capabilities

11. We know that **Iraq is self-sufficient in the technology required to produce biological weapons (BW)**. As with some CW equipment, UNSCOM only destroyed equipment that could be directly linked to BW production. Iraq also has its own engineering capability to design and construct BW associated fermenters and other equipment. Some dual-use equipment, including(DIS to provide) has also been purchased under the Oil for Food programme, but without monitoring of the equipment by UN inspectors Iraq could have diverted it to their BW programme. This newly purchased equipment and others previously subject to monitoring could be used in a resurgent BW programme. Facilities of concern include: the Castor Oil Production Plant at Fallujah, the residue from the castor bean pulp is used in the production of ricin biological agent; and the Al-Daura Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Plant, which was involved in BW agent production and research before the 1991 Gulf War. Evidence has emerged from defectors over the last two years that Iraq has sought to develop mobile facilities to produce biological agents. Other intelligence confirms that the Iraqi military have acquired such facilities, which Iraq hopes will conceal and protect biological agent production from military attack or UN inspection.

Chemical and biological agent delivery means

12. Iraq has a variety of **delivery means** available for both chemical and biological agents, some of which are very basic. These include:

- free fall bombs - Iraq acknowledged to UNSCOM the deployment to four sites of free fall bombs filled with biological agent during 1990-91. These bombs were filled with anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin. Iraq also acknowledged possession of four types of aerial bomb with various fills including sulphur mustard, tabun, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX
- artillery shells and rockets - Iraq made extensive use of artillery munitions filled with chemical agents during the Iran-Iraq War. Mortars can also be used for chemical agent delivery. Iraq also claimed to have tested the use of shells and rockets filled with biological agents. Over 20,000 artillery munitions remain unaccounted for by UNSCOM;
- helicopter and aircraft borne sprayers - Iraq carried out studies into aerosol dissemination of biological agent using these platforms prior to 1991. UNSCOM was unable to account for many of these devices and we judge that it is probable that Iraq retains a capability for aerosol dispersal of both chemical and biological agent;
- Al Hussein ballistic missiles (range 650km) - Iraq told UNSCOM that it filled 25 warheads with anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin. Iraq also developed chemical agent warheads for Al Hussein. Iraq also admitted to producing 50 CW warheads for Al Hussein which were intended for the delivery of a mixture of sarin and cyclosarin. Intelligence indicates Iraq retains up to 20 Al Husseins;
- Al Samoud/Ababil 100 ballistic missiles (range 150km plus) - It is unclear if chemical and biological warheads have been developed for these systems, but given their experience on other missile systems, Iraq probably has the technical expertise for doing so;
- L-29 remotely piloted vehicle programme - we judge that the modification of the L-29 jet trainer could allow it to be used as a pilot-less aircraft for the delivery of chemical and biological agents. The L-29 was subject to UNSCOM inspection for this reason;

Chemical and biological warfare: command and control

13. Special Security Organisation (SSO) and Special Republican Guard (SRG) units would be involved in the movement of any chemical and biological weapons to military units. The Iraqi

military holds artillery and missile systems at Corps level throughout the Armed Forces and conducts regular training with them. The Directorate of Rocket Forces has operational control of strategic missile systems and some Multiple Rocket Launcher Systems. Within the last month intelligence has suggested that the Iraqi military would be able to use their chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so

Conclusion

14. Intelligence confirms that Iraq has covert **chemical and biological weapons** programmes, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687. We also judge that:

- Iraq has chemical and biological agents and weapons available, either from pre-Gulf War stocks or more recent production;
- Iraq has the capability to produce the chemical agents sulphur mustard, tabun, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX within weeks of an order to do so;
- Iraq has a biological agent production capability and can produce at least anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin within days of an order to do so. Iraq has also developed mobile facilities to produce biological agents.
- the order to produce to chemical and biological agents has been given;
- Iraq has a variety of delivery means available;
- Iraq's military forces maintain the capability to use these weapons, with command, control and logistical arrangements in place.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

15. In 1991 we assessed that Iraq was less than three years away from possessing a nuclear weapon. After the Gulf War, Iraq's nuclear weapons infrastructure was dismantled by the IAEA. But we judge that Iraq is still working to achieve a nuclear weapons capability, in breach of its NPT obligations and UN Security Council Resolution 687. Much of its former

expertise in fissile material production and weapons design has been retained. In 1991 Iraqi nuclear weapons programme had gone some way to developing a workable nuclear weapon design and were researching some more advanced concepts. **Intelligence has indicated that scientific specialists were recalled to work on a nuclear weapons programme in the autumn of 1998.**

16. Judging on the basis of the available intelligence it is almost certain that the present Iraqi programme is based on gas centrifuge uranium enrichment, which was one of the routes Iraq

Gas Centrifuge Uranium Enrichment

Uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride is separated into its different isotopes in rapidly spinning rotor tubes of special centrifuges. Many hundreds or thousands of centrifuges are connected in cascades to enrich uranium. If the lighter U235 isotope is enriched to more than 90% it can be used in the core of a nuclear weapon

was following for producing fissile material before the Gulf War. But Iraq needs certain key equipment, such as gas centrifuge components, and materials for the - production of the fissile material necessary

before a nuclear bomb could be developed.

17. Following the expulsion of weapons inspectors in 1998 there has been an accumulation of intelligence indicating that Iraq is making concerted covert efforts to acquire technology and materials with nuclear applications. Iraq's existing holdings of processed uranium are under IAEA supervision. But **there is compelling evidence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa.** Iraqi has no known civil nuclear programme or nuclear power plants, therefore it has no legitimate reason to acquire uranium. It also has sufficient indigenous uranium deposits for any small needs it has.

18. Other suspicious procurement since 1998 includes vacuum pumps, magnets, filament winding machines, and balancing machines. All are needed to manufacture gas centrifuges. Since 2001 Iraq has made a particularly determined effort -illicitly to acquire specialised aluminium, which is subject to international export controls because of its potential application in gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium.

19. So long as sanctions continue to hinder the import of crucial goods for the production of fissile material..., Iraq would find it difficult to

Improvised nuclear device

produce a nuclear weapon. After the lifting of sanctions we assess that Iraq would need at least five years to produce a weapon. If Iraq acquired sufficient fissile material from abroad we judge it would take at least two years to make a working nuclear device. However, Iraq could produce an improvised nuclear device within a few months but this would be unreliable.

BALLISTIC MISSILES

20. Since the Gulf War, Iraq has been openly developing two short-range missiles up to a range of 150km, which are permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 687. The Al-Samoud liquid propellant missile has been extensively tested and is being deployed to military units.

Intelligence indicates that Iraq has also worked on extending its range to at least 200km in




FIGURE 1: ABABIL-100

breach of UN Security Resolution 687.

Testing of the solid propellant Ababil-100 (Figure 1) is also underway, with plans to extend its range to at least 200km. Compared to liquid propellant missiles, those powered by solid propellant offer greater ease of storage,

handling and mobility. They are also quicker to take into and out of action and can stay at a high state of readiness for longer periods

21. **According to intelligence, Iraq has retained up to 20 Al Hussein missiles (Figure 2), in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687.**

These missiles were either hidden from the UN as complete systems, or re-assembled using illegally retained engines and other components. Intelligence indicates that the engineering expertise available would allow these missiles to be maintained effectively. We assess that some of these missiles could be available for use. They could be used with a conventional, chemical or




FIGURE 2: AL HUSSEIN

biological warheads and are capable of reaching a number of countries in the region including Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

22. Intelligence has confirmed that Iraq's priority is to extend the range of its missile systems to over 1000km, enabling it to threaten other regional neighbours. These programmes employ hundreds of people. Satellite imagery (Figure 3) has shown a new engine test stand being constructed (A), which is larger than the current one used for Al Samoud (B), and that formerly used for testing SCUD engines (C) which was dismantled under UNSCOM supervision. This new stand will be capable of testing engines for **missiles with ranges over 1000km, which are not permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 687**. Such a facility would not be needed for systems that fall within the UN permitted range of 150km. The Iraqis have recently taken measures to conceal activities at this site




FIGURE 3: AL RAFAH/SHAHIYAT LIQUID PROPELLANT ENGINE STATIC TEST STAND

24. Iraq is also working to obtain improved guidance technology to increase missile accuracy. The success of UN restrictions means the development of new longer-range missiles is likely to be a slow process. These restrictions impact particularly on the:

- availability of foreign expertise;
- conduct of test flights to ranges above 150km;
- acquisition of guidance and control technology.

Saddam remains committed to developing longer-range missiles. We assess that, if sanctions remain effective, Iraq might achieve a missile capability of over 1000km within 5 years (Figure 4 shows the range of Iraq's various missiles).

25. Iraq has managed to rebuild much of the missile production infrastructure destroyed in the Gulf War and in Operation Desert Fox in 1998. New missile-related infrastructure is also under construction. **Some aspects of this, including rocket propellant mixing and casting facilities at the Al Mamoun Plant, appear to replicate those linked to the prohibited BADR-2000 programme (with a planned range of 700-1000km) that were destroyed in the Gulf War or by UNSCOM. A new plant for indigenously producing ammonium perchlorate, which is a key ingredient in the production of solid propellant rocket motors, has been constructed.** This has been provided illicitly by NEC Engineers Private Limited, an Indian chemical engineering firm with extensive links in Iraq, including to other suspect facilities such as the Fallujah 2 chlorine plant. After an extensive investigation, the Indian authorities have recently arrested NEC's General Manager for export control violations and suspended its export licence, although affiliated individuals and companies in the Middle East are still illicitly procuring for Iraq.

26. Despite a UN embargo, Iraq has also made concerted efforts to acquire additional production technology, including machine tools and raw materials, **in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 1051.** The embargo has succeeded in blocking many of these attempts, such as requests to buy magnesium powder and ammonium chloride. But, despite the dual use

nature of some of the items, we know from intelligence that some items have found their way to the Iraqi ballistic missile programme. More will inevitably continue to do so. Intelligence makes clear that Iraqi procurement agents and front companies in third countries are undertaking a global drive illicitly to acquire propellant chemicals for Iraq's ballistic missiles. This includes production level quantities of near complete sets of solid propellant motor ingredients such as aluminium powder and ammonium perchlorate. There have also been attempts to acquire large quantities of liquid propellant chemicals such as unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and hydrogen peroxide. We judge this is intended to support production and deployment of the Al Samoud and Ababil-100 and development of longer range systems.

Iraq: Current and Planned/Potential Ballistic Missiles




FIGURE 4: CURRENT AND PLANNED/POTENTIAL BALLISTIC MISSILES

FUNDING FOR THE WMD PROGRAMME

27. The UN has sought to restrict to generate funds for its military and WMD programmes. For example, Iraq earns money legally under the UN Oil For Food Programme (OFF) established

by UNSCR 986, whereby the proceeds of oil sold through the UN is used to buy humanitarian supplies for Iraq. This money remains under UN control, and cannot be used for military/WMD procurement.

28. However, the Iraqi regime continues to generate income outside UN control, either in the form of hard currency, or barter goods (which in turn means existing Iraqi funds are freed up to be spent on other things) Iraq's illicit earnings amounted to around USD 3 billion during 2001. Of this, illegal oil exports may have been worth around USD 2 billion. A further USD 1 billion may have been generated through abuses of OFF, including placing a surcharge on every barrel of oil sold, and charging commissions for contracts either to lift Iraqi oil or supply Iraq with humanitarian goods. Iraq also generates further income through the export of non-oil goods. We assess that Iraq will generate up to a further USD 3 billion during 2002.

29. These illicit earnings go to the Iraqi regime. They are used for building new palaces, as well as purchasing luxury goods and other civilian goods outside OFF. Some of these funds are also used by Saddam to maintain his armed forces, and to develop or acquire military equipment, including for chemical, biological and nuclear programmes. There is no indication as to what proportion of these funds may be used in this fashion but we have seen no evidence that Iraqi attempts to develop its weapons of mass destruction and its ballistic missile programme, e.g. through covert procurement of equipment from abroad has been inhibited in any way by lack of funds.

ANNEX A

HUMAN RIGHT ABUSES IN IRAQ

1. In a centralised tyranny, human rights abuse is something for which the leadership must take responsibility. Saddam's younger son, Qusai, is head of the internal security agencies. He has encouraged a policy of systematic torture and rape, and the threat of rape to coerce.
2. You do not have to be a criminal, or even a political opponent of the regime, to be held in an Iraqi jail. You can go to jail for being related to members of the opposition. Sometimes relatives are held as 'substitute prisoners' until the person wanted for arrest is found.
3. This happened to the father and two brothers of Al-Shaik Yahya Muhsin Ja'far al-Zeini, a theology student from Saddam City. When he was finally arrested, this is what happened (source: testimony to Amnesty International):
4. "...I saw a friend of mine, al-Shaikh Nasser Taresh al-Sa'idi, naked. He was handcuffed and a piece of wood was placed between his elbows and his knees. Two ends of the wood were placed on two high chairs and al-Shaikh Nasser was being suspended like a chicken. This method of torture is known as *al-Khaygania* (a reference to a former security director known as al-Khaygani). An electric wire was attached to al-Shaikh Nasser's penis and another one attached to one of his toes. He was asked if he could identify me and he said "this is al-Shaikh Yahya". They took me to another room and then after about 10 minutes they stripped me of my clothes and a security officer said "the person you saw has confessed against you". He said to me "You followers of [Ayatollah] al-Sadr have carried out acts harmful to the security of the country and have been distributing anti-government statements coming from abroad". He asked if I have any contact with an Iraqi religious scholar based in Iran who has been signing these statements. I said "I do not have any contacts with him"... I was then left suspended in the same manner as al-Shaikh al-Sa'idi. My face was looking upward. They attached an electric wire on my penis and the other end of the wire is attached to an electric motor. One security man was hitting my feet with a cable. Electric shocks were applied every few minutes and were increased. I must have been suspended for more than an hour. I lost consciousness.

They took me to another room and made me walk even though my feet were swollen from beating... They repeated this method a few times.”

5. Here is another personal testimony of Iraqi jail conditions:

6. Abdallah, a member of the Ba'ath Party whose loyalty became suspect has still-vivid personal memories from his four years of imprisonment at Abu Ghraib in the 1980s, where he was held naked the entire time and frequently tortured.

7. On the second day of his imprisonment, the men were forced to walk between two rows of five guards each, to receive their containers of food. While walking to get the food, they were beaten by the guards with plastic telephone cables. They had to return to their cells the same way, so that a walk to get breakfast resulted in twenty lashes. “It wasn't that bad going to get the food”, Abdallah said, “but coming back the food was spilled when we were beaten.” The same procedure was used when the men went to the bathroom.

8. On the third day, the torture began. “We were removed from our cells and beaten with plastic pipes. This surprised us, because we were asked no question. Possibly it was being done to break our morale”, Abdallah speculated. The torture escalated to sixteen sessions daily. The treatment was organized and systematic. Abdallah was held alone in a 3x2-meter room that opened onto a corridor.

9. “We were allowed to go to the toilet three times a day, then they reduced the toilet to once a day for only one minute. I went for four years without a shower or a wash”, Abdallah said. He also learned to cope with the deprivation and the hunger that accompanied his detention:

10. “I taught myself to drink a minimum amount of water because there was no place to urinate. They used wooden sticks to beat us and sometimes the sticks would break. I found a piece of a stick, covered with blood, and managed to bring it back to my room. I ate it for three days. A person who is hungry can eat anything. Pieces of our bodies started falling off from the beatings and our skin was so dry that it began to fall off. I ate pieces of my own body.

11. "No one, not Pushkin, not Mahfouz, can describe what happened to us. It is impossible to describe what living this day to day was like. I was totally naked the entire time. Half of the original groups [of about thirty men] died. It was a slow type of continuous physical and psychological torture. Sometimes, it seemed that orders came to kill one of us, and he would be beaten to death".

12. In December 1996, B (name withheld), a Kurdish businessman from Baghdad, married with children, was arrested outside his house by plainclothes security men. Initially his family did not know his whereabouts and went from one police station to another inquiring about him. Then through friends they found out that he was being held in the headquarters of the General Security Directorate in Baghdad. The family was not allowed to visit him.

13. Eleven months later in November 1997 the family was told by the authorities that he had been executed and that they should go and collect his body. His body bore evident signs of torture. His eyes were gouged out and the empty eye sockets were filled with paper. His right wrist and left leg were broken. The family was not given any reason for his arrest and subsequent execution. However, they suspected that he was executed because of his friendship with a retired army general who had links with the Iraqi opposition outside the country and who was arrested just before B's arrest and also executed.

14. Executions are carried out with no judicial process. We know that in February 2000, 64 male prisoners were executed at Abu Ghraib, followed in March by a further 58. In October 2001, 23 political prisoners were executed there. The worst known case is the execution of 4,000 prisoners at Abu Ghraib in 1984. Prisoners at the Mahjar jail have been executed by machine gun. Mahjar has an execution area called 'Hadiqa' (garden) where 3,000 prisoners were executed between 1993 and 1998.

15. Between 1997 and 1999, an estimated 2,500 prisoners were executed in what was called a 'prison cleansing' campaign: they were killed in order to reduce prison overcrowding(?).

16. No judicial process was evident when dozens of women accused of prostitution were beheaded in October 200, along with men accused of pimping. Some, at least, were accused for political reasons.

17. At the Mahjar prison in central Baghdad, which is part of the Police Training College(?), women prisoners are routinely raped by their guards. All prisoners are beaten twice a day. They receive no medical treatment. The normal occupancy is between 600 and 7800 prisoners in 30 cells underground and a further 30 cells which used to be dog kennels.

18. At the Sijn Al-Tarbut jail, three floors underground (?) at the Directorate of General Security building in Baghdad, prisoners are kept in rows of rectangular steel boxes, similar to the boxes in which bodies are stored in mortuaries. There are between 100 and 150 boxes. They are opened for half an hour a day, to allow the prisoner light and air. Prisoners have no food, only liquids. They remain in their boxes until they confess or die.

19. The Qurtiyya prison in the Talbiyyah area of the Saddam City district, Baghdad, consists of 50 to 60 metal boxes the size of tea chests in which prisoners are kept on the same confess-or-die basis. Each box has floor made of mesh to allow detainees to defecate.

20. Saddam favours such barbaric punishments. He has issued a series of decrees authorising amputation, branding, cutting off prisoners' ears. Methods of torture used in Iraqi jails include using electric drills to mutilate hands, pulling out fingernails, knife cuts, sexual attacks and 'official rape'.

21. He believes in the punishment fitting the crime. The penalty for slandering the President is to have your tongue cut out. Iraqi television has broadcast this form of political punishment as a warning.

22. Saddam and the head of his private office, General 'Abd Hamud, have both signed death warrants. The archives holding these warrants are held in the cafeteria on the eighth floor of the main Ministry of the Interior building in Baghdad.

23. Saddam's sons take after their father. Udayy once maintained a private torture chamber known as the Red Room in a building on the banks of the Tigris disguised as an electricity installation. It was Udayy who ordered the Iraq football team to be caned on the soles of the feet for losing a World Cup match.

24. He created a militia in 1994 which has used swords to execute victims outside their own homes. He has personally executed dissidents, for instance in the uprising at Basra which followed the Gulf War

25. But members of Saddam's family are far from being safe from persecution. A cousin of Saddam called Ala Abd Al-Qadir Al-Majid fled to Jordan ... [tell the story on page 49].

26. In mid 2001, 'Ala 'Abd Al-Qadir Al-Majid fled to Jordan from Iraq, citing disagreements with the regime over business matters. 'Ala was a cousin of Saddam Hussein, a former intelligence officer and, latterly, a businessman. He returned to Iraq after the Iraqi Ambassador in Jordan declared publicly that his life was not in danger. He was met at the border by Tahir Habbush, Head of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (the Mukhabarat), and taken to a farm owned by 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid. At the farm 'Ala was tied to a tree and executed by members of his immediate family who, following orders from Saddam, took it in turns to shoot him.

27. Saddam has a history of dealing with disloyalty by arranging for traitors, as Saddam see them, to be killed by their family or tribal associates. This helps to prevent blood feuds between different family/tribal groups and to distance his involvement.

28. 'Ala is just the latest of some 40 of Saddam's relatives, including women and children, that he has had killed. In February 1996, his sons-in-law Hussein Kamal and Saddam Kamal were executed. They had defected in 1995 and returned to Iraq from Jordan after the government had announced amnesties for them.

ANNEX B

**A SHORT HISTORY OF IRAQI WMD PROGRAMMES PRIOR TO
1991**

1. Iraq has been involved in Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) research for over 30 years. Its **Chemical Warfare (CW)** research commenced in 1971 at a small, well guarded site at Rashad to the Northeast of Baghdad. Here research was conducted on a number of CW agents including Mustard Gas, CS and Tabun. Later, in 1974 a dedicated organisation called Al-Hassan Ibn Al-Haitham was established. At the same time plans were made to build a large research and commercial-scale production facility in the desert some 70km Northwest of Baghdad under the Project cover of No 922. This was to become Muthanna State Establishment, also known as al-Muthanna, and operated under the front name of Iraq's State Establishment for Pesticide Production. It became partially operational in 1982-83. It had five research and development sections each tasked to pursue different programmes. In addition, the al-Muthanna site was the main CW agent production facility, and it also took the lead in weaponising CBW agents including all aspects of weapon development and testing, in association with the military. According to information supplied by the Iraqis, the total production capacity in 1991 was 4,000 tonnes of agent per annum, but we assess it could have been higher. Al-Muthanna was supported by three separate storage and precursor production facilities known as Fallujah 1, 2 and 3 near Habbaniyah, some of which were not completed before they were heavily bombed in the 1991 Gulf War.

2. Iraq started **Biological Warfare (BW)** research in the mid-1970s. The work started as small-scale research but Iraq believed in its utility, and authorised a purpose-built research and development facility at al-Salman, also known as Salman Pak, which is surrounded on 3 sides by the Tigris river and situated some 35km South of Baghdad. Intelligence suggests that although some progress was made in BW research, some staff were accused of mismanagement and fraud; also it appears that

Iraq decided to concentrate on developing CW agents and their delivery systems at al-Muthanna. However, the BW programme was revived with the outbreak of the Iraq/Iraq war in the early 80s . But it was Dr Rihab Taha's appointment in 1985, to head a small BW research team at al-Muthanna, which revived and developed the programme. At about the same time plans were made to develop the Salman Pak site into a secure BW research facility. Dr Taha continued to work with her team at Muthanna until 1987 when it moved to Salman Pak which were under the control of the Directorate of General Intelligence. Significant resources were poured into the programme, including the construction of a dedicated production facility, (Project 324) at al-Hakam. Agent production began in 1988 and weaponisation testing and later filling of munitions was conducted in association with the staff at Muthanna State Establishment. Even after the Gulf War, Iraq denied it had an offensive BW programme and the al-Hakam production facility was passed off as a facility for producing animal feed and bio-pesticides research. From mid-1990, other civilian facilities were taken over and some adapted for use in the production and research and development of BW agents. These included:

- Daura Foot and Mouth Vaccination Plant where it produced botulinum toxin and conducted virus research. But there is some intelligence which suggests that work was also conducted on anthrax
- al-Fudaliyah Agriculture and Water Research centre where Iraq admitted it undertook Aflatoxin production and genetic engineering:
- Amariyah Sera and Vaccine institute was used for the storage of BW seed stocks, and involved in genetic engineering

3. Iraq's nuclear programme was established under the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission in the 1950s. Under a nuclear co-operation agreement signed with the Soviet Union in 1959, a nuclear research centre, equipped with a research reactor, was

built at Tuwaitha, the main Iraqi nuclear research centre. The surge in Iraqi oil revenues in the early 1970s supported an expansion of the research programme. This was bolstered by the signing of co-operation agreements with France and Italy in the mid-1970s. France agreed to supply two research reactors powered by highly enriched uranium fuel, and Italy supplied equipment for fuel fabrication and handling. By the end of 1984 Iraq was self-sufficient in uranium ore. One of the reactors was destroyed in an Israeli air attack in June 1981 shortly before it was to become operational the other was never completed.

4. By the mid-1980s Iraq's deteriorating situation in the Iran-Iraq War prompted renewed interest in the military use of nuclear technology, and additional resources were put in developing technologies to enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons. Enriched uranium was preferred because it could be produced more covertly than plutonium. Iraq followed parallel programmes to produce highly enriched uranium - electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) and gas centrifuge enrichment. By 1991 one EMIS enrichment facility was nearing completion and another was under construction. Centrifuge facilities were also under construction, but the centrifuge design was still being developed. In August 1990 Iraq instigated a crash programme to develop a single nuclear weapon within a year, and considered the rapid development of a small 50 machine gas centrifuge cascade to produce the highly enriched uranium required. By the time of the Gulf War, the programme had made little progress. But it appears Iraq had probably decided to concentrate on gas centrifuges as a means for producing the necessary fissile material.

5. Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had a well-developed **ballistic missile** industry. Iraq fired over 500 SCUD-type missiles at Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. 93 SCUD type-missiles were fired during the Gulf War. The latter were targeted at Israel and Coalition forces stationed in the Gulf region. Armed with conventional warheads they did limited damage. Iraq admitted to UNSCOM that it had 50 chemical and 25 biological warheads available but did not use them. Most of the missiles fired in the

Gulf War were an Iraqi produced version of the SCUD missile, the Al Hussein, with an extended range of 650 km. Iraq was working on other stretched SCUD variants, such as the Al Abbas, which had a range of 900km. Iraq was also seeking to reverse engineer the SCUD engine with a view to producing new missiles; recent evidence indicates that they may have succeeded at that time. In particular Iraq had plans for a new SCUD-derived missile with a range of 1200km. Iraq also conducted a partial flight test of a multi-stage satellite launch vehicle based on SCUD technology, known as the Al Abid. Also during this period, Iraq was developing the BADR-2000, a 700-1000km range two-stage solid propellant missile (based on the Iraqi part of the 1980s CONDOR-2 programme run in co-operation with Argentina and Egypt). There were plans for 1200-1500km range solid propellant follow-on systems.

SCUD missiles

The short-range mobile SCUD ballistic missile was developed by the Soviet Union in the 1950s, drawing on the technology of the German liquid-propellant V-2.

For many years it was the mainstay of Soviet and Warsaw Pact tactical missile forces, and it was also widely exported. Recipients of Soviet-manufactured SCUDs included Iraq, North Korea, Iran, and Libya, although not all were sold directly by the Soviet Union.

ANNEX C


WEAPONS INSPECTIONS: OBSTRUCTION AND CONCEALMENT

Obstruction


1. In addition to the examples given in the body of the paper, Iraqi steps to obstruct the UN weapons inspectors included:

- announcing that UN monitoring and verification plans were “unlawful” (October 1991);
- refusing UNSCOM inspectors access to the Ministry of Agriculture. Threats were made to inspectors who remained on watch outside the building. The inspection team had reliable evidence that the site contained archives related to proscribed activities;
- refusing to allow UNSCOM the use of its own aircraft to fly into Iraq (January 1993). In 1991-2 Iraq objected to UNSCOM using its own helicopters and choosing its own flight plans;
- refusing to allow UNSCOM to install remote-controlled monitoring cameras at two key missile sites (June-July 1993),
- repeatedly denying access to inspection teams (1991- December 1998);
- interfering with UNSCOM’s helicopter operations, threatening the safety of the aircraft and their crews (June 1997);
- demanding end of U2 overflights and the withdrawal of US UNSCOM staff (October 1997);
- destroying documentary evidence of WMD programmes (September 1997); and
- refusing access to inspection teams on the grounds that certain areas and even roads were deemed “Presidential Sites” (1997-98)

A photograph of a presidential site or what have been called "palaces".



Buckingham palace has been superimposed to demonstrate their comparative size



Buckingham Palace and grounds

Concealment

2. Iraq has admitted having a large, effective, system for hiding proscribed material including documentation, components, production equipment and, possibly, biological and chemical agents and weapons from the UN. Shortly after the adoption of UNSCR 687 in April 1991, an Administrative Security Committee (ASC) was formed with responsibility for advising Saddam on the information which could be released to UNSCOM and the IAEA. The Committee consisted of senior Military Industrial Commission (MIC) scientists from all of Iraq's WMD programmes. The Higher Security Committee (HSC) of the Presidential Office was in overall command of deception operations. The system was directed from the very highest political levels within the Presidential Office and involved, if not Saddam himself, his youngest son, Qusai. The system for hiding proscribed material relies on high mobility and good command and control. It uses lorries to move items at short notice and most hide sites appear to be located close to good road links and telecommunications. The Baghdad area was particularly favoured. In addition to active measures to hide material from the UN, Iraq has attempted to monitor, delay and collect intelligence on UN operations to aid its overall deception plan.

3. Nowhere was Iraqi obstruction of UN inspectors more blatant than in the field of biological weapons. Iraq denied that it had pursued a biological weapons programme until July 1995. Between 1991 and 1995, Iraq refused to disclose any details of its past programme.

4. In the course of the first biological weapons inspection in August 1991, Iraq claimed that it had merely conducted a military biological research programme. At the site visited, Al-Salman, Iraq had removed equipment, documents and even entire buildings. Later in the year, during a visit to the Al-Hakam site, Iraq declared to UNSCOM inspectors that the facility was used as a factory to produce proteins derived from yeast to feed animals. Inspectors subsequently discovered that the plant was a central site for the production of anthrax spores and botulinum toxin for weapons. The factory had also been sanitised by Iraqi officials to deceive inspectors.

5. Another key site, the Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Institute at Daura which produced botulinum toxin and probably anthrax, was not divulged as part of the programme. Five years later, after intense pressure, Iraq acknowledged that tens of tonnes of bacteriological warfare agent had been produced there and at Al-Hakam. Amazingly, Iraq *continued to develop* the Al-Hakam site into the 1990s, misleading UNSCOM about its true purpose.

6. Iraq consistently tried to obstruct UNSCOM's efforts to investigate the scale of its biological weapons programme. It created forged documents to account for bacterial growth media, imported in the late 1980s, specifically for the production of anthrax, botulinum toxin and probably plague. The documents were created to indicate that the material had been imported by the State Company for Drugs and Medical Appliances Marketing for use in hospitals and distribution to local authorities. Iraq also censored documents and scientific papers provided to the first UN inspection team, removing all references to key individuals, weapons and industrial production of agents.

7. Iraq has yet to provide any documents concerning production of agent and subsequent weaponisation. Iraq destroyed, unilaterally and illegally, biological weapons in 1991 and 1992 making accounting for these weapons impossible. In addition Iraq cleansed a key site at Al-Muthanna – its main research and development, production and weaponisation facility for chemical warfare agents - of all evidence of a biological programme in the toxicology department, the animal-house and weapons filling station.

8. The first biological inspection team tasked with establishing monitoring of compliance was denied access in March 1993. In July 1995, Iraq acknowledged reluctantly that biological agents had been produced on an industrial scale at Al-Hakam. Following the defection in August 1995 of Hussein Kamel, Iraq released over 2 million documents relating to its WMD programmes and acknowledged that it had pursued a biological programme that led to the deployment of actual weapons.

Iraq admitted producing in excess of 200 biological weapons with a reserve of agent to fill considerably more.

9. As documents recovered in August 1995 were assessed, it became apparent that the full disclosure required by the UN was far from complete. Successive inspection teams went to Iraq to try to gain greater understanding of the programme and to obtain credible supporting evidence. In July 1996 Iraq refused to discuss its past programme and doctrine forcing the team to withdraw in protest. Monitoring teams were at the same time finding undisclosed equipment and materials associated with the past programme. In response, Iraq grudgingly provided successive disclosures of their programme which were judged by UNSCOM, and specially convened international panels, to be technically inadequate.

10. Iraq refused to elaborate further on the programme during inspections in 1997 and 1998, confining discussion to previous topics. In July 1998, Tariq Aziz personally intervened in the inspection process stating that the biological programme was more secret and more closed than other WMD programmes. He also played down the significance of the programme. This is consistent with Iraq's policy of trivialising the biological weapons programme as the personal adventure of a few misguided scientists.

11. In late 1995, Iraq acknowledged weapons testing the biological agent ricin, but did not provide production information. Two years later – in early 1997 – UNSCOM discovered evidence that Iraq had produced ricin.

12. Iraq has used the biological agent, aflatoxin, against the Shia population in Karbala in 1991 and there is substantial evidence that biological weapons were deployed ready for use during the Gulf War. Defectors' reports also indicate that Iraq also carried out biological experiments on human beings.

DOCUMENT: Cabinet Office, exchange of emails between Joint Intelligence Committee assessments staff and MoD Defence Intelligence Staff

DATE: September 13, 2002, 11-11:30a.m.

SOURCE: Cabinet Office FOIA

CONTENT: This exchange shows that British officials were very conscious of the need to ensure that U.S. and U.K. claims about Iraq would complement rather than contradict

DOCUMENT 3

- An email between officials dated 13 September 2002, sent at 14:58 titled 'RE: IRAQ UK / US NUCLEAR ESTIMATES – IMPLICATIONS FOR SANCTIONS'

I'm not sure that the differences will be that great. Remember US & UK signed up to maintaining sanctions US can hardly do that and then turn round and say that they are having no effect

- An email between officials dated 13 September 2002, sent at 13:44 titled 'RE: IRAQ UK / US NUCLEAR ESTIMATES – IMPLICATIONS FOR SANCTIONS'

Agree - no sign of anything being published yet on any US site - once it appears, we will need to look at the specific wording and go forward. Suspect however there will be a significant difference in the UK/US views on effectiveness of sanctions.

- An email between officials dated 13 September 2002, sent at 13:21 titled 'IRAQ UK / US NUCLEAR ESTIMATES – IMPLICATIONS FOR SANCTIONS'

[redacted] makes a very good point about how comparisons of the UK and US positions on nuclear estimates could have fallout(!) in terms of follow on questioning about the effectiveness of sanctions. (Depending on the actual text of the US NIE/White paper).

It unrolls thus.

UK says Iraq could build a bomb in 5 years if sanctions have gone away.

US says Iraq could build a bomb in 5 years

The implication of the US statement is that this can be achieved whether sanctions are in place or not.

The potential line of follow on questioning is therefore - are we in disagreement with the US about whether sanctions are achieving anything?

I know that there is already a first draft of a Q&A pack to support the publication of the dossier, and that the Cabinet Office may circulate it soon for comment. This is one area that might need some attention.

Rgds.

DOCUMENT: Cabinet Office Minute, Deputy Head of Cabinet Office Overseas and Defence Secretariat Desmond Bowen-John Scarlett

DATE: September 11, 2002

SOURCE: Cabinet Office FOIA

CONTENT: This document responds to John Scarlett's explicit request on September 10 for comments on his draft.

DOCUMENT 7

- Minute (TO7934) from Desmond Bowen to John Scarlett copied to Alastair Campbell, Jonathan Powell and David Manning titled 'The Iraq Dossier' dated 11 September 2002

Thank you for a sight of the revised draft of the Dossier. I thought you might find it helpful to have a few comments on the draft as it stands now, accepting that you have more work to do on it.

I take it as read that the foreword is a political piece, signed by the Prime Minister or another Minister. In that text it would be useful to make the point that what follows is the work of officials, drawing on sensitive intelligence material. The foreword can be as loaded as we like in terms of the political message (provided it is consistent with the dossier itself), whereas the text itself should be the judgement of the experts.

As regards the wickedness of Saddam and his regime, I wonder if there are documents or statements which we can cite that clearly indicate his ambitions regionally and his intentions internally. The bit of the jigsaw that doesn't quite hang together is what Saddam, intends to do with the WMD he has been so intent on acquiring. It is one thing to ask the rhetorical question: what could they be used for except making mischief regionally; it is another to be able to point to stated objectives either from intelligence or public documents. It is, of course, the case that you point to the facts of Saddam's aggression and repression and use of WMD; perhaps we can make more of this and his unpredictability.

In looking at the WMD sections, you clearly want to be as firm and authoritative as you can be. You will need to judge the extent to which you need to hedge your judgements with, for example, "it is almost certain" and similar caveats. I appreciate that this can increase the authenticity of the document in terms of it being a proper assessment, but that needs to be weighed against the use that will be made by the opponents of action who will add up the number of judgements on which we do not have absolute clarity.

In the current stage of the draft there are two key sections on pages 30 and 36 which will need to be given proper prominence, probably at the end of that section. The sub-sections are entitled: Why Are We Concerned and Conclusions. I think it would be helpful to draw together the state of advancement of both chemical and biological capability, with military thinking and the delivery means. It would be helpful if there was more about where ballistic missiles are likely to be targeted rather than what countries are in range. The map on page 41 gives a good idea of the potential coverage. This also links back to the point at paragraph 3 above on intentions.

There may be an additional point about Human Rights, probably for the FCO to elaborate, which is less about abuses and more about the year on year degradation of Iraqi economic conditions such that more and more of the population have been falling below the poverty line because of Saddam's policies.

Finally, the question which we have to have in the back of our mind is "Why Now?". I think we have moved away from promoting the idea that we are in

imminent danger of attack and therefore intend to act in pre-emptive self defence. The approach is rather that Saddam has failed to abide by UNSCRS and his flouting of international law and continuing acquisition of WMD cannot be tolerated any longer. This difference is important because the focus shifts to Saddam's continuing efforts to equip himself with WMD, which is what the evidence shows.

DOCUMENT: Email Prime Minister's Official Spokesman Godric Smith-Alastair Campbell

DATE: September 12, 2002, 2:08 p.m.

SOURCE: Released by the British Hutton Inquiry - United Kingdom FOIA

CONTENT: This email was submitted to and published by the 2003 Hutton Inquiry in expurgated form but an unredacted version obtained under the U.K. Freedom of Information Act furnishes additional evidence of coordination with the Bush administration.

Alison Blackshaw

unredacted email
(1 of 1)

From: Godric Smith
Sent: 12 September 2002 14:06
To: Alastair Campbell
Subject: Dossier

Julian Miller rang me and said that he would like to come and show someone the latest thinking on the dossier tomorrow without getting into circulating copies just so as they are on the right track. Clearly John will be speaking to US. I said I thought it was best in the circs if he spoke to you if you were around tomorrow and were up for it. It is more presentational than content driven. Can Alison let him know if you are on for that or if not probably best if he sees Tom. I am not in



DOCUMENT: Information Note, U.K. Information Commissioner's Office

SOURCE: British Cabinet Office

DATE: September 13, 2002

CONTENT: This item comprises a list of documents that the U.K. information commissioner had ruled should or should not be released. Among those documents, as described by the commissioner, is "an email covering a copy of a Bush speech to compare with U.K. dossier claims; an attachment, 'What's Iraq Up to—Past and Present Intelligence.'"



Schedule of Information to be disclosed


Information to be disclosed

Defence Intelligence Staff information

- 1) 11 September 2002, an email with amendments to the draft dossier.
- 2) 13 September 2002, 2 emails, one raising potential contradictions between UK/US position on Iraqi nuclear capabilities, the other replying with a reference to US estimates of Iraqi nuclear capabilities being published in future.
- 3) 13 September 2002, an email response to 2).
- 4) 16 September 2002, an email with suggested dossier amendments, replying to a previous email of 13 September 2002 which enclosed a US (published?) document on the Iraqi nuclear programme.
- 5) 16 September 2002, 3 emails: comments on the US document in g); a request for comments on Chapter 3 and beyond in the dossier; and comments on Chapter 3 with suggestions of dossier amendments.

Non-Defence Intelligence Staff information

- 6) 11 September 2002, email memo from the Private Office of the Foreign Secretary to another member of Foreign and Commonwealth Office staff.
- 7) Memo dated 11 September 2002 from Deputy Head of the Overseas Defence Secretariat in the Cabinet Office to John Scarlett, Head of the Joint Intelligence Committee, cc Alistair Campbell/ Jonathan Powell/ Manning.



Information Commissioner's Office

Information to be disclosed in part

Defence Intelligence Staff information

- 8) 11 September 2002, an email with an assessment of Iraqi intentions, including a reference to the CIA – disclosure with points (a) and (b) redacted.

Non-Defence Intelligence Staff information

- 9) Memo dated 12 September 2002 from the UK Mission to the UN to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Information to be withheld

Defence Intelligence Staff information

- 10) 11 September 2002, 7 emails, comments on the draft dossier, covering attachments: a Joint Intelligence Committee assessment of WMD, referring to previous historical assessments; and a list of Export Licence Applications assessing whether they were WMD-related.
- 11) 13 September 2002, an email covering a copy of a Bush speech, to compare with UK dossier claims; an attachment, 'What's Iraq Up to – Past and Present Intelligence', dated 13 September 2002.
- 12) 16 September 2002, an email querying a previous email of 26 June 2002; and that email, which responds to questions about an Iraqi aircraft type implicated in WMD.
- 13) The names, anonymised designations and contact details of individuals contained within all information arising from the Defence Intelligence Staff should be redacted from those documents which are disclosed.

DOCUMENT: Cabinet Office Freedom of Information Disclosure, October 20, 2009

DATE: September 13 2002 - referenced in October 20, 2009 memo

SOURCE: Cabinet Office FOIA

CONTENT: This disclosure confirms that the speech circulated by email on September 13 was that given by Bush to the U.N. General Assembly on September 12, 2002.

Chris Ames
member@amesc.wanadoo.co.uk
(by email only)

20 October 2009

Dear Mr Ames,

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000

I am writing in response to your email of 22 September 2009, in which you made the following request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000:

On 13 September 2002 an email containing comments on the September 2002 Iraq dossier was sent to or from the Defence Intelligence Staff "covering a copy of a Bush speech". The email is described at point 11 of the Information Commissioner's appendix to an earlier FOI case, see <http://iraqdossier.com/foi/caboff1/scan0001.pdf>.

I would like to know which speech this refers to - i.e. the description of the speech set out in the email.

I can confirm that this email refers to the speech made by President Bush to the United Nations on 12 September 2002. The text of the speech is now available on the George W Bush White House Archives website.

If you are unhappy with the decisions made in relation to your request from the Cabinet Office you may ask for an internal review. If you wish to do so you should contact:

Sue Gray,
Director, Propriety & Ethics
70 Whitehall
London
SW1A 2AS

You should note that the Cabinet Office will not normally accept an application for internal review if it is received more than two months after a response was issued.



If you are not content with the outcome of the internal review, you have the right to apply directly to the Information Commissioner for a decision. Generally, the Commissioner cannot make a decision unless you have exhausted the complaints procedure provided by Cabinet Office. The Information Commissioner can be contacted at:

Information Commissioner's Office
Wycliffe House
Water Lane
Wilmslow
Cheshire
SK9 5AF

If you have any queries about this letter, please contact me. Please remember to quote the reference number above in any future communications.

Yours sincerely,

Y Edwards

YASMINE EDWARDS



DOCUMENT: Email exchange between Cabinet Office and Ministry of Defence officials

DATE: September 13 – 16, 2002

SOURCE: Cabinet Office FOIA

CONTENT: In the first of these emails, timed at 7:54 p.m. on September 13, one official, presumably with the JIC assessments staff within the Cabinet Office, sent a scan of “the latest US Doc. Summary + nuclear section” to a colleague in the Defence Intelligence Staff of the Ministry of Defence.

DOCUMENT 4

- An email between officials dated 16 September 2002, sent at 9:26 titled 'US Document on Iraqi's WMD Programmes'

Little to comment on.

Page 5 last sentence of para at top of page. I understood that only the single store of stockpiled uranium oxide (at Tuwaitha) was inspected. Perhaps [redacted] could advise.

Page 5. Box - BW testing

Test 1: I have the agent as being Clostridium Botulinum (ie Botulinum toxin)

Test 8 (al-Muhammadiyah - Nov 89 (Botulinum toxin)). I have the date as Aug 90

Test 9 (al-Muhammadiyah - Nov 89 (Aflatoxin)) I have the date as Aug 90

Test 10 (Jurf al-Sakr Firing Range) I have the date as Aug or Nov 90.

Page 10. Note that in the box, they have reverted to their previously published casualties at Halabjah of "hundreds". (Also previously they added a note that some casualties may have resulted from Iranian use of chemicals.)

page 21. Last para (under Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Program & Other Aircraft.) Line 2 add "aircraft" after MiG-21.

- An email between officials dated 13 September 2002, sent at 19:54 titled 'US Document on Iraqi's Nuclear Weapons Programme'

Please find attached a scanned copy of the latest US Doc. Summary + nuclear section.

Please note on the very last page of the hard copy document there is a reference to neutron generators. This was in the earlier version Do we have the intelligence on this?

Many thanks and good-night

- An email between officials dated 13 September 2002, sent at 19:54 titled 'US Document on Iraqi's Nuclear Weapons Programme'

Please find attached a scanned copy of the latest US Doc. Summary + nuclear section.

Please note on the very last page of the hard copy document there is a reference to neutron generators. This was in the earlier version Do we have the intelligence on this?

Many thanks and good-night

DOCUMENT: Cabinet Office, draft U.K. white paper

DATE: September 16, 2002

SOURCE: Released by the British Hutton Inquiry

CONTENT: A draft of IRAQ'S PROGRAMME FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL RELEASED

16 September 2002

**IRAQ'S PROGRAMME FOR
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION:**

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ASSESSMENT

CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL RELEASED

Page 1 of 53

DOS/2/0058

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<u>Executive Summary:</u>	Pages
<u>Part 1: Iraq's Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programmes</u>	Pages
Chapter I: The role of Intelligence	Pages
Chapter 2: Iraq's Programmes 1971- 1998	Pages
Chapter 3: The current position 1998- 2002	Pages
<u>Part 2: History of UN Weapons Inspectors</u>	Pages
<u>Part 3: Iraq under Saddam</u>	Pages
<u>Conclusion</u>	Pages

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DUTY CLERK N° 10

FOR ATTN

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CARE SUMNER

1. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq has developed chemical and biological weapons, acquired missiles allowing it to attack neighbouring countries with these weapons, and tried hard to develop a nuclear bomb. Iraq has admitted to all these programmes to acquire weapons of mass destruction. And Saddam has used chemical weapons, both against Iran and against his own people.
2. Information about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is already in the public domain from UN reports and from Iraqi defectors. A valuable assessment was provided by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on 9 September. The publicly available evidence points clearly to Iraq's continued possession of chemical and biological agents and weapons from before the Gulf War. It shows that Iraq has refurbished sites formerly associated with the production of chemical and biological agents. And it indicates a continuing Iraqi ability to manufacture these agents, and to use bombs, shells, artillery rockets and ballistic missiles to deliver them. The IISS report also judges that Iraq could assemble nuclear weapons within months of obtaining fissile material from foreign sources.
3. We endorse much of this analysis, which is largely based on information available prior to the de facto expulsion of UN inspectors in 1998. But significant additional information is available to the government from secret intelligence sources, described in more detail in this paper. This intelligence cannot tell us about everything. But it provides a fuller picture of Iraqi plans and capabilities. It shows that Saddam Hussein attaches great importance to possessing weapons of mass destruction which he regards as the basis for Iraq's regional power. It shows that he does not regard them only as weapons of last resort. He is ready to use them, including against his own population, and is determined to retain them. Intelligence also shows that Iraq is preparing plans to conceal evidence of these weapons from any renewed inspection, including by dispersing incriminating documents. And it allows us to judge that Iraq

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CAB/11/0141

CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL RELEASED

- has continued to produce chemical and biological agents;
- has military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, some of which could be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them. Saddam and his son Qusay have the political authority to authorise the use of these weapons;
- has developed mobile laboratories for military use, corroborating earlier reports about the mobile production of biological warfare agents;
- has assembled specialists to work on its nuclear programme;
- has pursued illegal programmes to procure controlled materials of potential use in the production of chemical and biological weapons programmes;
- has sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa, despite having no civil nuclear programme that could require it;
- is covertly trying to acquire technology and materials which could be used in the production of nuclear weapons, including specialised aluminium controlled because of its potential use in enriching uranium;
- has retained up to 20 Al Hussein missiles, capable of carrying chemical or biological warheads;
- is deploying its Al-Samoud liquid propellant missile, and has used the absence of weapons inspectors to work on extending its range beyond the limit of 150km imposed by the United Nations;
- is producing the solid-propellant missile Ababil-100, and is making efforts to extend its range;
- has constructed a new engine test stand for missiles capable of threatening Israel and all Iraq's Gulf neighbours as well as the UK Sovereign Bases in Cyprus and NATO members (Greece and Turkey);
- has pursued illegal programmes to procure materials for use in its illegal development of long range missiles;
- has begun dispersing its most sensitive weapons, equipment and material.

4. These judgements have been endorsed by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). More details on the judgements, and on the development of the JIC's assessments since 1998, are set out later in this paper.

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CAB/11/0142

5. The importance of denying Saddam access to weapons of mass destruction was recognised by the United Nations in a series of Resolutions between 1991 and 1998. The paper sets out the key UN Security Council Resolutions, accepted by Iraq, which required the destruction of these weapons. It also summarises the history of the UN inspections regime. This includes both the extent of Saddam's capabilities uncovered by the inspectors and Iraq's history of dishonesty, deception, intimidation and concealment in its dealings with the UN inspectors.

6. But the threat from Iraq does not depend solely on the capabilities we have described. It arises also because of the violent and aggressive nature of Saddam's regime. His record of internal repression and external aggression gives rise to unique concerns about the threat he poses. The paper briefly outlines his rise to power, the nature of his regime and his history of regional aggression. Vivid and horrifying accounts of Saddam's human rights abuses are also catalogued.

7. The paper briefly sets out how Iraq is able to finance its weapons programme. Drawing on illicit earnings generated outside UN control, Iraq generated income of some \$3 billion in 2001.

8. The paper concludes with a summary table setting out key points on Iraq's capabilities.

PART 1

IRAQ'S CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMMES

CHAPTER 1: THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

1. Since UN Inspectors were, in effect, expelled by Iraq in 1998, there has been little overt information on Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. Much of the publicly available information about Iraqi capabilities and intentions is necessarily dated. But we also have available a range of secret intelligence about these programmes and Saddam's intentions. This comes principally from the United Kingdom's intelligence and analysis agencies – the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS). We also have access to intelligence from close allies.

2. Intelligence rarely offers a complete account of activities which are designed to remain concealed. And the nature of Saddam's regime makes Iraq a difficult target for the intelligence services. Nonetheless, we have been able to develop a range of well positioned sources. The need to protect and preserve these sources inevitably limits the detail that can be made available. But intelligence has provided important insights into Iraqi programmes, and into Iraqi military thinking. Taken together with what is already known from other sources, this builds our understanding of Iraq's capabilities, and adds significantly to the analysis already in the public domain.

3. Iraq's capabilities have been regularly reviewed by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which has provided advice to the Prime Minister on the developing assessment on the basis of all available sources. Part 1 of this paper includes some of the most significant views reached by the JIC between 1999 and 2002.

Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)

The JIC is a Cabinet Committee with a history dating back to 1936. It brings together the Heads of the three Intelligence and Security Agencies (Secret Intelligence Service, Government Communications Headquarters and the Security Service), the Chief of Defence Intelligence and senior policy makers from the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Home Office, the Treasury and the Department of Trade and Industry. It provides regular intelligence assessments to the Prime Minister, other Ministers and senior officials on a wide range of foreign policy and international security issues. The JIC meets each week in the Cabinet Office. Its current chairman is John Scarlett

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CHAPTER 2: IRAQ'S PROGRAMMES: 1971-1998

1. Iraq has been involved in chemical and biological warfare research for over 30 years. Its **chemical warfare** research commenced in 1971 at a small, well guarded site at Rashad to the Northeast of Baghdad. Research was conducted here on a number of chemical agents including Mustard Gas, CS and Tabun. Later, in 1974 a dedicated organisation called Al-Hassan Ibn Al-Haitham was established. At the

Effects of Chemical Weapons

Mustard is a liquid agent, which gives also gives off a hazardous vapour, causing burns and blisters to exposed skin. When inhaled, mustard damages the respiratory tract; when ingested, it causes vomiting and diarrhoea. It attacks and damages the eyes, mucous membranes, lungs, skin, and blood-forming organs.

Tabun, sarin and VX are all nerve agents of which VX is the most toxic. They all damage the nervous system, producing muscular spasms and paralysis. As little as 10 milligrammes of VX on the skin can cause rapid death. . grammes kills ..people

same time plans were made to build a large research and commercial-scale production facility in the desert some 70km Northwest of Baghdad under the Project cover of No 922. This was to become Muthanna State Establishment, also known as al-Muthanna, and operated under the front name of Iraq's State Establishment for Pesticide Production. It became partially operational in 1982-83. It had five research and development sections each tasked to pursue different programmes. In addition, the al-Muthanna site was the main chemical agent production facility, and it also took the lead in weaponising chemical and biological agents including all aspects of weapon development and testing, in association with the military. According to information, subsequently supplied by the Iraqis, the total production capacity in 1991 was 4,000 tonnes of agent per annum, but we assess it could have been higher. Al-Muthanna was supported by three separate storage and precursor production facilities known as Fallujah 1, 2 and 3 near Habbaniyah, north-west of Baghdad, parts of which were not completed before they were heavily bombed in the 1991 Gulf War.

2. Iraq started **biological warfare** research in the mid-1970s. After small-scale research, a purpose-built research and development facility was authorised at al-

Salman, also known as Salman Pak. This is surrounded on three sides by the Tigris river and situated some 35km South of Baghdad. Although some progress was made in biological weapons research at this early stage, Iraq decided to concentrate on

The effects of biological agents

Anthrax is a disease caused by the bacterium *Bacillus anthracis*. Inhalation anthrax is the manifestation of the disease likely to be expected in biological warfare. The symptoms may vary, but can include fever and internal bleeding. The incubation period for anthrax is 1 to 7 days, with most cases occurring within 2 days of exposure

Botulinum toxin is one of the most toxic substances known to man. The first symptoms of poisoning may appear as early as 1 hour post exposure or as long as 8 days after exposure, with the incubation period between 12 and 22 hours. Paralysis leads to death by suffocation

Aflatoxins are fungal toxins, which are potent *carcinogens*. Most symptoms take a long time to show. Food products contaminated by aflatoxin can cause liver inflammation and cancer. It can also affect pregnant women, leading to stillborn babies and children born with mutations.

Ricin is derived from the castor bean and can cause multiple organ failure leading to death within one or two days of inhalation.

developing chemical agents and their delivery systems at al-Muthanna. With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, in the early 1980s, the biological weapons programme was revived. The appointment of Dr Rihab Taha in 1985, to head a small biological weapons research team at al-Muthanna, helped to develop the programme. At about the same time plans were made to develop the Salman Pak site into a secure biological warfare research facility. Dr Taha continued to work with her team at Muthanna until 1987 when it moved to Salman Pak, which was under the control of the Directorate of General Intelligence. Significant resources were provided for the programme, including the construction of a dedicated production facility, (Project 324) at al-Hakam. Agent production began in 1988 and weaponisation testing and later filling of munitions was conducted in association with the staff at Muthanna State Establishment. From mid-1990, other civilian facilities were taken over and some adapted for use in the production and research and development of biological agents. These included:

- Daura Foot and Mouth Vaccination Plant which produced botulinum toxin and conducted virus research. There is some intelligence to suggest that work was also conducted on anthrax,
- al-Fudaliyah Agriculture and Water Research centre where Iraq admitted it undertook Aflatoxin production and genetic engineering:
- Amariyah Sera and Vaccine institute which was used for the storage of biological agent seed stocks, and was involved in genetic engineering

3. By the time of the Gulf War Iraq was producing very large quantities of chemical and biological agents. From a series of Iraqi declarations to the UN during the 1990s we know that by 1991 they had produced at least:

- 19,000 litres of botulinum toxin, 8,500 litres of anthrax, 2,200 litres of aflatoxin, and were working on a number of other agents;
- 2,850 tonnes of mustard gas, 210 tonnes of tabun, 795 tonnes of sarin and cyclosarin, and 3.9 tonnes of VX.

4. Iraq's **nuclear programme** was established under the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission in the 1950s. Under a nuclear co-operation agreement signed with the Soviet Union in 1959, a nuclear research centre, equipped with a research reactor, was built at Tuwaitha, the main Iraqi nuclear research centre. The surge in Iraqi oil revenues in the early 1970s supported an expansion of the research programme. This was bolstered by the signing of co-operation agreements with France and Italy in the mid-1970s. France agreed to supply two research reactors powered by highly enriched uranium fuel, and Italy supplied equipment for fuel fabrication and handling. By the end of 1984 Iraq was self-sufficient in uranium ore. One of the reactors was destroyed in an Israeli air attack in June 1981 shortly before it was to become operational, the other was never completed.

5. By the mid-1980s the deterioration of Iraq's position in the war with Iran prompted renewed interest in the military use of nuclear technology, and additional resources were put into developing technologies to enrich uranium as fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. Enriched uranium was preferred because it could be produced more covertly than the alternative, plutonium. Iraq followed parallel programmes to produce highly enriched uranium: electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) and gas centrifuge enrichment. By 1991 one EMIS enrichment facility was nearing completion and another was under construction. Centrifuge facilities were also under construction, but the centrifuge design was still being developed. In August 1990 Iraq instigated a crash programme to develop a single nuclear weapon within a year, and envisaged the rapid development of a small 50 machine gas centrifuge cascade to produce the highly enriched uranium required. By the time of the Gulf War, the programme had made little progress. But, by that stage, Iraq decided to concentrate on gas centrifuges as the means for producing the necessary fissile material.

Effect of a 20-kiloton nuclear detonation

A detonation of a 20-kiloton nuclear warhead over a city might flatten an area of approximately 3 square miles. Within 1.6 miles of detonation, blast damage and radiation would cause 80% casualties, three-quarters of which would be fatal. Between 1.6 and 3.1 miles from the detonation, there would still be 10% casualties. Centred on St Paul's three square miles cover, centred on Edinburg Castle. .

6. Iraq's declared aim was to produce a weapon with a 20-kiloton yield and weapons designs were produced for both a simple gun-type device and for more complex implosion weapons. The latter were similar to the device used at Hiroshima in 1945. Iraq was also working on more advanced concepts. By 1991 the Iraqi programme was supported by large body of Iraqi nuclear expertise, programme documentation and databases and manufacturing infrastructure. On the basis of reports from UN inspections after the Gulf War it was eventually concluded that in 1991 Iraq wasaway from producing a nuclear weapon.

7. Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had a well-developed **ballistic missile** industry. Most of the missiles fired in the Gulf War were an Iraqi produced version of the SCUD

SCUD missiles

The short-range mobile SCUD ballistic missile was developed by the Soviet Union in the 1950s, drawing on the technology of the German V-2 developed in World War II.

For many years it was the mainstay of Soviet and Warsaw Pact tactical missile forces, and it was also widely exported. Recipients of Soviet-manufactured SCUDs included Iraq, North Korea, Iran, and Libya, although not all were sold directly by the Soviet Union.

missile, the Al Hussein, with an extended range of 650 km. Numbers before war.... Iraq was working on other stretched SCUD variants, such as the Al Abbas, which had a range

of 900km. Iraq was also seeking to reverse engineer the SCUD engine with a view to producing new missiles; recent evidence indicates that they may have succeeded at that time. In particular Iraq had plans for a new SCUD-derived missile with a range of 1200km. Iraq also conducted a partial flight test of a multi-stage satellite launch vehicle based on SCUD technology, known as the Al Abid. Also during this period, Iraq was developing the BADR-2000, a 700-1000km range two-stage solid propellant missile (based on the Iraqi part of the 1980s CONDOR-2 programme run in co-operation with Argentina and Egypt). There were plans for 1200-1500km range solid propellant follow-on systems.

The use of chemical and biological weapons

8. Iraq had made frequent use of a variety of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. (Many of the casualties are still alive in Iranian hospitals suffering from the long-term effects of numerous types of cancer and lung diseases.) In 1988 Saddam also used mustard and nerve agents against Iraqi Kurds at Halabja in northern Iraq (see photograph). Estimates vary, but according to Human Rights Watch up to 5,000 people were killed.

9. A month after the attack on Halabja, Iraqi troops used over 100 tons of sarin nerve agent against Iranian troops on the Al Fao peninsula. Over the next three months Iraqi troops used sarin and other nerve agents on Iranian troops causing extensive casualties.

The Attack on Halabja

Shortly before sunrise on Friday, 17th March 1988, the village of Halabja was bombarded by Iraqi warplanes. The raid was over in minutes. Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against his own people. A Kurd described the effects of a chemical attack on another village:

"My brothers and my wife had blood and vomit running from their noses and their mouths. Their heads were tilted to one side. They were groaning. I couldn't do much, just clean up the blood and vomit from their mouths and try in every way to make them breathe again. I did artificial respiration on them and then I gave them two injections each. I also rubbed creams on my wife and two brothers."

(From "Crimes Against Humanity," Iraqi National Congress.)



Among the corpses at Halabja, children were found dead where they had been playing outside their homes. In places, streets were piled with corpses.

10. Intelligence indicates that in 1991 Iraq used the biological warfare agent aflatoxin against the Shia population of Karbala.

11. From Iraqi declarations to the UN after the Gulf War we know that by 1991 Iraq had produced a variety of delivery means for chemical and biological agents including 75 ballistic missile warheads, over 16,000 free fall bombs and over 110,000 artillery rockets and shells.

- **The use of ballistic missiles**

12. Iraq fired over 500 SCUD-type missiles at Iran during the Iran-Iraq War at both civilian and military targets, and 93 SCUD-type missiles during the Gulf War. The

latter were targeted at Israel and at Coalition forces stationed in the Gulf region. Armed with conventional warheads they did only limited damage Iraq subsequently admitted to UNSCOM that it had 50 chemical and 25 biological warheads available for these missiles. It is not clear if the warheads were ever mated to the missiles. In any event they were not used.

13. At the end of the Gulf War the international community was determined that Iraq's arsenal of chemical and biological and ballistic missiles should be dismantled. The method chosen to achieve this aim was the establishment of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) to carry out intrusive inspections within Iraq and to eliminate its chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles with a range over 150km. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was charged with the abolition of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. Between 1991 and 1998 UNSCOM and the IAEA succeeded in identifying and destroying very large quantities of chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles as well as associated production facilities. They also destroyed the infrastructure for Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. This was achieved despite a continuous and sophisticated programme of harassment, obstruction and deception and denial (see Part 2). By 1998 UNSCOM concluded that they were unable to fulfil their mandate. The inspectors were withdrawn in December 1998.

14. Based on the UNSCOM report to the UN Security Council in January 1999 and earlier UNSCOM reports, we assess that when the UN inspectors left Iraq they were unable to account for:

- up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent, including 1.5 tonnes of VX nerve agent;
- up to 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals, including approximately 300 tonnes which, in the Iraqi CW programme, were unique to the production of VX;

- growth media procured for biological agent production (enough to produce over three times the 8,500 litres of anthrax spores Iraq admits to having manufactured);
- over 30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological agents.

15. The departure of the Inspectors meant that the International Community was unable to establish the truth behind these large discrepancies. It also greatly diminished our ability to monitor and assess Iraq's continuing attempts to reconstitute its programmes.

16. While the enforcement of the sanctions regimes and the UN arms embargo and US/UK air operations in 1998 have impeded Iraq's efforts to reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction, they have not halted them. Much of Iraq's missile infrastructure has been rebuilt; the nuclear weapons programme is being reconstituted, albeit with difficulty; and Iraq continues to produce chemical and biological agents.

CHAPTER 3: THE CURRENT POSITION: 1998-2002

1. This chapter sets out what we now know of Saddam's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, drawing on all the available evidence. While it takes account of the results from UN inspections and other publicly available information, it also draws heavily on intelligence about Iraqi efforts to develop their programmes and capabilities since 1998. The **main conclusions** are that:

- Iraq has a useable chemical and biological weapons capability, in breach of UNSCR 687, which has included recent production of chemical and biological agents;
 - Saddam continues to attach great importance to the possession of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, which he regards as being the basis for Iraq's regional power. He is not prepared to lose capabilities he has developed over the last four years;
 - Iraq can deliver chemical and biological agents using an extensive range of artillery shells, free-fall bombs, sprayers and ballistic missiles;
 - Iraq continues to work on developing nuclear weapons, in breach of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and in breach of UNSCR 687. Uranium has been sought from Africa that has no known civil nuclear application in Iraq;
 - Iraq possesses extended-range versions of the SCUD ballistic missile, capable of reaching Tehran, Eastern Turkey and Cyprus in breach of UNSCR 687. It is also developing longer range ballistic missiles;
 - Iraq's current military planning specifically envisages the use of chemical and biological weapons;
-
- Iraq's military forces maintain the capability to use chemical and biological weapons, with command, control and logistical arrangements in place. The Iraqi military may be able to deploy these weapons within forty five minutes of a decision to do so;

- Iraq is already taking steps to undermine the return of any UN weapons inspectors through concealment and dispersal of sensitive equipment and documentation;
- Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missiles programmes are not short of funds, despite the parlous state of the Iraqi economy.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

JIC Assessment: 1999-2002

2. Since the withdrawal of the inspectors the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) has monitored evidence, including from secret intelligence, of continuing work on Iraqi offensive chemical and biological warfare capabilities. In the first half of 2000 the JIC noted intelligence on Iraqi attempts to procure dual-use chemicals and the reconstruction of civil chemical production at sites formerly associated with the chemical warfare programme. Iraq had also been trying to procure dual-use materials and equipment which could be used for a biological warfare programme. Personnel known to have been connected to the biological warfare programme up to the Gulf War had been conducting research into pathogens. There was intelligence that Iraq was starting to produce biological warfare agents in mobile production centres. Planning for the project had begun in 1995 under Dr Rihab Taha, known to have been a central player in the pre-1995 programme. The JIC concluded that Iraq had sufficient expertise, equipment and material to produce biological weapons agents within weeks using its legitimate biotechnology facilities.

3. A JIC assessment in mid-2001 concluded that intelligence on Iraqi former chemical and biological warfare facilities, their limited reconstruction and civil production pointed to a continuing research and development programme. Since 1998 Iraqi development of mass destruction weaponry had been helped by the absence of inspectors and the increase in illegal border trade, which provided available hard currency.

4. In early 2002 the JIC assessed that Iraq retained production equipment, stocks of chemical agents and at least small amounts of precursors from before the Gulf War. Iraq could produce quantities of mustard gas within weeks and of Sarin and VX within months. In the case of VX it might already have done so. Iraq held stocks of biological agents from either before the Gulf

War or from more recent production. The JIC judged Iraq to be self-sufficient in the production of biological weapons. It also judged that Iraq had the means to deliver chemical and biological weapons

Recent Intelligence

5. Subsequently, intelligence has become available from reliable sources which complements and adds to previous intelligence and confirms the JIC assessment that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons. The intelligence also shows that the Iraqi leadership has been discussing a number of issues related to these weapons. This intelligence covers:

- **Confirmation that chemical and biological weapons play an important role in Iraqi military thinking.** Intelligence shows that Saddam attaches great importance to the possession of weapons of mass destruction which he regards as being the basis for Iraqi regional powers. He believes that respect for Iraq rests on its possession of chemical and biological weapons and the missiles capable of delivering them. Intelligence indicates that Saddam is determined to retain this capability and recognises that Iraqi political weight would be diminished if Iraq's military power rested solely on its weakened conventional military forces.
- **Iraqi attempts to retain its existing banned weapons systems:** Iraq is already taking steps to undermine the possible return of any UN weapons inspectors: Iraq has begun removing sensitive equipment and papers relating to its chemical and biological programmes and dispersing them beyond the gaze of inspectors, for example by hiding sensitive documents in the homes of his trusted officials. Saddam is determined not to lose the capabilities that he has been able to develop in the four years since inspectors left.
- **Saddam's willingness to use chemical and biological weapons:** intelligence indicates that Saddam is prepared to use chemical and biological weapons if he believes his regime is under threat. We also know from intelligence that as part of Iraq's military planning, Saddam is willing to use chemical and biological weapons against any internal uprising by the Shia population. The Iraqi military may be able to deploy chemical or biological weapons within forty five minutes of an order to do so.

Chemical and biological agents: surviving stocks

6. When confronted with questions about the unaccounted stocks, Iraq has claimed, repeatedly, that if it had retained any chemical agents from before the Gulf War they would have deteriorated sufficiently to render them harmless. But Iraq has admitted to having the knowledge and capability to add stabiliser to nerve agent which would prevent such decomposition.

7. Iraq has claimed that all its biological agents and weapons have been destroyed. No convincing proof of any kind has been produced to support this claim. In particular, Iraq could not explain large discrepancies between the amount of growth media (nutrients required for the specialised growth of agent) it procured before 1991 and the amounts of agent it admits to having manufactured. The discrepancy is enough to produce more than three times the amount of anthrax allegedly manufactured.

Chemical agent: production capabilities

8. Intelligence confirms that Iraq has continued to produce chemical agent. During the Gulf War a number of facilities which intelligence reporting indicated were directly or indirectly associated with Iraq's chemical weapons effort were attacked and damaged. Following the ceasefire UNSCOM destroyed or rendered harmless facilities and equipment used in Iraq's chemical weapons programme. Other equipment was released for civilian use either in industry or academic institutes, where it was tagged and regularly inspected and monitored, or else placed under camera monitoring, to ensure that it was not being misused. This monitoring ceased when UNSCOM withdrew from Iraq in 1998. However, capabilities remain and, although the main chemical weapon production facility at al-Muthanna was completely destroyed by UNSCOM and has not been rebuilt, other plants formerly associated with the chemical warfare programme have been rebuilt. This includes the chlorine and phenol plant at Fallujah 2 near Habbaniyah. In addition to their civilian uses, chlorine and phenol are used for precursor chemicals which contribute to the production of chemical agents.

9. The expansion of chlorine production facilities at Fallujah 2 gives Iraq a capacity well beyond that required for Iraq's civilian needs.

10. Other dual use facilities, which could be used to support the production of chemical agent and precursors, have been rebuilt and re-equipped. New chemical facilities have been built, some with illegal foreign assistance, and are probably fully operational or ready for production. These include the Ibn Sina Company at Tarmiya (see figure 1), which is a chemical research centre. It undertakes research, development and production of chemicals previously imported but not now available and which are needed for Iraq's civil industry. But it is known to be supporting the missile programme and could also be involved in the chemical weapons programme. The Director General ...of what is Hickmat Na'im al-Jalu who, prior to the Gulf War worked in Iraq's nuclear weapons programme and after the war was responsible for preserving Iraq's chemical expertise.



FIGURE 1: THE IBN SINA COMPANY AT TARMIYA

Parts of the al-Qa'Qaa chemical complex damaged in the Gulf War have also been repaired and are operational. Of particular concern are elements of the phosgene production plant at Al Qa'Qaa. These were severely damaged during the Gulf War, and dismantled under UNSCOM supervision, but have since been rebuilt. While phosgene does have industrial uses it can also be used by itself as a chemical agent or as a precursor for nerve agents.

11. Iraq has retained the expertise for chemical warfare research, agent production and weaponisation. Most of the personnel previously involved in the programme remain in country. Indeed, intelligence indicates that Haidar Husain Taha, recently reported in the media as being the factory manager of the Fallujah 2 plant, is almost certainly the same individual

who from 1984 until the end of the Gulf war worked at Iraq's CW programme at the Muthanna State Establishment researching mustard gas. While UNSCOM found a number of technical manuals (so called "cook books") for the production of chemical agents and critical precursors, Iraq's claim to have unilaterally destroyed the bulk of the documentation cannot be confirmed and is almost certainly untrue. Recent intelligence indicates that Iraq is still discussing methods of concealing such documentation in order to ensure that it is not discovered by any future UN inspections

The Problem of Dual Use Facilities

Almost all components and supplies used in weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes are dual-use. For example, any major petrochemical or biotech industry, as well as public health organisations, will have legitimate need for most materials and equipment required to manufacture chemical and biological weapons. Without UN weapons inspectors it is very difficult therefore to be sure about the true nature of many of Iraq's facilities.

For example, Iraq has built a large new chemical complex, Project Baiji, in the desert in north west Iraq at Ash Sharqat (see figure 2). This site is a former uranium enrichment facility, which was damaged during the Gulf War, and rendered harmless under supervision of the IAEA. Part of the site has been rebuilt, with work starting in 1992, as a chemical production complex. Despite the site being far away from populated areas it is surrounded by a high wall with watch towers and guarded by armed guards. Intelligence reports indicate that it will produce nitric acid, which can be used in explosives, missile fuel, and in the purification of uranium.



Biological agent: production capabilities

12. We know from intelligence that Iraq has continued to produce biological warfare agents. As with some chemical equipment, UNSCOM only destroyed equipment that could be directly linked to biological weapons production. Iraq also has its own engineering capability to design and construct biological agent associated fermenters, centrifuges, sprayer dryers and other equipment and is judged to be self-sufficient in the technology required to produce biological weapons. The experienced personnel who were active in the programme have largely remained in the country. They include.....Some dual-use equipment, including growth media, has also been purchased under the Oil for Food programme, but without monitoring of the equipment by UN inspectors Iraq could have diverted it to their biological weapons programme. This newly purchased equipment and others previously subject to monitoring could be used in a resurgent BW programme. Facilities of concern include:

- the Castor Oil Production Plant at Fallujah this was damaged in UK?US air attacks in 1998 (Operations Desert Fox) but has rebuilt. The residue from the castor bean pulp can be used in the production of ricin biological agent;
- the Al-Daura Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Plant, which was involved in biological agent production and research before the Gulf War. This has probably been renovated;
- The Amariyah Sera and Vaccine plant at...UNSCOM established that this was used to produce biological agents prior to the Gulf War. It has now expanded its storage capacity.

13. UNSCOM established that Iraq was planning to conceal from the inspectors the capability to produce biological warfare agents by developing mobile facilities. In the past two years evidence from defectors has indicated the existence of such facilities. **Recent intelligence** confirms that the Iraqi military have developed mobile facilities. These would help Iraq conceal and protect biological agent production from military attack or UN inspection.

Chemical and biological agents: delivery means

14. Iraq has a variety of delivery means available for both chemical and biological agents. These include:

- free fall bombs - Iraq acknowledged to UNSCOM the deployment to four sites of free fall bombs filled with biological agent during 1990-91. These bombs were filled with anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin. Iraq also acknowledged possession of four types of aerial bomb with various chemical agent fills including sulphur mustard, tabun, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX;
 - artillery shells and rockets - Iraq made extensive use of artillery munitions filled with chemical agents during the Iran-Iraq War. Mortars can also be used for chemical agent delivery. Iraq also claimed to have tested the use of shells and rockets filled with biological agents. Over 20,000 artillery munitions remain unaccounted for by UNSCOM;
 - helicopter and aircraft borne sprayers - Iraq carried out studies into aerosol dissemination of biological agent using these platforms prior to 1991. UNSCOM was unable to account for many of these devices. It is probable that Iraq retains a capability for aerosol dispersal of both chemical and biological agent; Any more on range and vulnerability
 - Al Hussein ballistic missiles (range 650km) - Iraq told UNSCOM that it filled 25 warheads with anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin. Iraq also developed chemical agent warheads for Al Hussein. Iraq admitted to producing 50 chemical warheads for Al Hussein which were intended for the delivery of a mixture of sarin and cyclosarin. However, technical analysis of warhead remnants has shown traces of VX degradation product which indicate that some additional warheads were made and filled with VX;
 - Al Samoud/Ababil 100 ballistic missiles (range 150km plus) - It is unclear if chemical and biological warheads have been developed for these systems, but given their experience on other missile systems, we judge that Iraq has the technical expertise for doing so;
-
- L-29 remotely piloted vehicle programme (see figure 3) - we know from intelligence that Iraq has attempted to modify the L-29 jet trainer to allow it to be used as a pilot-less aircraft (unmanned aerial vehicle - UAV) for the delivery of chemical and biological agents over a large area. This modification programme has had problems and Iraq is now focusing on developing smaller UAVs.

Chemical and biological warfare: command and control

15. The authority to use chemical and biological weapons ultimately resides with Saddam, but intelligence indicates that he may have also delegated this authority to his son Qusai. Special Security Organisation (SSO) and Special Republican Guard (SRG) units would be involved in the movement of any chemical and biological weapons to military units. The Iraqi military holds artillery and missile systems at Corps level throughout the Armed Forces and conducts regular training with them. The Directorate of Rocket Forces has operational control of strategic missile systems and some Multiple Rocket Launcher Systems.

Chemical and biological weapons: summary

16. Intelligence confirms that Iraq has covert chemical and biological weapons programmes, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687 and has continued to produce chemical and biological agents. Iraq has:

- chemical and biological agents and weapons available, both from pre-Gulf War stocks and more recent production;
- the capability to produce the chemical agents sulphur mustard, tabun, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX capable of producing mass casualties;
- a biological agent production capability and can produce at least anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. Iraq has also developed mobile facilities to produce biological agents.
- a variety of delivery means available;
- military forces, which maintain the capability to use these weapons, with command, control and logistical arrangements in place.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

JIC Assessments: 1999-2002

17. Since 1998 the JIC has monitored Iraq's attempts to reconstitute its nuclear weapons programme. In mid-2001 the JIC assessed that Iraq had continued its nuclear research after 1991. The JIC drew attention to intelligence that Iraq had recalled its nuclear scientists to the programme in 1998. Since 1998 Iraq had been trying to procure items that could be for use in the construction of centrifuges for the enrichment of uranium.

18. In early 2002, the JIC assessed that sanctions were hindering the import of crucial goods for the production of fissile material. If sanctions continued, **Iraq would not be able to** indigenously to produce a nuclear weapon. If they were removed or became ineffective, it would take Iraq at least five years to produce a weapon. This time-scale would shorten if Iraq succeeded in obtaining fissile material from abroad.

Nuclear weapons - why are they difficult to make?

A nuclear warhead requires sophisticated science and engineering, complex calculations and meticulous experimentation to convert the simplistic concepts seen in text books into a reliable bomb or missile warhead. Many of the hundreds of finely-engineered, specialised components are unique and have to be individually developed, made and tested rigorously. The warhead needs to be designed and tested to withstand accelerations, temperatures, vibrations and weather, and finally fired, using inert materials in place of the nuclear core, to prove that it works. All this involves many dangerous nuclear and explosive materials which need specialised facilities and techniques to ensure safe handling and production.

Iraqi Nuclear Weapons Expertise

19. Although the IAEA dismantled the physical infrastructure (such as....) of Iraqi nuclear weapons programme. Iraq retained, and retains, its experienced nuclear scientists and technicians, specialised in the production of fissile material and weapons design. They include It also retains the accompanying programme documentation and data, which was withheld from the inspectors.

Gas Centrifuge Uranium Enrichment

Uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride is separated into its different isotopes in rapidly spinning rotor tubes of special centrifuges. Many hundreds or thousands of centrifuges are connected in cascades to enrich uranium. If the lighter U235 isotope is enriched to more than 90% it can be used in the core of a nuclear weapon.

20. **Intelligence shows** that the present Iraqi programme is almost certainly based on gas centrifuge uranium enrichment, one of the routes Iraq was following for producing fissile material before the Gulf War. But Iraq needs certain key equipment, such as

gas centrifuge components, and materials for the production of the fissile material necessary before a nuclear bomb could be developed.

21. Following the expulsion of weapons inspectors in 1998 there has been **an accumulation of intelligence** indicating that Iraq is making concerted covert efforts to acquire dual-use technology and materials with nuclear applications. Iraq's existing holdings of processed uranium are under IAEA supervision. But there is compelling evidence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Iraqi has no known civil nuclear programme or nuclear power plants, therefore it has no legitimate reason to acquire uranium.

22. Other important procurement since 1998 includes attempts to purchase vacuum pumps, which could be used....an entire magnet production line of the correct specification for use in gas centrifuges, one large filament winding machine, which....and a large balancing machine which could be used in initial centrifuge balancing work. Of particular concern are the repeated attempts by Iraq covertly to acquire a very large quantity (60,000 pieces) of specialised aluminium tubes. The specialised aluminium in question is subject to international export controls because of its potential application in the construction of gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium. In the case of aluminium and magnets it appears **from intelligence** that Iraq is attempting to acquire a capability to produce these components on its own rather than rely on foreign procurement.

Nuclear weapons: timelines

23. The projected timeline contained in the JIC assessment of early 2002 (see paragraph...) for Iraq to acquire a nuclear weapon through indigenous production of fissile material depend on a number of variables including the effectiveness of sanctions and other export controls and Iraqi success (or otherwise) to date in procuring items such as those listed above.

24. The continuing existence of the specialist teams and back-up data means that, were Iraq to obtain fissile material from abroad, the timeline would be much shorter. In those circumstances, and depending on the effectiveness of Iraqi weapons designs, we judge that Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon in between one and two years.

Radiological dispersal device

A Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) is designed to cause injury, or to deny, access to an area through the dissemination of radioactive material. An RDD can be made using material from medical or industrial facilities, but makes an ineffective weapon. Very large amounts of highly radioactive material are required before an RDD will cause many fatalities or significant injuries.

Iraq experimented with radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) during 1987, using Zirconium-95 as a dispersal material for area denial. This programme never progressed beyond the research stage, and was dropped.

BALLISTIC MISSILES

JIC Assessment: 1999-2002

25. In mid-2001 the JIC drew attention to what it described as a "step-change" in progress on Iraqi missile programme over the previous two years. It was clear from intelligence that the range of Iraqi missiles which was permitted by the UN and supposedly limited to 150 kilometres was being extended and that work was under way on larger engines for longer-range missiles.

26. In early 2002 the JIC concluded that Iraq had begun to develop missiles with a range of over 1,000 kilometres. If sanctions remained in place the Iraqis would not be able to produce such a missile before 2007. Sanctions and the earlier work of the inspectors had caused significant problems for Iraqi missile development. In the previous six months Iraqi foreign procurement efforts for the missile programme had been bolder. The JIC also assessed that Iraq retained up to 20 Al Hussein missiles from before the Gulf War.

The Iraqi ballistic missile programme since 1998

27. Since the Gulf War, Iraq has been openly developing two short-range missiles up to a range of 150km, which are permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 687. The Al-Samoud

liquid propellant missile has been extensively tested and is being deployed to military units. **Intelligence indicates** that at least fifty have been produced. **Intelligence also indicates** that Iraq has worked on extending its range to at least 200km in breach of UN Security Resolution 687. Production of the solid propellant Ababil-100 (Figure 4) is also underway, probably as an unguided rocket at this stage. There are also plans to extend its range to at least 200km.



FIGURE 4: ABABIL-100

Compared to liquid propellant missiles, those powered by solid propellant offer greater ease of storage, handling and mobility. They are also quicker to take into and out of action and can stay at a high state of readiness for longer periods.

28. **According to intelligence**, Iraq has retained up to 20 Al Hussein missiles (Figure 5), in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687. These missiles were either hidden from the UN as complete systems, or re-assembled using illegally retained engines and other components. We judge that the engineering expertise available would allow these missiles to be maintained effectively, although the fact that at least some require re-assembly makes it difficult to judge exactly how many could be available for use. They could be used with conventional, chemical or biological warheads and, with a range of up to 650km, are capable of reaching a




FIGURE 5: AL HUSSEIN

number of countries in the region including Cyprus, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel.

29. **Intelligence has confirmed** that Iraq wants to extend the range of its missile systems to over 1000km, enabling it to threaten other regional neighbours. This work began in 1998, although efforts to regenerate the long range ballistic missile programme probably began in 1995. Iraq's missile programmes employ hundreds of people. **Satellite imagery** (Figure 6) has shown a new engine test stand being constructed (A), which is larger than the current one used for Al Samoud (B), and that formerly used for testing SCUD engines (C) which was dismantled under UNSCOM supervision. This new stand will be capable of testing engines for missiles with ranges over 1000km, which are not permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 687. Such a facility would not be needed for systems that fall within the UN permitted range of 150km. The Iraqis have recently taken measures to conceal activities at this site.




FIGURE 6: AL RAFAH/SHAHIYAT LIQUID PROPELLANT ENGINE STATIC TEST STAND

Iraq is also working to obtain improved guidance technology to increase missile accuracy.

30. The success of UN restrictions means the development of new longer-range missiles is likely to be a slow process. These restrictions impact particularly on the:

- availability of foreign expertise,
- conduct of test flights to ranges above 150km;
- acquisition of guidance and control technology.

Saddam remains committed to developing longer-range missiles. Even if sanctions remain effective, Iraq might achieve a missile capability of over 1000km within 5 years (Figure 4 shows the range of Iraq's various missiles)

31. Iraq has managed to rebuild much of the missile production infrastructure destroyed in the Gulf War and in Operation Desert Fox in 1998 (see Part 2). New missile-related infrastructure is also under construction. Some aspects of this, including rocket propellant mixing and casting facilities at the Al Mamoun Plant, appear to replicate those linked to the prohibited BADR-2000 programme (with a planned range of 700-1000km) which were destroyed in the Gulf War or dismantled by UNSCOM. A new plant at al-Mamoun for indigenously producing ammonium perchlorate, which is a key ingredient in the production of solid propellant rocket motors, has also been constructed. This has been provided illicitly by NEC Engineers Private Limited, an Indian chemical engineering firm with extensive links in Iraq, including to other suspect facilities such as the Fallujah 2 chlorine plant. After an extensive investigation, the Indian authorities have recently suspended its export licence, although affiliated individuals and companies in the Middle East are still illicitly procuring for Iraq.

32. Despite a UN embargo, Iraq has also made concerted efforts to acquire additional production technology, including machine tools and raw materials, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 1051. The embargo has succeeded in blocking many of these attempts, such as requests to buy magnesium powder and ammonium chloride. But, despite the dual use nature of some of the items, we know from intelligence that some items have found their way to the Iraqi ballistic missile programme. More will inevitably continue to do so. **Intelligence makes it clear** that Iraqi procurement agents and front companies in third countries are seeking illicitly to acquire propellant chemicals for Iraq's ballistic missiles. This includes production level quantities of near complete sets of solid propellant motor ingredients such as aluminium powder, ammonium perchlorate and hydroxyl terminated polybutadiene. There have also been attempts to acquire large quantities of liquid propellant chemicals such as unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and diethylenetriamine. We judge this is intended to support production and deployment of the Al Samoud and Ababil-100 and development of longer range systems.

Iraq: Current and Planned/Potential Ballistic Missiles




FIGURE 7: CURRENT AND PLANNED/POTENTIAL BALLISTIC MISSILES

FUNDING FOR THE WMD PROGRAMME

33. The UN has sought to restrict Iraq's ability to generate funds for its chemical, biological and other military programmes. For example, Iraq earns money legally under the UN Oil For Food Programme (OFF) established by UNSCR 986, whereby the proceeds of oil sold through the UN is used to buy humanitarian supplies for Iraq. This money remains under UN control, and cannot be used for military procurement. However, the Iraqi regime continues to generate income outside UN control, either in the form of hard currency, or barter goods (which in turn means existing Iraqi funds are freed up to be spent on other things). Iraq's illicit earnings amounted to around USD 3 billion during 2001. Compared to \$....in 2002 and \$.....in 1998 we assess that Iraq will generate up to a further USD 3 billion during 2002.

34. These illicit earnings go to the Iraqi regime. They are used for building new palaces, as well as purchasing luxury goods and other civilian goods outside OFF. Some of these funds are also

used by Saddam to maintain his armed forces, and to develop or acquire military equipment, including for chemical, biological and nuclear programmes. There is no indication as to what proportion of these funds may be used in this fashion. But we have seen no evidence that Iraqi attempts to develop its weapons of mass destruction and its ballistic missile programme, for example through covert procurement of equipment from abroad has been inhibited in any way by lack of funds. The steady increase over the last.....years in the availability of funds will enable Saddam to progress the programmes at a faster rate.

PART 2

HISTORY OF UN WEAPONS INSPECTIONS

1. During the 1990s, beginning in April 1991 immediately after the end of the Gulf War, the UN Security Council passed a series of resolutions [see box] establishing the authority of UNSCOM and the IAEA to carry out the work of dismantling Iraq's arsenal of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes and long range ballistic missiles.

UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) relating to WMD

UNSCR 687, April 1991 created the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and required Iraq to accept, unconditionally, "the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision" of its chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150km, and their associated programmes, stocks, components, research and facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was charged with abolition of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. UNSCOM and the IAEA must report that their mission has been achieved before the Security Council can end sanctions. They have not yet done so.

UNSCR 707, August 1991, stated that Iraq must provide full, final and complete disclosure of all its WMD programmes and provide unconditional and unrestricted access to UN inspectors. For over a decade Iraq has been in breach of this resolution. Iraq must also cease all nuclear activities of any kind other than civil use of isotopes.

UNSCR 715, October 1991 approved plans prepared by UNSCOM and IAEA for the ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) arrangements to implement UNSCR 687. Iraq did not accede to this to November 1993. OMV was conducted from April 1995 to 15 December 1998, when the UN left Iraq.

UNSCR 1051, March 1996 stated that Iraq must declare the shipment of dual-use WMD goods.

These resolutions were passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which authorises the use of military force to enforce them.

2. As outlined in UNSCR 687, Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes were also a breach of Iraq's commitments under:

- The Geneva Convention of 1925 – which bans the use of chemical weapons;
 - the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention – which bans the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of biological weapons;
 - and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – which prohibits Iraq from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons
3. UNSCR 687 obliged Iraq to provide declarations on all aspects of its WMD

UNSCOM and the IAEA were given the remit to designate any locations for inspection at any time, review any document and interview any scientist, technician or other individual and seize any prohibited items for destruction.

programmes within 15 days and accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless under international supervision of its chemical, biological and nuclear programmes, and all ballistic missiles with a range beyond 150 km. Iraq did not make a satisfactory declaration within the specified timeframe.

Iraq accepted the UNSCRs and agreed to co-operate with UNSCOM. The history of the UN weapons inspections was characterised by persistent Iraqi obstruction.

Iraqi Non-Co-operation with the Inspectors

4. The former Chairman of UNSCOM, Richard Butler, reported to the UN Security Council in January 1999, that in 1991 a decision was taken by a high-level Government committee to provide inspectors with only a portion of its proscribed weapons, components, production capabilities and stocks. UNSCOM concluded that Iraqi policy was based on the following actions:

- to provide only a portion of extant weapons stocks, releasing for destruction only those that were least modern;

- to retain the production capability and documentation necessary to revive programmes when possible,
- to conceal the full extent of its chemical weapons programme, including the VX nerve agent project; to conceal the number and type of chemical and biological warheads for proscribed long –range missiles;
- and to conceal the existence of its massive biological weapons programme.


5. In December 1997 Richard Butler reported to the UN Security Council that Iraq had created a new category of sites – “Presidential” and “sovereign” – from which it claimed that UNSCOM inspectors would henceforth be barred. The terms of the ceasefire in 1991 foresaw no such limitation. However, Iraq consistently refused to

Iraq's policy of deception

Iraq has admitted having a large, effective, system for hiding proscribed material including documentation, components, production equipment and, possibly, biological and chemical agents and weapons from the UN. Shortly after the adoption of UNSCR 687 in April 1991, an Administrative Security Committee (ASC) was formed with responsibility for advising Saddam on the information which could be released to UNSCOM and the IAEA. The Committee consisted of senior Military Industrial Commission (MIC) scientists from all of Iraq's WMD programmes. The Higher Security Committee (HSC) of the Presidential Office was in overall command of deception operations. The system was directed from the very highest political levels within the Presidential Office and involved, if not Saddam himself, his youngest son, Qusai. The system for hiding proscribed material relies on high mobility and good command and control. It uses lorries to move items at short notice and most hide sites appear to be located close to good road links and telecommunications. The Baghdad area was particularly favoured. In addition to active measures to hide material from the UN, Iraq has attempted to monitor, delay and collect intelligence on UN operations to aid its overall deception plan.

allow UNSCOM inspectors access to any of these eight Presidential sites. Many of these so-called “palaces” are in fact large compounds which are an integral part of Iraqi counter-measures designed to hide weapons material (see photograph).

A photograph of a presidential site or what have been called "palaces".



Buckingham palace has been superimposed to demonstrate their comparative size



Buckingham Palace and grounds

Intimidation

6. Once inspectors had arrived in Iraq, it quickly became apparent that the Iraqi's would resort to a range of measures (including physical threats and psychological intimidation of inspectors) to prevent UNSCOM and the IAEA from fulfilling their mandate.

7. In response to such incidents, the President of the Security Council issued frequent statements calling on Iraq to comply with its disarmament and monitoring obligations

Iraqi obstruction of UN weapons inspection teams.

- firing warning shots in the air to prevent IAEA inspectors from intercepting nuclear related equipment (June 1991),
- keeping IAEA inspectors in a car park for 4 days and refusing to allow them to leave with incriminating documents on Iraq's nuclear weapons programme (September 1991).
- announcing that UN monitoring and verification plans were "unlawful" (October 1991);
- refusing UNSCOM inspectors access to the Ministry of Agriculture. Threats were made to inspectors who remained on watch outside the building. The inspection team had reliable evidence that the site contained archives related to proscribed activities;
- refusing to allow UNSCOM the use of its own aircraft to fly into Iraq (January 1993). In 1991-2 Iraq objected to UNSCOM using its own helicopters and choosing its own flight plans,
- refusing to allow UNSCOM to install remote-controlled monitoring cameras at two key missile sites (June-July 1993);
- repeatedly denying access to inspection teams (1991- December 1998);
- interfering with UNSCOM's helicopter operations, threatening the safety of the aircraft and their crews (June 1997);
- demanding end of U2 overflights and the withdrawal of US UNSCOM staff (October 1997);
- destroying documentary evidence of WMD programmes (September 1997).

Obstruction

8. Iraq denied that it had pursued a biological weapons programme until July 1995.

In July 1995, Iraq acknowledged that biological agents had been produced on an industrial scale at Al-Hakam. Following the defection in August 1995 of Hussein Kamel, Saddam's son-in-law and former Director of the Military Industrialisation Commission, Iraq released over 2 million documents relating to its WMD programmes and acknowledged that it had pursued a biological programme that led to the deployment of actual weapons. Iraq admitted producing in excess of 200 biological weapons with a reserve of agent to fill considerably more.

9. Iraq tried to obstruct UNSCOM's efforts to investigate the scale of its biological

Inspection of Iraq's biological weapons programme

In the course of the first biological weapons inspection in August 1991, Iraq claimed that it had merely conducted a military biological research programme. At the site visited, Al-Salman, Iraq had removed equipment, documents and even entire buildings. Later in the year, during a visit to the Al-Hakam site, Iraq declared to UNSCOM inspectors that the facility was used as a factory to produce proteins derived from yeast to feed animals. Inspectors subsequently discovered that the plant was a central site for the production of anthrax spores and botulinum toxin for weapons. The factory had also been sanitised by Iraqi officials to deceive inspectors.

Another key site, the Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Institute at Daura which produced botulinum toxin and probably anthrax, was not divulged as part of the programme. Five years later, after intense pressure, Iraq acknowledged that tens of tonnes of bacteriological warfare agent had been produced there and at Al-Hakam. Amazingly, Iraq *continued to develop* the Al-Hakam site into the 1990s, misleading UNSCOM about its true purpose.

As documents recovered in August 1995 were assessed, it became apparent that the full disclosure required by the UN was far from complete. Successive inspection teams went to Iraq to try to gain greater understanding of the programme and to obtain credible supporting evidence. In July 1996 Iraq refused to discuss its past programme and doctrine forcing the team to withdraw in protest. Monitoring teams were at the same time finding undisclosed equipment and materials associated with the past programme. In response, Iraq grudgingly provided successive disclosures of their programme which were judged by UNSCOM, and specially convened international panels, to be technically inadequate.

In late 1995, Iraq acknowledged weapons testing the biological agent ricin, but did not provide production information. Two years later – in early 1997 – UNSCOM discovered evidence that Iraq had produced ricin.

weapons programme. It created forged documents to account for bacterial growth media, imported in the late 1980s, specifically for the production of anthrax, botulinum toxin and probably plague. The documents were created to indicate that the material had been imported by the State Company for Drugs and Medical

Appliances Marketing for use in hospitals and distribution to local authorities. Iraq also censored documents and scientific papers provided to the first UN inspection team, removing all references to key individuals, weapons and industrial production of agents.

10. Iraq has yet to provide any documents concerning production of agent and subsequent weaponisation. Iraq destroyed, unilaterally and illegally, some biological weapons in 1991 and 1992 making accounting for these weapons impossible. In addition Iraq cleansed a key site at Al-Muthanna – its main research and development, production and weaponisation facility for chemical warfare agents - of all evidence of a biological programme in the toxicology department, the animal-house and weapons filling station.

11. Iraq refused to elaborate further on the programme during inspections in 1997 and 1998, confining discussion to previous topics. In July 1998, Tariq Aziz personally intervened in the inspection process stating that the biological programme was more secret and more closed than other WMD programmes. He also played down the significance of the programme. Iraq has presented the biological weapons programme as the personal undertaking of a few misguided scientists.

12. At the same time, Iraq tried to maintain its nuclear weapons programme via a concerted campaign to deceive IAEA inspectors. In 1997 the Agency's Director General stated that the IAEA was "severely hampered by Iraq's persistence in a policy of concealment and understatement of the programme's scope."

Achievements

13. Despite the conduct of the Iraqi authorities towards them, both UNSCOM and the IAEA Action Team have valuable records of achievement in discovering and exposing Iraq's biological weapons programme and destroying very large quantities of chemical weapons stocks, missiles as well as the infrastructure for Iraq's nuclear weapons programme.

UNSCOM and IAEA Achievements

UNSCOM surveyed 1015 sites in Iraq, carrying out 272 separate inspections. Despite Iraqi obstruction and intimidation, UN inspectors uncovered details of chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. One of the main discoveries was that at the time of the Gulf War, [Iraq had been within 3 years - NPD checking UNSCOM language] of acquiring a nuclear weapon. Other major UNSCOM/IAEA achievements included:

- the destruction of 40,000 munitions for chemical weapons, 2,610 tonnes of chemical precursors and 411 tonnes of chemical warfare agent;
- the dismantling of Iraq's prime chemical weapons development and production complex at Al-Muthanna, and a range of key production equipment,
- the destruction of 48-SCUD type missiles, 11 mobile launchers and 56 sites, 30 warheads filled with chemical agents, and 20 conventional warheads;
- the destruction of the Al-Hakam biological weapons facility and a range of production equipment, seed stocks and growth media for biological weapons;
- the discovery in 1991 of 15 kg of highly enriched uranium, forcing Iraq's acknowledgement of uranium enrichment programmes and attempts to preserve key components of its prohibited nuclear weapons programme; and
- the removal and destruction of the infrastructure for the nuclear weapons programme, including the Al-Athir weaponisation/testing facility.

14. Despite UNSCOM's efforts, following the effective ejection of UN inspectors in December 1998, there remained a series of significant unresolved disarmament issues. In summarising the situation in a report to the Security Council, the UNSCOM Chairman, Richard Butler indicated that:

- contrary to the requirement that destruction be conducted under international supervision, "Iraq undertook extensive, unilateral and secret destruction of large quantities of proscribed weapons and items";
- and Iraq "also pursued a practice of concealment of proscribed items, including weapons, and a cover up of its activities in contravention of Council resolutions."

Overall, Butler declared that obstructive Iraqi activity had had "a significant impact upon the Commission's disarmament work."

Withdrawal of the Inspectors

15. By the end of 1998 UNSCOM was in direct confrontation with the Iraqi Government which was refusing to co-operate. The US and the UK had made clear that anything short of full co-operation would make military action unavoidable. Richard Butler was requested to report to the UN Security Council in December 1998 and stated that, following a series of direct confrontations, coupled with the systematic refusal by Iraq to co-operate, UNSCOM was no longer able to perform its disarmament mandate. As a direct result, on December 16 the weapons inspectors were withdrawn and Operation Desert Fox was launched by the US and the UK a few hours afterwards.

Operation Desert Fox (16-19 December 1998):

Operation Desert Fox targeted industrial facilities related to Iraq's ballistic missile programme and a suspect biological warfare facility as well as military airfields and sites used by Iraq's security organisations which are involved in its weapons of mass destruction programmes. Key facilities associated with Saddam's Ballistic Missile programme were significantly degraded.

The Situation Since 1998

16. There have been no UN-mandated weapons inspections in Iraq since 1998. In an effort to enforce Iraqi compliance with its disarmament and monitoring obligations, the Security Council passed resolution 1284 in December 1999. This established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) as a successor organisation to UNSCOM and called on Iraq to give UNMOVIC inspectors "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transport". It also set out the steps Iraq needed to take to in return for the eventual suspension and lifting of sanctions. A key measure of Iraqi compliance would be full co-operation with UN inspectors, including unconditional, immediate and unrestricted access to any and all sites.

Given Iraq's track record of co-operation with UNSCOM and the IAEA between 1991-98, it is difficult to conclude other than that the prospects of Iraq meeting this standard are dim.

17. For the past three years, Iraq has allowed the IAEA to carry out an annual inspection of a stockpile of low-enriched uranium. This has led some countries and western commentators to conclude – erroneously – that Iraq is meeting its nuclear disarmament and monitoring obligations. As the IAEA has pointed out in recent weeks, this annual inspection does “not serve as a substitute for the verification activities required by the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council.”

18. Dr. Hans Blix, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, and Dr. Mohammed El-Baradei, the Director General of the IAEA, have declared that in the absence of inspections it is impossible to verify Iraqi compliance with its UN disarmament and monitoring obligations. In April 1999, an independent UN panel of experts noted that “the longer inspection and monitoring activities remain suspended, the more difficult the comprehensive implementation of Security Council resolutions becomes, increasing the risk that Iraq might reconstitute its proscribed weapons programmes.”

19. The departure of the Inspectors greatly diminished our ability to monitor and assess Iraq's continuing attempts to reconstitute its chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.

PART 3

IRAQ UNDER SADDAM

Introduction

1. The Republic of Iraq is bounded by Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and the Persian Gulf. Its population of around 23 million is ethnically and religiously diverse. Approximately 77% are Arabs Sunni Muslims form around 17% of the Arab population and dominate the government. About 60% of Iraqis are Shias and 20% are Kurds. The remaining 3% of the population consists of Turkomans, Armenians, Assyrians, Christians and Jews.

2. Public life in Iraq is nominally dominated by the Ba'ath Party (see box on next page). But all real authority rests with Saddam Hussein and his immediate circle. Saddam's family, tribe and a small number of associates remain his most loyal supporters. He uses them to convey his orders, including to members of the government.

3. Saddam Hussein uses patronage and violence to

Saddam's rise to power

Saddam Hussein was born in 1937 in the Tikrit district, north of Baghdad. In 1957 he joined the Ba'ath Party. After taking part in a failed attempt to assassinate the Iraqi President, Abdul Karim Qasim, Saddam escaped, first to Syria and then to Egypt. In his absence he was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.

Saddam returned to Baghdad in 1963 when the Ba'ath Party came to power. He went into hiding after the Ba'ath fell from power later that year. He was captured and imprisoned, but in 1967 escaped and took over responsibility for Ba'ath security. Saddam set about imposing his will on the Party and establishing himself at the centre of power.

The Ba'ath Party returned to power in 1968. In 1969 Saddam became Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, Deputy to the President, and Deputy Secretary-General of the Regional Command of the Ba'ath. In 1970 he joined the Party's National Command and in 1977 was elected Assistant Secretary General. In July 1979, he took over the Presidency of Iraq. Within days, five fellow members of the Revolutionary Command Council were accused of involvement in a coup attempt. They and 17 others were summarily executed.

motivate his supporters and to control or eliminate opposition. Potential rewards include social status, money and better access to goods. Saddam's extensive security apparatus and Ba'ath Party network provides oversight of Iraqi society, with informants in social, government and military organisations. Saddam practises torture, execution and other forms of coercion against his enemies, real or suspected. His targets are not only those who have offended him, but also their families, friends or colleagues.

The Iraqi Ba'ath Party

The Ba'ath Party is the only legal political party in Iraq. It pervades all aspects of Iraqi life.

Membership, around 700,000, is necessary for self advancement and confers benefits from the regime.

4. Saddam acts to ensure that no other centres of power in Iraq. He has crushed parties and tribes which might try to assert themselves, such as the communists and the Kurds. Members of the opposition abroad have been the targets of assassination attempts conducted by Iraqi security services.

Saddam's security apparatus

Saddam relies on a long list of security organisations with overlapping responsibilities. The main ones are.

- The **Special Security Organisation** oversees Saddam's security and monitors the loyalty of other security services. Its recruits are predominantly from Tikrit.
- The **Special Republican Guard** is equipped with the best available military equipment. Its members are selected on the basis of loyalty to the regime.
- The **Directorate of General Security** is primarily responsible for countering threats from the civilian population.
- The **Directorate of General Intelligence** monitors and suppresses dissident activities at home and abroad.
- The **Directorate of Military Intelligence's** role includes the investigation of military personnel.
- The **Saddam Fidayeen**, under the control of Uday Hussein, has been used to deal with civil disturbances.

Internal Repression – the Kurds and the Shias

5. Saddam has pursued a long-term programme of persecution of the Iraqi Kurds, including the use of chemical weapons. During the Iran/Iraq war, Saddam appointed his cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid, as his deputy in the north. In 1987-88, al-Majid led the "Anfal" campaign of attacks on Kurdish villages. Amnesty

International estimates that more than 100,000 Kurds were killed or disappeared during this period.

6. After the Gulf War in 1991 Kurds in the north of Iraq rose up against Baghdad's rule. In response the Iraqi regime killed or imprisoned thousands, prompting a humanitarian crisis. Over a million Kurds fled into the mountains and tried to escape Iraq.

7. Persecution of Iraq's Kurds continues, although the protection provided by the northern No-Fly Zone has helped to curb the worst excesses. But outside this zone, the Baghdad regime has continued a policy of persecution and intimidation.

8. The regime has used chemical weapons against the Kurds, most notably in an attack on the city of Halabja in 1988.

The implicit threat of the use of CW against the Kurds and others is an important part of Saddam's attempt to keep the civilian population under control

9. The regime has tried to displace the traditional Kurdish and Turkoman populations of the areas under its control, primarily in order to weaken Kurdish claims to the oil-rich area

Repression and control: some examples

- A campaign of mass arrests and killing of Shia activists led to the execution of the Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr and his sister in April 1980.
- In 1983, 80 members of another leading Shia family were arrested. Six of them, all religious leaders, were executed.
- A massive chemical weapons attack on Kurds in Halabja town in 1988, killing 5000 and injuring 10000 more.
- A large number of officers from the Jabbur tribe were executed in the early 1990s for the alleged disloyalty of a few of them.

around the northern city of Kirkuk. Kurds and other non-Arabs are forcibly ejected to the three northern Iraqi governorates – Dohuk, Arbil and Sulaimaniyah – which are under de facto Kurdish control. According to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) Special Rapporteur for Iraq, 94,000 individuals have been expelled since 1991. Agricultural land owned by Kurds has been confiscated and

redistributed to Iraqi Arabs. Arabs from southern Iraq have been offered incentives to move into the Kirkuk area.

10. After the 1979 revolution that ousted the Shah in Iran, Saddam intensified a campaign against the Shia Muslim majority of Iraq, fearing that they might be encouraged by the new Shia regime.

11. In the wake of the Gulf War, riots broke out in the southern city of Basra on 1 March 1991, spreading quickly to other cities in Shia-dominated southern Iraq. The regime responded by killing thousands. Many Shia tried to escape to Iran and Saudi Arabia.

12. Some of the Shia hostile to the regime sought refuge in the marsh land of southern Iraq. In order to subjugate the area, Saddam embarked on a large-scale programme to drain the marshes to allow Iraqi ground forces to eliminate all opposition there. The rural population of the area fled or were forced to move to southern cities.

Human rights abuses – further examples

- About 2500 prisoners were executed between 1997 and 1999 in a "prison cleansing" campaign.
- 3000 prisoners were executed at the Mahjar Prison between 1993 and 1998.
- 4000 prisoners were executed at Abu Ghraib Prison in 1984.
- Prisoners are executed by machine gun.
- In October 2000, dozens of women accused of prostitution were beheaded without any judicial process. Some were accused for political reasons.
- Women prisoners at Mahjar are routinely raped by their guards.
- Prisoners at the Qurtiyya Prison in Baghdad and elsewhere are kept in metal boxes the size of tea chests. If they do not confess they are left to die.

Internal Repression – human rights

13. Human rights abuses continue. People continue to be arrested and detained on suspicion of political or religious activities, or often because they are related to members of the opposition. Executions are carried out without due process of law. Relatives are often prevented from burying the victims in accordance with Islamic practice. Thousands of prisoners have been executed

Human Rights – mistreatment in Abu Ghraib Prison

Abdallah, a member of the Ba'ath Party whose loyalty became suspect was imprisoned for four years at Abu Ghraib in the 1980s. On the second day of his imprisonment, the men were forced to walk between two rows of five guards each to receive their containers of food. While walking to get the food, they were beaten by the guards with plastic telephone cables. They had to return to their cells the same way, so that a walk to get breakfast resulted in twenty lashes. According to Abdallah, "It wasn't that bad going to get the food, but coming back the food was spilled when we were beaten." The same procedure was used when the men went to the bathroom. On the third day, the torture continued. "We were removed from our cells and beaten with plastic pipes. This surprised us, because we were asked no question. Possibly it was being done to break our morale", Abdallah speculated. The torture escalated to sixteen sessions daily. The treatment was organized and systematic. Abdallah was held alone in a 3x2-meter room that opened onto a corridor. "We were allowed to go to the toilet three times a day, then they reduced the toilet to once a day for only one minute. I went for four years without a shower or a wash", Abdallah said. He also learned to cope with the deprivation and the hunger that accompanied his detention: "I taught myself to drink a minimum amount of water because there was no place to urinate. They used wooden sticks to beat us and sometimes the sticks would break. I found a piece of a stick, covered with blood, and managed to bring it back to my room. I ate it for three days. A person who is hungry can eat anything. Pieces of our bodies started falling off from the beatings and our skin was so dry that it began to fall off I ate pieces of my own body "No one, not Pushkin, not Mahfouz, can describe what happened to us. It is impossible to describe what living this day to day was like. I was totally naked the entire time. Half of the original groups [of about thirty men] died. It was a slow type of continuous physical and psychological torture. Sometimes, it seemed that orders came to kill one of us, and he would be beaten to death".

14. Saddam has issued a series of decrees establishing severe penalties for criminal offences. These include amputation, branding, cutting off ears, and other forms of

Human Rights - individual testimony

" .I saw a friend of mine, al-Shaikh Nasser Taresh al-Sa'idi, naked. He was handcuffed and a piece of wood was placed between his elbows and his knees. Two ends of the wood were placed on two high chairs and al-Shaikh Nasser was being suspended like a chicken. This method of torture is know as *al-Khaygania* (a reference to a former security director known as al-Khaygani) An electric wire was attached to al-Shaikh Nasser's penis and another one attached to one of his toes. He was asked if he could identify me and he said "this is al-Shaikh Yahya". They took me to another room and then after about 10 minutes they stripped me of my clothes and a security officer said "the person you saw has confessed against you". He said to me "You followers of [Ayatollah] al-Sadr have carried out acts harmful to the security of the country and have been distributing anti-government statements coming from abroad". He asked if I have any contact with an Iraqi religious scholar based in Iran who has been signing these statements. I said "I do not have any contacts with him"... I was then left suspended in the same manner as al-Shaikh al-Sa'idi. My face was looking upward They attached an electric wire on my penis and the other end of the wire is attached to an electric motor. One security man was hitting my feet with a cable. Electric shocks were applied every few minutes and were increased. I must have been suspended for more than an hour. I lost consciousness. They took me to another room and made me walk even though my feet were swollen from beating... They repeated this method a few times." (testimony to Amnesty International from an Iraqi theology student from Saddam City)

mutilation. Anyone found guilty of slandering the President has their tongue removed.

Saddam's family

15. Saddam's son Uday maintained a private torture chamber known as the Red Room in a building on the banks of the Tigris disguised as an electricity installation. He ordered the Iraq football team to be caned on the soles of the feet for losing a World Cup match. He created a militia in 1994 which has used swords to execute victims outside their own homes. He has personally executed dissidents, for instance in the Shia uprising at Basra which followed the Gulf War.

16. Members of Saddam's family are also subject to persecution. A cousin of Saddam called Ala Abd Al-Qadir Al-Majid fled to Jordan from Iraq, citing disagreements with the regime over business matters.

He returned to Iraq after the Iraqi Ambassador in Jordan declared publicly that his life was not in danger. He was met at the border by Tahir Habbush, Head of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (the Mukhabarat), and taken to a farm owned by 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid. At the farm 'Ala was tied to a tree and executed by members of his immediate family who, following orders from Saddam, took it in turns to shoot him.

17. Some 40 of Saddam's relatives, including women and children, have been killed. In February 1996, his sons-in-law Hussein Kamel and Saddam Kamel were executed. They had defected in 1995 and returned to Iraq from Jordan after the government had announced amnesties for them.

Human Rights - individual testimony

In December 1996, a Kurdish businessman from Baghdad was arrested outside his house by plainclothes security men. Initially his family did not know his whereabouts and went from one police station to another inquiring about him. Then they found out that he was being held in the headquarters of the General Security Directorate in Baghdad. The family was not allowed to visit him. Eleven months later the family was told by the authorities that he had been executed and that they should go and collect his body. His body bore evident signs of torture. His eyes were gouged out and the empty eye sockets filled with paper. His right wrist and left leg were broken. The family was not given any reason for his arrest and subsequent execution. However, they suspected that he was executed because of his friendship with a retired army general who had links with the Iraqi opposition outside the country and who was arrested just before his arrest and also executed.

Saddam's Wars

18. As well as ensuring his absolute control inside Iraq, Saddam has tried to make Iraq the dominant power of the region. In pursuit of these objectives he has led Iraq into two wars of aggression against neighbours, the Iran-Iraq war and the invasion of Kuwait.

19. With the fall of the Shah in Iran in 1979, relations between Iran and Iraq deteriorated sharply. In September 1980 Saddam renounced a border treaty he had agreed with Iran in 1975 ceding half of the Shatt al-Arab waterway to Iran. Shortly thereafter, Saddam launched a large-scale invasion of Iran. He believed that he could take advantage of the state of weakness, isolation and disorganisation he perceived in post-revolutionary Iran. He aimed to seize territory, including that ceded to Iran a few years earlier, and to assert Iraq's position as a leader of the Arab world. Saddam expected it to be a short, sharp campaign. But the conflict lasted for eight years.

20. It is estimated that the Iran/Iraq war cost the two sides a million casualties. Iraq used chemical weapons. Some twenty thousand Iranians were killed by mustard gas, and the

Opposition to Saddam during the Iran/Iraq war

During the war Saddam's security apparatus ensured any internal dissent or opposition was quickly eliminated. In 1982 he quickly purged a group within Iraq's ruling clique which suggested that the war might be brought to an end more quickly if Saddam stood down.

nerve agents tabun and sarin, all of which Iraq still possesses. Iraq also fired over 500 ballistic missiles at Iranian targets, including major cities.

21. ~~The cost of the war ran into hundreds of billions of dollars for both sides. Iraq~~ gained nothing. After the war ended, Saddam resumed his previous pursuit of primacy in the Gulf. His policies involved spending huge sums of money on new military equipment. But Iraq was burdened by debt incurred during the war and the price of oil, Iraq's only major export, was low.

22. By 1990 Iraq's financial problems were severe. Saddam looked at ways to press the oil-producing states of the Gulf to force up the price of crude oil by limiting production and waive the \$40 billion that they had loaned Iraq during its war with Iran. Kuwait had made some concessions over production ceilings. But Saddam blamed Kuwait for over production. When his threats and blandishments failed, Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. He believed that occupying Kuwait could prove profitable.

23. Saddam also sought to justify the conquest of Kuwait on other grounds. Like other Iraqi leaders before him, he claimed that, as Kuwait's rulers had come under the jurisdiction of the governors of Basra in the time of the Ottoman Empire, Kuwait should belong to Iraq.

24. During its occupation of Kuwait, Iraq denied access to the Red Cross, which has a mandate to provide protection and assistance to civilians affected by international armed conflict. The death penalty was extended to "crimes" such as looting and hoarding food.

25. In an attempt to deter military action to expel it from Kuwait, the Iraqi

Abuses by Iraqi forces in Kuwait

- Robbery and rape of Kuwaitis and expatriates.
- Summary executions.
- People dragged from their homes and held in improvised detention centres.
- Amnesty International has listed 38 methods of torture used by the Iraqi occupiers. These included beatings, breaking of limbs, extracting finger and toenails, inserting bottle necks into the rectum, and subjecting detainees to mock executions.
- Kuwaiti civilians arrested for "crimes" such as wearing beards.

regime took hostage several hundred foreign nationals (including children) in Iraq and Kuwait, and prevented thousands more from leaving. Hostages were held as human shields at a number of strategic military and civilian sites.

26. At the end of the Gulf War, the Iraqi army fleeing Kuwait set fire to over 1,160 Kuwaiti oil wells, with serious environmental consequences.

27. More than 600 Kuwaiti prisoners of war and missing persons are still unaccounted for. Iraq refuses to comply with its UN obligation to account for the missing. It has provided sufficient information to close only three case-files.

DOCUMENT: 10 Downing Street, memo from Alastair Campbell to John Scarlett

DATE: September 17, 2002

SOURCE: Released by the British Hutton Inquiry

CONTENT: This memo confirms the existence of an intervening draft OF THE Iraq dossier, which Alastair Campbell saw on September 13. Campbell worried that the text included a JIC assessment which projected that even after sanctions ended, it would take Iraq at least five years to develop a nuclear weapon. He wrote, referring to Scarlett's deputy: "The nuclear timelines issue is difficult. I felt it worked better in the last draft Julian showed me: namely 'radiological devices' in months: nuclear bomb 1-2 years with help; 5 years with no sanctions."

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Alastair Campbell
Date: 17 September 2002

JOHN SCARLETT

cc: Julian Miller
Daniel Pruce
Jonathan Powell
David Manning

Please find below a number of drafting points. As I was writing this, the Prime Minister had a read of the draft you gave me this morning, and he too made a number of points. He has also read my draft foreword, which I enclose (he will want another look at it before finally signing it off but I'd appreciate your views at this stage).

He said he thought you'd done a very good job and it was convincing (though I pointed out that he is not exactly a "don't know" on the issue).

He feels that Chapter 3 should be re-ordered, to build towards the conclusions through detail ie. start with paragraph 8 (chemical agent) through to paragraph 16, then do paragraphs 2-7, then paragraph 1. If you agree, it would need a little re-writing.

He, like me, was worried about the way you have expressed the nuclear issue particularly in paragraph 18. Can we not go back, on timings, to "radiological device" in months; nuclear bomb in 1-2 years with help; 5 years with no sanctions.

He wondered if there were any more pictures that could be used.

He thought we should make more of the "no civil nuclear" point, and list dual use products.

He felt we don't do enough on human rights, and Saddam's disregard for human life is an important point. He felt there should be more made of the points in the box on page 45

My detailed comments on the draft, which is much stronger.

CAB/11/0066

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

1. In light of the last 24 hours, I think we should make more of the point about current concealment plans. Also in the executive summary, it would be stronger if we said that despite sanctions and the policy of containment, he has made real progress, even if this echoes the Prime Minister.
2. In the summary you are clear that Saddam's sons have authority to authorise CW/BW use. In the text (Page 23) it is weaker "may have".
3. Can we say he has secured uranium from Africa.
4. Could we use the 60,000 figure in the executive summary, re aluminium.
5. Also in executive summary, can we be clear about the distances by which he is seeking to extend missile range.
6. "Vivid and horrifying", re human rights, doesn't fit with the dry text around it.
7. Re illicit earnings, how much of the 3 billion is illegally gained.
8. On page 15 can we list quantities of eg. Shells, sprays etc.
9. On page 16, bottom line, "might" reads very weakly.
10. On page 17, 2 lines from the bottom, "may" is weaker than in the summary.
11. On page 19, top line, again "could" is weak "capable of being used" is better.
12. Re FMD vaccine plant. It doesn't need the last sentence re "probable" renovation.
13. On page 24, 3rd line, you say 1991 when I think you mean 1998.
14. The nuclear timelines issue is difficult. I felt it worked better in the last draft. Julian showed me: namely "radiological devices" in months: nuclear bomb 1 - 2 years with help; 5 years with no sanctions.
15. It would be stronger if you could be more explicit about when a JIC assessment has gone to the PM, and the basis upon which it has been published.

CAB / 11 / 0067

CONFIDENTIAL

16 I've seen Ed Owen's comments, and don't agree that there are too many bullet points in the executive summary.

ALASTAIR CAMPBELL

CAB/11/0068

DOCUMENT: British Government, dossier on “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction,”

DATE: September 24, 2002

SOURCE: U.K. government publication

CONTENT: The document that Tony Blair presented to parliament on September 24 made the case, as he put it, for dealing with Iraq’s WMD—and in reality for going to war. Blair’s foreword to the dossier asserted that intelligence had “established beyond doubt” that Saddam Hussein had and was continuing to develop WMD, including weapons that could be launched within 45 minutes. The paper was declared to be based on authentic assessments from within the British intelligence community.

IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

THE ASSESSMENT OF THE BRITISH
GOVERNMENT

IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

THE ASSESSMENT OF THE BRITISH
GOVERNMENT

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FOREWORD BY THE PRIME MINISTER, THE RIGHT HONOURABLE TONY BLAIR MP

The document published today is based, in large part, on the work of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). The JIC is at the heart of the British intelligence machinery. It is chaired by the Cabinet Office and made up of the heads of the UK's three Intelligence and Security Agencies, the Chief of Defence Intelligence, and senior officials from key government departments. For over 60 years the JIC has provided regular assessments to successive Prime Ministers and senior colleagues on a wide range of foreign policy and international security issues.

Its work, like the material it analyses, is largely secret. It is unprecedented for the Government to publish this kind of document. But in light of the debate about Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), I wanted to share with the British public the reasons why I believe this issue to be a current and serious threat to the UK national interest.

In recent months, I have been increasingly alarmed by the evidence from inside Iraq that despite sanctions, despite the damage done to his capability in the past, despite the UN Security Council Resolutions expressly outlawing it, and despite his denials, Saddam Hussein is continuing to develop WMD, and with them the ability to inflict real damage upon the region, and the stability of the world.

Gathering intelligence inside Iraq is not easy. Saddam's is one of the most secretive and dictatorial regimes in the world. So I believe people will understand why the Agencies cannot be specific about the sources, which have formed the judgements in this document, and why we cannot publish everything we know. We cannot, of course, publish the detailed raw intelligence. I and other Ministers have been briefed in detail on the intelligence and are satisfied as to its authority. I also want to pay tribute to our Intelligence and Security Services for the often extraordinary work that they do.

What I believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and that he has been able to extend the range of his ballistic missile programme. I also believe that, as stated in the document, Saddam will now do his utmost to try to conceal his weapons from UN inspectors.

The picture presented to me by the JIC in recent months has become more not less worrying. It is clear that, despite sanctions, the policy of containment has not worked sufficiently well to prevent Saddam from developing these weapons.

I am in no doubt that the threat is serious and current, that he has made progress on WMD, and that he has to be stopped.

Saddam has used chemical weapons, not only against an enemy state, but against his own people. Intelligence reports make clear that he sees the building up of his WMD capability, and the belief overseas that he would use these weapons, as vital to his

strategic interests, and in particular his goal of regional domination. And the document discloses that his military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them.

I am quite clear that Saddam will go to extreme lengths, indeed has already done so, to hide these weapons and avoid giving them up.

In today's inter-dependent world, a major regional conflict does not stay confined to the region in question. Faced with someone who has shown himself capable of using WMD, I believe the international community has to stand up for itself and ensure its authority is upheld.

The threat posed to international peace and security, when WMD are in the hands of a brutal and aggressive regime like Saddam's, is real. Unless we face up to the threat, not only do we risk undermining the authority of the UN, whose resolutions he defies, but more importantly and in the longer term, we place at risk the lives and prosperity of our own people.

The case I make is that the UN Resolutions demanding he stops his WMD programme are being flouted; that since the inspectors left four years ago he has continued with this programme; that the inspectors must be allowed back in to do their job properly; and that if he refuses, or if he makes it impossible for them to do their job, as he has done in the past, the international community will have to act.

I believe that faced with the information available to me, the UK Government has been right to support the demands that this issue be confronted and dealt with. We must ensure that he does not get to use the weapons he has, or get hold of the weapons he wants.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Under Saddam Hussein Iraq developed chemical and biological weapons, acquired missiles allowing it to attack neighbouring countries with these weapons and persistently tried to develop a nuclear bomb. Saddam has used chemical weapons, both against Iran and against his own people. Following the Gulf War, Iraq had to admit to all this. And in the ceasefire of 1991 Saddam agreed unconditionally to give up his weapons of mass destruction.
2. Much information about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is already in the public domain from UN reports and from Iraqi defectors. This points clearly to Iraq's continuing possession, after 1991, of chemical and biological agents and weapons produced before the Gulf War. It shows that Iraq has refurbished sites formerly associated with the production of chemical and biological agents. And it indicates that Iraq remains able to manufacture these agents, and to use bombs, shells, artillery rockets and ballistic missiles to deliver them.
3. An independent and well-researched overview of this public evidence was provided by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on 9 September. The IISS report also suggested that Iraq could assemble nuclear weapons within months of obtaining fissile material from foreign sources.
4. As well as the public evidence, however, significant additional information is available to the Government from secret intelligence sources, described in more detail in this paper. This intelligence cannot tell us about everything. However, it provides a fuller picture of Iraqi plans and capabilities. It shows that Saddam Hussein attaches great importance to possessing weapons of mass destruction which he regards as the basis for Iraq's regional power. It shows that he does not regard them only as weapons of last resort. He is ready to use them, including against his own population, and is determined to retain them, in breach of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR).
5. Intelligence also shows that Iraq is preparing plans to conceal evidence of these weapons, including incriminating documents, from renewed inspections. And it confirms that despite sanctions and the policy of containment, Saddam has continued to make progress with his illicit weapons programmes.
6. As a result of the intelligence we judge that Iraq has:
 - continued to produce chemical and biological agents;
 - military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, including against its own Shia population. Some of these weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them;
 - command and control arrangements in place to use chemical and biological weapons. Authority ultimately resides with Saddam Hussein. (There is intelligence that he may have delegated this authority to his son Qusai);

- developed mobile laboratories for military use, corroborating earlier reports about the mobile production of biological warfare agents;
 - pursued illegal programmes to procure controlled materials of potential use in the production of chemical and biological weapons programmes;
-

- tried covertly to acquire technology and materials which could be used in the production of nuclear weapons;
 - sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa, despite having no active civil nuclear power programme that could require it;
 - recalled specialists to work on its nuclear programme;
-

- illegally retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles, with a range of 650km, capable of carrying chemical or biological warheads;
 - started deploying its al-Samoud liquid propellant missile, and has used the absence of weapons inspectors to work on extending its range to at least 200km, which is beyond the limit of 150km imposed by the United Nations;
 - started producing the solid-propellant Ababil-100, and is making efforts to extend its range to at least 200km, which is beyond the limit of 150km imposed by the United Nations;
 - constructed a new engine test stand for the development of missiles capable of reaching the UK Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus and NATO members (Greece and Turkey), as well as all Iraq's Gulf neighbours and Israel;
 - pursued illegal programmes to procure materials for use in its illegal development of long range missiles;
-

- learnt lessons from previous UN weapons inspections and has already begun to conceal sensitive equipment and documentation in advance of the return of inspectors.

7. These judgements reflect the views of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). More details on the judgements and on the development of the JIC's assessments since 1998 are set out in Part 1 of this paper.

8. Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are in breach of international law. Under a series of UN Security Council Resolutions Iraq is obliged to destroy its holdings of these weapons under the supervision of UN inspectors. Part 2 of the paper sets out the key UN Security Council Resolutions. It also summarises the history of the UN inspection regime and Iraq's history of deception, intimidation and concealment in its dealings with the UN inspectors.

9. But the threat from Iraq does not depend solely on the capabilities we have described. It arises also because of the violent and aggressive nature of Saddam Hussein's regime. His record of internal repression and external aggression gives rise to unique concerns about the threat he poses. The paper briefly outlines in Part 3 Saddam's rise to power, the nature of his regime and his history of regional aggression. Saddam's human rights abuses are also catalogued, including his record of torture, mass arrests and summary executions.
10. The paper briefly sets out how Iraq is able to finance its weapons programme. Drawing on illicit earnings generated outside UN control, Iraq generated illegal income of some \$3 billion in 2001.

PART 1

IRAQ'S CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMMES

CHAPTER 1: THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

1. Since UN inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq in 1998, there has been little overt information on Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. Much of the publicly available information about Iraqi capabilities and intentions is dated. But we also have available a range of secret intelligence about these programmes and Saddam Hussein's intentions. This comes principally from the United Kingdom's intelligence and analysis agencies – the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the Security Service, and the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS). We also have access to intelligence from close allies.
2. Intelligence rarely offers a complete account of activities which are designed to remain concealed. The nature of Saddam's regime makes Iraq a difficult target for the intelligence services. Intelligence, however, has provided important insights into Iraqi programmes and Iraqi military thinking. Taken together with what is already known from other sources, this intelligence builds our understanding of Iraq's capabilities and adds significantly to the analysis already in the public domain. But intelligence sources need to be protected, and this limits the detail that can be made available.
3. Iraq's capabilities have been regularly reviewed by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which has provided advice to the Prime Minister and his senior colleagues on the developing assessment, drawing on all available sources. Part 1 of this paper includes some of the most significant views reached by the JIC between 1999 and 2002.

Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)

The JIC is a Cabinet Committee with a history dating back to 1936. The JIC brings together the Heads of the three Intelligence and Security Agencies (Secret Intelligence Service, Government Communications Headquarters and the Security Service), the Chief of Defence Intelligence, senior policy makers from the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Home Office, the Treasury and the Department of Trade and Industry and representatives from other Government Departments and Agencies as appropriate. The JIC provides regular intelligence assessments to the Prime Minister, other Ministers and senior officials on a wide range of foreign policy and international security issues. It meets each week in the Cabinet Office.

CHAPTER 2

IRAQ'S PROGRAMMES: 1971–1998

1. Iraq has been involved in chemical and biological warfare research for over 30 years. Its **chemical warfare** research started in 1971 at a small, well guarded site at Rashad to the north east of Baghdad. Research was conducted there on a number of chemical agents including mustard gas, CS and tabun. Later, in 1974 a dedicated organisation called al-Hasan Ibn al-Haitham was established. In the late 1970s plans were made to build a large research and commercial-scale

Effects of Chemical Weapons

Mustard is a liquid agent, which gives off a hazardous vapour, causing burns and blisters to exposed skin. When inhaled, mustard damages the respiratory tract; when ingested, it causes vomiting and diarrhoea. It attacks and damages the eyes, mucous membranes, lungs, skin, and blood-forming organs.

Tabun, sarin and VX are all nerve agents of which VX is the most toxic. They all damage the nervous system, producing muscular spasms and paralysis. As little as 10 milligrammes of VX on the skin can cause rapid death.

production facility in the desert some 70km north west of Baghdad under the cover of Project 922. This was to become Muthanna State Establishment, also known as al-Muthanna, and operated under the front name of Iraq's State Establishment for Pesticide Production. It became operational in 1982-83. It had five research and development sections, each tasked to pursue different programmes. In addition, the al-Muthanna site was the main chemical agent production facility, and it also took the lead in weaponising chemical and biological agents including all aspects of weapon development and testing, in association with the military. According to information, subsequently supplied by the Iraqis, the total production capacity in 1991 was 4,000 tonnes of agent per annum, but we assess it could have been higher. Al-Muthanna was supported by three separate storage and precursor production facilities known as Fallujah 1, 2 and 3 near Habbaniyah, north west of Baghdad, parts of which were not completed before they were heavily bombed in the 1991 Gulf War.

2. Iraq started **biological warfare** research in the mid-1970s. After small-scale research, a purpose-built research and development facility was authorised at al-Salman, also known as Salman Pak. This is surrounded on three sides by the Tigris river and situated some 35km south of Baghdad. Although some progress was made in biological weapons research at this early stage, Iraq decided to concentrate on developing chemical agents and their delivery systems at al-Muthanna. With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, in the early 1980s, the biological weapons programme was revived. The appointment of Dr Rihab Taha in 1985, to head a small biological weapons research team at al-Muthanna,

The effects of biological agents

Anthrax is a disease caused by the bacterium *Bacillus Anthracis*. Inhalation anthrax is the manifestation of the disease likely to be expected in biological warfare. The symptoms may vary, but can include fever and internal bleeding. The incubation period for anthrax is 1 to 7 days, with most cases occurring within 2 days of exposure.

Botulinum toxin is one of the most toxic substances known to man. The first symptoms of poisoning may appear as early as 1 hour post exposure or as late as 8 days after exposure, with the incubation period between 12 and 22 hours. Paralysis leads to death by suffocation.

Aflatoxins are fungal toxins, which are potent carcinogens. Most symptoms take a long time to show. Food products contaminated by aflatoxins can cause liver inflammation and cancer. They can also affect pregnant women, leading to stillborn babies and children born with mutations.

Ricin is derived from the castor bean and can cause multiple organ failure leading to death within one or two days of inhalation.

helped to develop the programme. At about the same time plans were made to develop the Salman Pak site into a secure biological warfare research facility. Dr Taha continued to work with her team at al-Muthanna until 1987 when it moved to Salman Pak, which was under the control of the Directorate of General Intelligence. Significant resources were provided for the programme, including the construction of a dedicated production facility (Project 324) at al-Hakam. Agent production began in 1988 and weaponisation testing and later filling of munitions was conducted in association with the staff at Muthanna State Establishment. From mid-1990, other civilian facilities were taken over and some adapted for use in the production and research and development of biological agents. These included:

- al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Vaccine Institute which produced botulinum toxin and conducted virus research. There is some intelligence to suggest that work was also conducted on anthrax;
 - al-Fudaliyah Agriculture and Water Research Centre where Iraq admitted it undertook aflatoxin production and genetic engineering;
 - Amariyah Sera and Vaccine Institute which was used for the storage of biological agent seed stocks and was involved in genetic engineering.
3. By the time of the Gulf War Iraq was producing very large quantities of chemical and biological agents. From a series of Iraqi declarations to the UN during the 1990s we know that by 1991 they had produced at least:
- 19,000 litres of botulinum toxin, 8,500 litres of anthrax, 2,200 litres of aflatoxin and were working on a number of other agents;

- 2,850 tonnes of mustard gas, 210 tonnes of tabun, 795 tonnes of sarin and cyclosarin, and 3.9 tonnes of VX.
4. Iraq's **nuclear programme** was established under the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission in the 1950s. Under a nuclear co-operation agreement signed with the Soviet Union in 1959, a nuclear research centre, equipped with a research reactor, was built at Tuwaitha, the main Iraqi nuclear research centre. The research reactor worked up to 1991. The surge in Iraqi oil revenues in the early 1970s supported an expansion of the research programme. This was bolstered in the mid-1970s by the acquisition of two research reactors powered by highly enriched uranium fuel and equipment for fuel fabrication and handling. By the end of 1984 Iraq was self-sufficient in uranium ore. One of the reactors was destroyed in an Israeli air attack in June 1981 shortly before it was to become operational; the other was never completed.
 5. By the mid-1980s the deterioration of Iraq's position in the war with Iran prompted renewed interest in the military use of nuclear technology. Additional resources were put into developing technologies to enrich uranium as fissile material (material that makes up the core of a nuclear weapon) for use in nuclear weapons. Enriched uranium was preferred because it could be more easily produced covertly than the alternative, plutonium. Iraq followed parallel programmes to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU), electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) and gas centrifuge enrichment. By 1991 one EMIS enrichment facility was nearing completion and another was under construction. However, Iraq never succeeded in its EMIS technology and the programme had been dropped by 1991. Iraq decided to concentrate on gas centrifuges as the means for producing the necessary fissile material. Centrifuge facilities were also under construction, but the centrifuge design was still being developed. In August 1990 Iraq instigated a crash programme to develop a single nuclear weapon within a year. This programme envisaged the rapid development of a small 50 machine gas centrifuge cascade to produce weapons-grade HEU using fuel from the Soviet research reactor, which was already substantially enriched, and unused fuel from the reactor bombed by the Israelis. By the time of the Gulf War, the crash programme had made little progress.
 6. Iraq's declared aim was to produce a missile warhead with a 20-kiloton yield and weapons designs were produced for the simplest implosion weapons. These were similar to the device used at Nagasaki in 1945. Iraq was also working on more

Effect of a 20-kiloton nuclear detonation

A detonation of a 20-kiloton nuclear warhead over a city might flatten an area of approximately 3 square miles. Within 1.6 miles of detonation, blast damage and radiation would cause 80% casualties, three-quarters of which would be fatal. Between 1.6 and 3.1 miles from the detonation, there would still be 10% casualties.

advanced concepts. By 1991 the programme was supported by a large body of Iraqi nuclear expertise, programme documentation and databases and manufacturing infrastructure. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iraq had:

- experimented with high explosives to produce implosive shock waves;
- invested significant effort to understand the various options for neutron initiators;
- made significant progress in developing capabilities for the production, casting and machining of uranium metal.

SCUD missiles

The short-range mobile SCUD ballistic missile was developed by the Soviet Union in the 1950s, drawing on the technology of the German V-2 developed in World War II.

For many years it was the mainstay of Soviet and Warsaw Pact tactical missile forces and it was also widely exported. Recipients of Soviet-manufactured SCUDs included Iraq, North Korea, Iran, and Libya, although not all were sold directly by the Soviet Union.

7. Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had a well-developed **ballistic missile** industry. Many of the missiles fired in the Gulf War were an Iraqi modified version of the SCUD missile, the al-Hussein, with an extended range of 650km. Iraq had about 250 imported SCUD-type missiles prior to the Gulf War plus an unknown number of indigenously produced engines and components. Iraq was working on other stretched SCUD variants, such as the al-Abbas, which had a range of 900km. Iraq was also seeking to reverse-engineer the SCUD engine with a view to producing new missiles. Recent intelligence indicates that they may have succeeded at that time. In particular, Iraq had plans for a new SCUD-derived missile with a range of 1200km. Iraq also conducted a partial flight test of a multi-stage satellite launch vehicle based on SCUD technology, known as the al-Abid. Also during this period, Iraq was developing the Badr-2000, a 700-1000km range two-stage solid propellant missile (based on the Iraqi part of the 1980s CONDOR-2 programme run in co-operation with Argentina and Egypt). There were plans for 1200–1500km range solid propellant follow-on systems.

The use of chemical and biological weapons

8. Iraq had made frequent use of a variety of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. Many of the casualties are still in Iranian hospitals suffering from the long-term effects of numerous types of cancer and lung diseases. In 1988 Saddam also used mustard and nerve agents against Iraqi Kurds at Halabja in northern Iraq (see box on p15). Estimates vary, but according to Human Rights Watch up to 5,000 people were killed.

9. Iraq used significant quantities of mustard, tabun and sarin during the war with Iran resulting in over 20,000 Iranian casualties. A month after the attack on Halabja, Iraqi troops used over 100 tonnes of sarin against Iranian troops on the al-Fao peninsula. Over the next three months Iraqi troops used sarin and other nerve agents on Iranian troops causing extensive casualties.

The Attack on Halabja

On Friday 17th March 1988 the village of Halabja was bombarded by Iraqi warplanes. The raid was over in minutes. Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against his own people. A Kurd described the effects of a chemical attack on another village:

“My brothers and my wife had blood and vomit running from their noses and their mouths. Their heads were tilted to one side. They were groaning. I couldn’t do much, just clean up the blood and vomit from their mouths and try in every way to make them breathe again. I did artificial respiration on them and then I gave them two injections each. I also rubbed creams on my wife and two brothers.”

(From “Crimes Against Humanity” Iraqi National Congress.)



Among the corpses at Halabja, children were found dead where they had been playing outside their homes. In places, streets were piled with corpses.

10. From Iraqi declarations to the UN after the Gulf War we know that by 1991 Iraq had produced a variety of delivery means for chemical and biological agents including over 16,000 free-fall bombs and over 110,000 artillery rockets and shells. Iraq also admitted to the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) that it had 50 chemical and 25 biological warheads available for its ballistic missiles.

The use of ballistic missiles

11. Iraq fired over 500 SCUD-type missiles at Iran during the Iran-Iraq War at both civilian and military targets, and 93 SCUD-type missiles during the Gulf War. The latter were targeted at Israel and Coalition forces stationed in the Gulf region.
12. At the end of the Gulf War the international community was determined that Iraq's arsenal of chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles should be dismantled. The method chosen to achieve this was the establishment of UNSCOM to carry out intrusive inspections within Iraq and to eliminate its chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles with a range of over 150km. The IAEA was charged with the abolition of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. Between 1991 and 1998 UNSCOM succeeded in identifying and destroying very large quantities of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles as well as associated production facilities. The IAEA also destroyed the infrastructure for Iraq's nuclear weapons programme and removed key nuclear materials. This was achieved despite a continuous and sophisticated programme of harassment, obstruction, deception and denial (see Part 2). Because of this UNSCOM concluded by 1998 that it was unable to fulfil its mandate. The inspectors were withdrawn in December 1998.
13. Based on the UNSCOM report to the UN Security Council in January 1999 and earlier UNSCOM reports, we assess that when the UN inspectors left Iraq they were unable to account for:
 - up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent, including 1.5 tonnes of VX nerve agent;
 - up to 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals, including approximately 300 tonnes which, in the Iraqi chemical warfare programme, were unique to the production of VX;
 - growth media procured for biological agent production (enough to produce over three times the 8,500 litres of anthrax spores Iraq admits to having manufactured);
 - over 30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological agents.
14. The departure of UNSCOM meant that the international community was unable to establish the truth behind these large discrepancies and greatly diminished its ability to monitor and assess Iraq's continuing attempts to reconstitute its programmes.

CHAPTER 3

THE CURRENT POSITION: 1998–2002

1. This chapter sets out what we know of Saddam Hussein's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, drawing on all the available evidence. While it takes account of the results from UN inspections and other publicly available information, it also draws heavily on the latest intelligence about Iraqi efforts to develop their programmes and capabilities since 1998. The **main conclusions** are that:
 - Iraq has a useable chemical and biological weapons capability, in breach of UNSCR 687, which has included recent production of chemical and biological agents;
 - Saddam continues to attach great importance to the possession of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles which he regards as being the basis for Iraq's regional power. He is determined to retain these capabilities;
 - Iraq can deliver chemical and biological agents using an extensive range of artillery shells, free-fall bombs, sprayers and ballistic missiles;
 - Iraq continues to work on developing nuclear weapons, in breach of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in breach of UNSCR 687. Uranium has been sought from Africa that has no civil nuclear application in Iraq;
 - Iraq possesses extended-range versions of the SCUD ballistic missile in breach of UNSCR 687 which are capable of reaching Cyprus, Eastern Turkey, Tehran and Israel. It is also developing longer-range ballistic missiles;
 - Iraq's current military planning specifically envisages the use of chemical and biological weapons;
 - Iraq's military forces are able to use chemical and biological weapons, with command, control and logistical arrangements in place. The Iraqi military are able to deploy these weapons within 45 minutes of a decision to do so;
 - Iraq has learnt lessons from previous UN weapons inspections and is already taking steps to conceal and disperse sensitive equipment and documentation in advance of the return of inspectors;
 - Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missiles programmes are well-funded.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Assessment: 1999–2002

2. Since the withdrawal of the inspectors the JIC has monitored evidence, including from secret intelligence, of continuing work on Iraqi offensive chemical and biological warfare capabilities. In the first half of 2000 the JIC noted

intelligence on Iraqi attempts to procure dual-use chemicals and on the reconstruction of civil chemical production at sites formerly associated with the chemical warfare programme. Iraq had also been trying to procure dual-use materials and equipment which could be used for a biological warfare programme. Personnel known to have been connected to the biological warfare programme up to the Gulf War had been conducting research into pathogens. There was intelligence that Iraq was starting to produce biological warfare agents in mobile production facilities. Planning for the project had begun in 1995 under Dr Rihab Taha, known to have been a central player in the pre-Gulf War programme. The JIC concluded that Iraq had sufficient expertise, equipment and material to produce biological warfare agents within weeks using its legitimate bio-technology facilities.

3. In mid-2001 the JIC assessed that Iraq retained some chemical warfare agents, precursors, production equipment and weapons from before the Gulf War. These stocks would enable Iraq to produce significant quantities of mustard gas within weeks and of nerve agent within months. The JIC concluded that intelligence on Iraqi former chemical and biological warfare facilities, their limited reconstruction and civil production pointed to a continuing research and development programme. These chemical and biological capabilities represented the most immediate threat from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Since 1998 Iraqi development of mass destruction weaponry had been helped by the absence of inspectors and the increase in illegal border trade, which was providing hard currency.
4. In the last six months the JIC has confirmed its earlier judgements on Iraqi chemical and biological warfare capabilities and assessed that Iraq has the means to deliver chemical and biological weapons.

Recent intelligence

5. Subsequently, intelligence has become available from reliable sources which complements and adds to previous intelligence and confirms the JIC assessment that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons. The intelligence also shows that the Iraqi leadership has been discussing a number of issues related to these weapons. This intelligence covers:
 - **Confirmation that chemical and biological weapons play an important role in Iraqi military thinking:** intelligence shows that Saddam attaches great importance to the possession of chemical and biological weapons which he regards as being the basis for Iraqi regional power. He believes that respect for Iraq rests on its possession of these weapons and the missiles capable of delivering them. Intelligence indicates that Saddam is determined to retain this capability and recognises that Iraqi political weight would be diminished if Iraq's military power rested solely on its conventional military forces.
 - **Iraqi attempts to retain its existing banned weapons systems:** Iraq is already taking steps to prevent UN weapons inspectors finding evidence of

its chemical and biological weapons programme. Intelligence indicates that Saddam has learnt lessons from previous weapons inspections, has identified possible weak points in the inspections process and knows how to exploit them. Sensitive equipment and papers can easily be concealed and in some cases this is already happening. The possession of mobile biological agent production facilities will also aid concealment efforts. Saddam is determined not to lose the capabilities that he has been able to develop further in the four years since inspectors left.

- **Saddam's willingness to use chemical and biological weapons:** intelligence indicates that as part of Iraq's military planning Saddam is willing to use chemical and biological weapons, including against his own Shia population. Intelligence indicates that the Iraqi military are able to deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so.

Chemical and biological agents: surviving stocks

6. When confronted with questions about the unaccounted stocks, Iraq has claimed repeatedly that if it had retained any chemical agents from before the Gulf War they would have deteriorated sufficiently to render them harmless. But Iraq has admitted to UNSCOM to having the knowledge and capability to add stabiliser to nerve agent and other chemical warfare agents which would prevent such decomposition. In 1997 UNSCOM also examined some munitions which had been filled with mustard gas prior to 1991 and found that they remained very toxic and showed little sign of deterioration.
7. Iraq has claimed that all its biological agents and weapons have been destroyed. No convincing proof of any kind has been produced to support this claim. In particular, Iraq could not explain large discrepancies between the amount of growth media (nutrients required for the specialised growth of agent) it procured before 1991 and the amounts of agent it admits to having manufactured. The discrepancy is enough to produce more than three times the amount of anthrax allegedly manufactured.

Chemical agent: production capabilities

8. Intelligence shows that Iraq has continued to produce chemical agent. During the Gulf War a number of facilities which intelligence reporting indicated were directly or indirectly associated with Iraq's chemical weapons effort were attacked and damaged. Following the ceasefire UNSCOM destroyed or rendered harmless facilities and equipment used in Iraq's chemical weapons programme. Other equipment was released for civilian use either in industry or academic institutes, where it was tagged and regularly inspected and monitored, or else placed under camera monitoring, to ensure that it was not being misused. This monitoring ceased when UNSCOM withdrew from Iraq in 1998. However, capabilities remain and, although the main chemical weapon production facility at al-Muthanna was completely destroyed by UNSCOM and has not been

rebuilt, other plants formerly associated with the chemical warfare programme have been rebuilt. These include the chlorine and phenol plant at Fallujah 2 near Habbaniyah. In addition to their civilian uses, chlorine and phenol are used for precursor chemicals which contribute to the production of chemical agents.

9. Other dual-use facilities, which are capable of being used to support the production of chemical agent and precursors, have been rebuilt and re-equipped. New chemical facilities have been built, some with illegal foreign assistance, and are probably fully operational or ready for production. These include the Ibn Sina Company at Tarmiyah (see figure 1), which is a chemical research centre. It undertakes research, development and production of chemicals previously imported but not now available and which are needed for Iraq's civil industry. The Director General of the research centre is Hikmat Na'im al-Jalu who prior to the Gulf War worked in Iraq's nuclear weapons programme and after the war was responsible for preserving Iraq's chemical expertise.



FIGURE 1: THE IBN SINA COMPANY AT TARMİYAH

10. Parts of the al-Qa'qa' chemical complex damaged in the Gulf War have also been repaired and are operational. Of particular concern are elements of the phosgene production plant at al-Qa'qa'. These were severely damaged during the Gulf War, and dismantled under UNSCOM supervision, but have since been rebuilt. While phosgene does have industrial uses it can also be used by itself as a chemical agent or as a precursor for nerve agent.
11. Iraq has retained the expertise for chemical warfare research, agent production and weaponisation. Most of the personnel previously involved in the programme remain in country. While UNSCOM found a number of technical manuals (so called "cook books") for the production of chemical agents and critical precursors, Iraq's claim to have unilaterally destroyed the bulk of the documentation cannot be confirmed and is almost certainly untrue. Recent intelligence indicates that Iraq is still discussing methods of concealing such documentation in order to ensure that it is not discovered by any future UN inspections.

The Problem of Dual-Use Facilities

Almost all components and supplies used in weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes are dual-use. For example, any major petrochemical or biotech industry, as well as public health organisations, will have legitimate need for most materials and equipment required to manufacture chemical and biological weapons. Without UN weapons inspectors it is very difficult therefore to be sure about the true nature of many of Iraq's facilities.

For example, Iraq has built a large new chemical complex, Project Baiji, in the desert in north west Iraq at al-Sharqat (see figure 2). This site is a former uranium enrichment facility which was damaged during the Gulf War and rendered harmless under supervision of the IAEA. Part of the site has been rebuilt, with work starting in 1992, as a chemical production complex. Despite the site being far away from populated areas it is surrounded by a high wall with watch towers and guarded by armed guards. Intelligence reports indicate that it will produce nitric acid which can be used in explosives, missile fuel and in the purification of uranium.



FIGURE 2: AL-SHARQAT CHEMICAL PRODUCTION FACILITY

Biological agent: production capabilities

12. We know from intelligence that Iraq has continued to produce biological warfare agents. As with some chemical equipment, UNSCOM only destroyed equipment that could be directly linked to biological weapons production. Iraq also has its own engineering capability to design and construct biological agent associated fermenters, centrifuges, sprayer dryers and other equipment and is judged to be self-sufficient in the technology required to produce biological weapons. The

experienced personnel who were active in the programme have largely remained in the country. Some dual-use equipment has also been purchased, but without monitoring by UN inspectors Iraq could have diverted it to their biological weapons programme. This newly purchased equipment and other equipment previously subject to monitoring could be used in a resurgent biological warfare programme. Facilities of concern include:

- the Castor Oil Production Plant at Fallujah: this was damaged in UK/US air attacks in 1998 (Operation Desert Fox) but has been rebuilt. The residue from the castor bean pulp can be used in the production of the biological agent ricin;
 - the al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Institute: which was involved in biological agent production and research before the Gulf War;
 - the Amariyah Sera and Vaccine Plant at Abu Ghraib: UNSCOM established that this facility was used to store biological agents, seed stocks and conduct biological warfare associated genetic research prior to the Gulf War. It has now expanded its storage capacity.
13. UNSCOM established that Iraq considered the use of mobile biological agent production facilities. In the past two years evidence from defectors has indicated the existence of such facilities. Recent intelligence confirms that the Iraqi military have developed mobile facilities. These would help Iraq conceal and protect biological agent production from military attack or UN inspection.

Chemical and biological agents: delivery means

14. Iraq has a variety of delivery means available for both chemical and biological agents. These include:
- free-fall bombs: Iraq acknowledged to UNSCOM the deployment to two sites of free-fall bombs filled with biological agent during 1990–91. These bombs were filled with anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin. Iraq also acknowledged possession of four types of aerial bomb with various chemical agent fills including sulphur mustard, tabun, sarin and cyclosarin;
 - artillery shells and rockets: Iraq made extensive use of artillery munitions filled with chemical agents during the Iran-Iraq War. Mortars can also be used for chemical agent delivery. Iraq is known to have tested the use of shells and rockets filled with biological agents. Over 20,000 artillery munitions remain unaccounted for by UNSCOM;
 - helicopter and aircraft borne sprayers: Iraq carried out studies into aerosol dissemination of biological agent using these platforms prior to 1991. UNSCOM was unable to account for many of these devices. It is probable that Iraq retains a capability for aerosol dispersal of both chemical and biological agent over a large area;
 - al-Hussein ballistic missiles (range 650km): Iraq told UNSCOM that it filled 25 warheads with anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin. Iraq also

developed chemical agent warheads for al-Hussein. Iraq admitted to producing 50 chemical warheads for al-Hussein which were intended for the delivery of a mixture of sarin and cyclosarin. However, technical analysis of warhead remnants has shown traces of VX degradation product which indicate that some additional warheads were made and filled with VX;

- al-Samoud/Ababil-100 ballistic missiles (range 150km plus): it is unclear if chemical and biological warheads have been developed for these systems, but given the Iraqi experience on other missile systems, we judge that Iraq has the technical expertise for doing so;
- L-29 remotely piloted vehicle programme (see figure 3): we know from intelligence that Iraq has attempted to modify the L-29 jet trainer to allow it to be used as an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) which is potentially capable of delivering chemical and biological agents over a large area.



FIGURE 3: THE L-29 JET TRAINER

Chemical and biological warfare: command and control

15. The authority to use chemical and biological weapons ultimately resides with Saddam but intelligence indicates that he may have also delegated this authority to his son Qusai. Special Security Organisation (SSO) and Special Republican Guard (SRG) units would be involved in the movement of any chemical and biological weapons to military units. The Iraqi military holds artillery and missile systems at Corps level throughout the Armed Forces and conducts regular training with them. The Directorate of Rocket Forces has operational control of strategic missile systems and some Multiple Launcher Rocket Systems.

Chemical and biological weapons: summary

16. Intelligence shows that Iraq has covert chemical and biological weapons programmes, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687 and has continued to produce chemical and biological agents. Iraq has:
 - chemical and biological agents and weapons available, both from pre-Gulf War stocks and more recent production;
 - the capability to produce the chemical agents mustard gas, tabun, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX capable of producing mass casualties;

- a biological agent production capability and can produce at least anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. Iraq has also developed mobile facilities to produce biological agents;
- a variety of delivery means available;
- military forces, which maintain the capability to use these weapons with command, control and logistical arrangements in place.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Assessments: 1999–2001

17. Since 1999 the JIC has monitored Iraq's attempts to reconstitute its nuclear weapons programme. In mid-2001 the JIC assessed that Iraq had continued its nuclear research after 1998. The JIC drew attention to intelligence that Iraq had recalled its nuclear scientists to the programme in 1998. Since 1998 Iraq had been trying to procure items that could be for use in the construction of centrifuges for the enrichment of uranium.

Iraqi nuclear weapons expertise

18. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Chapter 2 describe the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme prior to the Gulf War. It is clear from IAEA inspections and Iraq's own declarations that by 1991 considerable progress had been made in both developing methods to produce fissile material and in weapons design. The IAEA dismantled the physical infrastructure of the Iraqi nuclear weapons

Elements of a nuclear weapons programme: nuclear fission weapon

A typical nuclear fission weapon consists of:

- fissile material for the core which gives out huge amounts of explosive energy from nuclear reactions when made "super critical" through extreme compression. Fissile material is usually either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or weapons-grade plutonium:
 - HEU can be made in gas centrifuges (see separate box on p25);
 - plutonium is made by reprocessing fuel from a nuclear reactor;
- explosives which are needed to compress the nuclear core. These explosives also require a complex arrangement of detonators, explosive charges to produce an even and rapid compression of the core;
- sophisticated electronics to fire the explosives;
- a neutron initiator to provide initial burst of neutrons to start the nuclear reactions.

Weaponisation

Weaponisation is the conversion of these concepts into a reliable weapon. It includes:

- developing a weapon design through sophisticated science and complex calculations;
- engineering design to integrate with the delivery system;
- specialised equipment to cast and machine safely the nuclear core;
- dedicated facilities to assemble the warheads;
- facilities to rigorously test all individual components and designs;

The complexity is much greater for a weapon that can fit into a missile warhead than for a larger Nagasaki-type bomb.

programme, including the dedicated facilities and equipment for uranium separation and enrichment, and for weapon development and production, and removed the remaining highly enriched uranium. But Iraq retained, and retains, many of its experienced nuclear scientists and technicians who are specialised in the production of fissile material and weapons design. Intelligence indicates that Iraq also retains the accompanying programme documentation and data.

19. Intelligence shows that the present Iraqi programme is almost certainly seeking an indigenous ability to enrich uranium to the level needed for a nuclear weapon. It indicates that the approach is based on gas centrifuge uranium enrichment, one of the routes Iraq was following for producing fissile material before the Gulf War. But Iraq needs certain key equipment, including gas centrifuge components and components for the production of fissile material before a nuclear bomb could be developed.

Gas centrifuge uranium enrichment

Uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride is separated into its different isotopes in rapidly spinning rotor tubes of special centrifuges. Many hundreds or thousands of centrifuges are connected in cascades to enrich uranium. If the lighter U235 isotope is enriched to more than 90% it can be used in the core of a nuclear weapon.

20. Following the departure of weapons inspectors in 1998 there has been an accumulation of intelligence indicating that Iraq is making concerted covert efforts to acquire dual-use technology and materials with nuclear applications. Iraq's known holdings of processed uranium are under IAEA supervision. But there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Iraq has no active civil nuclear power programme or nuclear power plants and therefore has no legitimate reason to acquire uranium.

Iraq's civil nuclear programme

- Iraq's long-standing civil nuclear power programme is limited to small scale research. Activities that could be used for military purposes are prohibited by UNSCR 687 and 715.
- Iraq has no nuclear power plants and therefore no requirement for uranium as fuel.
- Iraq has a number of nuclear research programmes in the fields of agriculture, biology, chemistry, materials and pharmaceuticals. None of these activities requires more than tiny amounts of uranium which Iraq could supply from its own resources.
- Iraq's research reactors are non-operational; two were bombed and one was never completed.

21. Intelligence shows that other important procurement activity since 1998 has included attempts to purchase:
 - vacuum pumps which could be used to create and maintain pressures in a gas centrifuge cascade needed to enrich uranium;
 - an entire magnet production line of the correct specification for use in the motors and top bearings of gas centrifuges. It appears that Iraq is attempting to acquire a capability to produce them on its own rather than rely on foreign procurement;
 - Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride (AHF) and fluorine gas. AHF is commonly used in the petrochemical industry and Iraq frequently imports significant amounts, but it is also used in the process of converting uranium into uranium hexafluoride for use in gas centrifuge cascades;
 - one large filament winding machine which could be used to manufacture carbon fibre gas centrifuge rotors;
 - a large balancing machine which could be used in initial centrifuge balancing work.
22. Iraq has also made repeated attempts covertly to acquire a very large quantity (60,000 or more) of specialised aluminium tubes. The specialised aluminium in question is subject to international export controls because of its potential application in the construction of gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium, although there is no definitive intelligence that it is destined for a nuclear programme.

Nuclear weapons: timelines

23. In early 2002, the JIC assessed that UN sanctions on Iraq were hindering the import of crucial goods for the production of fissile material. The JIC judged

that while sanctions remain effective Iraq would not be able to produce a nuclear weapon. If they were removed or prove ineffective, it would take Iraq at least five years to produce sufficient fissile material for a weapon indigenously. However, we know that Iraq retains expertise and design data relating to nuclear weapons. We therefore judge that if Iraq obtained fissile material and other essential components from foreign sources the timeline for production of a nuclear weapon would be shortened and Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon in between one and two years.

BALLISTIC MISSILES

Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Assessment: 1999–2002

24. In mid-2001 the JIC drew attention to what it described as a “step-change” in progress on the Iraqi missile programme over the previous two years. It was clear from intelligence that the range of Iraqi missiles which was permitted by the UN and supposedly limited to 150kms was being extended and that work was under way on larger engines for longer-range missiles.
25. In early 2002 the JIC concluded that Iraq had begun to develop missiles with a range of over 1,000kms. The JIC assessed that if sanctions remained effective the Iraqis would not be able to produce such a missile before 2007. Sanctions and the earlier work of the inspectors had caused significant problems for Iraqi missile development. In the previous six months Iraqi foreign procurement efforts for the missile programme had been bolder. The JIC also assessed that Iraq retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles from before the Gulf War.

The Iraqi ballistic missile programme since 1998

26. Since the Gulf War, Iraq has been openly developing two short-range missiles up to a range of 150km, which are permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 687. The al-Samoud liquid propellant missile has been extensively tested and is being deployed to military units. Intelligence indicates that at least 50 have



FIGURE 4: ABABIL-100

been produced. Intelligence also indicates that Iraq has worked on extending its range to at least 200km in breach of UN Security Resolution 687. Production of the solid propellant Ababil-100 (Figure 4) is also underway, probably as an unguided rocket at this stage. There are also plans to extend its range to at least 200km. Compared to liquid propellant missiles, those powered by solid

propellant offer greater ease of storage, handling and mobility. They are also quicker to take into and out of action and can stay at a high state of readiness for longer periods.

27. According to intelligence, Iraq has retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles (Figure 5), in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687. These missiles were either hidden from the UN as complete systems, or re-assembled using illegally retained engines and other components. We judge that the engineering expertise available would allow these missiles to be maintained effectively, although the fact that at least some require re-assembly makes it difficult to judge exactly how many could be available for use. They could be used with conventional, chemical or biological warheads and, with a range of up to 650km, are capable of reaching a number of countries in the region including Cyprus, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel.




FIGURE 5: AL-HUSSEIN

28. Intelligence has confirmed that Iraq wants to extend the range of its missile systems to over 1000km, enabling it to threaten other regional neighbours. This work began in 1998, although efforts to regenerate the long-range ballistic missile programme probably began in 1995. Iraq's missile programmes employ hundreds of people. Satellite imagery (Figure 6) has shown a new engine test stand being constructed (A), which is larger than the current one used for al-Samoud (B), and that formerly used for testing SCUD engines (C) which was dismantled under UNSCOM supervision. This new stand will be capable of testing engines for medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) with ranges over 1000km, which are not permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 687. Such a facility would not be needed for systems that fall within the UN permitted range of 150km. The Iraqis have recently taken measures to conceal activities at this site. Iraq is also working to obtain improved guidance technology to increase missile accuracy.



FIGURE 6: AL-RAFAH/SHAHIYAT LIQUID PROPELLANT ENGINE STATIC TEST STAND

29. The success of UN restrictions means the development of new longer-range missiles is likely to be a slow process. These restrictions impact particularly on the:
- availability of foreign expertise;
 - conduct of test flights to ranges above 150km;
 - acquisition of guidance and control technology.
30. Saddam remains committed to developing longer-range missiles. Even if sanctions remain effective, Iraq might achieve a missile capability of over 1000km within 5 years (Figure 7 shows the range of Iraq's various missiles).
31. Iraq has managed to rebuild much of the missile production infrastructure destroyed in the Gulf War and in Operation Desert Fox in 1998 (see Part 2). New missile-related infrastructure is also under construction. Some aspects of this, including rocket propellant mixing and casting facilities at the al-Mamoun Plant, appear to replicate those linked to the prohibited Badr-2000 programme (with a planned range of 700–1000km) which were destroyed in the Gulf War or dismantled by UNSCOM. A new plant at al-Mamoun for indigenously producing ammonium perchlorate, which is a key ingredient in the production of solid propellant rocket motors, has also been constructed. This has been provided illicitly by NEC Engineers Private Limited, an Indian chemical engineering firm with extensive links in Iraq, including to other suspect facilities such as the Fallujah 2 chlorine plant. After an extensive investigation, the Indian authorities have recently suspended its export licence, although other individuals and companies are still illicitly procuring for Iraq.
32. Despite a UN embargo, Iraq has also made concerted efforts to acquire additional production technology, including machine tools and raw materials, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 1051. The embargo has succeeded in blocking many of these attempts, such as requests to buy magnesium powder and ammonium chloride. But we know from intelligence that some items have found their way to the Iraqi ballistic missile programme. More will inevitably continue to do so. Intelligence makes it clear that Iraqi procurement agents and front companies in third countries are seeking illicitly to acquire propellant chemicals for Iraq's ballistic missiles. This includes production level quantities of near complete sets of solid propellant rocket motor ingredients such as aluminium powder, ammonium perchlorate and hydroxyl terminated polybutadiene. There have also been attempts to acquire large quantities of liquid propellant chemicals such as Unsymmetrical Dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and diethylenetriamine. We judge these are intended to support production and deployment of the al-Samoud and development of longer-range systems.




FIGURE 7: CURRENT AND PLANNED/POTENTIAL BALLISTIC MISSILES

FUNDING FOR THE WMD PROGRAMME

33. The UN has sought to restrict Iraq's ability to generate funds for its chemical, biological and other military programmes. For example, Iraq earns money legally under the UN Oil For Food Programme (OFF) established by UNSCR 986, whereby the proceeds of oil sold through the UN are used to buy humanitarian supplies for Iraq. This money remains under UN control and cannot be used for military procurement. However, the Iraqi regime continues to generate income outside UN control either in the form of hard currency or barter goods (which in turn means existing Iraqi funds are freed up to be spent on other things).

UN Sanctions

UN sanctions on Iraq prohibit all imports to and exports from Iraq. The UN must clear any goods entering or leaving. The UN also administers the Oil for Food (OFF) programme. Any imports entering Iraq under the OFF programme are checked against the Goods Review List for potential military or weapons of mass destruction utility.

34. These illicit earnings go to the Iraqi regime. They are used for building new palaces, as well as purchasing luxury goods and other civilian goods outside the OFF programme. Some of these funds are also used by Saddam Hussein to maintain his armed forces, and to develop or acquire military equipment, including for chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. We do not know what proportion of these funds is used in this way. But we have seen no evidence that Iraqi attempts to develop its weapons of mass destruction and its ballistic missile programme, for example through covert procurement of equipment from abroad, has been inhibited in any way by lack of funds. The steady increase over the last three years in the availability of funds will enable Saddam to progress the programmes faster.

Iraq's illicit earnings

Year	Amount in \$billions
1999	0.8 to 1
2000	1.5 to 2
2001	3
2002	3 (estimate)

PART 2

HISTORY OF UN WEAPONS INSPECTIONS

1. During the 1990s, beginning in April 1991 immediately after the end of the Gulf War, the UN Security Council passed a series of resolutions [see box] establishing the authority of UNSCOM and the IAEA to carry out the work of dismantling Iraq's arsenal of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes and long-range ballistic missiles.

UN Security Council Resolutions relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction

UNSCR 687, April 1991 created the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and required Iraq to accept, unconditionally, “the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision” of its chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150km, and their associated programmes, stocks, components, research and facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was charged with abolition of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. UNSCOM and the IAEA must report that their mission has been achieved before the Security Council can end sanctions. They have not yet done so.

UNSCR 707, August 1991, stated that Iraq must provide full, final and complete disclosure of all its programmes for weapons of mass destruction and provide unconditional and unrestricted access to UN inspectors. For over a decade Iraq has been in breach of this resolution. Iraq must also cease all nuclear activities of any kind other than civil use of isotopes.

UNSCR 715, October 1991 approved plans prepared by UNSCOM and IAEA for the ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) arrangements to implement UNSCR 687. Iraq did not accede to this until November 1993. OMV was conducted from April 1995 to 15 December 1998, when the UN left Iraq.

UNSCR 1051, March 1996 stated that Iraq must declare the shipment of dual-use goods which could be used for mass destruction weaponry programmes.

These resolutions were passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which is the instrument that allows the UN Security Council to authorise the use of military force to enforce its resolutions.

2. As outlined in UNSCR 687, Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes were also a breach of Iraq's commitments under:
 - The 1925 Geneva Protocol which bans the use of chemical and biological weapons;

- the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention which bans the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of biological weapons;
 - the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which prohibits Iraq from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons.
3. UNSCR 687 obliged Iraq to provide declarations on all aspects of its weapons of mass destruction programmes within 15 days and accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless under international supervision of its chemical, biological and nuclear programmes, and all ballistic missiles with a range beyond 150km. Iraq did not make a satisfactory declaration within the specified time-frame.


Iraq accepted the UNSCRs and agreed to co-operate with UNSCOM. The history of the UN weapons inspections was characterised by persistent Iraqi obstruction.

UNSCOM and the IAEA were given the remit to designate any locations for inspection at any time, review any document and interview any scientist, technician or other individual and seize any prohibited items for destruction.

Iraqi Non-Co-operation with the Inspectors

4. The former Chairman of UNSCOM, Richard Butler, reported to the UN Security Council in January 1999 that in 1991 a decision was taken by a high-level Iraqi Government committee to provide inspectors with only a portion of its proscribed weapons, components, production capabilities and stocks. UNSCOM concluded that Iraqi policy was based on the following actions:
- to provide only a portion of extant weapons stocks, releasing for destruction only those that were least modern;
 - to retain the production capability and documentation necessary to revive programmes when possible;
 - to conceal the full extent of its chemical weapons programme, including the VX nerve agent project; to conceal the number and type of chemical and biological warheads for proscribed long-range missiles;
 - and to conceal the existence of its biological weapons programme.
5. In December 1997 Richard Butler reported to the UN Security Council that Iraq had created a new category of sites, “Presidential” and “sovereign”, from which it claimed that UNSCOM inspectors would henceforth be barred. The terms of the ceasefire in 1991 foresaw no such limitation. However, Iraq consistently refused to allow UNSCOM inspectors access to any of these eight Presidential sites. Many of these so-called “palaces” are in fact large compounds which are an integral part of Iraqi counter-measures designed to hide weapons material (see photograph on p35).

A photograph of a “presidential site” or what have been called “palaces”.



Boundary of presidential site

The total area taken by Buckingham Palace and its grounds has been superimposed to demonstrate their comparative size

Iraq's policy of deception

Iraq has admitted to UNSCOM to having a large, effective, system for hiding proscribed material including documentation, components, production equipment and possibly biological and chemical agents and weapons from the UN. Shortly after the adoption of UNSCR 687 in April 1991, an Administrative Security Committee (ASC) was formed with responsibility for advising Saddam on the information which could be released to UNSCOM and the IAEA. The Committee consisted of senior Military Industrial Commission (MIC) scientists from all of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programmes. The Higher Security Committee (HSC) of the Presidential Office was in overall command of deception operations. The system was directed from the very highest political levels within the Presidential Office and involved, if not Saddam himself, his youngest son, Qusai. The system for hiding proscribed material relies on high mobility and good command and control. It uses lorries to move items at short notice and most hide sites appear to be located close to good road links and telecommunications. The Baghdad area was particularly favoured. In addition to active measures to hide material from the UN, Iraq has attempted to monitor, delay and collect intelligence on UN operations to aid its overall deception plan.

Intimidation

6. Once inspectors had arrived in Iraq, it quickly became apparent that the Iraqis would resort to a range of measures (including physical threats and psychological intimidation of inspectors) to prevent UNSCOM and the IAEA from fulfilling their mandate.
7. In response to such incidents, the President of the Security Council issued frequent statements calling on Iraq to comply with its disarmament and monitoring obligations.

Iraqi obstruction of UN weapons inspection teams

- firing warning shots in the air to prevent IAEA inspectors from intercepting nuclear related equipment (June 1991);
- keeping IAEA inspectors in a car park for 4 days and refusing to allow them to leave with incriminating documents on Iraq's nuclear weapons programme (September 1991);
- announcing that UN monitoring and verification plans were "unlawful" (October 1991);
- refusing UNSCOM inspectors access to the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture. Threats were made to inspectors who remained on watch outside the building. The inspection team had reliable evidence that the site contained archives related to proscribed activities;
- in 1991–2 Iraq objected to UNSCOM using its own helicopters and choosing its own flight plans. In January 1993 it refused to allow UNSCOM the use of its own aircraft to fly into Iraq;
- refusing to allow UNSCOM to install remote-controlled monitoring cameras at two key missile sites (June-July 1993);
- repeatedly denying access to inspection teams (1991- December 1998);
- interfering with UNSCOM's helicopter operations, threatening the safety of the aircraft and their crews (June 1997);
- demanding the end of U2 overflights and the withdrawal of US UNSCOM staff (October 1997);
- destroying documentary evidence of programmes for weapons of mass destruction (September 1997).

Obstruction

8. Iraq denied that it had pursued a biological weapons programme until July 1995. In July 1995, Iraq acknowledged that biological agents had been produced on an industrial scale at al-Hakam. Following the defection in August 1995 of Hussein Kamil, Saddam's son-in-law and former Director of the Military Industrialisation Commission, Iraq released over 2 million documents relating to its mass destruction weaponry programmes and acknowledged that it had

pursued a biological programme that led to the deployment of actual weapons. Iraq admitted producing 183 biological weapons with a reserve of agent to fill considerably more.

Inspection of Iraq's biological weapons programme

In the course of the first biological weapons inspection in August 1991, Iraq claimed that it had merely conducted a military biological research programme. At the site visited, al-Salman, Iraq had removed equipment, documents and even entire buildings. Later in the year, during a visit to the al-Hakam site, Iraq declared to UNSCOM inspectors that the facility was used as a factory to produce proteins derived from yeast to feed animals. Inspectors subsequently discovered that the plant was a central site for the production of anthrax spores and botulinum toxin for weapons. The factory had also been sanitised by Iraqi officials to deceive inspectors. Iraq continued to develop the al-Hakam site into the 1990s, misleading UNSCOM about its true purpose.

Another key site, the Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Institute at al-Dawrah which produced botulinum toxin and probably anthrax was not divulged as part of the programme. Five years later, after intense pressure, Iraq acknowledged that tens of tonnes of bacteriological warfare agent had been produced there and at al-Hakam.

As documents recovered in August 1995 were assessed, it became apparent that the full disclosure required by the UN was far from complete. Successive inspection teams went to Iraq to try to gain greater understanding of the programme and to obtain credible supporting evidence. In July 1996 Iraq refused to discuss its past programme and doctrine forcing the team to withdraw in protest. Monitoring teams were at the same time finding undisclosed equipment and materials associated with the past programme. In response, Iraq grudgingly provided successive disclosures of its programme which were judged by UNSCOM and specially convened international panels to be technically inadequate.

In late 1995 Iraq acknowledged weapons testing the biological agent ricin, but did not provide production information. Two years later, in early 1997, UNSCOM discovered evidence that Iraq had produced ricin.

9. Iraq tried to obstruct UNSCOM's efforts to investigate the scale of its biological weapons programme. It created forged documents to account for bacterial growth media, imported in the late 1980s, specifically for the production of anthrax, botulinum toxin and probably plague. The documents were created to indicate that the material had been imported by the State Company for Drugs and Medical Appliances Marketing for use in hospitals and distribution to local authorities. Iraq also censored documents and scientific papers provided to the first UN inspection team, removing all references to key individuals, weapons and industrial production of agents.

10. Iraq has yet to provide any documents concerning production of agent and subsequent weaponisation. Iraq destroyed, unilaterally and illegally, some biological weapons in 1991 and 1992 making accounting for these weapons impossible. In addition, Iraq cleansed a key site at al-Muthanna, its main research and development, production and weaponisation facility for chemical warfare agents, of all evidence of a biological programme in the toxicology department, the animal-house and weapons filling station.
11. Iraq refused to elaborate further on the programme during inspections in 1997 and 1998, confining discussion to previous topics. In July 1998 Tariq Aziz personally intervened in the inspection process stating that the biological programme was more secret and more closed than other mass destruction weaponry programmes. He also played down the significance of the programme. Iraq has presented the biological weapons programme as the personal undertaking of a few misguided scientists.
12. At the same time, Iraq tried to maintain its nuclear weapons programme via a concerted campaign to deceive IAEA inspectors. In 1997 the IAEA Director General stated that the IAEA was “severely hampered by Iraq’s persistence in a policy of concealment and understatement of the programme’s scope”.

Inspection achievements

13. Despite the conduct of the Iraqi authorities towards them, both UNSCOM and the IAEA Action Team have valuable records of achievement in discovering and exposing Iraq’s biological weapons programme and destroying very large quantities of chemical weapons stocks and missiles as well as the infrastructure for Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme.
14. Despite UNSCOM’s efforts, following the effective ejection of UN inspectors in December 1998 there remained a series of significant unresolved disarmament issues. In summarising the situation in a report to the UN Security Council, the UNSCOM Chairman, Richard Butler, indicated that:
 - contrary to the requirement that destruction be conducted under international supervision “Iraq undertook extensive, unilateral and secret destruction of large quantities of proscribed weapons and items”;
 - and Iraq “also pursued a practice of concealment of proscribed items, including weapons, and a cover up of its activities in contravention of Council resolutions”.

Overall, Richard Butler declared that obstructive Iraqi activity had had “a significant impact upon the Commission’s disarmament work”.

UNSCOM and IAEA achievements

UNSCOM surveyed 1015 sites in Iraq, carrying out 272 separate inspections. Despite Iraqi obstruction and intimidation, UN inspectors uncovered details of chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. Major UNSCOM/IAEA achievements included:

- the destruction of 40,000 munitions for chemical weapons, 2,610 tonnes of chemical precursors and 411 tonnes of chemical warfare agent;
- the dismantling of Iraq's prime chemical weapons development and production complex at al-Muthanna and a range of key production equipment;
- the destruction of 48 SCUD-type missiles, 11 mobile launchers and 56 sites, 30 warheads filled with chemical agents, and 20 conventional warheads;
- the destruction of the al-Hakam biological weapons facility and a range of production equipment, seed stocks and growth media for biological weapons;
- the discovery in 1991 of samples of indigenously-produced highly enriched uranium, forcing Iraq's acknowledgement of uranium enrichment programmes and attempts to preserve key components of its prohibited nuclear weapons programme;
- the removal and destruction of the infrastructure for the nuclear weapons programme, including the al-Athir weaponisation/testing facility.

Withdrawal of the inspectors

15. By the end of 1998 UNSCOM was in direct confrontation with the Iraqi Government which was refusing to co-operate. The US and the UK had made clear that anything short of full co-operation would make military action unavoidable. Richard Butler was requested to report to the UN Security Council in December 1998 and stated that, following a series of direct confrontations, coupled with the systematic refusal by Iraq to co-operate, UNSCOM was no longer able to perform its disarmament mandate. As a direct result on 16 December the weapons inspectors were withdrawn. Operation Desert Fox was launched by the US and the UK a few hours afterwards.

Operation Desert Fox (16–19 December 1998)

Operation Desert Fox targeted industrial facilities related to Iraq's ballistic missile programme and a suspect biological warfare facility as well as military airfields and sites used by Iraq's security organisations which are involved in its weapons of mass destruction programmes. Key facilities associated with Saddam Hussein's ballistic missile programme were significantly degraded.

The situation since 1998

16. There have been no UN-mandated weapons inspections in Iraq since 1998. In an effort to enforce Iraqi compliance with its disarmament and monitoring obligations, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1284 in December 1999. This established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) as a successor organisation to UNSCOM and called on Iraq to give UNMOVIC inspectors “immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transport”. It also set out the steps Iraq needed to take in return for the eventual suspension and lifting of sanctions. A key measure of Iraqi compliance would be full co-operation with UN inspectors, including unconditional, immediate and unrestricted access to any and all sites, personnel and documents.
17. For the past three years, Iraq has allowed the IAEA to carry out an annual inspection of a stockpile of nuclear material (depleted natural and low-enriched uranium). This has led some countries and western commentators to conclude erroneously that Iraq is meeting its nuclear disarmament and monitoring obligations. As the IAEA has pointed out in recent weeks, this annual inspection does “not serve as a substitute for the verification activities required by the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council”.
18. Dr Hans Blix, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, and Dr Mohammed El-Baradei, the Director General of the IAEA, have declared that in the absence of inspections it is impossible to verify Iraqi compliance with its UN disarmament and monitoring obligations. In April 1999 an independent UN panel of experts noted that “the longer inspection and monitoring activities remain suspended, the more difficult the comprehensive implementation of Security Council resolutions becomes, increasing the risk that Iraq might reconstitute its proscribed weapons programmes”.
19. The departure of the inspectors greatly diminished the ability of the international community to monitor and assess Iraq’s continuing attempts to reconstitute its chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.

PART 3

IRAQ UNDER SADDAM HUSSEIN

Introduction

1. The Republic of Iraq is bounded by Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and the Persian Gulf. Its population of around 23 million is ethnically and religiously diverse. Approximately 77% are Arabs. Sunni Muslims form around 17% of the Arab population and dominate the government. About 60% of Iraqis are Shias and 20% are Kurds. The remaining 3% of the population consists of Assyrians, Turkomans, Armenians, Christians and Yazidis.

Saddam Hussein's rise to power

Saddam Hussein was born in 1937 in the Tikrit district, north of Baghdad. In 1957 he joined the Ba'ath Party. After taking part in a failed attempt to assassinate the Iraqi President, Abdul Karim Qasim, Saddam escaped, first to Syria and then to Egypt. In his absence he was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.

Saddam returned to Baghdad in 1963 when the Ba'ath Party came to power. He went into hiding after the Ba'ath fell from power later that year. He was captured and imprisoned, but in 1967 escaped and took over responsibility for Ba'ath security. Saddam set about imposing his will on the Party and establishing himself at the centre of power.

The Ba'ath Party returned to power in 1968. In 1969 Saddam became Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, Deputy to the President, and Deputy Secretary General of the Regional Command of the Ba'ath. In 1970 he joined the Party's National Command and in 1977 was elected Assistant Secretary General. In July 1979, he took over the Presidency of Iraq. Within days, five fellow members of the Revolutionary Command Council were accused of involvement in a coup attempt. They and 17 others were summarily executed.

2. Public life in Iraq is nominally dominated by the Ba'ath Party (see box on p44). But all real authority rests with Saddam and his immediate circle. Saddam's family, tribe and a small number of associates remain his most loyal supporters. He uses them to convey his orders, including to members of the government.
3. Saddam uses patronage and violence to motivate his supporters and to control or eliminate opposition. Potential rewards include social status, money and better access to goods. Saddam's extensive security apparatus and Ba'ath Party network provides oversight of Iraqi society, with informants in social, government and military organisations. Saddam practises torture, execution and

other forms of coercion against his enemies, real or suspected. His targets are not only those who have offended him, but also their families, friends or colleagues.

The Iraqi Ba'ath Party

The Ba'ath Party is the only legal political party in Iraq. It pervades all aspects of Iraqi life. Membership, around 700,000, is necessary for self-advancement and confers benefits from the regime.

4. Saddam acts to ensure that there are no other centres of power in Iraq. He has crushed parties and ethnic groups, such as the communists and the Kurds, which might try to assert themselves. Members of the opposition abroad have been the targets of assassination attempts conducted by Iraqi security services.

Saddam Hussein's security apparatus

Saddam relies on a long list of security organisations with overlapping responsibilities. The main ones are:

- The **Special Security Organisation** oversees Saddam's security and monitors the loyalty of other security services. Its recruits are predominantly from Tikrit.
- The **Special Republican Guard** is equipped with the best available military equipment. Its members are selected on the basis of loyalty to the regime.
- The **Directorate of General Security** is primarily responsible for countering threats from the civilian population.
- The **Directorate of General Intelligence** monitors and suppresses dissident activities at home and abroad.
- The **Directorate of Military Intelligence's** role includes the investigation of military personnel.
- The **Saddam Fidayeen**, under the control of Saddam's son Udayy, has been used to deal with civil disturbances.

5. Army officers are an important part of the Iraqi government's network of informers. Suspicion that officers have ambitions other than the service of the President leads to immediate execution. It is routine for Saddam to take pre-emptive action against those who he believes might conspire against him.

Internal Repression – the Kurds and the Shias

6. Saddam has pursued a long-term programme of persecution of the Iraqi Kurds, including through the use of chemical weapons. During the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam appointed his cousin, Ali Hasan al-Majid, as his deputy in the north. In

1987-88, al-Majid led the “Anfal” campaign of attacks on Kurdish villages. Amnesty International estimates that more than 100,000 Kurds were killed or disappeared during this period.

Repression and control: some examples

- A campaign of mass arrests and killing of Shia activists led to the execution of the Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr and his sister in April 1980.
- In 1983 80 members of another leading Shia family were arrested. Six of them, all religious leaders, were executed.
- A massive chemical weapons attack on Kurds in Halabja town in March 1988 killing 5000 and injuring 10,000 more.
- A large number of officers from the Jabbur tribe were executed in the early 1990s for the alleged disloyalty of a few of them.

7. After the Gulf War in 1991 Kurds in the north of Iraq rose up against Baghdad’s rule. In response the Iraqi regime killed or imprisoned thousands, prompting a humanitarian crisis. Over a million Kurds fled into the mountains and tried to escape Iraq.
8. Persecution of Iraq’s Kurds continues, although the protection provided by the northern No-Fly Zone has helped to curb the worst excesses. But outside this zone the Baghdad regime has continued a policy of persecution and intimidation.
9. The regime has used chemical weapons against the Kurds, most notably in an attack on the town of Halabja in 1988 (see Part 1 Chapter 2 paragraph 9). The implicit threat of the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds and others is an important part of Saddam’s attempt to keep the civilian population under control.
10. The regime has tried to displace the traditional Kurdish and Turkoman populations of the areas under its control, primarily in order to weaken Kurdish claims to the oil-rich area around the northern city of Kirkuk. Kurds and other non-Arabs are forcibly ejected to the three northern Iraqi governorates, Dohuk, Arbil and Sulaimaniyah, which are under de facto Kurdish control. According to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) Special Rapporteur for Iraq, 94,000 individuals have been expelled since 1991. Agricultural land owned by Kurds has been confiscated and redistributed to Iraqi Arabs. Arabs from southern Iraq have been offered incentives to move into the Kirkuk area.
11. After the 1979 revolution that ousted the Shah in Iran, Saddam intensified a campaign against the Shia Muslim majority of Iraq, fearing that they might be encouraged by the new Shia regime in Iran.
12. On 1 March 1991, in the wake of the Gulf War, riots broke out in the southern city of Basra, spreading quickly to other cities in Shia-dominated southern Iraq.

The regime responded by killing thousands. Many Shia tried to escape to Iran and Saudi Arabia.

13. Some of the Shia hostile to the regime sought refuge in the marshland of southern Iraq. In order to subjugate the area, Saddam embarked on a large-scale programme to drain the marshes to allow Iraqi ground forces to eliminate all opposition there. The rural population of the area fled or were forced to move to southern cities or across the border into Iran.

Saddam Hussein's Wars

14. As well as ensuring his absolute control inside Iraq, Saddam has tried to make Iraq the dominant power of the region. In pursuit of these objectives he has led Iraq into two wars of aggression against neighbours, the Iran-Iraq war and the invasion of Kuwait.
15. With the fall of the Shah in Iran in 1979, relations between Iran and Iraq deteriorated sharply. In September 1980 Saddam renounced a border treaty he had agreed with Iran in 1975 ceding half of the Shatt al-Arab waterway to Iran. Shortly thereafter, Saddam launched a large-scale invasion of Iran. He believed that he could take advantage of the state of weakness, isolation and disorganisation he perceived in post-revolutionary Iran. He aimed to seize territory, including that ceded to Iran a few years earlier, and to assert Iraq's position as a leader of the Arab world. Saddam expected it to be a short, sharp campaign. But the conflict lasted for eight years. Iraq fired over 500 ballistic missiles at Iranian targets, including major cities.

Opposition to Saddam during the Iran-Iraq war

During the war Saddam's security apparatus ensured that any internal dissent or opposition was quickly eliminated. In 1982 he quickly purged a group within Iraq's ruling clique which had suggested that the war might be brought to an end more quickly if Saddam stood down.

16. It is estimated that the Iran-Iraq war cost the two sides a million casualties. Iraq used chemical weapons extensively from 1984. Some twenty thousand Iranians were killed by mustard gas and the nerve agents tabun and sarin, all of which Iraq still possesses. The UN Security Council considered the report prepared by a team of three specialists appointed by the UN Secretary General in March 1986, following which the President made a statement condemning Iraqi use of chemical weapons. This marked the first time a country had been named for violating the 1925 Geneva Convention banning the use of chemical weapons.
17. The cost of the war ran into hundreds of billions of dollars for both sides. Iraq gained nothing. After the war ended, Saddam resumed his previous pursuit of primacy in the Gulf. His policies involved spending huge sums of money on new

military equipment. But Iraq was burdened by debt incurred during the war and the price of oil, Iraq's only major export, was low.

18. By 1990 Iraq's financial problems were severe. Saddam looked at ways to press the oil-producing states of the Gulf to force up the price of crude oil by limiting production and waive the \$40 billion that they had loaned Iraq during its war with Iran. Kuwait had made some concessions over production ceilings. But Saddam blamed Kuwait for over-production. When his threats and blandishments failed, Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. He believed that occupying Kuwait could prove profitable.

Abuses by Iraqi forces in Kuwait

- Robbery and rape of Kuwaitis and expatriates.
- Summary executions.
- People dragged from their homes and held in improvised detention centres.
- Amnesty International has listed 38 methods of torture used by the Iraqi occupiers. These included beatings, breaking of limbs, extracting finger and toenails, inserting bottle necks into the rectum, and subjecting detainees to mock executions.
- Kuwaiti civilians arrested for "crimes" such as wearing beards.

19. Saddam also sought to justify the conquest of Kuwait on other grounds. Like other Iraqi leaders before him, he claimed that, as Kuwait's rulers had come under the jurisdiction of the governors of Basra in the time of the Ottoman Empire, Kuwait should belong to Iraq.
20. During its occupation of Kuwait, Iraq denied access to the Red Cross, which has a mandate to provide protection and assistance to civilians affected by international armed conflict. The death penalty was imposed for relatively minor "crimes" such as looting and hoarding food.
21. In an attempt to deter military action to expel it from Kuwait, the Iraqi regime took hostage several hundred foreign nationals (including children) in Iraq and Kuwait and prevented thousands more from leaving, in direct contravention of international humanitarian law. Hostages were held as human shields at a number of strategic military and civilian sites.
22. At the end of the Gulf War, the Iraqi army fleeing Kuwait set fire to over 1,160 Kuwaiti oil wells with serious environmental consequences.
23. More than 600 Kuwaiti and other prisoners of war and missing persons are still unaccounted for. Iraq refuses to comply with its UN obligation to account for the missing. It has provided sufficient information to close only three case-files.

Abuse of human rights

24. This section draws on reports of human rights abuses from authoritative international organisations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.
25. Human rights abuses continue within Iraq. People continue to be arrested and detained on suspicion of political or religious activities or often because they are related to members of the opposition. Executions are carried out without due process of law. Relatives are often prevented from burying the victims in accordance with Islamic practice. Thousands of prisoners have been executed.

Human rights: abuses under Saddam Hussein

- 4000 prisoners were executed at Abu Ghraib Prison in 1984.
- 3000 prisoners were executed at the Mahjar Prison between 1993 and 1998.
- About 2500 prisoners were executed between 1997 and 1999 in a “prison cleansing” campaign.
- 122 male prisoners were executed at Abu Ghraib prison in February/ March 2000. A further 23 political prisoners were executed there in October 2001.
- In October 2000 dozens of women accused of prostitution were beheaded without any judicial process. Some were accused for political reasons.
- Women prisoners at Mahjar are routinely raped by their guards.
- Methods of torture used in Iraqi jails include using electric drills to mutilate hands, pulling out fingernails, knife cuts, sexual attacks and ‘official rape’.
- Prisoners at the Qurtiyya Prison in Baghdad and elsewhere are kept in metal boxes the size of tea chests. If they do not confess they are left to die.

26. Saddam has issued a series of decrees establishing severe penalties for criminal offences. These include amputation, branding, cutting off ears, and other forms of mutilation. Anyone found guilty of slandering the President has their tongue removed.

Human Rights – mistreatment in Abu Ghraib Prison

Abdallah, a member of the Ba'ath Party whose loyalty became suspect was imprisoned for four years at Abu Ghraib in the 1980s. On the second day of his imprisonment, the men were forced to walk between two rows of five guards each to receive their containers of food. While walking to get the food, they were beaten by the guards with plastic telephone cables. They had to return to their cells the same way, so that a walk to get breakfast resulted in twenty lashes. According to Abdallah, "It wasn't that bad going to get the food, but coming back the food was spilled when we were beaten." The same procedure was used when the men went to the bathroom. On the third day, the torture continued. "We were removed from our cells and beaten with plastic pipes. This surprised us, because we were asked no question. Possibly it was being done to break our morale", Abdallah speculated. The torture escalated to sixteen sessions daily. The treatment was organised and systematic. Abdallah was held alone in a 3x2-meter room that opened onto a corridor. "We were allowed to go to the toilet three times a day, then they reduced the toilet to once a day for only one minute. I went for four years without a shower or a wash", Abdallah said. He also learned to cope with the deprivation and the hunger that accompanied his detention: "I taught myself to drink a minimum amount of water because there was no place to urinate. They used wooden sticks to beat us and sometimes the sticks would break. I found a piece of a stick, covered with blood, and managed to bring it back to my room. I ate it for three days. A person who is hungry can eat anything. Pieces of our bodies started falling off from the beatings and our skin was so dry that it began to fall off. I ate pieces of my own body. "No one, not Pushkin, not Mahfouz, can describe what happened to us. It is impossible to describe what living this day to day was like. I was totally naked the entire time. Half of the original groups [of about thirty men] died. It was a slow type of continuous physical and psychological torture. Sometimes, it seemed that orders came to kill one of us, and he would be beaten to death". (Source: *Human Rights Watch*)

Saddam Hussein's family

27. Saddam's son Udayy maintained a private torture chamber known as the Red Room in a building on the banks of the Tigris disguised as an electricity installation. He created a militia in 1994 which has used swords to execute victims outside their own homes. He has personally executed dissidents, for instance in the Shia uprising at Basra which followed the Gulf War.
28. Members of Saddam's family are also subject to persecution. A cousin of Saddam, Ala Abd al-Qadir al-Majid, fled to Jordan from Iraq citing disagreements with the regime over business matters. He returned to Iraq after the Iraqi Ambassador in Jordan declared publicly that his life was not in danger. He was met at the border by Tahir Habbush, Head of the Directorate of General Intelligence (the Mukhabarat), and taken to a farm owned by Ali Hasan al-Majid. At the farm Ala was tied to a tree and executed by members of his immediate family who, following orders from Saddam, took it in turns to shoot him

29. Some 40 of Saddam's relatives, including women and children, have been killed. His sons-in-law Hussein and Saddam Kamil had defected in 1995 and returned to Iraq from Jordan after the Iraqi government had announced amnesties for them. They were executed in February 1996.

Human Rights –individual testimony

In December 1996, a Kurdish businessman from Baghdad was arrested outside his house by plainclothes security men. Initially his family did not know his whereabouts and went from one police station to another inquiring about him. Then they found out that he was being held in the headquarters of the General Security Directorate in Baghdad. The family was not allowed to visit him. Eleven months later the family was told by the authorities that he had been executed and that they should go and collect his body. His body bore evident signs of torture. His eyes were gouged out and the empty eye sockets filled with paper. His right wrist and left leg were broken. The family was not given any reason for his arrest and subsequent execution. However, they suspected that he was executed because of his friendship with a retired army general who had links with the Iraqi opposition outside the country and who was arrested just before his arrest and also executed. *(Source: Amnesty International)*

Human Rights – individual testimony

"...I saw a friend of mine, al-Shaikh Nasser Taresh al-Sa'idi, naked. He was handcuffed and a piece of wood was placed between his elbows and his knees. Two ends of the wood were placed on two high chairs and al-Shaikh Nasser was being suspended like a chicken. This method of torture is known as al-Khaygania (a reference to a former security director known as al-Khaygani). An electric wire was attached to al-Shaikh Nasser's penis and another one attached to one of his toes. He was asked if he could identify me and he said "this is al-Shaikh Yahya". They took me to another room and then after about 10 minutes they stripped me of my clothes and a security officer said "the person you saw has confessed against you". He said to me "You followers of [Ayatollah] al-Sadr have carried out acts harmful to the security of the country and have been distributing anti-government statements coming from abroad". He asked if I have any contact with an Iraqi religious scholar based in Iran who has been signing these statements. I said "I do not have any contacts with him"... I was then left suspended in the same manner as al-Shaikh al-Sa'idi. My face was looking upward. They attached an electric wire on my penis and the other end of the wire is attached to an electric motor. One security man was hitting my feet with a cable. Electric shocks were applied every few minutes and were increased. I must have been suspended for more than an hour. I lost consciousness. They took me to another room and made me walk even though my feet were swollen from beating... They repeated this method a few times." *(Source: Amnesty International, testimony from an Iraqi theology student from Saddam City)*

Further copies are available on the Internet from:
No10 (www.pm.gov.uk)
FCO (www.fco.gov.uk)
MOD (www.mod.uk)
The Stationery Office (www.official-documents.co.uk)

DOCUMENT: CIA white paper, “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs”

DATE: October 4, 2002

SOURCE: U.S. Government publication

CONTENT: This CIA paper was published two days after the NIE that was being prepared on the same subject. By comparison with the July draft, it had been significantly strengthened. The worst-case nuclear timeline of “within a year” had been added, along with reference to the aluminum tubes.



Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs

October 2002

Key Judgments

Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs

Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.

Baghdad hides large portions of Iraq's WMD efforts. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information.

Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.

- Iraq's growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases Baghdad's capabilities to finance WMD programs; annual earnings in cash and goods have more than quadrupled.
- Iraq largely has rebuilt missile and biological weapons facilities damaged during Operation Desert Fox and has expanded its chemical and biological infrastructure under the cover of civilian production.
- Baghdad has exceeded UN range limits of 150 km with its ballistic missiles and is working with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which allow for a more lethal means to deliver biological and, less likely, chemical warfare agents.
- Although Saddam probably does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent on acquiring them.

How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon depends on when it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material.

- If Baghdad acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material from abroad, it could make a nuclear weapon within a year.
 - Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon until the last half of the decade.
- Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain proscribed high-strength aluminum tubes are of significant concern. All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons and that these tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program. Most intelligence specialists assess this to be the intended use, but some believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs.

- Based on tubes of the size Iraq is trying to acquire, a few tens of thousands of centrifuges would be capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a couple of weapons per year.

Baghdad has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX. Its capability was reduced during the UNSCOM inspections and is probably more limited now than it was at the time of the Gulf war, although VX production and agent storage life probably have been improved.

- Saddam probably has stocked a few hundred metric tons of CW agents.
- The Iraqis have experience in manufacturing CW bombs, artillery rockets, and projectiles, and probably possess CW bulk fills for SRBM warheads, including for a limited number of covertly stored, extended-range Scuds.

All key aspects—R&D, production, and weaponization—of Iraq’s offensive BW program are active and most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf war.

- Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives, including potentially against the US Homeland.
- Baghdad has established a large -scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability, which includes mobile facilities; these facilities can evade detection, are highly survivable, and can exceed the production rates Iraq had prior to the Gulf war.

Iraq maintains a small missile force and several development programs, including for a UAV that most analysts believe probably is intended to deliver biological warfare agents.

- Gaps in Iraqi accounting to UNSCOM suggest that Saddam retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud -variant SRBMs with ranges of 650 to 900 km.
- Iraq is deploying its new al-Samoud and Ababil-100 SRBMs, which are capable of flying beyond the UN -authorized 150-km range limit.
- Baghdad’s UAVs—especially if used for delivery of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents—could threaten Iraq’s neighbors, US forces in the Persian Gulf, and the United States if brought close to, or into, the US Homeland.
- Iraq is developing medium-range ballistic missile capabilities, largely through foreign assistance in building specialized facilities.

Discussion

Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs

In April 1991, the UN Security Council enacted Resolution 687 requiring Iraq to declare, destroy, or render harmless its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal and production infrastructure under UN or International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervision. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 also demanded that Iraq forgo the future development or acquisition of WMD.

Baghdad's determination to hold onto a sizeable remnant of its WMD arsenal, agents, equipment, and expertise has led to years of dissembling and obstruction of UN inspections. Elite Iraqi security services orchestrated an extensive concealment and deception campaign to hide incriminating documents and material that precluded resolution of key issues pertaining to its WMD programs.

- Iraqi obstructions prompted the Security Council to pass several subsequent resolutions demanding that Baghdad comply with its obligations to cooperate with the inspection process and to provide United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and IAEA officials immediate and unrestricted access to any site they wished to inspect.
- Although outwardly maintaining the facade of cooperation, Iraqi officials frequently denied or substantially delayed access to facilities, personnel, and documents in an effort to conceal critical information about Iraq's WMD programs.

Successive Iraqi declarations on Baghdad's pre-Gulf war WMD programs gradually became more accurate between 1991 and 1998, but only because of sustained pressure from UN sanctions, Coalition military force, and vigorous and robust inspections facilitated by information from cooperative countries. Nevertheless, **Iraq never has fully accounted for major gaps and inconsistencies in its declarations and has provided no credible proof that it has completely destroyed its weapons stockpiles and production infrastructure.**

- UNSCOM inspection activities and Coalition military strikes destroyed most of its prohibited ballistic missiles and some Gulf war-era chemical and biological munitions, but Iraq still has a small force of extended-range Scud-variant missiles, chemical precursors, biological seed stock, and thousands of munitions suitable for chemical and biological agents.
- Iraq has preserved and in some cases enhanced the infrastructure and expertise necessary for WMD production and has used that capability to maintain a stockpile of WMD and to increase its size and sophistication in some areas.

UN Security Council Resolutions and Provisions for Inspections and Monitoring: Theory and Practice

Resolution Requirement	Reality
Res. 687 (3 April 1991) Requires Iraq to declare, destroy, remove, or render harmless under UN or IAEA supervision and not to use, develop, construct, or acquire all chemical and biological weapons, all ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 150 km, and all nuclear weapons-usable material, including related material, equipment, and facilities. The resolution also formed the Special Commission and authorized the IAEA to carry out immediate on-site inspections of WMD-related facilities based on Iraq's declarations and UNSCOM's designation of any additional locations.	Baghdad refused to declare all parts of each WMD program, submitted several declarations as part of its aggressive efforts to deny and deceive inspectors, and ensured that certain elements of the program would remain concealed. The prohibition against developing delivery platforms with ranges greater than 150 km allowed Baghdad to research and develop shorter-range systems with applications for longer-range systems and did not affect Iraqi efforts to convert full-size aircraft into unmanned aerial vehicles as potential WMD delivery systems with ranges far beyond 150 km.
Res. 707 (15 August 1991) Requires Iraq to allow UN and IAEA inspectors immediate and unrestricted access to any site they wish to inspect. Demands Iraq provide full, final, and complete disclosure of all aspects of its WMD programs; cease immediately any attempt to conceal, move, or destroy WMD-related material or equipment; allow UNSCOM and IAEA teams to use fixed-wing and helicopter flights throughout Iraq; and respond fully, completely, and promptly to any Special Commission questions or requests.	Baghdad in 1996 negotiated with UNSCOM Executive Chairman Ekeus modalities that it used to delay inspections, to restrict to four the number of inspectors allowed into any site Baghdad declared as "sensitive," and to prohibit them altogether from sites regarded as sovereign. These modalities gave Iraq leverage over individual inspections. Iraq eventually allowed larger numbers of inspectors into such sites but only after lengthy negotiations at each site.
Res. 715 (11 October 1991) Requires Iraq to submit to UNSCOM and IAEA long-term monitoring of Iraqi WMD programs; approved detailed plans called for in UNSCRs 687 and 707 for long-term monitoring.	Iraq generally accommodated UN monitors at declared sites but occasionally obstructed access and manipulated monitoring cameras. UNSCOM and IAEA monitoring of Iraq's WMD programs does not have a specified end date under current UN resolutions.
Res. 1051 (27 March 1996) Established the Iraqi export/import monitoring system, requiring UN members to provide IAEA and UNSCOM with information on materials exported to Iraq that may be applicable to WMD production, and requiring Iraq to report imports of all dual-use items.	Iraq is negotiating contracts for procuring—outside of UN controls—dual-use items with WMD applications. The UN lacks the staff needed to conduct thorough inspections of goods at Iraq's borders and to monitor imports inside Iraq.
Res. 1060 (12 June 1996) and Resolutions 1115, 1134, 1137, 1154, 1194, and 1205. Demands that Iraq cooperate with UNSCOM and allow inspection teams immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to facilities for inspection and access to Iraqi officials for interviews. UNSCR 1137 condemns Baghdad's refusal to allow entry to Iraq to UNSCOM officials on the grounds of their nationality and its threats to the safety of UN reconnaissance aircraft.	Baghdad consistently sought to impede and limit UNSCOM's mission in Iraq by blocking access to numerous facilities throughout the inspection process, often sanitizing sites before the arrival of inspectors and routinely attempting to deny inspectors access to requested sites and individuals. At times, Baghdad would promise compliance to avoid consequences, only to renege later.
Res. 1154 (2 March 1998) Demands that Iraq comply with UNSCOM and IAEA inspections and endorses the Secretary General's memorandum of understanding with Iraq, providing for "severest consequences" if Iraq fails to comply. Res. 1194 (9 September 1998) Condemns Iraq's decision to suspend cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA. Res. 1205 (5 November 1998) Condemns Iraq's decision to cease cooperation with UNSCOM.	UNSCOM could not exercise its mandate without Iraqi compliance. Baghdad refused to work with UNSCOM and instead negotiated with the Secretary General, whom it believed would be more sympathetic to Iraq's needs.
Res. 1284 (17 December 1999) Established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), replacing UNSCOM; and demanded that Iraq allow UNMOVIC teams immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all aspects of Iraq's WMD program.	Iraq repeatedly has rejected the return of UN arms inspectors and claims that it has satisfied all UN resolutions relevant to disarmament. Compared with UNSCOM, 1284 gives the UNMOVIC chairman less authority, gives the Security Council a greater role in defining key disarmament tasks, and requires that inspectors be full-time UN employees.

Since December 1998, Baghdad has refused to allow UN inspectors into Iraq as required by the Security Council resolutions. Technical monitoring systems installed by the UN at known and suspected WMD and missile facilities in Iraq no longer operate. Baghdad prohibits Security Council-mandated monitoring overflights of Iraqi facilities by UN aircraft and helicopters. Similarly, Iraq has curtailed most IAEA inspections since 1998, allowing the IAEA to visit annually only a very small number of sites to safeguard Iraq's stockpile of uranium oxide.

In the absence of inspectors, Baghdad's already considerable ability to work on prohibited programs without risk of discovery has increased, and there is substantial evidence that Iraq is reconstituting prohibited programs. Baghdad's vigorous concealment efforts have meant that specific information on many aspects of Iraq's WMD programs is yet to be uncovered. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information.

- Limited insight into activities since 1998 clearly show that Baghdad has used the absence of UN inspectors to repair and expand dual-use and dedicated missile-development facilities and to increase its ability to produce WMD.

Nuclear Weapons Program

More than ten years of sanctions and the loss of much of Iraq's physical nuclear infrastructure under IAEA oversight have not diminished Saddam's interest in acquiring or developing nuclear weapons.

- Iraq's efforts to procure tens of thousands of proscribed high-strength aluminum tubes are of significant concern. All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons and that these tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program. Most intelligence specialists assess this to be the intended use, but some believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs.

Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development program before the Gulf war that focused on building an implosion-type weapon using highly enriched uranium. Baghdad was attempting a variety of uranium enrichment techniques, the most successful of which were the electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) and gas centrifuge programs. After its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq initiated a crash program to divert IAEA-safeguarded, highly enriched uranium from its Soviet and French-supplied reactors, but the onset of hostilities ended this effort. Iraqi declarations and the UNSCOM/IAEA inspection process revealed much of Iraq's nuclear weapons efforts, but Baghdad still has not provided complete information on all aspects of its nuclear weapons program.

- Iraq has withheld important details relevant to its nuclear program, including procurement logs, technical documents, experimental data, accounting of materials, and foreign assistance.

- Baghdad also continues to withhold other data about enrichment techniques, foreign procurement, weapons design, and the role of Iraqi security services in concealing its nuclear facilities and activities.
- In recent years, Baghdad has diverted goods contracted under the Oil-for-Food Program for military purposes and has increased solicitations and dual-use procurements—outside the Oil-for-Food process—some of which almost certainly are going to prohibited WMD and other weapons programs. Baghdad probably uses some of the money it gains through its illicit oil sales to support its WMD efforts.

Before its departure from Iraq, the IAEA made significant strides toward dismantling Iraq's nuclear weapons program and unearthing the nature and scope of Iraq's past nuclear activities. In the absence of inspections, however, most analysts assess that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear program—unraveling the IAEA's hard-earned accomplishments.

Iraq retains its cadre of nuclear scientists and technicians, its program documentation, and sufficient dual-use manufacturing capabilities to support a reconstituted nuclear weapons program. Iraqi media have reported numerous meetings between Saddam and nuclear scientists over the past two years, signaling Baghdad's continued interest in reviving a nuclear program.

Iraq's expanding international trade provides growing access to nuclear-related technology and materials and potential access to foreign nuclear expertise. An increase in dual-use procurement activity in recent years may be supporting a reconstituted nuclear weapons program.

- The acquisition of sufficient fissile material is Iraq's principal hurdle in developing a nuclear weapon.
- **Iraq is unlikely to produce indigenously enough weapons-grade material for a deliverable nuclear weapon until the last half of this decade. Baghdad could produce a nuclear weapon within a year if it were able to procure weapons-grade fissile material abroad.**

Baghdad may have acquired uranium enrichment capabilities that could shorten substantially the amount of time necessary to make a nuclear weapon.

Iraq: Declared Nuclear Facilities



Chemical Warfare Program

Iraq has the ability to produce chemical warfare (CW) agents within its chemical industry, although it probably depends on external sources for some precursors. Baghdad is expanding its infrastructure, under cover of civilian industries, that it could use to advance its CW agent production capability. During the 1980s Saddam had a formidable CW capability that he used against Iranians and against Iraq's Kurdish population. Iraqi forces killed or injured more than 20,000 people in multiple attacks, delivering chemical agents (including mustard agent¹ and the nerve agents sarin and tabun²) in aerial bombs, 122mm rockets, and artillery shells against both tactical military targets and segments of Iraq's Kurdish population. Before the 1991 Gulf war, Baghdad had a large stockpile of chemical munitions and a robust indigenous production capacity.

Documented Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons				
Date	Area Used	Type of Agent	Approximate Casualties	Target Population
Aug 1983	Hajj Umran	Mustard	fewer than 100	Iranians/Kurds
Oct-Nov 1983	Panjwin	Mustard	3,000	Iranian/Kurds
Feb-Mar 1984	Majnoon Island	Mustard	2,500	Iranians
Mar 1984	al-Basrah	Tabun	50 to 100	Iranians
Mar 1985	Hawizah Marsh	Mustard/Tabun	3,000	Iranians
Feb 1986	al-Faw	Mustard/Tabun	8,000 to 10,000	Iranians
Dec 1986	Umm ar Rasas	Mustard	thousands	Iranians
Apr 1987	al-Basrah	Mustard/Tabun	5,000	Iranians
Oct 1987	Sumar/Mehran	Mustard/nerve agents	3,000	Iranians
Mar 1988	Halabjah	Mustard/nerve agents	hundreds	Iranians/Kurds

¹ Mustard is a blister agent that causes medical casualties by blistering or burning exposed skin, eyes, lungs, and mucus membranes within hours of exposure. It is a persistent agent that can remain a hazard for days.

² Sarin, cyclosarin, and tabun are G-series nerve agents that can act within seconds of absorption through the skin or inhalation. These agents overstimulate muscles or glands with messages transmitted from nerves, causing convulsions and loss of consciousness. Tabun is persistent and can remain a hazard for days. Sarin and cyclosarin are not persistent and pose more of an inhalation hazard than a skin hazard.

Chemical-Filled Munitions Declared by Iraq



*Iraqi 250-gauge
chemical bomb.*



*Iraqi 500-gauge
chemical bombs.*



*Iraqi DB-2
chemical bomb.*



*Iraqi FI-400
chemical bombs.*



*Iraqi 155-mm
chemical shell.*



*Iraqi Al Husayn
chemical
warheads.*



*122-mm rockets
filled with the
chemical nerve
agent sarin prior
to destruction.*

Although precise information is lacking, human rights organizations have received plausible accounts from Kurdish villagers of even more Iraqi chemical attacks against civilians in the 1987 to 1988 time frame—with some attacks as late as October 1988—in areas close to the Iranian and Turkish borders.

- UNSCOM supervised the destruction of more than 40,000 chemical munitions, nearly 500,000 liters of chemical agents, 1.8 million liters of chemical precursors, and seven different types of delivery systems, including ballistic missile warheads.

More than 10 years after the Gulf war, gaps in Iraqi accounting and current production capabilities strongly suggest that Iraq maintains a stockpile of chemical agents, probably VX,³ sarin, cyclosarin,⁴ and mustard.

- **Iraq probably has concealed precursors, production equipment, documentation, and other items necessary for continuing its CW effort.** Baghdad never supplied adequate evidence to support its claims that it destroyed all of its CW agents and munitions. Thousands of tons of chemical precursors and tens of thousands of unfilled munitions, including Scud -variant missile warheads, remain unaccounted for.
- UNSCOM discovered a document at Iraqi Air Force headquarters in July 1998 showing that Iraq overstated by at least 6,000 the number of chemical bombs it told the UN it had used during the Iran -Iraq War—bombs that remain are unaccounted for.
- Iraq has not accounted for 15,000 artillery rockets that in the past were its preferred means for delivering nerve agents, nor has it accounted for about 550 artillery shells filled with mustard agent.
- Iraq probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents.


Baghdad continues to rebuild and expand dual-use infrastructure that it could divert quickly to CW production. The best examples are the chlorine and phenol plants at the Fallujah II facility. Both chemicals have legitimate civilian uses but also are raw materials for the synthesis of precursor chemicals used to produce blister and nerve agents. Iraq has three other chlorine plants that have much higher capacity for civilian production; these plants and Iraqi imports are more than sufficient to meet Iraq's civilian

³ VX is a V-series nerve agent that is similar to but more advanced than G-series nerve agents in that it causes the same medical effects but is more toxic and much more persistent. Thus, it poses a far greater skin hazard than G-series agents. VX could be used for long-term contamination of territory.


⁴ See footnote 5.

needs for water treatment. Of the 15 million kg of chlorine imported under the UN Oil-for-Food Program since 1997, Baghdad used only 10 million kg and has 5 million kg in stock, suggesting that some domestically produced chlorine has been diverted to such proscribed activities as CW agent production.

- Fallujah II was one of Iraq's principal CW precursor production facilities before the Gulf war. In the last two years the Iraqis have upgraded the facility and brought in new chemical reactor vessels and shipping containers with a large amount of production equipment. They have expanded chlorine output far beyond pre-Gulf war production levels—capabilities that can be diverted quickly to CW production. Iraq is seeking to purchase CW agent precursors and applicable production equipment and is trying to hide the activities of the Fallujah plant.



Iraq: CW-Related Production Facilities and Declared Sites of Deployed Alcohol-Filled or Chemical Agent-Filled Munitions During Desert Storm



Biological Warfare Program

Iraq has the capability to convert quickly legitimate vaccine and biopesticide plants to biological warfare (BW) production and already may have done so. This capability is particularly troublesome because Iraq has a record of concealing its BW activities and lying about the existence of its offensive BW program.

After four years of claiming that they had conducted only “small-scale, defensive” research, Iraqi officials finally admitted to inspectors in 1995 to production and weaponization of biological agents. The Iraqis admitted this only after being faced with evidence of their procurement of a large volume of growth media and the defection of Husayn Kamil, former director of Iraq’s military industries.



Two R-400A bombs in foreground photographed by UNSCOM inspectors at Murasana Airfield near the Al Walid Airbase in late 1991 bear markings indicating they were to be filled with botulinum toxin. Other bombs appear to have markings consistent with binary chemical agent fill. This evidence contradicted Iraq's declarations that it did not deploy BW munitions to operational airbases and that it destroyed all BW bombs in July 1991—declarations that were subsequently retracted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

Iraq: Declared BW-Related Sites



Iraqi-Acknowledged Open-Air Testing of Biological Weapons

Location-Date	Agent	Munition
Al Muhammadiyat – Mar 1988	<i>Bacillus subtilis</i> ⁵	250-gauge bomb (cap. 65 liters)
Al Muhamma diyat – Mar 1988	<i>Botulinum toxin</i>	250-gauge bomb (cap. 65 liters)
Al Muhammadiyat – Nov 1989	<i>Bacillus subtilis</i>	122mm rocket (cap. 8 liters)
Al Muhammadiyat – Nov 1989	<i>Botulinum toxin</i>	122mm rocket (cap. 8 liters)
Al Muhammadiyat – Nov 1989	Aflatoxin	122mm rocket (cap. 8 liters)
Khan Bani Saad – Aug 1988	<i>Bacillus subtilis</i>	aerosol generator – Mi-2 helicopter with modified agricultural spray equipment
Al Muhammadiyat – Dec 1989	<i>Bacillus subtilis</i>	R-400 bomb (cap. 85 liters)
Al Muhammadiyat – Nov 1989	<i>Botulinum toxin</i>	R-400 bomb (cap. 85 liters)
Al Muhammadiyat – Nov 1989	Aflatoxin	R-400 bomb (cap. 85 liters)
Jurf al-Sakr Firing Range – Sep 1989	Ricin	155mm artillery shell (cap. 3 liters)
Abu Obeydi Airfield – Dec 1990	Water	Modified Mirage F1 drop-tank (cap. 2,200 liters)
Abu Obeydi Airfield – Dec 1990	Water/potassium permanganate	Modified Mirage F1 drop-tank (cap. 2,200 liters)
Abu Obeydi Airfield – Jan 1991	Water/glycerine	Modified Mirage F1 drop-tank (cap. 2,200 liters)
Abu Obeydi Airfield – Jan 1991	<i>Bacillus subtilis</i> /Glycerine	Modified Mirage F1 drop-tank (cap. 2,200 liters)

- Iraq admitted producing thousands of liters of the BW agents anthrax, ⁶ botulinum toxin, (which paralyzes respiratory muscles and can be fatal within 24 to 36 hours), and aflatoxin, (a potent carcinogen that can attack the liver, killing years after ingestion), and preparing BW - filled Scud-variant missile warheads, aerial bombs, and aircraft spray tanks before the Gulf war.


Baghdad did not provide persuasive evidence to support its claims that it unilaterally destroyed its BW agents and munitions. **Experts from UNSCOM assessed that Baghdad’s declarations vastly understated the production of biological agents and estimated that Iraq actually produced two-to-four times the amount of agent that it acknowledged producing**, including *Bacillus anthracis*—the causative agent of anthrax—and botulinum toxin.

The improvement or expansion of a number of nominally “civilian” facilities that were directly associated with biological weapons indicates that key aspects of Iraq’s offensive BW program are active and most elements more advanced and larger than before the 1990-1991 Gulf war.

⁵ *Bacillus subtilis* is commonly used as a simulant for *B. anthracis*.

⁶ An infectious dose of anthrax is about 8,000 spores, or less than one-millionth of a gram in a non-immuno-compromised person. Inhalation anthrax historically has been 100 percent fatal within five to seven days, although in recent cases aggressive medical treatment has reduced the fatality rate.

- The al-Dawrah Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) Vaccine Facility is one of two known Biocontainment Level-3—facilities in Iraq with an extensive air handling and filtering system. Iraq admitted that before the Gulf war Al-Dawrah had been a BW agent production facility. UNSCOM attempted to render it useless for BW agent production in 1996 but left some production equipment in place because UNSCOM could not prove it was connected to previous BW work. In 2001, Iraq announced it would begin renovating the plant without UN approval, ostensibly to produce a vaccine to combat an FMD outbreak. In fact, Iraq easily can import all the foot-and-mouth vaccine it needs through the UN.
- The Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute is an ideal cover location for BW research, testing, production, and storage. UN inspectors discovered documents related to BW research at this facility, some showing that BW cultures, agents, and equipment were stored there during the Gulf war. Of particular concern is the plant's new storage capacity, which greatly exceeds Iraq's needs for legitimate medical storage.
- The Fallujah III Castor Oil Production Plant is situated on a large complex with an historical connection to Iraq's CW program. Of immediate BW concern is the



potential production of ricin toxin.⁷ Castor bean pulp, left over from castor oil production, can be used to extract ricin toxin. Iraq admitted to UNSCOM that it manufactured ricin and field-tested it in artillery shells before the Gulf war. Iraq operated this plant for legitimate purposes under UNSCOM scrutiny before 1998 when UN inspectors left the country. Since 1999, Iraq has rebuilt major structures destroyed during Operation Desert Fox. Iraqi officials claim they are making castor oil for brake fluid, but verifying such claims without UN inspections is impossible.

In addition to questions about activity at known facilities, **there are compelling reasons to be concerned about BW activity at other sites and in mobile production units and laboratories.** Baghdad has pursued a mobile BW research and production capability to better conceal its program.

- UNSCOM uncovered a document on Iraqi Military Industrial Commission letterhead indicating that Iraq was interested in developing mobile fermentation units, and an Iraqi scientist admitted to UN inspectors that Iraq was trying to move in the direction of mobile BW production.
- Iraq has now established large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capabilities based on mobile BW facilities.


Ballistic Missile Program

Iraq has developed a ballistic missile capability that exceeds the 150km range limitation established under UNSCR 687. During the 1980s, Iraq purchased 819 Scud B missiles from the USSR. Hundreds of these 300km range missiles were used to attack Iranian cities during the Iran-Iraq War. Beginning in 1987, Iraq converted many of these Soviet Scuds into extended-range variants, some of which were fired at Tehran; some were launched during the Gulf war, and others remained in Iraq's inventory at war's end. Iraq admitted filling at least 75 of its Scud warheads with chemical or biological agents and deployed these weapons for use against Coalition forces and regional opponents, including Israel in 1991.

Most of the approximately 90 Scud-type missiles Saddam fired at Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain during the Gulf war were al-Husayn variants that the Iraqis modified by lengthening the airframe and increasing fuel capacity, extending the range to 650 km.

Baghdad was developing other longer-range missiles based on Scud technology, including the 900km al-Abbas. Iraq was designing follow-on multi-stage and clustered medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) concepts with intended ranges up to 3,000 km. Iraq also had a program to develop a two-stage missile, called the Badr-2000, using solid-propellants with an estimated range of 750 to 1,000 km.

⁷ Ricin can cause multiple organ failure within one or two days after inhalation.



- Iraq never fully accounted for its existing missile programs. Discrepancies in Baghdad’s declarations suggest that Iraq retains a small force of extended -range Scud-type missiles and an undetermined number of launchers and warheads. Further, Iraq never explained the disposition of advanced missile components, such as guidance and control systems, that it could not produce on its own and that would be critical to developmental programs.

Iraq continues to work on UN -authorized short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs)—those with a range no greater than 150 km—that help develop the expertise and infrastructure needed to produce longer -range missile systems. The al-Samoud liquid propellant SRBM and the Ababil-100 solid propellant SRBM, however, are capable of flying beyond the allowed 150km range. Both missiles have been tested aggressively and are in early deployment. Other evidence strongly suggests Iraq is modifying missile testing and production facilities to produce even longer -range missiles.

- The Al-Rafah-North Liquid Propellant Engine Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) Facility is Iraq’s principal site for the static testing of liquid propellant missile engines. Baghdad has been building a new test stand there that is larger than the test stand associated with al-Samoud engine testing and the defunct Scud engine test stand. The only plausible explanation for this test facility is that Iraq intends to test engines for longer -range missiles prohibited under UNSCR 687.

SA-2 (Al Samoud) Engine Test



Iraq conducted static tests of the SA-2 SAM sustainer engine to support development of the Al Samoud SRBM. This test stand is capable of testing engines for Iraq's UN-authorized liquid-propellant ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles. The new test stand at Al-Rafah is larger than both this test stand and the defunct Scud engine test stand, indicating Iraqi intentions to test engines for longer-range missiles.

Iraq: Ballistic-Missile-Related Facilities





- The Al-Mutasim Solid Rocket Motor and Test Facility, previously associated with Iraq's Badr-2000 solid-propellant missile program, has been rebuilt and expanded in recent years. The al-Mutasim site supports solid-propellant motor assembly, rework, and testing for the UN -authorized Ababil-100, but the size of certain facilities there, particularly those newly constructed between the assembly rework and static test areas, suggests that Baghdad is preparing to develop systems that are prohibited by the UN.
- At the Al-Mamoun Solid Rocket Motor Production Plant and RDT&E Facility, the Iraqis, since the December 1998 departure of inspectors, have rebuilt structures damaged during the Gulf war and dismantled by UNSCOM that originally were built

to manufacture solid propellant motors for the Badr -2000 program. They also have built a new building and are reconstructing other buildings originally designed to fill large Badr-2000 motor casings with solid propellant.

- Also at al-Mamoun, the Iraqis have rebuilt two structures used to “mix” solid propellant for the Badr -2000 missile. The new buildings—about as large as the original ones—are ideally suited to house large, UN -prohibited mixers. In fact, the only logical explanation for the size and configuration of these mixing buildings is that Iraq intends to develop longer -range, prohibited missiles.

Iraq has managed to rebuild and expand its missile development infrastructure under sanctions. Iraqi intermediaries have sought production technology, machine tools, and raw materials in violation of the arms embargo.

- The Iraqis have completed a new ammonium perchlorate production plant at Mamoun that supports Iraq’s solid propellant missile program. Ammonium perchlorate is a common oxidizer used in solid propellant missile motors. Baghdad would not have been able to complete this facility without help from abroad .
- In August 1995, Iraq was caught trying to acquire sensitive ballistic missile guidance components, including gyroscopes originally used in Russian strategic nuclear SLBMs, demonstrating that Baghdad has been pursuing proscribed, advanced, long -range missile technology for some time. Iraqi officials admitted that, despite international prohibitions, they had received a similar shipment earlier that year.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Program and Other Aircraft

Iraq is continuing to develop other platforms which most analysts believe probably are intended for delivering biological warfare agents. Immediately before the Gulf war, Baghdad attempted to convert a MiG -21 into an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to carry spray tanks capable of dispensing chemical or biological agents. UNSCOM assessed that the program to develop the spray system was successful, but the conversion of the MiG -21 was not. More recently, Baghdad has attempted to convert some of its L-29 jet trainer aircraft into UAVs that can be fitted with chemical and biological warfare (CBW) spray tanks, most likely a continuation of previous efforts with the MiG -21. Although much less sophisticated than ballistic missiles as a delivery platform, an aircraft—manned or unmanned—is the most efficient way to disseminate chemical and biological weapons over a large, distant area.

- Iraq already has produced modified drop -tanks that can disperse biological or chemical agents effectively. Before the Gulf war, the Iraqis successfully experimented with aircraft-mounted spray tanks capable of releasing up to 2,000 liters of an anthrax simulant over a target area. Iraq also has modified commercial crop sprayers successfully and tested them with an anthrax simulant delivered by helicopters.


Iraqi L-29 UAV Test-Bed Aircraft at Samarra East Airbase



- Baghdad has a history of experimenting with a variety of unmanned platforms. Iraq's use of newer, more capable airframes would increase range and payload, while smaller platforms might be harder to detect and therefore more survivable. This capability represents a serious threat to Iraq's neighbors and to international military forces in the region.
- Iraq used tactical fighter aircraft and helicopters to deliver chemical agents, loaded in bombs and rockets, during the Iran-Iraq War. Baghdad probably is considering again using manned aircraft as delivery platforms depending on the operational scenario.

Procurement in Support of WMD Programs

Iraq has been able to import dual-use, WMD-relevant equipment and material through procurements both within and outside the UN sanctions regime. **Baghdad diverts some of the \$10 billion worth of goods now entering Iraq every year for humanitarian needs to support the military and WMD programs instead.** Iraq's growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases Baghdad's capabilities to finance its WMD programs. Over the last four years Baghdad's earnings from illicit oil sales have more than quadrupled to about \$3 billion this year.



Test of dissemination of BW agents from a modified drop tank carried by a Mirage F1. The drop tank was filled with 1000 liters of slurry Bacillus subtilis, a simulant for B. anthracis, and disseminated over Abu Obeydi Airbase in January 1991. The photo is from a videotape provided by Iraq to UNSCOM.

- UN monitors at Iraq's borders do not inspect the cargo —worth hundreds of millions of dollars—that enters Iraq every year outside of the Oil-for-Food Program; some of these goods clearly support Iraq's military and WMD programs. For example, Baghdad imports fiber-optic communication systems outside of UN auspices to support the Iraqi military.
- Iraq imports goods using planes, trains, trucks, and ships without any type of international inspections—in violation of UN Security Council resolutions.

Even within the UN -authorized Oil-for-Food Program, Iraq does not hide that it wants to purchase military and WMD-related goods. For example, **Baghdad diverted UN-approved trucks for military purposes and construction equipment to rehabilitate WMD-affiliated facilities, even though these items were approved only to help the civilian population.**

- Iraq has been able to repair modern industrial machine tools that previously supported production of WMD or missile components and has imported additional tools that it may use to reconstitute Baghdad's unconventional weapons arsenal.
- On several occasions, Iraq has asked to purchase goods —such as neutron generators and servo valves—that the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) views as linchpins for prohibited Iraqi programs; alternative, non-dual-use items would serve the civilian purpose purportedly intended for this equipment.

UNMOVIC began screening contracts pursuant to UNSCR 1284 in December 1999 and since has identified more than 100 contracts containing dual-use items as defined in UNSCR 1051 that can be diverted into WMD programs. UNMOVIC also has requested that suppliers provide technical information on hundreds of other goods because of concerns about potential misuse of dual-use equipment. In many cases, Iraq has requested technology that clearly exceeds requirements for the stated commercial end - use when it easily could substitute items that could not be used for WMD.

- On some UN contracts, Baghdad claimed that the requested goods are designed to rehabilitate facilities—such as the Al Qa'im phosphate plant and Fallujah—that in the past were used to support both industrial and WMD programs.

DOCUMENT: U.S. Embassy Hungary Cable to U.S. Department of State, et al.,
“Free Iraqi Forces in Positive Images”

DATE: April 3, 2003

SOURCE: State Department FOIA

CONTENT: The U.S. embassy in Budapest asks for positive images and video it can use to publicize the “successes” of the “Free Iraqi Forces” (paramilitary volunteers from Iraqi opposition groups).

ACTION IO-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	AMAD-00	A-00	CIAE-00	INL-00
	DODE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EUR-00	OIGO-00	UTED-00	VC-00
	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-00	VCE-00	M-00	AC-01	NEA-00
	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	DHS-00	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	SS-00	TEST-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	R-00	EPAE-00	IIP-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-00	DRL-01	G-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/006W

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R 041212Z APR 03
 FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9928
 AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
 AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA
 AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
 AMEMBASSY VIENNA
 AMEMBASSY WARSAW

RELEASED IN FULL

UNCLAS BUDAPEST 000949

FOR ACTING U/S HARRISON, IPP JBULLOCK AND IRAQI TASK
 FORCE/PDPA
 INFO FOR PAOS

E.O. 12958: N/A
 TAGS: KPAO PREL OIIP OPRC IZ

SUBJECT: FREE IRAQI FORCES IN POSITIVE IMAGES

REF STATE 85201

1. EMBASSY BUDAPEST WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE NOTIFICATION SHOULD ANY OF THE REQUESTED POSITIVE IMAGE AND VIDEO PLACEMENT INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE FREE IRAQI FORCES (FIF). THOSE FIF SOLDIERS RECEIVED CIVIL AFFAIRS TRAINING AT HUNGARY'S TASZAR AIR BASE AND ARE CURRENTLY SERVING WITH DIFFERENT COALITION UNITS IN IRAQ.

2. CONSIDERABLE HUNGARIAN PUBLIC CONTROVERSY AND UNEASE SURROUNDED THE INTRODUCTION OF THE TASZAR TRAINING PROGRAM FOR EXPATRIATE IRAQI VOLUNTEERS SEVERAL MONTHS AGO. OUR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS TO DISPELL THAT CONTROVERSY AND QUELL THE UNEASE RESULTED IN GROWING ACCEPTANCE OF THE FIF TRAINING AS A HIGHLY POSITIVE HUNGARIAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL WAR ON TERRORISM.

3. SO FAR, WE HAVE RECEIVED ONLY SCATTERED AND

UNCLASSIFIED

ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE ATTESTING TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FIF VOLUNTEERS IN THE IRAQ CONFLICT. WE UNDERSTAND THAT SEVERAL OF THOSE INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN SINGLED OUT BY THE MEDIA FOR THE INVALUABLE ROLES THEY HAVE PLAYED. (WE UNDERSTAND, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT TWO SELF-PROCLAIMED IRAQI SUICIDE BOMBERS POINTEDLY SOUGHT OUT AND SURRENDED TO A FIF VOLUNTEER IN FRONT OF CNN'S CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR.)

4. POST WILL USE ANY FUTURE MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE FIF TO REMIND THE HUNGARIAN PUBLIC-AND THE WORLD-ABOUT THE SUCCESS OF THE FIF VOLUNTEERS AND THE SINGULAR CONTRIBUTION THEY ARE MAKING IN THIS CONFLICT.

GARVEY

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

DOCUMENT: U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters United States Army Training and Doctrine Command Memo from Raymond D. Barrett, Jr. to Commander, Forces Command, “After Action Review, Training and Equipping of Free Iraqi Forces (FIF)”

DATE: May 21, 2003

SOURCE: Department of Defense

CONTENT: Summarizing its experience providing military training to recruits from Iraqi opposition groups (the “Free Iraqi Forces”) to support the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Army reports that “Funds necessary for mission preparation, forming and deploying....and sustaining the training task force were not provided at the start of operations,” so it “had to reallocate funding from critical training needs to support the mission.” In addition, it faced a “Lack of guidance initially as to what tasks the FIF required training on....When the number of FIF volunteers did not materialize as originally forecasted, and no further volunteers were forthcoming,” the source of authority to stop training and re-assign the training force was not clear. The command recommends that future missions to train foreign personnel include “more initial notice, support, and guidance,” and upfront funding: “Any reallocation or unforecasted expenditures severely impact the training base.”



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
102 MCNAIR DRIVE
FORT MONROE VIRGINIA 23661-1047

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

ATTG-ET (350)

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, Forces Command (G3), 1777 Hardee
Avenue SW, Fort McPherson, GA 30330-1062

SUBJECT: After Action Review, Training and Equipping of Free
Iraqi Forces (FIF)

1. Reference FORSCOM Memorandum, After Action Review, Training and Equipping of Free Iraqi Forces (FIF), received 14 May 03.
2. Enclosed are HQ TRADOC's AAR comments for the FIF operations.
3. TRADOC personnel from Fort Jackson were attached to Task Force Warrior Headquarters at Fort Polk. Fort Jackson's AAR comments have been compiled and sent to Task Force Warrior personnel for inclusion in their AAR.
4. Point of contact for this action is LTC Kuster, DCSOPS&T, Director IET, DSN 680-5602 or commercial (757) 788-5602.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Encl

RAYMOND D. BARRETT, JR.
Major General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations and Training

21 May 2003

A. Executive Summary.

TRADOC was tasked to provide the cadre to train Free Iraqi Force (FIF) soldiers on Basic Combat Training (BCT) tasks, Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC) tasks, and Officer Candidate School (OCS) tasks. The planning phase began in October 2002 with deployment in January 2003 to Tazsar, Hungary. TRADOC provided 110 training cadre: 10 PLDC, 88 BCT, 10 OCS, and 2 engineer cadre. The military police training requirement was rescinded prior to departure to Hungary. One BCT battalion from Fort Jackson provided the 88 BCT cadre which resulted in TRADOC delaying the implementation of 71L OSUT. The 10 PLDC cadre were provided by Fort Knox, and backfilled by a reserve unit from Fort McCoy, WI. Fort Benning provided the OCS cadre resulting in an increase of student to instructor ratio beyond the normally accepted level.

B. Positive Actions/Successes.

ISSUE: FORSCOM G-3, Deployment Branch, was instrumental in assisting TRADOC elements in deploying from CONUS to Tazsar, Hungary.

DISCUSSION: As a TDA organization, TRADOC does not have the personnel or expertise to deploy units. TRADOC relied upon FORSCOM G-3, Deployment Branch, to assist TRADOC elements in the development of deployment equipment lists (DEL), and the scheduling and coordination of strategic transportation assets. Without FORSCOM's invaluable expertise, TRADOC would have been challenged to meet deployment timelines.

RECOMMENDATION: TRADOC continue to rely upon FORSCOM deployment expertise in future operational missions.

C. Challenges Overcome/Areas of Improvement.

ISSUE: There was confusion as to which headquarters had the authority to terminate the FIF training mission once all FIF recruits finished training at Tazsar, Hungary.

DISCUSSION: When the number of FIF volunteers did not materialize as originally forecasted, and no further volunteers were forthcoming, the decision-making authority to stop the training and redeploy the TTF was not clear. It took several days to reach a decision to discontinue training and begin redeployment of the training task force.

RECOMMENDATION: Clearly delineate command responsibilities for both the supporting and the supported MACOMS.

ISSUE: Lack of initial contingency funding forced TRADOC to pull scarce funds internally to meet emerging contingency requirements.

DISCUSSION: Funds necessary for mission preparation, forming and deploying the TTF, and sustaining the TTF were not provided at the start of operations. TRADOC had to reallocate funding from critical training needs to support the mission. A better transition from a training posture to deployment operations can be made if the funds required are readily available at the onset of the mission.

RECOMMENDATION: Provide contingency funding at mission execution vice having MACOMs internally re-allocate scarce funds to meet contingency requirements.

ISSUE: Removal of cadre from training base.

DISCUSSION: The TRADOC training base is comprised of specifically identified and trained MOS personnel. These training personnel are only one deep in most situations. Removal of these personnel from the training can result in training delays. If the funds are not available initially to hire temporary contractors to backfill cadre, then the training may stop all together for unspecified periods of time.

RECOMMENDATION: Provide the necessary planning information far enough in advance to allow TRADOC to reassign cadre, hire temporary contractors, or activate reserve component personnel to fill positions of deploying cadre.

ISSUE: Lack of guidance initially as to what tasks the FIF required training on

DISCUSSION: There was a lack of clear guidance initially to TRADOC as to what the FIF programs of instruction (POI) should contain to meet the intent of the mission. TRADOC modified existing POIs for FIF use. Modifications included deleting reference to US specific training requirements such as Army Values, and sexual harassment training. Because instruction had to take place via translator, TRADOC POIs doubled the training hours per lesson to accommodate that translation lag. Several contractors and active duty personnel spent numerous days adjusting and modifying POIs and training support packages. Time, material, and money could have been saved.

RECOMMENDATION: Provide clear initial guidance outlining what subjects need to be taught, duration of training time, and number of trainees in order to allow subject matter experts the time to provide a quality product that meets the mission's intent.

D. Advice for Potential Future Missions.

Future missions for training foreign personnel with U.S. Army soldiers must include more initial notice, support, and guidance. TRADOC must have the time to backfill deploying personnel either with reserve component personnel or temporary hires. It is crucial to know the requirements and timeline as soon as possible. TRADOC must also have the funding upfront. Any reallocation or unforecasted expenditures severely impact the training base. Guidance must be clear, and command relationships and responsibilities must be known from the beginning.

DOCUMENT: *“Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States”*[extract]

DATE: July 22, 2004

SOURCE: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States

CONTENT: Undertaken at the request of President Bush and Congress in response to public pressure for an official inquiry into events leading up to the 9/11 attacks, the investigation’s report identifies a number of intelligence and organizational failures. It finds no evidence supporting allegations that hijacker Mohammed Atta met in Prague with an Iraqi intelligence official. It reports that according to his own testimony Bush suspected Iraq of involvement immediately after the attacks, and that the NSC counterterrorism unit reported back to him that there was no compelling supporting evidence; Donald Rumsfeld, who favored immediately attacking Iraq as well as al-Qaeda targets, then directed the Pentagon to get more intelligence on Iraq. The report says that Paul Wolfowitz was the chief advocate for an immediate attack on Iraq. Bush called for contingency planning for military actions, but deferred a decision to invade.

THE 9/11
COMMISSION
REPORT

THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT

Final Report of the
National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States

OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT EDITION

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001

ISBN 0-16-072304-3

Atta's Alleged Trip to Prague

Mohamed Atta is known to have been in Prague on two occasions: in December 1994, when he stayed one night at a transit hotel, and in June 2000, when he was en route to the United States. On the latter occasion, he arrived by bus from Germany, on June 2, and departed for Newark the following day.⁶⁹

The allegation that Atta met with an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in April 2001 originates from the reporting of a single source of the Czech intelligence service. Shortly after 9/11, the source reported having seen Atta meet with Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al Ani, an Iraqi diplomat, at the Iraqi Embassy in Prague on April 9, 2001, at 11:00 A.M. This information was passed to CIA headquarters.

The U.S. legal attaché ("Legat") in Prague, the representative of the FBI, met with the Czech service's source. After the meeting, the assessment of the Legat and the Czech officers present was that they were 70 percent sure that the source was sincere and believed his own story of the meeting. Subsequently, the Czech intelligence service publicly stated that there was a 70 percent probability that the meeting between Atta and Ani had taken place. The Czech Interior Minister also made several statements to the press about his belief that the meeting had occurred, and the story was widely reported.

The FBI has gathered evidence indicating that Atta was in Virginia Beach on April 4 (as evidenced by a bank surveillance camera photo), and in Coral Springs, Florida on April 11, where he and Shehhi leased an apartment. On April 6, 9, 10, and 11, Atta's cellular telephone was used numerous times to call various lodging establishments in Florida from cell sites within Florida. We cannot confirm that he placed those calls. But there are no U.S. records indicating that Atta departed the country during this period. Czech officials have reviewed their flight and border records as well for any indication that Atta was in the Czech Republic in April 2001, including records of anyone crossing the border who even looked Arab. They have also reviewed pictures from the area near the Iraqi embassy and have not discovered photos of anyone who looked like Atta. No evidence has been found that Atta was in the Czech Republic in April 2001.

According to the Czech government, Ani, the Iraqi officer alleged to have met with Atta, was about 70 miles away from Prague on April 8–9 and did not return until the afternoon of the ninth, while the source was firm that the sighting occurred at 11:00 A.M. When questioned about the reported April 2001 meeting, Ani—now in custody—has denied ever

meeting or having any contact with Atta. Ani says that shortly after 9/11, he became concerned that press stories about the alleged meeting might hurt his career. Hoping to clear his name, Ani asked his superiors to approach the Czech government about refuting the allegation. He also denies knowing of any other Iraqi official having contact with Atta.

These findings cannot absolutely rule out the possibility that Atta was in Prague on April 9, 2001. He could have used an alias to travel and a passport under that alias, but this would be an exception to his practice of using his true name while traveling (as he did in January and would in July when he took his next overseas trip). The FBI and CIA have uncovered no evidence that Atta held any fraudulent passports.

KSM and Binalshibh both deny that an Atta-Ani meeting occurred. There was no reason for such a meeting, especially considering the risk it would pose to the operation. By April 2001, all four pilots had completed most of their training, and the muscle hijackers were about to begin entering the United States.

The available evidence does not support the original Czech report of an Atta-Ani meeting.⁷⁰

student visa, both of them had to persuade INS inspectors that they should be admitted so that they could continue their flight training. Neither operative had any problem clearing Customs.⁷¹

After returning to Florida from their trips, Atta and Shehhi visited Georgia, staying briefly in Norcross and Decatur, and renting a single-engine plane to fly with an instructor in Lawrenceville. By February 19, Atta and Shehhi were in Virginia. They rented a mailbox in Virginia Beach, cashed a check, and then promptly returned to Georgia, staying in Stone Mountain. We have found no explanation for these travels. In mid-March, Jarrah was in Georgia as well, staying in Decatur. There is no evidence that the three pilots met, although Jarrah and Atta apparently spoke on the phone. At the end of the month, Jarrah left the United States again and visited Senguen in Germany for two weeks. In early April, Atta and Shehhi returned to Virginia Beach and closed the mailbox they had opened in February.⁷²

By the time Atta and Shehhi returned to Virginia Beach from their travels in Georgia, Hazmi and Hanjour had also arrived in Virginia, in Falls Church. They made their way to a large mosque there, the Dar al Hijra mosque, sometime in early April.⁷³

As we mentioned earlier, one of the imams at this mosque was the same Anwar Aulaqi with whom Hazmi had spent time at the Rabat mosque in San Diego. Aulaqi had moved to Virginia in January 2001. He remembers Hazmi

FBI was aware of the flights of Saudi nationals and was able to screen the passengers before they were allowed to depart.³⁰

The FBI interviewed all persons of interest on these flights prior to their departures. They concluded that none of the passengers was connected to the 9/11 attacks and have since found no evidence to change that conclusion. Our own independent review of the Saudi nationals involved confirms that no one with known links to terrorism departed on these flights.³¹

10.2 PLANNING FOR WAR

By late in the evening of September 11, the President had addressed the nation on the terrible events of the day. Vice President Cheney described the President's mood as somber.³² The long day was not yet over. When the larger meeting that included his domestic department heads broke up, President Bush chaired a smaller meeting of top advisers, a group he would later call his "war council."³³ This group usually included Vice President Cheney, Secretary of State Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, General Hugh Shelton, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (later to become chairman) General Myers, DCI Tenet, Attorney General Ashcroft, and FBI Director Robert Mueller. From the White House staff, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Chief of Staff Card were part of the core group, often joined by their deputies, Stephen Hadley and Joshua Bolten.

In this restricted National Security Council meeting, the President said it was a time for self-defense. The United States would punish not just the perpetrators of the attacks, but also those who harbored them. Secretary Powell said the United States had to make it clear to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Arab states that the time to act was now. He said we would need to build a coalition. The President noted that the attacks provided a great opportunity to engage Russia and China. Secretary Rumsfeld urged the President and the principals to think broadly about who might have harbored the attackers, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Sudan, and Iran. He wondered aloud how much evidence the United States would need in order to deal with these countries, pointing out that major strikes could take up to 60 days to assemble.³⁴

President Bush chaired two more meetings of the NSC on September 12. In the first meeting, he stressed that the United States was at war with a new and different kind of enemy. The President tasked principals to go beyond their pre-9/11 work and develop a strategy to eliminate terrorists and punish those who support them. As they worked on defining the goals and objectives of the upcoming campaign, they considered a paper that went beyond al Qaeda to

propose the "elimination of terrorism as a threat to our way of life," an aim that would include pursuing other international terrorist organizations in the Middle East.³⁵

Rice chaired a Principals Committee meeting on September 13 in the Situation Room to refine how the fight against al Qaeda would be conducted. The principals agreed that the overall message should be that anyone supporting al Qaeda would risk harm. The United States would need to integrate diplomacy, financial measures, intelligence, and military actions into an overarching strategy. The principals also focused on Pakistan and what it could do to turn the Taliban against al Qaeda. They concluded that if Pakistan decided not to help the United States, it too would be at risk.³⁶

The same day, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage met with the Pakistani ambassador to the United States, Maleeha Lodhi, and the visiting head of Pakistan's military intelligence service, Mahmud Ahmed. Armitage said that the United States wanted Pakistan to take seven steps:

- to stop al Qaeda operatives at its border and end all logistical support for Bin Ladin;
- to give the United States blanket overflight and landing rights for all necessary military and intelligence operations;
- to provide territorial access to U.S. and allied military intelligence and other personnel to conduct operations against al Qaeda;
- to provide the United States with intelligence information;
- to continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts;
- to cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop recruits from going to Afghanistan; and,
- if the evidence implicated bin Ladin and al Qaeda and the Taliban continued to harbor them, to break relations with the Taliban government.³⁷

Pakistan made its decision swiftly. That afternoon, Secretary of State Powell announced at the beginning of an NSC meeting that Pakistani President Musharraf had agreed to every U.S. request for support in the war on terrorism. The next day, the U.S. embassy in Islamabad confirmed that Musharraf and his top military commanders had agreed to all seven demands. "Pakistan will need full US support as it proceeds with us," the embassy noted. "Musharraf said the GOP [government of Pakistan] was making substantial concessions in allowing use of its territory and that he would pay a domestic price. His standing in Pakistan was certain to suffer. To counterbalance that he needed to show that Pakistan was benefiting from his decisions."³⁸

At the September 13 NSC meeting, when Secretary Powell described Pakistan's reply, President Bush led a discussion of an appropriate ultimatum to the Taliban. He also ordered Secretary Rumsfeld to develop a military plan against

al Qaeda's sanctuary in Afghanistan. The new directive—formally signed on October 25, after the fighting in Afghanistan had already begun—included new material followed by annexes discussing each targeted terrorist group. The old draft directive on al Qaeda became, in effect, the first annex.⁵⁷ The United States would strive to eliminate all terrorist networks, dry up their financial support, and prevent them from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The goal was the “elimination of terrorism as a threat to our way of life.”⁵⁸

10.3 “PHASE TWO” AND THE QUESTION OF IRAQ

President Bush had wondered immediately after the attack whether Saddam Hussein's regime might have had a hand in it. Iraq had been an enemy of the United States for 11 years, and was the only place in the world where the United States was engaged in ongoing combat operations. As a former pilot, the President was struck by the apparent sophistication of the operation and some of the piloting, especially Hanjour's high-speed dive into the Pentagon. He told us he recalled Iraqi support for Palestinian suicide terrorists as well. Speculating about other possible states that could be involved, the President told us he also thought about Iran.⁵⁹

Clarke has written that on the evening of September 12, President Bush told him and some of his staff to explore possible Iraqi links to 9/11. “See if Saddam did this,” Clarke recalls the President telling them. “See if he's linked in any way.”⁶⁰ While he believed the details of Clarke's account to be incorrect, President Bush acknowledged that he might well have spoken to Clarke at some point, asking him about Iraq.⁶¹

Responding to a presidential tasking, Clarke's office sent a memo to Rice on September 18, titled “Survey of Intelligence Information on Any Iraq Involvement in the September 11 Attacks.” Rice's chief staffer on Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, concurred in its conclusion that only some anecdotal evidence linked Iraq to al Qaeda. The memo found no “compelling case” that Iraq had either planned or perpetrated the attacks. It passed along a few foreign intelligence reports, including the Czech report alleging an April 2001 Prague meeting between Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer (discussed in chapter 7) and a Polish report that personnel at the headquarters of Iraqi intelligence in Baghdad were told before September 11 to go on the streets to gauge crowd reaction to an unspecified event. Arguing that the case for links between Iraq and al Qaeda was weak, the memo pointed out that Bin Ladin resented the secularism of Saddam Hussein's regime. Finally, the memo said, there was no confirmed reporting on Saddam cooperating with Bin Ladin on unconventional weapons.⁶²

On the afternoon of 9/11, according to contemporaneous notes, Secretary Rumsfeld instructed General Myers to obtain quickly as much information as

possible. The notes indicate that he also told Myers that he was not simply interested in striking empty training sites. He thought the U.S. response should consider a wide range of options and possibilities. The secretary said his instinct was to hit Saddam Hussein at the same time—not only Bin Ladin. Secretary Rumsfeld later explained that at the time, he had been considering either one of them, or perhaps someone else, as the responsible party.⁶³

According to Rice, the issue of what, if anything, to do about Iraq was really engaged at Camp David. Briefing papers on Iraq, along with many others, were in briefing materials for the participants. Rice told us the administration was concerned that Iraq would take advantage of the 9/11 attacks. She recalled that in the first Camp David session chaired by the President, Rumsfeld asked what the administration should do about Iraq. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz made the case for striking Iraq during “this round” of the war on terrorism.⁶⁴

A Defense Department paper for the Camp David briefing book on the strategic concept for the war on terrorism specified three priority targets for initial action: al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Iraq. It argued that of the three, al Qaeda and Iraq posed a strategic threat to the United States. Iraq’s long-standing involvement in terrorism was cited, along with its interest in weapons of mass destruction.⁶⁵

Secretary Powell recalled that Wolfowitz—not Rumsfeld—argued that Iraq was ultimately the source of the terrorist problem and should therefore be attacked.⁶⁶ Powell said that Wolfowitz was not able to justify his belief that Iraq was behind 9/11. “Paul was always of the view that Iraq was a problem that had to be dealt with,” Powell told us. “And he saw this as one way of using this event as a way to deal with the Iraq problem.” Powell said that President Bush did not give Wolfowitz’s argument “much weight.”⁶⁷ Though continuing to worry about Iraq in the following week, Powell said, President Bush saw Afghanistan as the priority.⁶⁸

President Bush told Bob Woodward that the decision not to invade Iraq was made at the morning session on September 15. Iraq was not even on the table during the September 15 afternoon session, which dealt solely with Afghanistan.⁶⁹ Rice said that when President Bush called her on Sunday, September 16, he said the focus would be on Afghanistan, although he still wanted plans for Iraq should the country take some action or the administration eventually determine that it had been involved in the 9/11 attacks.⁷⁰

At the September 17 NSC meeting, there was some further discussion of “phase two” of the war on terrorism.⁷¹ President Bush ordered the Defense Department to be ready to deal with Iraq if Baghdad acted against U.S. interests, with plans to include possibly occupying Iraqi oil fields.⁷²

Within the Pentagon, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz continued to press the case for dealing with Iraq. Writing to Rumsfeld on September 17 in a memo headlined “Preventing More Events,” he argued that if there was even a 10 percent chance that Saddam Hussein was behind the 9/11 attack, maximum pri-

ority should be placed on eliminating that threat. Wolfowitz contended that the odds were “far more” than 1 in 10, citing Saddam’s praise for the attack, his long record of involvement in terrorism, and theories that Ramzi Yousef was an Iraqi agent and Iraq was behind the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center.⁷³ The next day, Wolfowitz renewed the argument, writing to Rumsfeld about the interest of Yousef’s co-conspirator in the 1995 Manila air plot in crashing an explosives-laden plane into CIA headquarters, and about information from a foreign government regarding Iraqis’ involvement in the attempted hijacking of a Gulf Air flight. Given this background, he wondered why so little thought had been devoted to the danger of suicide pilots, seeing a “failure of imagination” and a mind-set that dismissed possibilities.⁷⁴

On September 19, Rumsfeld offered several thoughts for his commanders as they worked on their contingency plans. Though he emphasized the worldwide nature of the conflict, the references to specific enemies or regions named only the Taliban, al Qaeda, and Afghanistan.⁷⁵ Shelton told us the administration reviewed all the Pentagon’s war plans and challenged certain assumptions underlying them, as any prudent organization or leader should do.⁷⁶

General Tommy Franks, the commanding general of Central Command, recalled receiving Rumsfeld’s guidance that each regional commander should assess what these plans meant for his area of responsibility. He knew he would soon be striking the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. But, he told us, he now wondered how that action was connected to what might need to be done in Somalia, Yemen, or Iraq.⁷⁷

On September 20, President Bush met with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and the two leaders discussed the global conflict ahead. When Blair asked about Iraq, the President replied that Iraq was not the immediate problem. Some members of his administration, he commented, had expressed a different view, but he was the one responsible for making the decisions.⁷⁸

Franks told us that he was pushing independently to do more robust planning on military responses in Iraq during the summer before 9/11—a request President Bush denied, arguing that the time was not right. (CENTCOM also began dusting off plans for a full invasion of Iraq during this period, Franks said.) The CENTCOM commander told us he renewed his appeal for further military planning to respond to Iraqi moves shortly after 9/11, both because he personally felt that Iraq and al Qaeda might be engaged in some form of collusion and because he worried that Saddam might take advantage of the attacks to move against his internal enemies in the northern or southern parts of Iraq, where the United States was flying regular missions to enforce Iraqi no-fly zones. Franks said that President Bush again turned down the request.⁷⁹

HAVING ISSUED DIRECTIVES to guide his administration’s preparations for war, on Thursday, September 20, President Bush addressed the nation before a joint session of Congress. “Tonight,” he said, “we are a country awakened to

danger.”⁸⁰ The President blamed al Qaeda for 9/11 and the 1998 embassy bombings and, for the first time, declared that al Qaeda was “responsible for bombing the USS *Cole*.”⁸¹ He reiterated the ultimatum that had already been conveyed privately. “The Taliban must act, and act immediately,” he said. “They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.”⁸² The President added that America’s quarrel was not with Islam: “The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them.” Other regimes faced hard choices, he pointed out: “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make: Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”⁸³

President Bush argued that the new war went beyond Bin Ladin. “Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there,” he said. “It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.” The President had a message for the Pentagon: “The hour is coming when America will act, and you will make us proud.” He also had a message for those outside the United States. “This is civilization’s fight,” he said. “We ask every nation to join us.”⁸⁴

President Bush approved military plans to attack Afghanistan in meetings with Central Command’s General Franks and other advisers on September 21 and October 2. Originally titled “Infinite Justice,” the operation’s code word was changed—to avoid the sensibilities of Muslims who associate the power of infinite justice with God alone—to the operational name still used for operations in Afghanistan: “Enduring Freedom.”⁸⁵

The plan had four phases.

- In *Phase One*, the United States and its allies would move forces into the region and arrange to operate from or over neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan and Pakistan. This occurred in the weeks following 9/11, aided by overwhelming international sympathy for the United States.
- In *Phase Two*, air strikes and Special Operations attacks would hit key al Qaeda and Taliban targets. In an innovative joint effort, CIA and Special Operations forces would be deployed to work together with each major Afghan faction opposed to the Taliban. The Phase Two strikes and raids began on October 7. The basing arrangements contemplated for Phase One were substantially secured—after arduous effort—by the end of that month.
- In *Phase Three*, the United States would carry out “decisive operations” using all elements of national power, including ground troops, to topple the Taliban regime and eliminate al Qaeda’s sanctuary in Afghanistan. Mazar-e-Sharif, in northern Afghanistan, fell to a coalition assault by Afghan and U.S. forces on November 9. Four days later the Taliban had fled from Kabul. By early December, all major cities

had fallen to the coalition. On December 22, Hamid Karzai, a Pash-tun leader from Kandahar, was installed as the chairman of Afghanistan's interim administration. Afghanistan had been liberated from the rule of the Taliban.

In December 2001, Afghan forces, with limited U.S. support, engaged al Qaeda elements in a cave complex called Tora Bora. In March 2002, the largest engagement of the war was fought, in the mountainous Shah-i-Kot area south of Gardez, against a large force of al Qaeda jihadists. The three-week battle was substantially successful, and almost all remaining al Qaeda forces took refuge in Pakistan's equally mountainous and lightly governed frontier provinces. As of July 2004, Bin Ladin and Zawahiri are still believed to be at large.

- In *Phase Four*, civilian and military operations turned to the indefinite task of what the armed forces call "security and stability operations."

Within about two months of the start of combat operations, several hundred CIA operatives and Special Forces soldiers, backed by the striking power of U.S. aircraft and a much larger infrastructure of intelligence and support efforts, had combined with Afghan militias and a small number of other coalition soldiers to destroy the Taliban regime and disrupt al Qaeda. They had killed or captured about a quarter of the enemy's known leaders. Mohammed Atef, al Qaeda's military commander and a principal figure in the 9/11 plot, had been killed by a U.S. air strike. According to a senior CIA officer who helped devise the overall strategy, the CIA provided intelligence, experience, cash, covert action capabilities, and entrée to tribal allies. In turn, the U.S. military offered combat expertise, firepower, logistics, and communications.⁸⁶ With these initial victories won by the middle of 2002, the global conflict against Islamist terrorism became a different kind of struggle.

mental appropriation "a lifesaver." See, for example, the request for supplemental appropriations in CIA briefing materials, "Targeting the Terrorists: Next Steps and New Initiatives," Feb. 1, 2000 (for the President).

75. Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004).

76. James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004).

77. Richard Clarke interviews (Dec. 18, 2003; Feb. 3, 2004).

78. CIA memos, summary of weekly Berger/Tenet meeting, Apr. 5, 12, 2000; NSC memo, "April 19, 2000 Agenda for Deputies Committee Meeting on CT: The Millennium Threat FY00 and FY01 Budget Review," NSC memo, "Summary of Conclusions of April 18, 2000 CSG Meeting," Apr. 26, 2000. On May 2, 2000, Berger was updated on budget issues relating to the CIA and other agencies; there was agreement on the most critical items to be funded, but not on the source of that funding. In CIA's case, it had already reprogrammed over \$90 million, but Tenet wanted to use most of this money on non-counterterrorism programs. NSC memo, Kurtz to Berger, "Budget Issues," May 2, 2000. On June 29, 2000, the President authorized raising the CIA's covert action funding ceiling. NSC memo, McCarthy to CSG, "DCI Wants to Raise Funding Ceiling," May 8, 2000; NSC memo, McCarthy to others July 7, 2000 (appendix on authorities). But funding issues in other agencies remained unresolved. Clarke complained that neither Treasury nor Justice would identify offsets. Clarke encouraged OMB to tell both departments that if they would not identify offsets then OMB would. NSC email, Clarke to Rudman and Mitchell, May 9, 2000. On August 1, 2000, Clarke wrote Berger that one of five goals by the end of the Clinton administration was to secure appropriations for cybersecurity and millennium after-action review projects. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, "Goals and Wildcards," Aug. 1, 2000. As late as September 2000, Clarke was advising Berger that unfunded counterterrorism requests continued to be his number one priority. NSC note, Clarke to Berger, Sept. 9, 2000.

79. Executive Order 13099 (Aug. 20, 1998); Rick Newcomb interview (Feb. 4, 2004); Robert McBride interview (Nov. 19–20, 2003); NSC memo, Kurtz to Berger, June 28, 2000. OFAC did freeze accounts belonging to Salah Idris, the owner of the al Shifa facility bombed in response to the East Africa embassy bombings. Idris filed suit against his bank and OFAC. OFAC subsequently authorized the unfreezing of those accounts. James Risen, "To Bomb Sudan Plant, or Not: A Year Later, Debates Rankle," *New York Times*, Oct. 27, 1999, p. A1. The inability to freeze funds is attributed in part to a lack of intelligence on the location of Bin Ladin's money, OFAC's reluctance or inability to rely on what classified information there may have been, and Bin Ladin's transfer of assets into the hands of trusted third parties or out of the formal financial system by 1998. Even if OFAC had received better intelligence from the intelligence community, it would have been powerless to stop the bulk of the problem. Al Qaeda money flows depended on an informal network of hawalas and Islamic institutions moving money from Gulf supporters to Afghanistan. These funds would not therefore have touched the U.S. formal financial system. OFAC's authorities are only against U.S. persons, financial institutions, and businesses. Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003); Rick Newcomb interview (Feb. 4, 2003).

80. Executive Order 13129; Treasury memo, Newcomb to Johnson, "Blocking of Taliban-Controlled Assets," undated (probably Oct. 18, 1999).

81. DOS cable, State 184471, Sept. 30, 1999; 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.

82. The Financial Action Task Force, a multilateral government organization dedicated to standard setting, focused on money laundering, particularly as it related to crimes such as drug trafficking and large-scale fraud that involved vast amounts of illegally procured money. Although the UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing Terrorism in December 1999, the convention did not enter into force until April 2002.

83. Doug M. interview (Dec. 16, 2003); Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004). See also Mike interview (Dec. 11, 2003), setting forth the goals of the UBL station; none relate specifically to terrorist financing. Another witness recalled that the UBL station made some effort to gather intelligence on al Qaeda financing, but it proved to be too hard a target, the CIA had too few sources and, as a result, little quality intelligence was produced. Ed G. interview (Feb. 3, 2004). Some attributed the problem to the CIA's separation of terrorist-financing analysis from other counterterrorism activities. Within the Directorate of Intelligence, a group was devoted to the analysis of all financial issues, including terrorist financing. Called the Office of Transnational Issues (OTI), Illicit Transaction Groups (ITG), it dealt with an array of issues besides terrorist financing, including drug trafficking, drug money laundering, alien smuggling, sanctions, and corruption. ITG was not part of the CTC, although it rotated a single analyst to CTC. Moreover, OTI analysts were separated from the operational side of terrorist financing at CTC, which planned operations against banks and financial facilitators. William Wechsler interview (Jan. 7, 2004); Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003).

84. CIA analytic report, "Funding Islamic Extremist Movements: The Role of Islamic Financial Institutions," OTI 97-10035CX, Dec. 1997.

85. Mike interview (Dec. 11, 2003).

86. CIA analytic reports, "Usama Bin Ladin: Some Saudi Financial Ties Probably Intact," OTI IR 99-005CX, Jan. 11, 1999; "How Bin Ladin Commands a Global Terrorist Network," CTC 99-40003, Jan. 27, 1999; "Islamic Terrorists: Using Nongovernmental Organizations Extensively," CTC 99-40007, Apr. 9, 1999.

87. See NSC memo, Kurtz to Berger, June 28, 2000; NSC document, TNT to Berger, Nov. 3, 1998, roadmap for Small Group, undated. The problem continued until 9/11. Intelligence reporting was so limited that one CIA intelligence analyst told us that, unassisted, he could read and digest the universe of intelligence reporting on al Qaeda financial issues in the three years prior to the 9/11 attacks. Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003).

88. Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004); see, e.g., NSC memo, Clarke to CSG, "Concept of Operations for Task Force Test of the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center," Nov. 1, 2000; Treasury memo, Romy to Sloan, "FTAT SCIF," May 17, 2001; Treasury memo, Newcomb to Sloan, "Response to Romy Memo," May 23, 2001. Despite post-9/11 declarations to the contrary, on the eve of 9/11 FTAT had funds appropriated, but no people hired, no security clearances, and no space to work. Treasury memo, Newcomb to Dam, "Establishing the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center," Aug. 3, 2001. One Treasury official described CIA's posture as "benign neglect" toward the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center (FTATC), and characterized the CIA as believing that financial tracking had limited utility. Treasury memo, Mat Burrows to O'Neill, "Your PC on Counterterrorism on 4 September," Sept. 4, 2001. National Security Advisor Rice told us she and her staff had determined by spring 2001 that terrorist financing proposals were a good option, so Treasury continued to plan to establish an office for 24 financing analysts. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). In fact, as noted above, Treasury failed to follow through on the establishment of the FTATC until after 9/11.

89. This assessment is based on an extensive review of FBI files and interviews with agents and supervisors at FBI Headquarters and various field offices.

90. Although there was an increased focus on money laundering, several significant legislative and regulatory initiatives designed to close vulnerabilities in the U.S. financial system failed to gain traction. Some of these, such as a move to control foreign banks with accounts in the United States, died as a result of banking industry pressure. Others, such as the regulation of money remitters within the United States, were mired in bureaucratic inertia and a general antiregulatory environment. In any event, it is an open question whether such legislative or regulatory initiatives would have significantly harmed al Qaeda, which generally made little use of the U.S. financial system to move or store its money.

91. Treasury report, "The 2001 National Money Laundering Strategy," Sept. 2001.

92. NSC email, Berger's office to executive secretaries, "Millennium Alert After Action Review," Mar. 9, 2000.

93. PDD-62, "Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas," May 22, 1998, pp. 8-9; NSC email, Berger's office to executive secretaries, "Millennium Alert After Action Review," Mar. 9, 2000.

94. PDD-62, May 22, 1998; PDD-39, "U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism," June 21, 1995, p. 2.

95. NSC email, Berger's office to executive secretaries, "Millennium Alert After Action Review," Mar. 9, 2000.

96. PDD-62, May 22, 1998, p. 9. Congress had authorized the Alien Terrorist Removal Court at the request of the Justice Department in 1996, and it was established in 1997. Clarke noted the court had not been "highly useful." NSC email, Berger's office to executive secretaries, "Millennium Alert After Action Review," Mar. 9, 2000. Indeed, it had not been used at all.

97. PDD-62, May 22, 1998, p. 8; NSC memo, Clarke, "Summary of Conclusions for March 31, 2000 Millennium Alert Immigration Review Meeting," Apr. 13, 2000. One provision from PDD-62 not updated and reiterated in 2000 was a directive to CIA to ensure that names (and aliases) of terrorists were collected and disseminated to State, INS, and the FBI in a timely way, so that the border agencies could place them on a watchlist and the FBI could identify them in the United States.

98. NSC email, Berger's office to executive secretaries, "Millennium Alert After Action Review," Mar. 9, 2000.

99. Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004); Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004); Scott Fry interview (Dec. 29, 2003); Scott Gration interview (March 3, 2004); NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Mar. 2, 2000. Clarke apparently took the comment as a presidential instruction to take another look at what additional actions could be taken against Bin Ladin. Given diplomatic failures to directly pressure the Taliban through Pakistan, the NSC staff saw increased support to the Northern Alliance and Uzbeks as alternative options. NSC memo, "The Millennium Terrorist Alert—Next Steps," undated.

100. A good account of the episode is found in Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (Penguin, 2004), pp. 487-491; see also *ibid.*, pp. 495-496, 502-503, 517-519; Richard interview (Dec. 11, 2003). "Richard" told us the attack had already occurred when CIA headquarters heard about it; "within this building, they were breathless," he remarked. The CIA concern was apparently over possible casualties and whether, by sharing intelligence with Massoud on Bin Ladin's possible location, the CIA might have violated the assassination ban. Tenet did not recall the incident, saying it was no doubt just "a blip" on his screen within the context of the millennium alerts. George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004). The incident was, however, noticed by the NSC counterterrorism staff, which pointedly asked to be kept in the loop in the future. NSC memo, "Review of Terrorism Alert and Lessons Learned," Jan. 3, 2000 (draft).

101. See, e.g., CIA officers' visits to Tashkent noted in CIA briefing materials, DCI Update, "Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat," Feb. 18, 2000; CIA briefing materials, EXDIR Update, Visit to Tashkent, Apr. 5, 2000. CTC teams were deployed to Afghanistan to meet with Massoud on March 13-21, 2000, and possibly on April 24-28,

50. NSC memo, "Conclusions of National Security Council Meeting," Sept. 17, 2001.
51. See NSC memo, Rice to Cheney, Powell, O'Neill, Rumsfeld, Ashcroft, Gonzales, Card, Tenet, and Shelton, Sept. 16, 2001.
52. NSC memo, "Conclusions of National Security Council Meeting," Sept. 17, 2001.
53. NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions of Terrorist Fund-raising Meeting Held on September 18, 2001.
54. DOS briefing materials, "Fact Sheet on Response to Terrorist Attacks in US," Sept. 17, 2001.
55. DOS cable, State 161279, "Deputy Secretary Armitage—Mamoud Phone Call," Sept. 18, 2001.
56. White House transcript, Vice President Cheney interview with Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, Jan. 18, 2002, pp. 7–8.
57. Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004).
58. See National Security Presidential Directive 9, Oct. 25, 2001.
59. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). On Iran, see Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004.
60. Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror* (Free Press, 2004), p. 32. According to Clarke, he responded that "al Qaeda did this." When the President pressed Clarke to check if Saddam was involved and said that he wanted to learn of any shred of evidence, Clarke promised to look at the question again, but added that the NSC and the intelligence community had looked in the past for linkages between al Qaeda and Iraq and never found any real linkages. *Ibid.*
61. President Bush told us that Clarke had mischaracterized this exchange. On the evening of September 12, the President was at the Pentagon and then went to the White House residence. He dismissed the idea that he had been wandering around the Situation Room alone, saying, "I don't do that." He said that he did not think that any president would roam around looking for something to do. While Clarke said he had found the President's tone "very intimidating," ("Clarke's Take on Terror," CBSnews.com, Mar. 21, 2004, online at www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/03/19/60minutes/printable607356.shtml), President Bush doubted that anyone would have found his manner intimidating. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). Roger Cressey, Clarke's deputy, recalls this exchange with the President and Clarke concerning Iraq shortly after 9/11, but did not believe the President's manner was intimidating. Roger Cressey interview (June 23, 2004).
62. NSC memo, Kurtz to Rice, Survey of Intelligence Information on any Iraq Involvement in the September 11 Attacks, Sept. 18, 2001. On *60 Minutes* (CBS, Mar. 21, 2004), Clarke said that the first draft of this memo was returned by the NSC Front Office because it did not find a tie between Iraq and al Qaeda; Rice and Hadley deny that they asked to have the memo redone for this reason.
63. See DOD notes, Victoria Clarke notes, Sept. 11, 2001; DOD notes, Stephen Cambone notes, Sept. 11, 2001. Cambone's notes indicate this exchange took place at 2:40 P.M. on September 11, 2001. Steven Cambone interview (July 15, 2004).
64. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). For an account of Rumsfeld's and Wolfowitz's position on Iraq, see Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (Simon & Schuster, 2002), pp. 83–84. Rice told us that the *Bush at War* account of the Camp David discussions on Iraq accorded with her memory.
65. DOD memo, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, "War on Terrorism: Strategic Concept," Sept. 14, 2001.
66. Colin Powell interview (Jan. 21, 2004). Rumsfeld told Bob Woodward that he had no recollection of Wolfowitz's remarks at Camp David. DOD transcript, "Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with the Washington Post," Jan. 9, 2002 (online at www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t02052002_t0109wp.html).
67. Colin Powell interview (Jan. 21, 2004). Powell raised concerns that a focus on Iraq might negate progress made with the international coalition the administration was putting together for Afghanistan. Taking on Iraq at this time could destroy the international coalition. *Ibid.*
68. Colin Powell interview (Jan. 21, 2004).
69. White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 20, 2001.
70. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004).
71. NSC memo, "Conclusions of National Security Council Meeting," Sept. 17, 2001.
72. Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004; see also Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (Simon & Schuster, 2004), p. 22.
73. DOD memo, Wolfowitz to Rumsfeld, "Preventing More Events," Sept. 17, 2001. We review contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda in chapter 2. We have found no credible evidence to support theories of Iraqi government involvement in the 1993 WTC bombing. Wolfowitz added in his memo that he had attempted in June to get the CIA to explore these theories.
74. DOD memo, Wolfowitz to Rumsfeld, "Were We Asleep?" Sept. 18, 2001.
75. DOD memo, Rumsfeld to Shelton, "Some Thoughts for CINCs as They Prepare Plans," Sept. 19, 2001. In a memo that appears to be from Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith to Rumsfeld, dated September 20, the author expressed disappointment at the limited options immediately available in Afghanistan and the lack of ground options. The author suggested instead hitting terrorists outside the Middle East in the initial offensive, perhaps delib-

crately selecting a non-al Qaeda target like Iraq. Since U.S. attacks were expected in Afghanistan, an American attack in South America or Southeast Asia might be a surprise to the terrorists. The memo may have been a draft never sent to Rumsfeld, or may be a draft of points being suggested for Rumsfeld to deliver in a briefing to the President. DOD memo, Feith to Rumsfeld, "Briefing Draft," Sept. 20, 2001.

76. Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004).

77. Tommy Franks interview (Apr. 9, 2004).

78. NSC memo, memorandum of conversation from meeting of President Bush with Prime Minister Blair, Sept. 20, 2001.

79. Tommy Franks interview (Apr. 9, 2004).

80. White House transcript, President Bush's Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, Sept. 20, 2001. British Prime Minister Tony Blair attended the session.

81. *Ibid.* Several NSC officials, including Clarke and Cressey, told us that the mention of the Cole in the speech to Congress marked the first public U.S. declaration that al Qaeda had been behind the October 2000 attack. Clarke said he added the language on this point to the speech. Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004); Roger Cressey interview (Dec. 15, 2003).

82. White House transcript, President Bush's Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, Sept. 20, 2001. President Bush told the *Washington Post* that he considered having Powell deliver the ultimatum to the Taliban, but determined it would have more impact coming directly from the president. White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 20, 2001.

83. White House transcript, President Bush's Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, Sept. 20, 2001.

84. *Ibid.*

85. Tommy Franks interview (Apr. 9, 2004). Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers and Major General Del Dailey, commander of Joint Special Operations Command, also attended the September 21 meeting. The meeting was in direct response to the President's September 17 instruction to Rumsfeld to develop a military campaign plan for Afghanistan. The original "Infinite Justice" name was a continuation of a series of names begun in August 1998 with Operation Infinite Reach, the air strikes against Bin Laden's facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan after the embassy bombings. The series also included Operation Infinite Resolve, a variety of proposed follow-on strikes on al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan.

86. DOD Special Operations Command and Central Command briefings (Sept. 15-16, 2003; Apr. 8-9, 2004; Apr. 28, 2004); Tommy Franks interview (Apr. 9, 2004). On death of Atef, see Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *Age of Sacred Terror*, p. 349; Henry, "The CIA in Afghanistan, 2001-2002," *Studies in Intelligence* (classified version), vol. 47, no. 2 (2003), pp. 1, 11. See Donald Rumsfeld testimony, Mar. 23, 2004 (nearly two-thirds of the known leaders of al Qaeda had been killed or captured).

11 Foresight—and Hindsight

1. Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford Univ. Press, 1962), p. 387.

2. Intelligence Community analytic report, "The Foreign Terrorist Threat in the United States," NIE 95-13, July 1995, pp. v, vii-viii, 10-11, 13, 18.

3. Intelligence Community analytic report, "The Foreign Terrorist Threat in the US: Revisiting Our 1995 Estimate," ICB 97-8, Apr. 1997, p. 1.

4. For Bin Laden being mentioned in only two other sentences, see *ibid.*

5. Titles are drawn from articles in the National Intelligence Daily and the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.

6. John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004).

7. *Ibid.*; Pattie Kindsvater interview (Sept. 12, 2003).

8. Tim Weiner, "U.S. Hard Put to Find Proof Bin Laden Directed Attacks," *New York Times*, Apr. 13, 1999, p. A1.

9. Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 23; see also *ibid.*, pp. 5, 21-22.

10. For a concise statement of the role of the national estimate process, see Task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, *Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence* (Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), pp. 34-35 (additional views of Richard Betts).

11. Waldo Heinrichs, *Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II* (Oxford Univ. Press, 1988), p. 215.

12. For the response being routine, see Gordon Prange, *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* (McGraw-Hill, 1981), pp. 732-733. For a brief summary of these routines and the reasons why the intercepts were not properly digested, see Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 2d ed. (Longman, 1999), p. 194, n. 72.

13. PDBs were not routinely briefed to congressional leaders, though this item could have been in some other intelligence briefing. It was not circulated in the NID or SEIB. For the September 1998 report, see Intelligence report, "Terrorism: Possible Attack on a U.S. City," Sept. 8, 1998.

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