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Eisenhower - John F. Kennedy
Correspondences - Contact Documents

150 pages of documents dealing with the relationship between Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. The files date from March 1960 to September 1963.

Earlier material mainly concern briefings and meetings between then Senator and President-Elect Kennedy and President Eisenhower. Topics include North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nuclear sharing, Laos, the Congo, Algeria, disarmament, nuclear test suspension negotiations, Cuba and Latin America, United States balance of payments and the gold outflow, and the need for a balanced budget. Personal messages and congratulations are found throughout.

Later material mainly covers briefings and meetings between President Kennedy and former President Eisenhower. Topics include Laos, Cuba, the United States limited war capability, and the flow of gold. Correspondence concerning the restoration of Eisenhower’s former military rank is also included.

Highlights among the documents include:

During the 1960 presidential campaign, Senator Kennedy wrote to President Eisenhower about his concerns that the election might have a negative impact on the nuclear test ban treaty negotiations.

In August 1960, President Eisenhower contacted Senator Kennedy to pave the way for the Democratic presidential nominee to begin receiving briefings from the Department of Defense and the CIA on the vary of world situations.

A memo briefing book prepared by Kennedy advisor George W. Ball covers the domestic and international issues President-elect Kennedy would hold meetings on with President Eisenhower as part of the transition of power.

The day before Kennedy was sworn in as President, he dictated notes to his secretary Evelyn Lincoln about the meeting held with President Eisenhower earlier that day at the White House. The first topic involved a 45 minute conversation on the emergency procedures in place in case of an immediate attack. According to Kennedy, Eisenhower seemed eager to demonstrate the method of summering a helicopter to whisk the President away, as he picked up a telephone and gave the command, “Opal Drill Three.”

Correspondences relate the efforts of President Kennedy to re-instate Eisenhower’s rank as a five star general.

Letters and memos throughout this collection mark that the Kennedy Administration and the President himself conferred with President Eisenhower on world events.

The papers show that Eisenhower received briefings directly from CIA director John A. McCon.
A document relays that Eisenhower would give public support to JFK if he were to send American troops into Laos.

A memo from CIA Director McCone says that while discussing Laos, Eisenhower warned of the consequences of losing Southeast Asia, pointing out that if it is lost nothing would stop the southward movement of Communism through Indonesia and this would have the effect of cutting the world in half.

In June of 1963, President Kennedy sought out the help of Eisenhower to get his Civil Rights Bill through Congress.
The documents in this folder are numbered 1–84.
Dear Senator Kennedy:

Thank you sincerely for your letter and for the confidence it implies in the attempt I am making to achieve a fair and just agreement for the cessation of nuclear testing. I note with satisfaction that you also support an effort to arrange a temporary moratorium of tests, for the purpose of providing opportunity to solve the inherent technical and other problems, and that you agree that I should act without regard to the coming national election.

I assure you that I value your expression of dedication to the cause of world peace.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Dwight Eisenhower
March 30, 1960

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I have been greatly disturbed by the possibility that our current nuclear test ban negotiations might be jeopardized by the approach of a Presidential election.

You have consistently indicated your own belief that the present Geneva negotiations may be bringing us close to a final agreement to end testing. I share this belief with you. At the same time, you may be understandably reluctant to decide on a small-test moratorium which might bind your successor in office.

As a candidate for the Presidential nomination -- although only one candidate among many -- let me assure you that, if elected President, I will undertake to carry out in good faith any moratorium extending beyond your term of office which you now decide to be in the best interests of the nation. I realize that such an assurance from a single candidate has only a limited value. But I hope that it will help you to proceed -- unhindered by thoughts of the coming election -- with your efforts to bring about agreement on this vital matter, and thus bring us one step closer to world peace.

Sincerely yours,

John F. Kennedy
August 19, 1960

Dear Senator Kennedy:

In view of your letter of August eleventh and that of Senator Richard B. Russell to you of August tenth, both concerning briefings relative to the defense and missile programs, the following arrangements have been made:

Lieutenant General Earle G. Wheeler, the Director of the Joint Staff, an officer in a particularly advantageous position to explain and review all of the material in the possession of and from time to time furnished to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, will be made available to conduct the briefing you requested at your convenience.

General Wheeler will get in touch with you to make detailed arrangements.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The Honorable John F. Kennedy
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.
IT IS A PLEASURE TO SEND MY GREETINGS TO THOSE ATTENDING THE 8TH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR THE WELFARE OF CRIPPLES.

AS PART OF THE OPENING CEREMONIES OF THIS CONGRESS, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS ISSUING AN "EMPLOY THE HANDICAPPED" COMMEMORATIVE STAMP. THIS STAMP, SMALL IN ITSELF, REFLECTS A BROAD NATIONAL CONCERN FOR REHABILITATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED. SUCH WORK IS A NATURAL OUTGROWTH OF OUR RESPECT FOR THE DIGNITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL.

I AM DELIGHTED TO ADD MY BEST WISHES FOR A PRODUCTIVE CONGRESS.

Dwight D. Eisenhower
I believe it to be in the national interest, and I hope it conforms to your desire, for you, as the duly designated candidate of one of the major parties for the presidency of the United States, to have periodic briefings on the international scene from a responsible official in the Central Intelligence Agency. Acting on the assumption that you likewise believe such briefings to be in the national interest, I have already requested the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Allen Dulles, to arrange procedural details with you or with some designated member of your staff.

Because of the secret character of the information that would be furnished you, it would be exclusively for your personal knowledge. Otherwise, however, the receipt of such information would impose no restriction on full and free discussion.

On the assumption that you desire me to authorize similar briefings for the honorable Lyndon Johnson, your vice presidential candidate, I am offering them to him by telegram today, and these briefings will go forward unless you advise of any view to the contrary that you might have.

Dwight D. Eisenhower.
THE WHITE HOUSE

November 25, 1960.

Dear Senator Kennedy:

Mrs. Eisenhower joins me in warm congratulations to you and Mrs. Kennedy on the birth of your son.

We add also our good wishes to your little daughter on her approaching third birthday.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The Honorable John F. Kennedy,
Washington, D.C.
325AM NOV 9TH=

SPO01 GOVT PD SP SHERATON PARK HOTEL WASHINGTON DC
SENATOR JOHN F KENNEDY=
HYANNISPORT MASS=

MY CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU FOR THE VICTORY YOU HAVE JUST WON AT THE POLLS. I WILL BE SENDING YOU PROMPTLY A MORE COMPREHENSIVE TELEGRAM SUGGESTING CERTAIN MEASURES THAT MAY COMMEND THEMSELVES TO YOU AS YOU PREPARE TO TAKE OVER NEXT JANUARY THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PRESIDENCY

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER=

THE COMPANY WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE
Informal List of Subjects to be Discussed at Meeting of President Eisenhower and Senator John F. Kennedy

Subjects suggested by Senator Kennedy:

1) Berlin - Far East (Communist China, Formosa) - Cuba
2) The present National Security setup
   Functioning of National Security Council and inter-relation of various departments, committees and agencies
3) Organization within the White House
   What phases of the operation have been particularly useful to President Eisenhower?
4) De Gaulle, Adenauer and MacMillan
   President Eisenhower’s opinion and evaluation of these men
5) Pentagon organization
   Suggestions by President Eisenhower as to its more effective operation

Subjects suggested by President Eisenhower:

1) Cuba and Latin America
2) The NATO nuclear sharing problem
3) The balance of payments situation
   Gold outflow - world confidence in the dollar -
   need for a balanced budget
4) Recent developments in Laos
5) Africa
   Particular attention given to the Congo and
   Algeria
6) Disarmament and nuclear testing
7) The White House staff
December 5, 1960

Dear Senator:

Enclosed are brief summaries on questions expected to be raised by the President in your meeting with him tomorrow morning.

After our conversation Friday, we received from Clark Clifford a specific agenda of subjects. George Ball and I have, therefore, included summaries to cover the additional subjects on this list which we did not discuss on Friday.

If you have any questions about the enclosed materials, don't hesitate to call George or me at the following numbers:

Office: Executive 3-3711

Home: George Ball - Woodley 6-3100
      John Sharon - Oliver 6-5248

Sincerely,

John Sharon

Enclosures

Honorable John F. Kennedy
3307 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
MEMORANDUM

December 5, 1960

TO: Senator John F. Kennedy
FROM: John H. Sharon and George W. Ball
SUBJECT: Meeting with President Eisenhower on Tuesday, December 6, 1960

I. General Persons has advised Mr. Clifford that the President intends to discuss the following subjects at your meeting with him on Tuesday:

1. NATO nuclear sharing
2. Laos
3. The Congo
4. Algeria
5. a) Disarmament
   b) Nuclear test suspension negotiations
6. Cuba and Latin America
7. U.S. balance of payments and the gold outflow
8. "The need for a balanced budget"

II. Briefing memoranda on these topics are attached. In keeping with your expressed intentions to avoid direct involvement in action taken by the outgoing Administration, these sheets have been limited to:

   (1) a brief summary of the present situation;
   (2) questions on which you might want to request additional information.

III. If the situation permits, we would recommend that you take advantage of the Eisenhower meeting by:

   (1) request memoranda on each topic discussed by the President, with specific reference to some of the questions suggested in the attached memoranda;
   (2) designate a liaison officer to the Department of State. The liaison officer would serve as a conduit for information needed in the work of the task forces.
HON. JOHN F. KENNEDY

Briefing Memoranda

for

Meeting with President Eisenhower

Tuesday

December 6, 1960
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It is now probable that the proposal for nuclear sharing through NATO will not appear on the Agenda at the NATO meeting in Paris on December 16-18. However, there will undoubtedly be informal discussions of this question among the Ministers attending that meeting.

In talking with President Eisenhower, we suggest that you take the following position:

1. **Full Exploration.** While you are not prepared at this time to commit your Administration either in favor of, or in opposition to, the principle of nuclear sharing, you do intend to have this question fully and promptly explored by the State and Defense Departments and the Atomic Energy Commission.

2. **Legislative Problem.** Since any proposal for nuclear sharing that is likely to be acceptable to the NATO allies will presumably require some amendment to the MacMahon Act, it will also be necessary to review fully with the members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy any proposals that are developed.
3. Urgency of Problem. You may wish to indicate to President Eisenhower that you recognize the urgency of the problem. General de Gaulle's determination to develop a French national atomic deterrent is a divisive force within the NATO Alliance. In addition, the refusal of the French Government to join in any test ban agreement can seriously embarrass the West in its efforts to stop nuclear testing and ultimately make progress toward disarmament. The need for getting control of the atom through some kind of centralized Western arrangement is reinforced by preliminary intelligence reports this week that the Israeli Government, with French help, has a plutonium-producing reactor in operation and may have the minimum amounts of special nuclear materials for an atomic explosion within the next two years.

4. Question of Observer at NATO Meeting. In addition to asking your support for the principle of nuclear sharing through NATO, President Eisenhower may invite you to send an observer (presumably your new Secretary of State) to the NATO meeting on December 16-18. We suggest that you decline this invitation. The visit of Vice President-elect Johnson and Senator Fulbright to the Parliamentarians'
Conference has already given the European governments an indication that your Administration will give serious consideration to the proposal for a NATO nuclear deterrent. Moreover, the visit has demonstrated that your Administration will be seriously interested in European problems and in the strengthening of the Western Alliance. Under these circumstances, the presence of your new Secretary of State, or even of some lesser representative of your Administration, at the NATO meeting might prove an anti-climax, since the European heads of state might expect that a second visit by a representative of your Government would produce concrete policy proposals.

1. President Eisenhower should be asked to elaborate his views on the significance he attaches to nuclear sharing through NATO.

2. What proposals, if any, with regard to NATO nuclear sharing does the Eisenhower Administration propose to make at the NATO meeting this month?

3. Will those proposals contemplate the abandonment of the "two-key" principle?

4. Will those proposals involve the amendment of the MacMahon Act?
LAOS

FACTS

1. In late 1959, the Communists, to prevent the further consolidation of a rightist, nationalist government which did not recognize the Communist States and which favored closer ties with the West, used a severely limited war to gain their objectives. They employed internal, autonomous, Communist paramilitary forces (Pathet Lao) directly supported by the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" (North Vietnam) and indirectly by the "Chinese People's Republic" (Red China). The Communist objectives were to obtain restoration of a coalition government (in which they formerly had participated), to deny UN jurisdiction in the area, and cause reduction or elimination of American influence and assistance.

2. Not all these Communist objectives were obtained, but they succeeded in preserving their essential source of leverage on Laotian affairs in the form of a military base area within the country. In addition, they demonstrated for many Laotians the desirability of a genuine neutralist policy, because of the extreme weakness of their underdeveloped state and its dangerous situation in the midst of stronger neighbors belonging either to the Communist or Southeast Asia Treaty bloc.
3. In August of this year, a military coup by an obscure army captain, Kong Le, against another rightist cabinet developed into a fight between Kong Le's nationalist, neutralist forces and those of rightist General Phoumi Novo8an, "strong-man" defense minister in the deposed cabinet. The latter refused to participate in a coalition cabinet and, backed by his uncle, Marshal Sarit of Thailand, indicated he would try to fight his way to power. This led to an attack on Phoumi's forces by the Communist Pathet Lao in the North and by Kong Le's nationalist paratroops in the South. Although Phoumi has indicated he is now ready to join the government, it may be too late to negotiate a stable political settlement on any terms other than those originally sought by the Communists. Prince Savanna Phouma has been seeking to form a government of conciliation but the Communist Pathet Lao now demands: (a) a coalition cabinet barring General Phoumi and his followers; (b) a policy of "genuine neutrality"--defined as establishing diplomatic relations with all Communist countries, but opposing efforts to bring SEATO, or even the United Nations, into the country's
internal affairs. Meanwhile, Captain Kong Le may be tempted to try to finish the job himself.

4. It would appear that the rightists, possibly backed by the United States, have overplayed their hand and triggered a reaction temporarily uniting Communists and nationalists-neutralists in pursuit of the common goal of reducing Western influence.

President Eisenhower probably will confine himself to commenting on the latest efforts of the United States, through diplomatic and covert channels, to conciliate the situation among the contending groups and to protect the interests of those who have identified themselves with a pro-Western policy.

1. Has the U.S. any important elements of suasion on the internal Laotian situation, other than that represented by General Phoumi?

2. If a neutralist government can be established without Communist participation, may not this now be the best the West can hope for?
3. Taking into account the strong evidence of neutralist sentiment, and the danger inherent in attempting to get Laos to take sides in any future conflict involving the Communist states and SEATO, may not Laos make its best contribution to the peace of Southeast Asia, as well as to its own security, by carrying on as a neutral buffer state?
FACTS

There are seven major forces in the Congo:

1. The Kasavubu-Mobutu Regime. Early in September, President Joseph Kasavubu dismissed Premier Patrice Lumumba. Lumumba, supported by the Parliament, declared the dismissal unconstitutional. Army Chief of Staff Colonel Joseph Mobutu then intervened, "neutralizing" the political contenders and ousting the influential Soviet bloc missions brought in by Lumumba. Mobutu has refused to reconvene Parliament. He has established a government based on young intellectuals and college students. Mobutu's power base is the army, the loyalty of which is questionable. Kasavubu has in effect recognized the legitimacy of the Mobutu government. At the UN, the Kasavubu delegation, after bitter debate and with strong Western support, has finally been seated, a set-back for Lumumba's supporters.

2. The Lumumba Forces. Under virtual "house arrest" since September, Lumumba, following his attempted escape, is now imprisoned. However, his home town of Stanleyville remains a Lumumba preserve under the control of his brother and Lumumba's former Vice Premier, a vigorous pro-Communist. Lumumba also has important pockets of support in neighboring
provinces. There is danger that a dissident army may be raised in these areas to wage civil war against the Kasavubu-Mobutu regime. This would give the Soviets new access to the Congo.

3. Katanga Province. Moise Tshombe, President of Katanga Province, announced secession from the Congo on July 11. Katanga controls 60% of the Congo's wealth and Tshombe is heavily supported, and perhaps controlled, by the Belgian enterprise, Union Minière du Haut Katanga. It is not yet clear whether Tshombe will participate with other Congolese leaders in roundtable discussions leading to a federal structure for the Congo.

4. The African States. The Kasavubu-Lumumba rivalry has elicited strong responses from African states. In terms of contemporary African political issues, Kasavubu has come to symbolize the following: federal government based on tribalism; cooperation with Belgium; resistance to the Soviet bloc; suspicion of the Nkrumah approach to pan-Africanism. Lumumba, in turn, symbolizes: unitary government based on centralism; hostility to Belgium; a desire for strong Soviet support; approval for the pan-African ideal. Pro-Lumumba African states include
Ghana, Guinea, Mali, the UAR and Morocco. Pro-Kasavubu states include most of the former French colonies. In the last few days, the Kasavubu-Mobutu regime has severed relations with Ghana and the UAR.

5. The Soviet Bloc. Bloc diplomatic missions and technicians were evicted by Mobutu. Many of these personnel are probably waiting in the wings in Ghana and Guinea. The Belgian Communist Party was active in Congolese affairs prior to independence and throughout the Lumumba regime. It may still be a factor. The Soviets have recently demanded that the UN Force in the Congo be disbanded forthwith.

6. Belgium. Recently many Belgian civil servants have returned to governmental posts in the Congo. Ambassador Dayal, Mr. Hammarskjold's special representative, has deplored the role of these Belgian officials who, he claims, are acting outside the UN. The United States Government has sided with Belgium in this dispute, indicating its confidence that Belgium will make its aid available through UN channels.

7. The United Nations. The UN is mandated to maintain order without becoming involved in the Congo's internal disputes. A 20,000-man UN Force
has prevented widespread chaos arising from tribal tensions. At the administrative level, UN technicians have kept a minimal governmental operation in being. At the diplomatic level, the UN has appointed a 15-man Conciliation Committee, composed of Afro-Asian states, to attempt to heal political wounds in the Congo. Mr. Kasavubu, however, has not as yet granted the Committee the right to intervene.

The two most serious problems facing the UN are these:

a. How will it finance its operation? The United States is to pay approximately half the $60 million bill for the UN Force for 1960; Hammarskjold estimates it will cost $10 million monthly thereafter.

b. How can the UN maintain the impartiality and effectiveness of a Force many of whose most important contingents have been contributed by governments hostile to the Kasavubu-Mobutu regime? It is possible that the pro-Lumumba Afro-Asian states will pull out of the UN mission entirely. This could lead to their mounting their own offensive against the Leopoldville government. It is
also conceivable that Kasavubu will ask the UN Force to leave. Relations between the UN and the Kasavubu-Mobutu regime have been further strained by UN Ambassador Dayal's criticism of the Mobutu government and by recent clashes between UN and Congolese troops.

These are probably among the reasons why President Eisenhower wishes to talk about the Congo:

1. A new Soviet offensive may be shaping up in Lumumba's Oriental Province, which has just announced secession from the Congo.

2. If the pro-Lumumba Afro-Asia states decide to withdraw their troops from the UN Force, the Congo will face a new crisis.

3. The UN Congo Mission is in serious financial straits. President Eisenhower will no doubt insist that we must continue to work through the UN since this is the only hope of keeping the cold war out of Africa.
1. What are likely to be the consequences of the expanding Belgian presence in the Congo for the UN operation and for the maintenance of civil order?

2. Is there evidence of Soviet aid going to the pro-Lumumba government in Stanleyville? What can be done to prevent the development of a Communist-oriented state and possible civil war?

3. Can the UN Force maintain impartiality given the hostility to the Kasavubu-Mobutu regime of so many of the governments it represents?

4. What plans have been made for financing an operation of this size for an indefinite period?
1. **Problem.** The most pressing problem with regard to Algeria is the United Nations debate which started today (Monday). In previous years the Algerian question has arisen on the question of postponing consideration of resolutions advanced by the Arab-Asian bloc. This year the Arab nations are planning to put forward a resolution calling for the United Nations supervision of an Algerian plebiscite.

2. **Western Strategy: Plan for a Nigerian Initiative.** To head off this resolution, arrangements are now being discreetly made for Nigeria to offer a resolution calling for the member nations of the UN to cooperate in working out conditions of a cease-fire and self-determination for the Algerian people. The Prime Minister of Nigeria, speaking for the largest nation in Black Africa, has undertaken negotiations with Bourguiba. There are preliminary indications that Bourguiba may be sympathetic to this effort since he recognizes that adoption of the much stronger Arab resolution would only serve to harden French resistance.
3. Avoidance of Western Identification. Although the Prime Minister of Nigeria is understood to have conferred with Macmillan, it is essential to avoid any suspicion that the Western nations are influencing or inspiring the Nigerian initiative.

4. Acceptability to French. The French would be willing to accept the Nigerian resolution. They would, however, totally disregard a resolution calling for a UN supervised plebiscite and would withdraw from discussions of such a resolution in the General Assembly.

5. Acceptability to Latin America. Certain of the Latin American nations, as well as certain of the African nations, are inclined to favor the Nigerian initiative. They are concerned that the adoption of a resolution calling for UN intervention through a supervised plebiscite might set a precedent having unfortunate implications for themselves.

Obviously this is a matter upon which you should take no position. For the time being French uncertainty as to the ultimate attitude of your
Administration toward the Algerian issue is having a beneficial effect in stimulating General de Gaulle to increase his efforts to work out a reasonable settlement of this troublesome issue.
DISARMAMENT

FACTS

1. There are no arrangements for resumption of the ten-nation general disarmament negotiations that ended last June in Geneva with the Soviet walk-out. It is most unlikely that these negotiations will be resumed on the previous basis. Before negotiations can be resumed it is probably essential to find a means of associating the neutrals with the negotiations.

2. In the meantime, a series of resolutions on disarmament have been placed before the United Nations. It is expected that all of these resolutions will come up for preliminary action prior to the mid-December recess. However, it is probable that they can be disposed of provisionally by referral to the moribund Disarmament Commission.

3. Within the American Government, what could serve as the nucleus of a new organization exists in the form of the United States Disarmament Administration, recently established within the State Department. While the function of the USDA was negotiated with the other interested agencies (e.g., the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission) and its establishment acknowledged by letter from the President to the Secretary of State, it is
based neither on Executive Order nor legislation. As this organization has been developed, the Kennedy Administration will have complete freedom to decide whether the disarmament organization should be (a) an independent agency, reporting directly to the President; or (b) a semi-autonomous agency, responsible to the Secretary of State for policy guidance, as are I.C.A. and U.S.I.A. The present United States Disarmament Administration has been authorized 52 positions for the present fiscal year; 21 more are provided in the FY 1962 budget. $400,000 is available for contract studies and research projects this fiscal year; $1,000,000 is being sought for FY 1962.

QUESTIONS

1. To what extent can the new Administration safely delay any firm commitment for resumption of disarmament negotiations, pending study of the negotiating history and of the positions that the United States has taken in the past?

2. What arrangements would President Eisenhower recommend for briefing a representative of the new Administration on the entire field of arms control and disarmament?
3. What is President Eisenhower's judgment on the best location within the Government of the disarmament organization?
TEST SUSPENSION NEGOTIATIONS

FACTS

1. Status of the Negotiations. The Geneva conference on nuclear testing is in recess. The United States and Britain have proposed it resume on February 7, and Russian agreement is expected. The date could be postponed by as much as a month to enable the new Administration to review the negotiating situation and the present status of the draft treaty. The Russians have made it clear that they anticipate that the new American Administration will need time to consider the entire matter.

2. The Major Issues. Since the Spring of 1960, the Geneva negotiations have concentrated unsuccessfully on attempts to resolve the various issues blocking agreement on a first-stage "threshold" treaty. (Such a treaty would cover tests only in those environments which cannot be monitored with present technology.) These issues are:
   a. The annual quota of on-site inspections.
   b. The number and installation schedule of control posts.
c. The composition of the control organization's staff and executive organs.


3. The Seismic Research Program. In May, 1960, a wide area of agreement was achieved among the technical experts of the three parties on a coordinated research program for improving capabilities of detecting underground nuclear explosions. Immediately after the collapse of the Paris Summit Conference the Russians, at the political level, repudiated their experts and said that they would not participate in the proposed research program. However, they reserved their right to veto any part of the United States research program, and to inspect any nuclear devices that might be used in it, without reciprocal obligation to contribute Russian nuclear devices.

4. The Present Situation Regarding the Test Moratorium. A de facto moratorium on testing exists. At the expiration of the second period of unilateral U.S. suspension of testing on January 1, 1960, President Eisenhower stated that the United States considered itself free to resume
nuclear weapons testing, but that we would not do so without announcing our intention in advance.

**QUESTIONS**

1. To what extent is the Soviet Union interested in concluding a test suspension treaty? What are the best means by which this interest might be probed?

2. What are the prospects for obtaining French adherence to the proposed test suspension treaty? How might their adherence best be brought about?
CUBA AND LATIN AMERICA

FACTS

Two developments have occurred since the briefing given you by Mr. Dulles in Palm Beach.

1. Castro influence was apparent in the Venezuelan riots which broke out ten days ago and have been suppressed by President Betancourt's government.

2. The Eisenhower Administration made a finding that Cuba is "communist controlled", in order to allocate $1 million for relief of approximately 36,000 Cuban refugees in the United States. This finding was made under legislation providing the special mutual security fund to aid refugees from "communist controlled" countries.

QUESTIONS

1. To what extent is Cuba responsible for revolutionary activity elsewhere in Latin America?

2. What is the present and prospective effectiveness of the trade embargo?

3. To what extent can we anticipate support of action against Cuba by other American states?
   a. Through the Organization of American States?
   b. In the United Nations?
4. Have we sought common action in support of our Cuban policies by our European allies in connection with the trade embargo?

5. Are attempts being made to curtail all shipments to Cuba through concerted tanker control?

6. Can we expect increased support from Canada on Latin American problems?

7. To what extent is the Castro regime dependent on Soviet and Chinese financial and technical assistance?
U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND GOLD OUTFLOW

1. Increasing Rate of Balance of Payments Deficit. Since 1950 (with the exception of 1957), the United States has run a balance of payments deficit which reached a peak of $3.8 billion in 1959. This year, on the basis of third quarter returns, the deficit is running at an annual rate of $4.3 billion. (This contrasts with an annual rate in the second quarter of $2.9 billion and in the first quarter of $2.6 billion.)

2. Gold Outflow. The amount of gold flow in the first three quarters of 1960 has been as follows: First quarter, $50 million; Second quarter, $94 million; Third quarter, $637 million; for a total of $781 million. The level of U.S. gold holdings has declined steadily from about $23 billion in 1957 (about $25 billion in 1949) to the present level of about $18 billion.

3. Causes of Rise in Deficit. The principal causes of the recent aggravation in the deficit and the resulting gold outflow are the net short-term capital movements from the United States -- probably consisting for the most part of funds held by United States investors -- stimulated by
higher interest rates abroad and declining yields on short-term investments here.

4. **Growth in Export Surplus.** The level of commercial exports this year is expected to reach, and perhaps exceed, the all-time peak attained in 1957 ($19.5 billion). Nevertheless the merchandise trade surplus (excess of exports over imports), running at an annual rate of $4.5 billion, is insufficient to offset other payments.

5. **Measures the Eisenhower Administration Has Taken (1959-60).**

   a. **Export Promotion Drive.** This has consisted principally of adding new commercial attaches abroad, broadening export credit financing and the wide dissemination of foreign market information. The impact of this program to date is questionable.

   b. **Tying United States Development Loan Fund Assistance to U.S. Procurement.** Initiated in October, 1959, the impact of this measure will appear in next year's balance of payments and will amount to no more than $100 million.

   c. **Efforts Begun in 1957 to Eliminate Foreign Restrictions Against U.S. Exports.** This is a long-term but healthy measure. The
industrialized nations have responded in a substantial way.


1. Beginning January 1, 1961, the number of armed forces wives and children abroad shall be reduced by 15,000 a month until the total is not more than 200,000. Most of the dependents will come from Europe. The Directive appears to apply equally to draftees and the career service.

2. Military post exchanges are prohibited from purchasing foreign goods.

3. The International Cooperation Administration is ordered to place "primary emphasis" on buying American goods and services in its foreign operations.

4. The Defense Department is ordered to cut "by a very substantial amount" all military buying planned abroad in 1961 for both American defense forces and those of allied nations.

5. Commissaries and stores operated by American embassies are ordered to stop
buying foreign goods for sale to American diplomats and their dependents.

(6) The Secretary of State is directed to make strong new efforts to win new tariff concessions and trade concessions for American products shipped abroad.

(7) The Secretary of Agriculture is directed to make sure that disposal of surplus agricultural commodities abroad does not interfere with commercial marketings of U.S. farm products.

6. Estimated Savings from Directive. The Treasury estimates that the Directive will save about $1 billion a year. The actions to be taken by the Defense Department may account for about a third of this estimated $1 billion total saving. Executive branch agencies are under instructions, pursuant to the Directive, to explore other means to minimize the balance of payments impact of their operations abroad and to report to the President by December 15 on the measures they are taking.

7. Visit to Bonn of Anderson and Dillon. The objective of the visit was to arrange for the Germans to absorb approximately $650 million of U.S. dollar expenditures by financing the maintenance of our forces there. This unsuccessful mission has now
been followed up by quieter staff level talks between the two governments. The measures being discussed probably include counter-offers made by the Germans to Anderson (such as the Germans assuming financing of projects currently being financed by U.S. aid, and making advance payments on German debts to U.S.), to increase the return of dollars to the U.S.

**QUESTIONS**

1. What is the amount of dollar saving to be realized as a result of the measures currently being undertaken by the Administration?

2. What will be the effect of these efforts in redressing the imbalance in the balance of payments?

3. What other international actions are currently contemplated by the Administration in this area?
"THE NEED FOR A BALANCED BUDGET"

FACTS

1. **The Problem.** Less-than-anticipated revenues as a result of growing unemployment and lower corporate profits imperil the achievement of a balanced budget for fiscal year 1961 (period July 1, 1960 to June 30, 1961).

2. **Anticipated Surplus.** The present Administration initially contemplated a budget of $80 billion for the present fiscal year and governmental revenues of about $84 billion, with a surplus of $4 billion. This original estimate was subsequently revised to envisage expenditures of about $80.4 billion and revenue of approximately $81.5 billion, yielding a surplus of only $1.1 billion.

3. **Possible Deficit.** Increasing unemployment (now approaching 5½ millions, with a consequent loss in personal income tax revenues) threatens to lower over-all revenue further. Industry is currently operating at less than four-fifths of capacity. Reduced profits mean lower corporation returns, a principal item in general revenue. The current forecast is for a budget deficit in this Administration's last fiscal year. Adoption of
anti-recession measures involving additional government outlays would increase both the chances for, and size of, a deficit. However, the President may indicate that he is seeking to handle the unemployment problem by extra-budgetary means (e.g., changing bank reserve requirements, discount rates, etc.).

4. Fiscal Year 1962 Budget. The fiscal year 1962 budget to be submitted by the present Administration is still being formulated.

It is possible that President Eisenhower will:

1. Stress the importance of keeping budgetary expenditures within available revenues in the interest of maintaining "a sound dollar" at home and abroad.

2. Indicate certain additional measures he is contemplating taking during the remainder of his term to ameliorate the effects of the current recession, particularly as regards employment.

3. Suggest the character of his prospective Budget Message to Congress.
QUESTIONS

1. What measures to stem growth of unemployment does President Eisenhower contemplate initiating between now and January 20?

2. What are his estimates of size of income loss due to unemployment and lower industrial security?
QUESTIONS

NATO NUCLEAR SHARING

1. President Eisenhower should be asked to elaborate his views on the significance he attaches to nuclear sharing through NATO.

2. What proposals, if any, with regard to NATO nuclear sharing does the Eisenhower Administration propose to make at the NATO meeting this month?

3. Will those proposals contemplate the abandonment of the "two-key" principle?

4. Will those proposals involve the amendment of the MacMahon Act?

LAOS

1. Has the U.S. any important elements of suasion on the internal Laotian situation, other than that represented by General Phoumi?

2. If a neutralist government can be established without Communist participation, may not this now be the best the West can hope for?

3. Taking into account the strong evidence of neutralistic sentiment, and the danger inherent in attempting to get Laos to take sides in any future conflict involving the Communist states and SEATO, may not Laos make its best contribution to the peace of Southeast Asia, as well as to its own security, by carrying on as a neutral buffer state?

THE CONGO

1. What are likely to be the consequences of the expanding Belgian presence in the Congo for the UN operation and for the maintenance of civil order?
THE CONGO (Cont'd)
2. Is there evidence of Soviet aid going to the pro-Lumumba government in Stanleyville? What can be done to prevent the development of a Communist-oriented state and possible civil war?
3. Can the UN Force maintain impartiality given the hostility to the Kasavubu-Mobutu regime of so many of the governments it represents?
4. What plans have been made for financing an operation of this size for an indefinite period?

ALGERIA

No questions.

DISARMAMENT
1. To what extent can the new Administration safely delay any firm commitment for resumption of disarmament negotiations, pending study of the negotiating history and of the position that the United States has taken in the past?
2. What arrangements would President Eisenhower recommend for briefing a representative of the new Administration on the entire field of arms control and disarmament?
3. What is President Eisenhower's judgment on the best location within the government of the disarmament organization?

TEST SUSPENSION NEGOTIATIONS
1. To what extent is the Soviet Union interested in concluding a test suspension treaty? What are the best means by which this interest might be probed?
TEST SUSPENSION NEGOTIATIONS (Cont'd)

2. What are the prospects for obtaining French adherence to the proposed test suspension treaty? How might their adherence best be brought about?

CUBA AND LATIN AMERICA

1. To what extent is Cuba responsible for revolutionary activity elsewhere in Latin America?
2. What is the present and prospective effectiveness of the trade embargo?
3. To what extent can we anticipate support of action against Cuba by other American states?
   a. Through the Organization of American States?
   b. In the United Nations?
4. Have we sought common action in support of our Cuban policies by our European allies in connection with the trade embargo?
5. Are attempts being made to curtail all shipments to Cuba through concerted tanker control?
6. Can we expect increased support from Canada on Latin American problems?
7. To what extent is the Castro regime dependent on Soviet and Chinese financial and technical assistance?

U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND GOLD OUTFLOW

1. What is the amount of dollar saving to be realized as a result of the measures currently being undertaken by the Administration?
U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND GOLD OUTFLOW (Cont'd)

2. What will be the effect of these efforts in redressing the imbalance in the balance of payments?

3. What other international actions are currently contemplated by the Administration in this area?

"THE NEED FOR A BALANCED BUDGET"

1. What measures to stem growth of unemployment does President Eisenhower contemplate initiating between now and January 20?

2. What are his estimates of size of income loss due to unemployment and lower industrial security?
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The documents in this folder are numbered 1 - 6.
The documents on the attached list are closed because of their security classifications. They have been submitted for mandatory review under Executive Order 11652. When items are declassified, their entries on the attached list are so marked and lined out and the documents are added to the open material in this folder.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORM OF DOCUMENT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DECLASSIFIED NLX-32-108  01/19/61</td>
<td>Notes dictated by JFK to E. Lincoln following meeting with President Eisenhower</td>
<td>01/25/64</td>
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<td>05/10/62</td>
<td>CIA S(…) 4pp</td>
<td>06/22/62</td>
<td>Memorandum of Conversation by MV Forrestal re 6/21/62 briefing of General Eisenhower</td>
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**RESTRICTION CODES**

(A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
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Mr. David Kendall dictated following over the phone:

(a) Preparations for the President's action in case of defense emergency.

   Emergency action plans
   Documents
   Operations
   Facilities
   Succession
   Arrangements relating to Presidential authorization of use of atomic weapons

(b) Concerning defense.

   Weekly meetings with the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff as well as target planning response doctrine

(c) Authority for special operations, including intelligence activities

The foregoing are for discussion with President-elect Kennedy. Topics suggested by Mr. Kennedy are to be discussed in the larger meeting. The above would be discussed by the President with Mr. Kennedy alone. The purpose of discussing President Eisenhower's list when alone is that there will be things that will come out and that he will raise that have not been discussed in the presence of some of the Cabinet officers who would be present at the larger meeting.
I visited E. this morning at 9:00 o'clock. This last visit had been suggested by Roscoe Drummond, who had informed me that as a result of a visit he had had with the President he thought the President would welcome a second visit from me. This fit in with my own desire. I was anxious to see E. for two reasons:

First because it would serve a specific purpose in reassuring the public as to the harmony of the transition. Therefore strengthening our hands.

Secondly because I was anxious to get some commitment from the outgoing administration as to how they would deal with Laos which they were handing to us. I thought particularly it would be helpful to have some idea as to how prepared they were for military intervention.

General Persons welcomed me to the White House this Thursday morning. The President was at his desk looking very fit, pink cheeked and unharassed. He told me that he felt that he had been busier now on the way out then when he came in. We spent the next 45 minutes going through the emergency procedures that might be called upon in case of an immediate attack. I asked him several questions as to staff organization. He pointed out how invaluable General Persons had been and said I would need a similar staff assistant if I was to harmonize throughout my administration the various matters that would come before me. "Only the tough problems get to you" he said.

President Eisenhower had a broader range of information than I had presumed and discussed with knowledgeability the
the functions of the OCDM, i.e. if all the engines came from Chicago and if Chicago was knocked out it would be their responsibility to find out where other parts could be had if our source was knocked out. He asked me twice if I would like to see a drill of a helicopter. The second time he called in his naval aide, picked up a telephone on his right side and said into the phone "Opal Drill Three". He sent the naval aide out and three minutes later he appeared. The President said to me in these drills they only go as far as the Washington Monument. The naval aide said "I told them this morning to come to the White House lawn."

At 9:45 a.m. we went in where the six Cabinet members were seated and we continued to discuss the issues. Mr. Herter talked most of the time. He pointed out that as to the question of Laos that any proposal which would include communists in the government would end up with the communists in control of the government and therefore this solution should be regarded with great suspicion. He agreed that the local government forces were more vigorous in the struggle but he said this could be improved with the MAG group being sent there. This would not in any way be against the Geneva pact and the Germans were bitter about this matter any how. He stated that they were afraid that the British and French would not respond. I asked the Secretary as to whether in his opinion we should intervene if the SETO was invoked by the government. He said very directly that he felt we should. It was the cork in the bottle. If Laos fell, then Thailand, the Philippines, and of course Chiang Kai Shek would go. I turned to the President. He stated also that he felt we should
intervene. When I asked him whether he felt that the communists could intervene with greater force he said it was a question as to whether they would be willing to see the war spread. I asked Mr. Gates whether he felt the United States would have sufficient military power and he said he felt they could; that they had conducted a survey and while we might not be able to handle two fronts, they could handle one. He also said that with the use of certain aircraft it would be possible to cut down the time from 17 days to 12 days to move 12,000 men and supplies for these men in the Pacific and the Marines from Okinawa.

I came away from that meeting feeling that the Eisenhower administration would support intervention - they felt it was preferable to a communist success in Laos.

Dictated to me
Evelyn Lincoln
By President-elect Kennedy
January 19, 1961
President-elect Kennedy also asked me to call Mr. Rusk, Mr. Clark Clifford and Mr. McNamara and find out if they took notes on this meeting. If so, he would like a copy of their notes.

Evelyn Lincoln
January 19, 1961
Memorandum of Subjects for Discussion at Meeting of President Eisenhower and Senator Kennedy on Thursday, January 19, 1961

STATE
- Laos
- Cuba, Dominican Republic and Caribbean area
- The Congo, and the African situation generally
- Berlin
- Nuclear Test Talks and Disarmament
- Algeria, and other current problems with France

DEFENSE
- An appraisal of limited war requirements vs. limited war capabilities

TREASURY
- Any suggestions President Eisenhower and his administration may have regarding the coordination and development of basic economic, fiscal and monetary policies

Meeting with President Eisenhower at 9:00 AM.
January 19.
The northwest gate on Pennsylvania Ave. and go in West Executive Office entrance.
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Meeting with President Eisenhower at 9:00AM.
January 19.
Use northwest gate on Pennsylvania Ave. and go in West Executive Office entrance.
January 21, 1961

My dear Mr. President:

On my first day in office I want to send you a note of special thanks for your many acts of cordiality and assistance during the weeks since the election.

I am certain that your generous assistance has made this one of the most effective transitions in the history of our Republic. I have very much enjoyed personally the association which we have had in this common effort.

With all good wishes to you and Mrs. Eisenhower in the days ahead, I am

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy
January 21, 1961

My dear Mr. President:

On my first day in office I want to send you a note of special thanks for your many acts of cordiality and assistance during the weeks since the election.

I am certain that your generous assistance has made this one of the most effective transition in the history of our Republic. I have very much enjoyed personally the association which we have had in this common effort.

With all good wishes to you and Mrs. Eisenhower in the days ahead, I am

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy
January 24, 1961

Honorable John F. Kennedy
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I enclose original and one copy of memorandum containing the highlights of the discussion between you and former President Eisenhower and your and his chief advisers, which took place on January 19, 1961.

The subjects covered in the attached memorandum are those which appeared to me at the time to be the most significant.

Respectfully yours,

Clark M. Clifford
To: President Kennedy  
From: Clark M. Clifford  

January 24, 1961

Memorandum on Conference  
between President Eisenhower and President-elect Kennedy  
and their Chief Advisers on January 19, 1961

After a few introductory remarks by President Eisenhower, he suggested that attention first be given to the existing situation in Laos and he asked Secretary of State Herter to speak in this regard.

The substance of Secretary Herter’s remarks are as follows: The present government in Laos, the Boun Oum government, which is referred to as the Royal Laotian Government, is supported by the King but it appears to be weak and ineffectual. The Royal Laotian Government (RLG) is strongly supported by the United States, Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines. The British and French are definitely lukewarm and the Communist bloc is bitterly opposed and is seeking to destroy the present government.

At different times, it has been suggested by interested parties that the problems in Laos should be submitted to the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) or the United Nations. Others have suggested a submission of the matter to the International Control Commission (ICC) or establishment of a neutral nations commission. The Indian Government
has already proposed that the matter be submitted to the International Control Commission (ICC) and the United States, England and Canada are considering it.

At this point, President Eisenhower interjected that he believes there would be some merit to the submission of the problem to the International Control Commission (ICC) but that, personally, he prefers that SEATO take charge of the controversy. This country has tried to get important members of SEATO interested in submitting the Laotian problem to SEATO but such efforts have not been successful to date. Certain members of SEATO have taken the position that the trouble in Laos is due to internal internecine difficulties and that there is not a clear case of aggression from the outside. The British and French have made it clear to this country that they do not want SEATO to intervene.

At this point, Secretary Herter stated that if the present government of Laos applies to SEATO for relief, it is his opinion that the members of SEATO are definitely bound.

Secretary Herter described the attitude of the Soviet bloc as being one of trouble making in the area and testing the unity and strength of Western intentions. The Pathet Lao are receiving substantial help from the Communists through an airlift which is delivering in the neighborhood of fifty tons of materiel of war daily. It is not thought that the Soviet bloc wants a major war in this area but they will continue to make trouble.
right up to that point. Secretary Herter believes that we must convince the Soviet bloc of the seriousness of our intentions to defend Laos but at the same time we must try to persuade our allies to move with us in concert.

Secretary Herter inserted the thought we probably could work out an agreement with the British to proceed on a united basis if they would agree to recognize the present government in Laos.

Secretary Herter stated that he was clear in his own mind that if a political settlement could not be arranged in Laos, then this country must intervene.

At this point, President Eisenhower stated that Laos is the present key to the entire area of South East Asia. If Laos were lost to the Communists, it would bring an unbelievable pressure to bear on Thailand, Cambodia and South Vietnam. President Eisenhower stated that he considered Laos of such importance that if it reached the stage where we could not persuade others to act with us, then he would be willing, "as a last desperate hope, to intervene unilaterally."

Secretary Herter spoke up and said that Thailand was a valuable ally for they fully understood their danger because a Communist dominated Laos would at once expose Thailand's borders. He stated that the Laotian military training under the French is poor. He indicated that attention was being given to getting United States military instructors into Laos or
increasing the number of military instructors in Laos.

Secretary Herter stated that the morale of the Royal Laotian Government forces was not good. This made it more difficult for us because such forces were so undependable. President Eisenhower spoke up and stated he did not understand why the Communist soldiers in such countries always seem to have better morale than the soldiers representing the democratic forces. He stated there is something about the Communist philosophy that gave their supporters a certain inspiration and a certain dedication. President Eisenhower commented also that there may be some concern on the part of the Russian high command of possible Chinese Communist intervention in Laos. If this were to happen, then the Russians might feel that they would lose control of the situation.

President Eisenhower advanced the thought that it would be fatal to permit the Communists to have a part in any new Laotian government. He stated that experience shows that any time you permit Communists to have a part in the government of such a nation, they end up in control. He cited China as an illustration and referred briefly to General Marshall's ill-fated mission to China.

President-elect Kennedy asked the question as to how long it would take to put a division of American troops into Laos. Secretary of Defense Gates estimated that it would take from twelve to seventeen days. He added, however, that it could be done more quickly if we used American troops that were now stationed in the Pacific.
CUBA

President Eisenhower said with reference to guerrilla forces which are opposed to Castro that it was the policy of this government to help such forces to the utmost. At the present time, we are helping train anti-Castro forces in Guatemala. It was his recommendation that this effort be continued and accelerated.

LIMITED WAR CAPABILITIES

Secretary Gates said that studies were either in progress or had been completed with reference to limited war requirements and capabilities in Korea, Formosa, Iran, Berlin and Laos.

Secretary Gates was exceedingly sanguine about the state of our forces insofar as limited war capabilities were concerned. He said that the United States forces are in excellent shape and fully adequate to meet any foreseeable test. He did add that, whereas we were in excellent shape to meet one limited war situation, we could not meet two limited war situations, if they both existed at the same time. He also commented on the Defense Department modernization program which he reported was making fine progress. At this point, President Eisenhower made comments about the difficulties of modernizing arms and cited the Garand rifle as an example.
FLOW OF GOLD

Secretary of the Treasury Anderson stated that efforts of this government to stop the flow of gold were important in two respects. First, that some measures that were put into operation would actually slow up the flow of gold; and second, such measures had a psychological effect by demonstrating to the world that we were determined to correct this situation. He expressed the feeling that this second element had a powerful psychological value.

President Eisenhower offered the opinion that inasmuch as the military forces abroad were under orders to send back to this country the families of servicemen, such policy should be broadened to include the families of State Department officials. He indicated that military personnel felt they were being unfairly treated because they had been singled out for this action. President Eisenhower indicated, however, that such action insofar as State Department personnel were concerned would probably be vigorously resisted by the State Department.

Secretary Anderson concluded the brief discussion on the gold situation by saying that the erosion of our gold position was continuing unabated. He said that in his opinion it was becoming increasingly serious and measures must be found to reverse the present trend.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 25, 1961

Memorandum to the President

From: Ralph Dungan

Per your request of last Sunday, here is McNamara's recapitulation of your recent conversations with President Eisenhower.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

You asked that I put in writing my recollection of the subjects discussed at the meeting with President Eisenhower at the White House on Thursday, January 19. My notes taken at the meeting are not complete, but they indicate that the following statements were made:

A. With respect to Laos:

1. President Eisenhower advised against unilateral action by the United States in connection with Laos.

2. The President stated that the British and French were reluctant to fulfill their obligations under the SEATO Treaty.

3. Secretary Herter stated that if the Phoumi government requested aid from SEATO, he, Herter, believed we would be bound by our obligations under the SEATO Treaty to supply such aid. In this event, he stated he believed the British would probably fulfill their treaty obligations, but that the French would not.

4. Herter added that if a political settlement in Laos is not possible, we must support the Royal Laotian Government's request for SEATO intervention.

5. President-elect Kennedy inquired of President Eisenhower whether, in the event of intervention in the Laotian conflict by either the United States or SEATO, the Sino-Soviet bloc could be expected to counter with forces in excess of those provided by either the SEATO nations or the United States. President Eisenhower's answer was not completely clear, but he implied that the Sino-Soviet bloc could support the Pathet Lao with resources of men and materiel substantially larger than those which the SEATO nations could be expected to provide for the support of the Royal Laotian Government.
6. Secretary Herter stated that the introduction of communist members into the Laotian Government would undoubtedly lead to subversion of the government, and the ultimate replacement of a coalition government with a communist government. President Eisenhower replied he was not certain that this would be the result; he believed it might be possible to maintain indefinitely a coalition government including representatives of the communists.

7. President Eisenhower stated without qualification, "If Laos is lost to the Free World, in the long run we will lose all of Southeast Asia."

8. President-elect Kennedy asked, "What action can be taken to keep the Chinese Communists out of Laos?" There was no answer to this question from President Eisenhower.

B. With respect to Cuba:

1. President Eisenhower stated in the long run the United States cannot allow the Castro Government to continue to exist in Cuba.

C. With respect to "limited war":

1. Secretary Gates stated, "The United States can handle any number of small limited war situations at one time."

2. Secretary Gates stated that the Defense Department had taken the funds authorized by the last Congress over and above what the Department had requested, and had committed these funds to additional airlift capacity and to the design of a new cargo plane.

3. Secretary Gates stated that major problems relating to airlift capacity were:
   a. the right to over-fly;
   b. the congestion of landing fields.

D. With respect to the gold flow:

1. President Eisenhower stated the United States would be better prepared for limited war if we were to bring a division back from NATO and station the division within the continental limits of the United States. He pointed out that such action would ease the gold problem, but would require careful preparation with NATO.
2. President Eisenhower stated that if the order restricting travel of military dependents remains in effect, similar restrictions should apply to the dependents of personnel of other governmental departments, including the State Department.

Robert S. McNamara

Robert S. McNamara
DDE

Thomasville, Georgia,

Dear Mr. President:

It was good of you to inform me of your appreciation of such help as my associates and I were able to give the new Administration in its take-over of Executive Responsibility. We are happy that the cooperation of the "Old" and the "New" may possibly have set a record for smoothness in such an operation.

With the profound hope that under your leadership the country will be peaceful, prosperous and happy -- and with best wishes,

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The President,
The White House.
DEAR MR PRESIDENT, I AM DEEPLY APPRECIATIVE OF YOUR THOUGHTFULNESS IN SUGGESTING TO THE CONGRESS THAT MY FORMER ARMY RANK BE RESTORED TO ME. THANK YOU VERY MUCH. SINCERELY

DWIGHT D EISENHOWER.
The White House
Washington

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THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

DEAR MR PRESIDENT, I AM DEEPLY APPRECIATIVE OF YOUR THOUGHTFULNESS IN SUGGESTING TO THE CONGRESS THAT MY FORMER ARMY RANK BE RESTORED TO ME. THANK YOU VERY MUCH. SINCERELY

Dwight D Eisenhower.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 1, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Restoration of Eisenhower Military Rank

1. If queried about double pensions, it is suggested that this is a question for the Congress, but one would assume that President Eisenhower would prefer to retain his Presidential pension, but again this is a question for the Congress.

2. Assuming the restoration without pay and allowances, Mrs. Eisenhower would be entitled to no monetary benefits of any kind -- not even death benefits should President Eisenhower predecease her.

3. If any military assistants are provided President Eisenhower, they will be counted against the $50,000 annual allowance for staff authorized former Presidents.

4. Apparently word has come through that President Eisenhower is interested only in the military rank, but since 5-star generals are always regarded as on active duty, he would be entitled to medical and dental care -- Mrs. Eisenhower only to medical care.

Lee C. White
PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
COCHRAN AND ODLUM RANCH  
INDIO, CALIFORNIA  

I AM VERY GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR YOUR MOST  
GENEROUS AND HELPFUL STATEMENT TODAY.  
I THINK IT STRENGTHENS OUR COUNTRY'S POSITION  
AT A CRITICAL TIME. WITH EVERY GOOD WISH.  

JOHN F. KENNEDY
IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

THE WHITE HOUSE TODAY MADE PUBLIC
THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE
PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT DWIGHT D.
EISENHOWER.

March 22, 1961

Dear Mr. President:

It gives me a great deal of pleasure to inform you that I have today approved the Act of Congress authorizing your appointment to the active list of the Regular Army as General of the Army with your former date of rank in such grades. I have directed that a commission be prepared immediately.

The legislation constitutes a reaffirmation of the affection and regard of our Nation for you.

I have arranged to have an exact copy of the Enrolled Bill made, and it is enclosed herewith.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy

Honorable Dwight D. Eisenhower

Cohran and Oohm Ranch

Indio, California
Dear Mr. President:

Thank you very much for your thoughtful kindness in arranging to have an exact copy of the Enrolled Bill made and sent to me, that restores my former rank as a General of the Army.

I am most appreciative of the compliment that you and the Congress have paid me in the development and approval of this legislation.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Personal and Confidential

April 9, 1961.

Dear Mr. President,

Before he left, the Prime Minister asked me to send you a copy of the personal and confidential letter which he is sending to General Eisenhower about Laos as a result of his conversation with you. His understanding was that you would also treat this as strictly personal and confidential to yourself.

As we understand General Eisenhower is not going to be back in Washington for another week, we are sending this letter by safe hand through our Consulate-General in Los Angeles in order to do what we can to ensure that there is no slip up and that it gets directly into General Eisenhower's hands personally.

Sincerely yours,

The President

of the United States of America.
CONFIDENTIAL

April 9, 1961

It was very good to hear your voice over the telephone on Friday. I was very sorry that we could not meet.

As you will have seen from the Communiqué, we have had good talks and covered a lot of ground.

We discussed a lot of problems, but we naturally spent a good deal of time on Laos. I know you feel very strongly that we must keep Laos out of Communist hands. So do I. So, I know, does the new President. But I need not tell you what a bad country this is for military operations. Indeed, I doubt whether we could save the situation by military action; and I am sure that, even if we could, the cost in men and money would be absurdly high, to say nothing of the difficulties of Asian opinion. I am sure, therefore, that we ought to go all out for a political settlement,
if we can get one; and I believe that by political action we have a chance to make the country a neutral pad between Thailand and the Communists.

As I understand it, President Kennedy is under considerable pressure about "appeasement" in Laos. I quite see why this should be so: we have not forgotten the lessons of history. I should however be very sorry if our two countries became involved in an open-ended commitment on this dangerous and unprofitable terrain. So I would hope that in anything which you felt it necessary to say about Laos you would not encourage those who think that a military solution in Laos is the only way of stopping the Communists in that area.

I was so sorry to hear about Mamie. Dorothy and I send our love and hope so much that she will be recovered soon. When she is, can we hope that you will both come to recuperate at Culzean?

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, G.C.B., O.M.
June 21, 1961

Dear General Eisenhower:

I was extremely happy that you and Mrs. Eisenhower came to the luncheon today.

I need not tell you that the Japanese visitors were very grateful as public opinion in Japan has been focused on this visit. I think it will contribute immeasurably to strengthening the impression there that we value our good relations with Japan highly.

With every good wish.

Cordially,

General Dwight D. Eisenhower
Gettysburg
Pennsylvania
Dear Mr. President:

I am delighted to hear that you consider the luncheon the other day useful in helping to assure the Japanese government and people of the basic friendliness of America toward them. In addition, it was, of course, most interesting to me to have a talk with you about Berlin and Cuba.

I have since seen General Taylor, who briefed me thoroughly on the subject of Cuba, and I am sure that my own understanding of the affair accords accurately with the facts. I am grateful for his briefing, which you directed.

And I should add that both my wife and I were deeply appreciative of the opportunity given us to meet so many old friends and to participate in the delightful luncheon.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The President,
The White House,Washington, D.C.
July 16, 1961

Dear Mr. President:

You will recall our recent conversation about the importance of continuing a substantial foreign aid program including provisions which would insure firm forward commitment authority. At that time, you indicated your desire to assist in the enactment of such a program and reiterated your conviction on the necessity to include in the measure long-term financing provisions.

As you know, the Congress is now faced with important decisions involving foreign aid which could well affect the security of the United States and the whole free world. Therefore, I am very hopeful that you will be able to make your views known in an appropriate manner on this vital question.

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy

The Honorable Dwight D. Eisenhower
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania
The man who has dealt with the Berlin problem since 1944—as Supreme Allied Commander, as NATO chief, as two-term President—tells how we got where we are today, counsels America for the future.

MY VIEWS ON BERLIN

By DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Photographs by Burt Glinn

No extensive poll is required to demonstrate that in this difficult age uneasiness and worry are too often replacing the feelings of confidence and security that were once priceless possessions of our citizens. Virtually every day visitors to my office or strangers accosting me outside its door ask, “General, what is happening to us?” “Will there be war?” and almost invariably, “Are we going to fight about Berlin?” Indeed, much of their anxiety seems to be centered around this one word, and the variety of questions they ask is almost literally endless. And the last ones on the list are “What can I do?” “What do you think?”

No one, though he were a Solomon, could pretend to give satisfactory replies to all these questions, but usually I start with one or two of my own. I ask, “Have you followed the news of this matter; do you have any ideas on the subject?” In this way I put my visitor on notice that I, too, am a private citizen and, like him, must obtain the bulk of my information from the radio, the television, the magazines and the newspapers. While establishing this common basis, I also remind my questioner that all of us, regardless of personal political leanings, must, in time of international strain or crisis, be united in support of the American position when it is clear and so proclaimed by the President. He alone has the constitutional responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs; therefore, the unity that is indispensable to maximum strength can be achieved only by supporting, in critical circumstances, the measures that he may project. Consequently, I express to my visitors only such observations and thoughts as do not constitute in my mind any violations of these limitations.

Others may find it possible to discuss intelligently the current world debates centering about Berlin without reference to its early postwar history. I find this impossible. Any such attempt can only inspire new questions: “How did we ever get into this situation?” “Why do we have national responsibilities in Berlin?”

In the closing days of World War II, when the status of Berlin was in the process of being determined, our governmental heads were not blind to the serious potentialities in our dealings with the Soviets. I should make it clear that although with the hindsight of seventeen years, some people may see certain of those political decisions as unrealistic, we must remember what the West’s national leaders were then striving to accomplish. The Allies were fighting the war against Hitler, with the Soviets participating as a co-operating government. Our former relationships with the Soviets, formalized by the President’s recognition of that government in 1933, had not been of a kind to inspire any great confidence in their friendly purposes.
"IN 1944 WE ANTICIPATED REAL DIFFICULTIES."

...and intent. Nevertheless, the peoples of the world had a right to hope, in 1944-45, that out of the sacrifices commonly borne in the successful effort to destroy Hitler's evil scheme of world conquest, there might emerge a platform of understanding on which could be established practical agreements for a peaceful world.

The West's leaders were earnestly striving to bring about such a basis for better relations; had they failed to make this attempt, we would today be wailing about lost opportunities and "might-have-beens." Although those efforts seem now to have been futile and unrealistic, we can point to the fact that the United States and Great Britain did everything feasible and reasonable to get the Soviets to accompany us on the road leading toward a world of law.

In 1944, when the Allies were preparing for the invasion of northwestern Europe, Forrest Davis, reporting in The Saturday Evening Post of May 13 on President Roosevelt and the Teheran Conference of late 1943, said:

"It seemed to him [the President] that the creation of a Soviet military zone in the east would divide the Big Three more desirable than specific compacts."

Mr. Roosevelt, gambling for stakes as enormous as any so far played for, has been betting that the Soviet Union needs peace and is willing to pay for it by collaborating with the West. He chose, moreover, topromulgate his policy so sincerely that the Russians, proverbially mistrustful, could have no ground for misgiving.

At Teheran, the President threw his weight against explicit understandings on the future of Germany because he felt that premature.

If this is a correct interpretation of the President's thinking of that time—and I know of no reason why we should question it—then we can better understand the decision to continue the lack of specific mention of Berlin access rights in the 1944-45 agreements on the division of Germany—a lack that in today's climate seems very strange.

But the decisions then made were not, I happen to know, reached impulsively or without a great deal of study. In late 1943, when the Allies were preparing for the invasion of northwestern Europe, there was established on the political side a European Advisory Commission, a body which met in London and was composed of political representatives of the governments of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. It had the duty to make recommendations dealing with plans for governing a defeated Germany and, among other things, suggest the boundaries within Germany for the occupation of any one of the Associated Powers. Ambassador John Winant was the American representative on the body.

When we, in my headquarters, learned during the course of the year 1944 that the commission's recommendations fixed Berlin as Germany's capital and so established national boundaries as to place the city far inside the Soviet zone, we anticipated real difficulties.

I had first talked with President Roosevelt and General Marshall on the subject of future military occupation in January 1944, when I visited Washington between my departure from Italy and arrival in England, some months before the D-Day landings in Europe. At that time I thought and suggested that the whole occupation would be more smoothly conducted if we could avoid the establishment of national zones; I believed that quadripartite government over the entire area as a single entity would give no one nation an opportunity to be troublesome. But even then the President was apparently committed, with Great Britain and the Soviets, to the occupation of Germany by national zones. When I mentioned the matter to General Marshall he made no comment other than that he regarded such affairs as purely political in nature. Incidentally, at that time President Roosevelt remarked to me that he would insist upon the industrial northwest area of Germany as the one to be assigned to American occupation, saying that in southwest Germany there was nothing but scenery, tourism and fishing, of which he wanted none. Not until the second Quebec Conference, in September of 1944, did President Roosevelt abandon his claim for American control in the northwest zone. On January 28, 1945, Ambassador Winant wrote to the President: "You also told me that you wished United States troops to occupy the northwest zone....[My] Holding to your instructions to insist on the northwest zone was responsible for delay in reaching agreement on zones...."

In January and early February of 1945 the Prime Minister and the President and their staffs, then on their way to Yalta, stopped at Malta for preliminary bilateral conferences. To that meeting I sent my chief of staff, Geo. Bedell Smith, to describe our future operational plans and to express the personal conviction to our American supporters that the Western Allies would, by force of arms, gain a line well to the east of that suggested by the advisory commission as the boundary between the Soviet and Western Allied zones. We felt that if our political superiors agreed with us they might decide to insist upon their right to occupy a greater portion of the German territory than then recommended. General Smith's presentation obviously changed no ideas; the advisory commission's plan, outlining boundaries about as they now exist—without the inclusion yet of a French zone—was to stand. Indeed I later came to believe that the Allied authorities had concluded that any attempt to change the recommended plan in any fashion would have produced an East-West quarrel, a "veto" and a deterioration of Allied relations.

Incidentally, I have for years been under the impression that the governmental decision respecting the division of Germany was finally reached at Yalta. Recently, however, I saw a statement in a State Department document that final approval was given in September of 1944. In the document actually prepared as that it was stated, I would certainly have saved myself and my staff much study and work in suggesting possible desirable changes to our superiors. However, since reading this statement I have made a further examination of official documents. These show that while the members of the European Advisory Commission were aware that the commission had given such a recommendation to their governments in September of 1944—amended in November to give the British the northwest zone—"It was not until February 1, 1945, in a telegram sent from Malta by the Secretary of State that Ambassador Winant was authorized to inform the European Advisory Commission of this Government's approval of the amended protocol," concerning the establishment of zones.

After the President's dismissal, a year earlier, of the suggestion that Germany be governed without division into national zones, and the acceptance by the government of the line of division between East and West as recommended by the advisory commission, we later presented still another idea. This one was that Berlin might be abandoned as a site for the occupational capital. In lieu of using that city, then badly damaged by bombing, we felt it feasible to undertake the building of a cantonment capital, much like one of the great mobilization camps built in our own country for the training of troops. We suggested that it be located at the junction of the American, British and Soviet zones. This scheme likewise brought no positive reaction from our superiors. However, as evidence that the President might have had something similar in mind, he, in February of 1944, reportedly sketched out a plan for Germany's division so...
**CHURCHILL URGED THE CAPTURE OF BERLIN.**

that the national occupation zones would have had a common meeting point in Berlin.

It is to be remembered, however, that I, as a member of the uniformed services, had no official responsibility for advising on political subjects; my only reason for bringing up such matters, which I did only in informal fashion, was that we had found in some of our experiences with the Soviet military so much suspicion and arrogance as to minimize any confidence we might have otherwise developed in Stalin's good faith.

In any event, while our heads of government went off to Yalta and later carried on negotiations with the Soviets on matters of world-wide scope, we of the armed services concentrated on completing Hitler's defeat.

The final Allied operations plan for the overrunning of Germany was drawn up in the early spring of 1945 while most of our forces were still west of the Rhine, some 300 miles west of Berlin, and with the Elbe River—a serious military obstacle—running across our route of advance.

At the same moment the Soviets were poised only thirty miles to the east of Berlin, with no major military obstacles on their front, since they had already established a large bridgehead on the west side of the Oder River. At any moment we expected them to launch their final attack.

In view of time and distance factors, therefore, it was highly improbable that Allied forces could ever participate in—much less completely accomplish—an investment of Berlin. These circumstances, plus the fact that by prior political agreement any territory captured by us within the planned Soviet Zone would necessarily be surrendered to the Soviets, led to my personal decision to concentrate on two other important objectives. The first of these was to complete the annihilation of Hitler's forces at the earliest possible moment, as my basic Directive required. The second was to capture and hold areas outside Germany not yet allocated to the several victorious powers, since rapid movements in these other areas might be fruitful in bringing the maximum extent of territory under Western control.

However, after Prime Minister Churchill found, late in March of 1945, that our forces were progressing more rapidly than he had earlier thought possible, he became unhappy with my plan, previously communicated for purposes of co-ordination to Stalin. He urged the capture of Berlin by the Allies as a most important objective and requested me to give all my efforts to that end. I think there is no use here to undertake a laborious explanation of the vast difficulties of making radical changes in extensive military movements once launched, or to point out that even though our spearheads had reached the Elbe before mid-April the center of gravity of our forces was still well to the westward and had other important missions to be carried out. Nevertheless, two small bridgeheads were quickly established by our forces on the far bank of the Elbe, although one was later eliminated by German counterattack. The American Chiefs of Staff were aware of the Prime Minister's proposal but continued to support my plan on the grounds that it would most rapidly destroy the remainder of Hitler's forces and facilitate any Soviet attempt to make an Allied attack toward that city unwise.

In military operations of the war's final weeks, we had annoying local problems with the Soviets as we tried to co-ordinate for a future meeting with their advancing elements—anticipated for some time in April. Another difficulty arose in making plans for accepting the surrender of the remnants of Hitler's forces. Every move of ours for co-ordination of our combined actions was received by Stalin with suspicion and complaint. He seemed most fearful that the Allies might, without Russian participation, receive the surrender of the hostile troops, even though we had been carefully instructed by our governments to avoid even the appearance of unilateral action. We therefore had invited to our headquarters a Russian, General Susloparov, to act as a liaison officer between his forces and ours.

When Hitler's former chief of staff, Colonel General Jodl, after some preliminary maneuvering, came to Rheims to sign the instrument of surrender, effective on May eight, this Russian General was present, making it clear to the enemy that the surrender was to all of the Associated Powers. Nevertheless, we were directed by our governments to keep the affair secret for twenty-four hours in order that the Russians could, on May ninth, stage a public and completely useless surrender show, attempting to give the impression that the later ceremony was the only "official" submission of the hostile troops.

Some time later I had an experience which helped to give further insight into the Soviet mentality. Our respective governments had previously drawn up the basic agreements for the occupation and the duties of the several participants. These provided, as a first step, that troop commanders of the several national forces should meet in Berlin on a suitable day to affix their signatures to a basic proclamation on the administration of Germany. Incidentally, the three commanders had now become four, since the British and American governments, in order to give to France a suitable share of authority and responsibility in the occupation, had agreed to carve out of the zones of the Western Allies an appropriate one for the French. The Soviets had no objection to this but made no concession of territory themselves.

It was finally arranged that the commanders would gather in Berlin on June 5 for the signing ceremony and the first formal meeting of the "Berlin Council." All the papers had been tediously prepared by our respective governments in a time-consuming, back-and-forth process and sent to us in the field, and we of the West had been expressly warned to avoid the changing of a single comma, else the whole dreary exercise would probably have to be repeated. Consequently there was no reason whatsoever why the ceremony could not occur on the minute scheduled.

But even in such a routine and formal affair we had East-West trouble in Berlin. The Western commanders announced their readiness to sign, but as all three of us were, for the moment, guests in the Soviet zone, we had to await the convenience of Marshal Zhukov, the Soviet commander. When the time of the meeting arrived, Marshal Zhukov sent word that there would be a short delay. At the temporary residence assigned to me was a Russian liaison officer, who spoke passable English, and when the delay had reached half an hour I requested him to make inquiries as to the reasons for the postponement. He was unable to discover any reason—at least none that he was permitted to give me. Possibly he didn't even dare to ask.

As time passed I began to suspect that there was no basis for further delay; he was trying to harass us of the West. After repeating several times my requests for information and receiving only the excuse that military considerations required lengthy telephone calls to Moscow, I declined to be further victimized. I instructed the liaison officer that I would wait until five P.M.—it was then 4:30—and if he was to inform the Soviet commander, Marshal Zhukov, that if we could not all sign by that hour I was returning at once to my headquarter at Frankfurt and would be absent from the ceremony.

As the messenger prepared to depart I received word that all was ready for the signing, and I was requested to
"A MONUMENT OF SOVIET FAITHLESSNESS."

come to the appointed place. We all signed, and I regretted my inability to be present at a dinner that we were told, only at that moment, the marshal planned for that evening. I said that, in the absence of an invitation before coming to Berlin, I had made other arrangements for the night. In spite of elaborate preparations for this international banquet, and despite urgent urging by the host to attend, I declined to alter my determination to go back promptly to Frankfurt. By this time the marshal was the soul of hospitality, and I would have liked to stay for an occasion that gave every promise of being enjoyable. But while I might have found ways, I thought it advisable to impress upon my Soviet colleague that I meant what I said—and that he could count on my word when given. So I started home.

Whether or not he got the hint I do not know, but he did leave the party, in spite of well meant and urgent protests on my part, to escort me personally to Tempelhof, an airport some miles away, and stayed there until I was airborne. In later months I came to like Marshal Zhukov better than any other Russian I met, and I had with him a personal association close enough that the two of us were often able during the ensuing period to iron out many difficulties between our two commands.

Within the Berlin Council many affairs of minor significance were settled or at least smoothed over for the moment, but we had no authority to go beyond the limits laid down in the basic political documents written by the European Advisory Commission in 1944 and agreed to by the Allied governments in February of 1945. We took up matters involving administrative details concerning Germany, but we did not try to revise principal features of the basic papers—such as suggesting significant boundary changes or similar questions. Many things were fuzzy in the basic documents—especially the absence of specified routes of access—and of course the Soviets would never allow any revision or official interpretation concerning them that might give to the Allies any expanded or better defined rights.

I remained in command of the American forces until late November of 1945. Between that time and the day I entered the White House in 1953, there was an unbroken history of minor and major difficulties in or about Berlin. During most of those years I continued, in different capacities, to have some contact with incidents arising out of Communist intransigence. For two years I was Chief of Staff of the Army. Later, while serving as president of Columbia University, I acted, for a number of months, at the request of the President, as an informal presiding officer over the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who were incessantly concerned with questions concerning our situation in Germany and Berlin. For another year and a half I was commander of the military forces in NATO, the existence of which body came about because of threats posed to Western security by the Communists. During all those years the most serious threat the West had to face was the blockade by the Soviets in 1948 of land routes into Berlin, a threat that was met by General Clay’s courageous determination—approved by the governments—knowingly.

Possibly the Communists hoped, by the “Berlin Blockade” to force the Allies out of Berlin. If so, they were disappointed. By their chief they that we were determined, despite lack of land routes into Berlin and specific agreements concerning them, to maintain West Berlin and the Allied positions in that city, they finally agreed to desist from physical blockade, if the West would in turn agree to end its counter-blockade and attend a Foreign Ministers Conference later in the spring. The blockade ended on May 12, 1949.

At the resulting Council of Foreign Ministers it was agreed among other things that the occupation authorities should “consult together in Berlin on a quadripartite basis.” One purpose of these consultations—and resultant agreements—was to “mitigate the effects of the present administrative division of Germany and of Berlin,” notably by “expansion of trade and development of the financial and economic relations between the Western zone and the Eastern zone and between Berlin and the two zones.” The occupation authorities were to consider “questions of common interest relating to the administration of the four sectors in Berlin, with a view to normalizing as far as possible the life of the city.” Most significant, the four governments agreed that the occupation authorities “each in his own zone, will have the obligation to take the measures necessary to insure the normal functioning and utilization of railroad, water and road transport for movement of persons and goods . . . and for communications by post, telephone and telegraph . . . .

The recent erection by the Soviets of a stone wall separating the East-West parts of the city is a monument in stone and barbed wire of Soviet faithlessness. It makes a mockery of the agreements reached and solemnly approved by the Soviets at that Paris Conference. Moreover, that wall is a confession of weakness on the part of the Soviets; it acknowledges the failure of their system to command the respect or loyalty of their own people. For its purpose is not to keep us out; it is to keep their downtrodden, unhappy people in!

After my inauguration as President, I found the Berlin situation to be always in a state of ferment. A check of the records shows that during the eight years of my Administration, items which included the status of Berlin came up specifically and formally on the agenda of the National Security Council some twenty times, many more times as an auxiliary or secondary item in papers devoted to other major subjects, and on countless occasions through the briefings regularly presented to the Council by the Director of Intelligence, Mr. Allen Dulles.

The formulation of foreign and national defense policy is not the simple matter of yesteryear, when transportation was slower, communications both sluggish and meager, and weapons were limited in range and power. The destruction of a distant nation in a matter of hours was not even dreamed of before the days of the atomic bomb and the guided ballistic missile; today it is an awesome capability. If a President is to be fully and constantly informed—as he must be—on all phases of situations on which he is constantly called upon for decisions and direction, his sources of information and advice must be more broadly based than any single department of government. The agencies most directly involved during my Administration were the State, Defense and Treasury departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. The Vice President was a statutory member of the National Security Council. Because the viewpoints of the several officials on which he depends will in most cases reflect the status of that city by airfield.

Possibly the Congress established the National Security Council in 1947. In my experience, satisfactory decisions in foreign and defense matters can best be made with the invaluable assistance of the National Security Council and its supporting working groups.

As might be expected during the early years following my first inaugural, when divided Germany and Berlin

From beyond the barrier his masters built, a Voge-East German cop—contemplates freedom.
were not in the same "crisis" category as were Korea, Iran and Indochina, governmental discussions on Berlin were long-range in nature and principally involved planning for secure contingencies. However, the death of Stalin in March of 1953 initiated a season of intensive study and an analysis of the prospects that this event might be a signal for betterment of East-West relations. On April sixteenth of that year I appeared before a convention of the nation's newspaper representatives, proposing that a plan of disarmament should be promptly devised by the major powers, and announcing that if a satisfactory program could be agreed upon, America stood ready to devote a substantial portion of the money so saved to the economic development of emerging and less-developed nations. An included purpose was to settle the problem of a divided Germany and Berlin. This came to naught, though a better atmosphere seemed to exist for a time when the Soviet leaders announced their repudiation of the Stalin-era "personality cult."

As the year wore on, our policies toward the region were studied methodically and deliberately. In January of 1954 I approved the Berlin policy papers produced in the National Security Council, and most of the provisions continued to be followed quite consistently during the ensuing years.

Throughout my terms of office we insisted on making it clear to the Soviet Union that the Western powers regarded our situation in that city as one of right and principle, one which we were determined to maintain and that Soviet measures challenging that position would have the gravest consequences. This meant, of course, that we could not allow the Soviets to nibble away at Allied rights. The only way to prevent such nibbling would be to react vigorously to any local or minor harassments.

We recognized also that it would be necessary to continue to plan for all contingencies which might result from Soviet prodding and that such plans would include limited retaliatory measures, financial support to the city, increased air transport and the like.

In order to ameliorate the effects of any future partial blockade, we established an extensive stockpile of materials for the city of West Berlin. In our planning we emphasized, however, that such measures and a renewed airlift would be only supplements for more positive measures to defend our rights in Berlin. In the meantime, we planned to do what we could to bolster the morale and economy of the city, including the provision of economic aid.

The questions pertaining to Berlin were not exclusively West versus East. Despite the necessity for the Western Allies to act in concert, on details we could not always see eye to eye, because of varying national situations and outlook. Effective planning, therefore, was not easy. However, with Secretary Dulles—and later Secretary Hertler—I spared no effort to sustain close contact and consultation with our principles, oftentimes by personal, as well as official, friends. A strong, united, determined NATO was then—as it is now—the greatest insurance that West had for the maintenance of peace in that area.

Many questions were highly intricate. For example, should the city of Berlin be regarded as an economic center of equal importance with East Berlin? What was the extent to which the United States should mobilize in the event of a threatened alliance or an event of possible threat, or an event of actual threat, or a threatened violation in that city? Problems such as these I constantly considered, with the assistance of the NSC, during the first few months of my Administration.

An event that occasioned an unusual amount of National Security Council study on the German and Berlin question in 1953-55 was the growing pressure for a summit meeting—among the heads of government of the United States, United Kingdom, France and the Soviets. Always there are those who, here and abroad, believe that face-to-face negotiations among governmental heads can miraculously solve outstanding problems between East and West and soothe some of the irritations caused thereby. Neither Secretary of State Dulles nor I had any enthusiasm for such a meeting. Although the possibility was brought up almost continuously either in the press—foreign or our own—and in our Congress, I consistently declined to consider it favorably until some decisive act, rather than mere words, on the part of the Soviets would give some promise of improvement in their attitude.

One outstanding difficulty between East and West involved Austria. A peace treaty for that country had been approved by the major powers, but the Russians had unconscionably postponed its signing, and the matter was a constant irritant in our relations. But after long and inexplicable delays, the Soviets suddenly decided, almost two years after the death of Stalin, to sign that treaty. This act seemed to indicate a more responsible position on the part of the men in the Kremlin than we had so far been able to detect.

In the hope that a better attitude might be discovered and cultivated, our government agreed to attend a "summit" conference which was finally arranged for Geneva, to convene in July of 1955.

In preparation for the meeting, the National Security Council and the Department prepared a great many studies and estimates for my use and that of the American delegation at the conference. The most important question to be brought up was that of the division of Germany, with the situation in Berlin as an included problem. After much discussion an agreement was finally achieved to permit free elections in Germany to determine the fate and position of that entire nation, but nothing was ever done by the Soviets to implement the agreement nor to ease the tensions surrounding that unhappy city.

Other agreements were reached at Geneva, which could have had a direct and favorable effect on Berlin and Germany if they had been carried out, but all were finally repudiated by the Soviets. Some of the Geneva proposals, such as my "Open Skies" plan, either did not or directly bear upon the Berlin question or were rejected by the Soviets.

For the next three years no great change in the situation was recorded. But after the Soviet ultimatum of November of 1958, announcing an intention to sign, within six months, a peace treaty with East Germany and thus, according to them, terminating Western rights in Berlin, a new trial of strength seemed to threaten. As a consequence Berlin came up continually in the National Security Council.

But then, having made his announcement, Mr. Krushchev seemed to turn a more pleasant face to the West. He undertook a series of visits to other nations and invited some heads of government to Moscow. Reports from many sources and his own statement indicated that he believed the time ripe for another summit meeting. By no means would I agree to such a meeting with an ultimatum Berlin by East German forces being considered in the same light as an attack by Soviet forces? What was the extent to which the United States should mobilize in the event of a threatened violation in that city? Problems such as these I constantly considered, with the assistance of the NSC, during the first few months of my Administration. An event that occasioned an unusual amount of National Security Council study on the German and Berlin question in 1953-55 was the growing pressure for a
**WE MUST ALWAYS BE READY TO NEGOTIATE.**

My personal conversations with Chairman Khrushchev took place toward the close of his tour—at Camp David, Maryland. On our side we could uncover no new grounds for believing that another “summit” would prove more productive than that of 1955. But when he, in private conversations with me, agreed to withdraw his ultimatum concerning Berlin—and then lived up to his promise—I agreed to go to another conference, this time in Paris.

As the time for the conference approached, we unfortunately lost a reconnaissance plane (U-2) over Soviet territory. Incidentally, it set off here at home an immediate storm of partisan criticism concerning my conduct of foreign relations. At first the incident seemed to cause little concern to Khrushchev, who had known of these reconnaissance flights for some years. At most it appeared that the situation would result only in our attending the conference in a strained atmosphere. However, upon his arrival at Paris, he suddenly announced that he would not attend the meeting unless I should apologize personally and for my nation. This I of course refused to do—and there was no conference.

Yet during the remainder of my Presidency, Khrushchev made no further threats involving Berlin.

But in spite of threat and obstacles, Berlin has gone forward remarkably. In 1945, at the completion of my World War II command, I saw Germany flattened and beaten. In 1961, at the completion of my tenure as President of the United States, I saw a new West Germany risen from the rubble of defeat and advanced to powerful preeminence among the free and peaceful nations of the world. West Germany’s rise since World War II is one proof of the validity of our policy of firmness against aggression.

Between 1952 and 1960 West Germany approximately doubled its gross national product, its rate of new capital investment, its crude-steel production, its installed electrical generating capacity and its national income.

In six years, ending in 1959, West Berlin more than doubled its manufacturing production and its production of chemicals; tripled its production of food, beverages, and tobacco; and quadrupled its production of basic metals.

Thus West Berlin today stands as a shining showcase of liberty and wealth in a Communist land of darkness and poverty. The economic strength of West Germany adds a giant’s might to NATO and the defenses of the West. We must never erase this record of monumental progress by abandoning, as too hard or too unsophisticated or too ineffective, our policy of insistence on rights—on the Western powers’ right to be in Berlin, on West Germany’s right to ally itself with the forces of freedom, on the right of all the German people one day to become citizens of a Germany united and endowed with political liberty.

Out of all these experiences and incidents I—and any associates—reached a number of conclusions, some old and well understood, some less well known. Among many others they include:

Berlin is not so much a beleaguered city or threatened city, as a symbol—for the West, of principle, of good faith, of determination; for the Soviets, a thorn in their flesh, a wound to their pride, an impediment to their designs.

The Soviets want to banish the Allies from West Berlin because, first, it is to them an unwelcome show place of Western freedom and prosperity in a region otherwise completely regimented and impoverished; and, second, because the opportunity it creates for the unhappy East Germans to escape to freedom emphasizes the outside world the emptiness of the phrase “people’s democracy.” In the meantime, they use it as a pretext to create and intensify tensions and to try to divide the West.

Soviet promises, and even signed agreements not backed up by certainty of performance, are worthless. The Russians will strive earnestly to avoid general nuclear war, but they will use every conceivable device to spread falsehoods and distortions, so as to create confusion, fear and loss of confidence throughout the free world. They constantly refer to us as “capitalistic aggressors” and colonialists while they themselves hold the peoples of once free European nations in subjugation by force of arms. Even more important, the Soviet leaders are afraid to share the truth with their own people, withholding from them the meaning of individual freedom, the facts about our standard of living in the West, the news that thousands of refugees in recent months have risked their lives to flee the people’s paradise. They will continue to use threat, cajolery, bribery, deceit and any other means to further their purposes of world domination.

The Soviets have no intention of making any agreement where effective United Nations inspection in Communist areas must be accepted by them as a condition. Their police-state system is so well established over their own and subjugated peoples that, short of senseless and mutually destructive war, it will not disappear until free world strength, firmness of purpose and world educational progress finally build up a global opposition that will make dictatorship unthinkable.

So my answers to questions about Berlin cannot be rory with optimism, but neither are they black with pessimism. I observe to my visitors that wisdom points up the necessity for the free nations, particularly our own, to remain firm, steadfast and strong—spiritually, economically, militarily. We must always be ready to negotiate, but never to enter into bargaining where there is implied a weakening of principle or where freedom may thereby be, in the slightest degree, diluted. Our fortitude must always be equal to the continuity and intensity of the threat against us; and because of this we must be prepared to carry for years—even decades—all the burdens demanded in sustaining our position against Soviet clamation and every kind of aggression. The measures we adopt to preserve liberty must be responsive to our own studies and analyses; we must not allow ourselves to overmilitarize in fearful reaction to strident threat or to lower our guard in response to hollowed words. Steady, courageous and persistent support of our own positive programs will insure the maximum of safety.

And possibly this is the most important of all: We must be determined to do all these things without falling, as a people, into despair or hopelessness. We must realize that, as we put our minds to the positive and productive things that each of us can do, we shall always defeat any tendency toward despondency. We must never waste in supporting our Government and our President as they call upon us for sensible things and services necessary to meet every crisis of the future. We must determine, each of us, to do his or her part in spreading understanding among our people, for while understanding is no guarantee of peace, without understanding there will be no peace. And as we strive, with the fortitude and nobility that Americans always possess in great crisis, we shall experience the satisfaction that such efforts induce.

We must recognize once more, as we have in the past, that happiness is often the child of sacrifice. THE END
December 9, 1961

Dear General Eisenhower:

I have been meaning to write you for some days, but only found this opportunity tonight upon my return to Washington. I want you to know how much I appreciated and admired your televised remarks about the extremists. I don't know of anyone whose opinion on this matter will have greater weight; and your statement is another example of your service and devotion to the country.

Incidently, I read your article in the Saturday Evening Post about Berlin and found it very constructive and helpful.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Dwight D. Eisenhower
Gettysburg
Pennsylvania
November 21, 1961

Dear General:

Many thanks for your kind letter. I know that it will please the people of the Defense Department who handled the arrangements.

I was glad to see you looking so well on Saturday and I am looking forward to remaining in contact with you on the major international matters which affect our security.

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower
Gettysburg
Pennsylvania
Dear Mr. President:

Again I want to assure you of my gratitude for your courtesy in making it possible for me to attend the funeral on Saturday of "Mr. Sam." The arrangements for planes and other transportation that were made at the last minute turned out to be efficient and more than satisfactory, and I hope you share my pride in the ability of the members of our Armed Forces to act (in admittedly a small thing) with such dispatch.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The President
The White House
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The documents in this folder are numbered 1 - 26.
The documents on the attached list are closed because of their security classifications. They have been submitted for mandatory review under Executive Order 11652. When items are declassified, their entries on the attached list are so marked and lined out and the documents are added to the open material in this folder.
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<td>NLK-84-103</td>
<td>Memorandum of Conversation by MV Forrestal re 6/21/62 briefing of General Eisenhower</td>
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FILE LOCATION

PRESIDENT'S OFFICE FILES::SPECIAL CORRESPONDENCE:: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

RESTRICTION CODES

(A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
December 14, 1961

Dear Mr. President:

When I talked to you on the phone this morning, I neglected to mention my appreciation of your letter of December ninth. I am grateful to you for taking the trouble so to write me.

I consider the wave of sentiment that seems to be sweeping the country, and which I believe to be engendered by certain individuals seeking headlines, somewhat alarming, but I am certain the good sense of the majority of the American people will reject the extremist point of view in the long run.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The President
The White House
December 16, 1961

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for asking Secretary McGhee to come to the hospital the other evening to brief me on the current Congo situation.

Since I last talked to you, I have had a phone conversation with John McConal. He feels, as perhaps you know, that he can face the Christmas holidays better if he goes on an inspection trip and keeps busy. But he plans to come to the desert shortly after the first of the year and at that time will bring me up to date.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

The President
The White House
Palm Desert
December 28, 1961

Dear Mr. President:

I have been concerned, as I know everyone in the country has, by your father's illness. I trust that his vigorous constitution will stand him in good stead and enable him to pull out of this major blow that has been inflicted upon him. Please give your mother my good wishes for his steady and rapid improvement.

Just before I left Gettysburg, General Clifton called Colonel Schulz, relaying your more than kind offer of transportation assistance in and around the Washington area. I am deeply grateful for your thoughtfulness. Of course I shall, if necessary, take advantage of your suggestion -- although I shall try, under normal circumstances, to manage as I have been doing.

Despite the gravity of your father's illness, I send to you and your family my best wishes for the finest possible New Year.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The President
Palm Beach White House
Palm Beach, Florida
Dear Mr. President,

I am most appreciative of your kindness in sending to me, by the hand of John McConé, some of your Christmas golf balls. Since I am trying my best to play at least five days a week, I assure you that your gift is not only a useful one, but most welcome.

Along with my thanks, I send to you my best wishes,

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. PETERSON

The President has seen this letter. It has not been answered. I am sending it along to you for your information.

Evelyn Lincoln
Personal Secretary to the President

Noted: I don't think this requires a response.
January 15, 1962

Dear Mr. President:

I was most interested to learn from your recent letter of the principal features in your program for Trade Expansion. It is quite clear that the coming of the Common Market in Europe presents to us new problems, and I agree that for meeting and solving these problems, some adjustment in former practices will be necessary. I also agree that there must be plans to help in the adjustment of workers and companies who are unavoidably injured by sharp changes in our trade policies.

While this kind of program in the past has not been very appealing to the American business man and to certain elements of organized labor and, as a consequence, has been unattractive to various political figures, it is possible that with the increasing awareness of some of the implications to the United States of the development of the Common Market a real opportunity for action may be created.

Of course this matter of trade adjustment and negotiation with the Common Market cannot be considered in a vacuum. Along with it must be considered such matters as other policies on the fiscal, monetary and wage-cost-price front that will make it possible for us to be competitive and thus secure for our country and our people the advantages of freer flowing commerce among the nations of the free world. Without real effort and real dedication in attacking outstanding problems on these fronts, we cannot hope to realize the benefits that such an advance in our trade policies could bring to us. Even before your letter arrived, I had written to a number of leaders in my Party expressing this general view.
I am quite confident that Chris Herter will keep me informed of developments that otherwise might escape my notice, and I shall strive to do what I can to further the cause of a program that I have long believed to the long range advantage of the United States.

With best wishes and personal regard,

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The President
The White House
January 25, 1962

Dear Mr. President:

As you know I have been gratified at your expressions of support for the new trade program.

I did want you to have directly from me a copy of the message which I am sending to Congress.

I would of course welcome your comments and will appreciate your highly valued continued support as we go into the debate phase.

I hope this letter finds you well and enjoying your California vacation.

With all best wishes,

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy

The Honorable Dwight D. Eisenhower
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania

cc: Mr. Howard Petersen
    Mr. Holborn
MEMORANDUM FOR

HOWARD C. PETERSEN

The President asked me to send you this copy of President Truman's letter. The President also suggested that perhaps March would be the best time to issue the statement.

Evelyn Lincoln
Personal Secretary to the President
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Joint Tariff Policy Statement from Ex-Presidents

Governor Herter tells me that it is almost impossible to get anything done with General Eisenhower while he is on the West Coast. He has tried on other matters. He therefore thinks it will be necessary to wait until Eisenhower's return to Gettysburg, which will be later this month.

Governor Herter will undertake to go up and see him and, if possible, obtain his approval of a statement which we will prepare. Hopefully this can then be joined in by Ex-Presidents Hoover and Truman.

Howard C. Petersen
Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for sending me the complete text of your message to the Congress on trade. I shall try, as the situation unfolds, to keep my political associates informed as to my personal views.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The President
The White House

P.S.: My thanks, also, for having John McConne give me some advance information on the release of Powers and Air Force Captain.
March 8, 1962

Dear General Eisenhower:

As I told you on the telephone, I plan to be in Palm Springs visiting my sister and her husband on the 24th and 25th following my appearance at Berkeley. I should like very much to call on you either Saturday or Sunday morning at 11:00, if this fits in with your schedule. I am uncommitted on both days, however, and would be very glad to select a different time, if you should so desire.

I hope the sun is shining.

With every good wish.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Dwight D. Eisenhower
Gettysburg
Pennsylvania
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

14 March 1962

General Clifton:

Colonel Schulz called and said that he has a letter from the President to General Eisenhower, but that he is unable to effect delivery at the present time. General Eisenhower is south of the border and the only way that they can reach him is through the Richfield Oil Company, radio-phone unit.

General Eisenhower is expected to return on Saturday, the 17th, and an answer would be available by Monday the 19th. He wondered if this would be satisfactory if they attempt to contact General Eisenhower.

Colonel Schulz indicated that he would in Palm Springs to arrange details with you when the President arrives.

John Hays
Dear Mr. President:

As perhaps you know, the Administrator of the General Services Administration read, at the dedication of the Eisenhower Library in Abilene yesterday, the message you so kindly sent. It was warmly received by the entire assemblage, and much appreciated by my brothers and me.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The President
The White House
Dear Mr. President:

I am deeply grateful for your kindness in acting so promptly and favorably on the suggestions I made to you at Palm Desert concerning three members of the Army. In the cases of General Heaton and Colonel McNally, my purpose was only to urge something that I considered in the best interests of a Service to which I had long belonged and which still commands my loyalty. In the case of Colonel Schulz, my hope was that the Army could find it fitting to promote him prior to retirement because of his long and efficient service, much of it spent as a member of my own staff. I shall keep confidential your intentions respecting Colonel Schulz' promotion until his nomination has been publicly announced.

As to the Army's decision to bring the rank of Surgeon General back to that of Major General upon Heaton's retirement, I personally believe the Secretary's action is logical. Just as a matter of incidental information, some years back I adopted a policy of reserving one or two spots in the three star grade to be rotated on a reasonable basis among the several heads of the Army's Special Services; I thought this would be one way to promote morale among the members of these Special Services and occasionally to reward a very distinguished individual -- such as General Heaton.

On another subject I express again my appreciation of the measures you have taken to meet any quasi-official transportation need that I may encounter. I shall be careful to avoid any palpably inappropriate uses of such facilities.
This morning I participated in the making of a CBS film, the purpose of which is to support the policy of liberalizing international trade in the free world. I have previously written you of my long-held conviction that the objectives you are seeking in this field would promote national progress. In making the film I repeated this expression of support, but to questions directed specifically to the bill before the Congress, I made comments that show some disagreement as to detail. This seems only natural because I think it probable that no two men in the world could agree completely on the proper procedures in attacking and solving what is surely one of the most complex and difficult problems of our times.

I have a note from Secretary Rusk who requests an early appointment with me, indicating that he would like to go over the old and new problems that plague us all. I have promptly replied to the effect that I shall be glad to meet with him on the earliest date convenient to us both.

One other thing: While it is of course well known that in the domestic field there are governmental proposals and programs concerning which you and I do not agree, I assure you that my political views, though strongly held and sometimes vigorously expressed, contain nothing of personal animus on my part. Any allegation to the contrary that may come to your ears -- and I have heard that such a one has -- is either untrue or highly exaggerated and would, I hope, be wholly ignored. I am confident that anyone in your position finds -- certainly this was my own experience -- that some individuals will never hesitate to distort or even falsify in striving for a feeling of self-importance in the limelight that plays about the Presidency.

With best wishes,

Respectfully,

The President
The White House
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with General Eisenhower: Mr. McConne and Mr. Forrestal present

Essential points were as follows:

1. McConne and Forrestal described the current military situation which has grown out of the fall of Nam Tha and the retreat of the Phoumi forces some 85 miles southwest and across the Thailand border, pointing out that Phoumi forces did not offer resistance though they had numerical superiority and that this situation had occurred previously in the Plaine des Jarres and elsewhere.

2. Phoumi's intransigence politically foreclosed the formation of a government of national union in which those same political elements would be present as were represented in the last Souvanna Phouma government during the Eisenhower administration. The effort was not a coalition, but was a neutral government with a firm commitment to keep Laos free from Communist intrusion.

3. The political and military situation which has evolved confronts us with only two alternatives:

   a. The accomplishment of the national union government under Souvanna with Phoumi's participation or,
SECRET-EYES ONLY

b. The use of U. S. forces in Laos with possible assistance from the Thais but not others and with very little likelihood of strong military activity by the Laotians themselves because of their demonstrated inadequacies.

Eisenhower's views might be summarized as follows:

1. He questioned McCone closely as to whether Souvanna was a Communist, stating that he was convinced when Souvanna fled Laos and resided in Cambodia that he had turned Communist. McCone stated every check indicated Souvanna was not a Communist though he was a weak man.

2. Eisenhower stated that every government irrespective of what it was called, which incorporated Communists and others, eventually was taken over by the Communists. For that reason he was opposed to the proposed Souvanna government but he did not refer to that government as a "coalition government."

3. Eisenhower dwelt at length on the danger to South Vietnam and Thailand as both will be outflanked if Laos is in Communist hands and concluded that such a situation would be so critical to Southeast Asia and so important to the U. S. that most extreme measures, including the commitment of U. S. forces to combat in Laos, were justified.

4. Eisenhower urged a partitioning of Laos into Northern and
Southern sectors with the line as far north as possible and that to accomplish this we should support General Phoumi and his forces. When McConé pointed out Phoumi's demonstrated inadequacies, Eisenhower stated he named Phoumi because he thought he was a strong leader but recognized some alternate might be desirable.

5. McConé and Forrestal pointed out that this would involve a commitment of U. S. troops, very possibly with no assistance from other countries. Eisenhower replied that this would be proper, defensible, that he would support it and he felt the Congress would support it. At this point he urged that the President go before the Congress and seek a resolution authorizing him to act in Southeast Asia, the resolution being similar to those passed by the Congress at Eisenhower's request in connection with Formosa and the Middle East. McConé stated that he seriously questioned Congressional approval, citing Russell's statement. Eisenhower responded that he was sure that Congress and the people would support such a resolution and he personally would use his influence with his Party and the Congress to assist its passage.

6. Throughout the conversation, General Eisenhower expressed concern over a compromise position. He frequently compared the
Souvanna arrangement with earlier compromises in China and stated that his sampling of public opinion indicated a desire for the U. S. to demonstrate strength rather than compromise. He expressed great confidence in Thailand and also in President Diem of South Vietnam.

7. Finally Eisenhower warned of the consequences of losing Southeast Asia, pointing out that if it is lost, nothing would stop the southward movement of Communism through Indonesia and this would have the effect of cutting the world in half.

John A. McCone

Dictated but not read.
Mrs. Lincoln,

Here is all the correspondence I have on the President-Gen Eisenhower exchange.

Peggy Daley
Gen Clifton's office
May 17, 1962

Dear General:

As you perhaps know, I have been a great admirer of yours since our first meeting in Frankfurt, in 1945, when I accompanied Secretary Forrestal on a trip to Europe. I agree with your view concerning the differences that could easily arise between us, and will certainly do everything in my power to prevent any misunderstandings of thought, actions, or motive from eroding our association. I fully understand that there will be differences on some matters, especially on domestic issues, and at the same time, feel that in matters of national concern, especially in foreign affairs, we will see eye to eye.

Let me express my appreciation for your support in the Berlin crisis, in the foreign trade discussion, and especially on foreign aid. Your continued interest in our national security problems, and your ready acceptance of intelligence and operational briefings concerning Southeast Asia, leads me to feel that your important support and judgment are readily at the nation's command, for which I am truly grateful.

Thank you for your recent letter, and its encouragement. I have received word on your suggestion concerning the title for General Heaton, and at the appropriate time will make that change.

With best wishes and warm regards -- and those of longstanding.

Sincerely,

General Dwight D. Eisenhower
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania
Dear General:

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General Dwight D. Eisenhower
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania
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With best wishes and warm regards -- and those of long-standing.

Sincerely,

General Dwight D. Eisenhower
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania
May 3, 1962

Dear General:

I am pleased to inform you that your suggestions made during our most pleasant get-together at Palm Springs are being met.

Lieutenant Colonel McNally, who commands the White House Army Signal Agency, was promoted to the rank of Colonel on April 16. A Selection Board had just chosen him for advancement, and I directed that he be promoted immediately rather than wait for the approximately one thousand vacancies to occur that were ahead of him.

I am sure you will be pleased to know that I have signed the nomination for promotion to Brigadier General for your military aide, Colonel Schulz. Because it is on an individual basis, I am holding it until several more names come up the latter part of the month before sending it to the Senate.

Our solution on General Heaton seems to meet with his approval and, as I presume you know, he is waiting to talk it over with you sometime after May 9. To save the space on the General Officers list, it was our thought that it would be wise to let him fulfill his complete term as Surgeon General of the Army until the middle of 1963, and the day after retirement, call him back to active duty as a special teacher-consultant in surgery at Walter Reed with the full rank, pay and privileges of Lieutenant General. It was planned to have him continue in this position until he reaches the age of 64, at which time he would retire again. The reports to me from the Department of the Army are that all of these arrangements are completely satisfactory with
General Heaton. Additionally, the Army plans, under its new reorganization, to bring the rank of the Surgeon General back to Major General upon General Heaton’s retirement, and this was a factor in selecting this course of action.

General Clifton fully understands your thoughts on the use of military aircraft whenever you have a mission to perform which you deem appropriate for the use of official transportation, and a call to his office from your aide will make it immediately available. As you know, for your shorter trips from Gettysburg, the Department of the Army stands ready to furnish you a helicopter at any time, if you will let the Office of the Chief of Staff know of your needs. And I have directed that whenever you or Mrs. Eisenhower are in this area, official White House ground transportation is at your command.

With warm regards and best wishes,

Sincerely,

General Dwight D. Eisenhower
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania
June 7, 1962

Dear Mr. President:

Agreeable to Joint Resolution 51, 87th Congress (Public Law 87-364) and to your letter of June 5, I am happy to accept membership on the Woodrow Wilson Memorial Commission.

While, because of many preoccupations, I cannot promise faithful attendance at meetings or the performance of any important chores in connection with the Commission's work, I shall most certainly be happy to have the reports that you tell me will be forthcoming from the Secretary of the Interior on matters relating to the Commission.

Thank you very much for your thoughtfulness in bringing this matter to my attention.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The President
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.
July 16, 1962

Dear Mr. President:

I have just learned that during the process of planning for my trip to Europe, a belief somewhere developed that it would be desirable to have along a security officer. It seems that officials in some of the countries I am scheduled to visit thought, for security purposes, it would be desirable to establish a definite liaison between them and my visiting party.

You have been so kind, I am informed, as to assign an experienced Secret Service Agent to this chore. His services unquestionably will be of the greatest convenience; for your thoughtful courtesy I am deeply grateful.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Evelyn,

For your files -- a revised version of Mike Forrestal's memo for record.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of General Eisenhower in Gettysburg, Pa., at 11 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. on June 21, 1962

Persons present were: General Eisenhower, Lt. Colonel John Eisenhower, Director McConee, and Mr. Forrestal.

Director McConee briefed General Eisenhower on recent intelligence indications of a substantial military buildup by the Chinese Communists in Fukien Province (see SNIE 13-5-62). General Eisenhower speculated whether this buildup could be a reaction to statements by the Chinats that they intended operations against the Mainland. Director McConee said that this was a possibility. However the purpose of the buildup was not definitely known, but (according to the SNIE) could be (a) response to fear of landings from Taiwan; (b) resumption of a campaign of pressure on the Offshore Islands similar to that which occurred in 1958; and (c) a deliberate assault on the Offshore Islands in the immediate future. Director McConee said that the urgency and scale of the military preparations strongly supported the last possibility.

General Eisenhower gave his opinion that the disposition of ChiCom forces in Fukien Province would indicate whether their intentions were defensive or offensive. A defensive posture would probably involve a spreading out of military units up and down the coast with reserves fanned out in the rear echelons. An offensive posture would suggest a heavy concentration of troops in the immediate vicinity of the target.

General Eisenhower also emphasized that an invasion of Quemoy could hardly be carried out without an intensive artillery bombardment in advance. He said that he estimated that such a barrage would probably have to be continued for at least 72 hours, although possibly by an extremely heavy effort a "time-on-target" type barrage would shorten the time. General Eisenhower recollected the bombardment and the investing of the island of Pantelleria during the campaign in the Mediterranean. Despite intensive naval and air bombardment lasting for 3 or 4 days, relatively little actual damage was done to the gun
emplacements on the island. Nevertheless the garrison on the island surrendered without resisting a landing, because their morale had been badly shaken and because communications and utilities had been destroyed.

General Eisenhower then turned to the diplomatic problems involved in the defense of the Offshore Islands. He recalled that in 1958 the ChiComs had made numerous propaganda statements to the effect that it was their intention to recapture Taiwan. In the light of these statements it was possible for his Administration to construe an attack upon Quemoy and Matsu as the first stage of an attack upon the Mainland. General Eisenhower recalled that his and Mr. Dulles' statements indicated this intention, but he never made a categorical statement to this effect. General Eisenhower observed that today the President's position was somewhat more difficult, because there has so far been less propaganda relating the current buildup to a conquest of Formosa. Under these circumstances the President might wish to go back to Congress for the authority to commit the United States to the defense of the Offshore Islands. Of course with Congress in session, time was not so much of a problem. Also, if the ChiComs attack Taiwan by air or if they came in too close on reconnaissance, the original resolution would suffice as basis for our intervention.

In response to a question from Mr. Forrestal, General Eisenhower said that the United States could probably aid in the defense of Quemoy by non-combative means, such as supply, as we have done in 1958, without resorting to Congress, although consultations with the leadership would be desirable.

General Eisenhower also observed that it would be hard to stay out of the defense of Quemoy if the action there was prolonged and bloody.

General Eisenhower said that he approved the idea of a warning to the ChiComs to the effect that in the event of an attempt by them to begin operations against Taiwan, "the U.S. would do its part."

The Former President recollected that he had asked Chiang to evacuate civilians from the Islands of Quemoy and Matsu and make them into strong island fortresses, using a minimum number of
troops to do so. Director McCone observed that the Island of Quemoy
had been historically a fortress for Chinese who had been driven off
the Mainland and consequently was of considerable psychological
importance to Chiang. General Eisenhower observed that such a
fortress would be of value only for defensive purposes and not profitably
used as staging areas for an attack upon the Mainland.

Director McCone asked whether General Eisenhower had
supported Chiang's return to the Mainland. General Eisenhower
replied that the policy of his Administration was to avoid that ques-
tion. His policy was composed of the following elements: (1) the
preservation of the security of Taiwan and the Pescadores; (2) support
of Chiang in order to support the morale of the overseas Chinese;
(3) maintenance of Chiang's ability to conduct operations on the Main-
land but always under our complete control. Former President Eisenhower
recalled that he had revised President Truman's orders to the 7th Fleet
("unleashing Chiang") as a warning to the ChiComs that aggressive acts
on their part might be countered by activities on their own territory.

General Eisenhower summed up by saying that he was delighted
to have been given this briefing. The general feeling he had was that
we should be intensely watchful and alert -- "on the quivive." There
was time to decide the U.S. reaction.

MVForrestal
llw
September 4, 1962

Dear General:

Thank you for your letter.

I would like very much to have an opportunity to talk to you about our relations with Europe. I shall be here all the time, except for the week of the 16th, and would be very glad to see you at your convenience. I have suggested to Mrs. Lincoln that she call your secretary to arrange a mutually satisfactory time for us to get together.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Dwight D. Eisenhower
Gettysburg
Pennsylvania
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Remark by General Eisenhower

On Monday, General Eisenhower said that when he was President he was faced by majorities of the opposite parties in Congress for 6 years and still compiled "a much better record and performance."

The record of the Eisenhower and Kennedy Congresses is attached.

Apart from this record, it is interesting to compare the support that Eisenhower received from the Democrats with the support Kennedy has received from the Republicans. For instance, when Eisenhower asked for $5 billion to continue mutual security, 88 percent of the Democrats supported him. On the other hand, 78 percent of the Republicans opposed the Kennedy long-term foreign aid program.

Similarly, when Eisenhower asked for an extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1953, 95 percent of the Democrats supported him. On the other hand, 75 percent of the Republicans in the House voted against the Kennedy Trade Expansion Act.

When Eisenhower asked for an increase in Air Force funds for heavy bombers, 100 percent of the Republicans voted against him, but 80 percent of the Democrats voted to support him. (This amendment was defeated.)

One other statement by Eisenhower is worth remembering. According to the Donovan book, Eisenhower said that if the Democrats should win control of Congress while the Republicans held the Executive Branch, the result would be "a cold war of partisan politics. History shows that when the Executive and Legislative Branches are politically in conflict, politics in Washington runs riot."

Myer Feldman
May 21, 1963

Mr. Hugh Bullock
President
Pilgrims of the United States
One Wall Street
New York, New York

I am happy to learn that the Pilgrims of the United States are honoring President Dwight D. Eisenhower for his extraordinary services in the cause of friendship among the English-speaking peoples. His life has been lighted by a steadfast faith in Anglo-American friendship both as an end in itself and as a means of strengthening the larger vision of an Atlantic Community and of serving the larger cause of world justice and peace. It seems particularly appropriate that Sir Winston Churchill has been the only other recipient of the Pilgrims' medallion. May I add my warm congratulations to President Eisenhower and my best wishes to the Pilgrims.

John F. Kennedy

CC: Mr. Holborn
Mr. Schlesinger
Central Files

as, jr: mb
Dear Mr. President:

Thank you so much for the gracious message that you sent to the dinner last evening of The Pilgrims. I was deeply appreciative of your more than generous references to my efforts over the years to achieve even greater solidarity between peoples of the English-speaking nations.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The President
The White House
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
The President,
The White House,
Washington 25, D.C.

My dear Mr. President:

You were kind to send the warm and moving message to the Pilgrims dinner.

General Eisenhower appreciated it and the Pilgrims membership were enthusiastic in their applause. On their behalf may I thank you very much indeed.

We are proud to have you as our Honorary President.

Sincerely yours,

Hugh Bullock

HB:s
June 10, 1963

Dear Mr. President:

I am sending to the Congress this month a civil rights proposal designed to ease what I think you will agree is a growing national crisis over this issue. Related to the measure you sent to the Congress in 1957, it will broaden the right of the Department of Justice to bring suit in school desegregation cases and in those cases where public accommodations affecting interstate commerce deny equal service to customers on account of their race, giving a similar right to the affected customer. It also extends the Civil Rights Commission and expands existing procedures under the voting provisions of the 1957-1960 law.

I would like to meet with you over a final draft of the bill in the near future and hope it can have your support. It is clear that such a measure cannot pass either House without substantial bi-partisan support. I will call you on Wednesday of this week relating to the timing of such a meeting.

As always, I am grateful for your advice and consideration.

Sincerely,

Honorable Dwight D. Eisenhower
Gettysburg
Pennsylvania
Dear Mr. President:

Your letter of June tenth was, of course, written before I called at your office, on which occasion you and the Vice President discussed this matter with me.

As I then told you, I think this matter has become one that involves the conscience of the individual and the nation and, indeed, our moral standards.

As to the details of the legislation that might be needed I am not able to give a definitive opinion. This is a matter that I must leave to the lawyers, but I do believe that we must strive in every useful way to assure equality of economic and political rights for all citizens. Since leaving office I have always refused to try to influence the decisions and voting of Republicans in the Congress. Nevertheless, I do not hesitate to let them know of my personal convictions on any issue. In this case I shall make a point of letting them know, particularly the Republican leaders in the Senate, of the seriousness with which I view the entire problem.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The Honorable John F. Kennedy
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Various members of Congress have asked my views on the proposed legislation to reduce taxes this year. These are my views:

A tax cut is highly desirable but only if the persistent and frightening increase in Federal expenditures is halted in its tracks. It is my conviction that any tax cut without this firm halting of expenditure increases is unwise, undesirable and certain to damage our currency and the nation.

Before a tax cut can be justified, therefore, I believe that there should be explicit executive assurance of expenditure control. This assurance should be that, until a budgetary surplus has been achieved, future annual expenditures will not be permitted to rise above the already inflated level for this fiscal year of approximately $98,000,000,000.

Moreover, I am happy that these personal views are in accord with those of the Executive Committee of the Business Committee for Tax Reduction which stated last May, "The Committee believes that a reduction in the 1964 budget is reasonable and practicable" and, in addition, "we have had large, progressive increases in recent years and there is no justification for a continuation of the upward trend."

I trust that these sentiments expressed by the Business Committee in May continue to define its objectives today.